"Social Norms and Preference Falsification in a Democracy" 

GI Seminars
Thu . 26 May . 14h30 to 16h00
"Social Norms and Preference Falsification in a Democracy" 
Vicente Valentim
Organização: 
Marina Costa Lobo

This week in SPARC we will have Vicente Valentim, post-doc at Nuffield College, Oxford University, with the following presentation:

 

"Social Norms and Preference Falsification in a Democracy" 

Abstract 

Do political preferences translate into behavior? When an individual’s views are stigmatized, they have an incentive to conceal them. This paper provides real-world, causal evidence of preference falsification in a democratic setting. My research design leverages within-voting station variation in the observability of vote choices induced by a unique decision by the Spanish electoral commission. Using a difference-in-differences design, I show that observability of one’s behavior decreased voting for the right-wing party PP, which is stigmatized in the country. At the individual level, voters who support the party are more likely to make efforts to keep their vote choice secret. Those who make those efforts also feel more uncomfortable answering surveys on politics. The results highlight the role of social norms as predictors of political behavior, and highlight how seemingly minor changes to the voting procedure can affect electoral outcomes.

 

Here the link for our hybrid session:

https://videoconf-colibri.zoom.us/j/85495015202

As usual, our Seminar takes place on Thursday from 14h30-16h00.