Anti-Corruption Agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance
Anti-Corruption Agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance
The post-cold war environment has witnessed two major developments in the fight against corruption: 1) corruption has become a transnational phenomenon; and 2) attempts to curb its occurrence are no longer contingent upon state jurisdictions, actors and measures. Globalisation has married both domestic and international control initiatives. The globalisation of corruption mechanisms and transactions raises the need for an externalisation and internationalisation of control initiatives, whilst international initiatives need to be transposed into national jurisdictions where most anti-corruption work is carried out. Another distinctive feature of the anti-corruption activity of the post-Cold War period is the level of regulatory and institutional innovation achieved. Further to the role played by traditional anti-corruption actors, we also witnessed the rise of a key number of new (or renewed) governmental and civil society forces both at the domestic and international levels. One of the most prominent "integrity warriors" of the 1990s were the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). Anti-corruption agencies are public (funded) bodies of a durable nature whose specific mission is to fight corruption and associated crimes and to reduce the opportunity structures favourable to its occurrence through preventive and repressive strategies. Although embryos to these institutional units can be traced back in time, the first ACAs date from the postcolonial period in the aftermath of World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, the geographical location of these bodies has expanded from the developing to the developed world, from transition to consolidated democracies, as corruption started to be discussed and condemned beyond the stereotyped vision which previously circumscribed it to the Southern hemisphere. World institutions have incessantly recommended the creation of ACAs as an important piece of the national institutional architecture and grand strategy against corruption. In Central and East Europe countries, ACAs have also been recommended as part of macro anti-corruption programmes promoted in view of EU membership (The Copenhagen criteria suggest reforms related to the functioning of the political sphere and the judiciary as a pre-condition to accession). The format of these agencies and their success in keeping up with new forms of corruption vary from one country to another. But there is also a good deal of institutional mimetism and isomorphism. On the one hand, the creation of ACAs is the product of specific patterns of legal-institutional development. Each agency is, in that respect, one of a kind. Some countries have endowed their agencies with investigative and prosecution powers, whereas others have preferred a more preventive, educational and informative role. The formal label not always fit the institutional reality. Certain ACAs remain unknown to the wider public. There are also differences with regard to their scope of action, resources, accountability requirements, etc. On the other hand, there has also been a convergence in the type of agency discussed/adopted. The Hong Kong ICAC, created in 1974, is often referred in parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of these specialised agencies as "the most successful ACA" and it has become a model to many other countries. It may be improper to use the word "model", but at least we could say that, since the late 1980s, we have witnessed an increasing cross-country transfer of knowledge about the format of these bodies. Knowledge of the successes and failures of foreign experiences and the importation of models already tested abroad is an important feature of this policy process. Independently of their format and competences, ACAs encounter various constraints to their mandate, which explains the meagre results obtained by some of them: 1) difficulties in unveiling corruption via complaints (technical, statutory and cultural); 2) difficulties in obtaining information about corruption and its opportunity structures from other state bodies/agencies and 3) difficulties in establishing a good working relationship with the political sphere. There is also a discrepancy between expected results and achievable ones that should not be ignored. The burgeoning literature on corruption (Heidenheimer 1989, Mény 1992, Della Porta 1992) suggests that the most important issues are the incidence of corruption itself (causes, contexts and effects) and the effectiveness of various possible responses. Instead, our proposal argues that anti-corruption activity and in particular the new institutional responses to corruption, i.e. ACAs, should now be regarded as an important object of study in its own right (Anechiarico & Jacobs 1998; Krastev 2004).
Anti-Corruption Agencies; Corruption Control; Institutional Capacity; Judicial Reforms
The post-cold war environment has witnessed two major developments in the fight against corruption: 1) corruption has become a transnational phenomenon; and 2) attempts to curb its occurrence are no longer contingent upon state jurisdictions, actors and measures. Globalisation has married both domestic and international control initiatives. The globalisation of corruption mechanisms and transactions raises the need for an externalisation and internationalisation of control initiatives, whilst international initiatives need to be transposed into national jurisdictions where most anti-corruption work is carried out. Another distinctive feature of the anti-corruption activity of the post-Cold War period is the level of regulatory and institutional innovation achieved. Further to the role played by traditional anti-corruption actors, we also witnessed the rise of a key number of new (or renewed) governmental and civil society forces both at the domestic and international levels. One of the most prominent "integrity warriors" of the 1990s were the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). Anti-corruption agencies are public (funded) bodies of a durable nature whose specific mission is to fight corruption and associated crimes and to reduce the opportunity structures favourable to its occurrence through preventive and repressive strategies. Although embryos to these institutional units can be traced back in time, the first ACAs date from the postcolonial period in the aftermath of World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, the geographical location of these bodies has expanded from the developing to the developed world, from transition to consolidated democracies, as corruption started to be discussed and condemned beyond the stereotyped vision which previously circumscribed it to the Southern hemisphere. World institutions have incessantly recommended the creation of ACAs as an important piece of the national institutional architecture and grand strategy against corruption. In Central and East Europe countries, ACAs have also been recommended as part of macro anti-corruption programmes promoted in view of EU membership (The Copenhagen criteria suggest reforms related to the functioning of the political sphere and the judiciary as a pre-condition to accession). The format of these agencies and their success in keeping up with new forms of corruption vary from one country to another. But there is also a good deal of institutional mimetism and isomorphism. On the one hand, the creation of ACAs is the product of specific patterns of legal-institutional development. Each agency is, in that respect, one of a kind. Some countries have endowed their agencies with investigative and prosecution powers, whereas others have preferred a more preventive, educational and informative role. The formal label not always fit the institutional reality. Certain ACAs remain unknown to the wider public. There are also differences with regard to their scope of action, resources, accountability requirements, etc. On the other hand, there has also been a convergence in the type of agency discussed/adopted. The Hong Kong ICAC, created in 1974, is often referred in parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of these specialised agencies as "the most successful ACA" and it has become a model to many other countries. It may be improper to use the word "model", but at least we could say that, since the late 1980s, we have witnessed an increasing cross-country transfer of knowledge about the format of these bodies. Knowledge of the successes and failures of foreign experiences and the importation of models already tested abroad is an important feature of this policy process. Independently of their format and competences, ACAs encounter various constraints to their mandate, which explains the meagre results obtained by some of them: 1) difficulties in unveiling corruption via complaints (technical, statutory and cultural); 2) difficulties in obtaining information about corruption and its opportunity structures from other state bodies/agencies and 3) difficulties in establishing a good working relationship with the political sphere. There is also a discrepancy between expected results and achievable ones that should not be ignored. The burgeoning literature on corruption (Heidenheimer 1989, Mény 1992, Della Porta 1992) suggests that the most important issues are the incidence of corruption itself (causes, contexts and effects) and the effectiveness of various possible responses. Instead, our proposal argues that anti-corruption activity and in particular the new institutional responses to corruption, i.e. ACAs, should now be regarded as an important object of study in its own right (Anechiarico & Jacobs 1998; Krastev 2004).
