ICS Working Papers Nº2/2016

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ICS WORKING PAPERS 2016
expression of opinion on public policy not sanctioned by the executive In fact, between
1934 and the end of the regime following the Nazi occupation, 69.31 per cent of the
legislation was adopted directly by the council of ministers
A central element in the institutionalization of the new regime was the creation of a single
party, the Fatherland Front (VF – Vaterlandische Front), in 1933, into which segments of the
old CS party and the Heimwehr were channelled from above. Dolfuss, who could not count on
the unanimous support of the old CSP, which he called outdated, used this organization as a
highly centralized and completely obedient political tool; however, it has been noted the VF
‘remained a bureaucratic organizational shell with no dynamic development or importance of
its own’ The VF was given formal status in May 1934, on the same day the corporatist
constitution came into force. Two years later it was institutionalized as the only legal party.
Dollfuss declared himself the leader of the VF and appointed Starhemberg his deputy.
Starhemberg remained deputy after Dollfuss’s assassination in July 1934 until he was
replaced by Schuschnigg in 1936, who went on to combine VF leadership with the top
position in the state.
Membership was open both to individuals and organizations loyal to the ideals of the
fatherland as a substitute for a written programme. Dollfuss dissolved the CSP, just like he
had done with all other political parties, transferring its followers and their support networks
into the VF. The backbone of the VF leadership and senior state officials belonged to the
dominant conservative politics and bureaucracy. The VF was established as a single party and
its steering committee, the Führerrat, was similar to Mussolini’s Fascist Grand Council.
Dollfuss’ successor, Kurt Schuschnigg, was able to reduce the influence of the Heimwehr and
forced it to partially unite within the VF.
Corporatism in inter-war central Europe and the Balkans
The fate of political corporatism in central Europe and in the Balkans is more diverse since
many of these authoritarian experiences were brief, giving birth in some cases to poorly
institutionalized and hybrid regimes. Some of them were ‘able to work within a formal
parliamentary framework with a dominant government party that obtained a majority
through corrupt electoral practices, co-optation of some political elites and outlawing or
harassing those that oppose them, and by tolerating a weak and tamed opposition’. While
the form of government divided conservatives and the radical right, these regimes
incorporated significant compromises that led to the establishment of poorly institutionalized
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