"Coalition governance in presidential democracies"
This week in SPARC we will have Joris Thijm and Jorge M. Fernandes presenting the paper with the title: Coalition governance in presidential democracies.
The abstract is the following:
Existing work on cabinets in presidential democracies focuses on portfolio allocation and cabinet duration. There is much work on the beginning and end of coalition politics in presidential democracies. However, apart from a few case studies, coalition governance has remained largely uncharted territory. Coalition governments in presidential democracies are plagued with delegation problems akin to its parliamentary counterparts: hidden information, moral hazard, and adverse selection. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on coalition governance in presidential democracies. More specifically, we focus on how political parties deploy junior ministers (JMs) to shadow their coalition partners. Furthermore, our model distinguishes between president-based and party-based monitoring to account for junior ministers who operate as presidential and as party agents. Using an original dataset, our paper focuses on nine presidential democracies in Latin America, Africa and Asia over a twenty-year period. Findings suggest that both parties and the president use coalition governance tools to curb delegation perils and implement their preferred policy preferences.
The session will be hybrid, as usual from 14h30-16h00, and the zoom link is here:
