ICS Working Papers Nº2/2016

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ICS WORKING PAPERS 2016
institutional development of inter-war dictatorships, transcending – and in many cases
incorporating – historical fascism. Mussolini’s Italy has a much more limited role in the
dissemination of corporatist legislatures: as noted above, the comparative analysis of
constitutions and processes of institutional reform show Portugal under Salazar and Austria
under Dollfuss had a more significant role. Moreover, Italian Fascism was undergoing
institutional reform right up until the end of the 1930s: the Fascist and Corporatist Chamber
was not created until 1938.
The diversity of legislatures designed by authoritarian constitutions and institutional reforms
suggests the domination of mixed systems of single or dominant party legislatures with
corporatist chambers. Very few inter-war European dictators had, from the start, the
institutional power General Franco had in 1939, with the majority of them experiencing great
difficulties with the institutional design of their regimes, leading them into an
accommodation with the more prominent members of the coalitions that brought them to
power. In such cases, the ‘institutionalized interaction between the dictator and his allies
results in greater transparency among them, and by virtue of their formal structure,
institutions provide a publicly observable signal of the dictator’s commitment to power-
sharing’ Nevertheless, however appealing the principle of corporatist representation may
have been to authoritarian rulers, the creation of corporatist legislatures was much more
difficult to implement in many dictatorships, even when it had been part of the dictators’
programme. In some countries, such as in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, it was blocked by
monarchs who feared losing their power, while in others, such as Portugal, it was the initial
compromise with segments of conservative liberal parties that led to the institutionalization
of bicameral systems with a corporatist chamber and a parliament controlled by the
dominant or single party. In Austria, although never fully implemented, the pattern was for
almost integral functional representation.
To conclude, as far as can be observed from the case-studies analysed above, the political
institutions of the dictatorships – even authoritarian legislatures– were not as many students
of fascism have suggested, merely window dressing. Dictators also need compliance and co-
operation and in some cases, in order ‘to organize policy compromises, dictators need these
institutions’ that can serve as forums in which factions, and even the regime and its
opposition, can forge agreements‘, that can help authoritarian rulers maintain coalitions and
survive in power. As we have seen, corporatist parliaments are not just institutions for
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