Religion and Politics in a Global Society

Comparative Perspectives from the Portuguese-Speaking World

Edited by Paul Christopher Manuel, Alynna Lyon, and Clyde Wilcox
Portuguese Sea

Salt-laden sea, how much of your salt
Are tears of Portugal!

For us to cross you, how many sons have kept
Vigil in vain, and mothers wept!

Lived as old maids and how many brides-to-be
Till death, that you might be ours, the sea!

Was it worth while? It is worth while, all
If the soul is not small.

Whoever means to sail beyond the Cape
Must double sorrow—no escape.

Peril and abyss has God to the sea given
And yet made it the mirror of heaven.

Fernando Pessoa, Message, 2007
(reprinted by permission of Anthony Rudolf and Shearsman Books)
## Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Foreword: A Tale of Two Statues xiii

**I: Theoretical, Historical, and Cultural Issues**

1 Religion and Politics in the Portuguese-Speaking World: Three Theoretical Slices
   *Paul Christopher Manuel, Alyna Lyon, and Clyde Wilcox*
   
   3

2 Patterns of Settlement and Religious Imperial Agents in the Portuguese Empire
   *José Dimão Rodrigues, University of the Azores*
   
   15

3 Portugal and the Building of an Imaginary Empire
   *Susana Goulart Costa, University of the Azores*
   
   33

4 India’s Luso-Africans: The Politics of Race, Colonialism, and Gender in Early Modern Portugal and Post-Colonial Goa
   *Bindu Malieckal, Saint Anselm College*
   
   47

**II: Societies Dominated by a Single Religious Tradition**

5 The Activist Catholic Church in Post-Portuguese East Timor: “The Church is not a Political Institution”
   *Alyna Lyon, University of New Hampshire*
   
   75

6 Religion and Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Devotion, Democracy, and the Marian Apparitions at Fátima
   *Paul Christopher Manuel, Mount St. Mary’s University*
   
   93
Contents

III: Competing Religious Societies, with a Formerly Dominant Church

7 Faith-State Relations in Brazil: What Does Religious Competition Mean for Democracy?  
Christine A. Gustafson, Saint Anselm College  
13

8 The “Depoliticizing Machine”: Church and State in Angola since Independence  
Didier Pécoulard, Swiss Peace Foundation and the University of Basel  
139

IV: Societies with Marked Religious Diversity, without a Dominant Church

9 A Special Place: Imagining Goa from the Estado da India to Indian Independence  
Mathew N. Schmalz, College of the Holy Cross  
163

10 The Catholic Church in Mozambique under Revolution, War, and Democracy  
Eric Morier-Genoud, Queen’s University, Belfast, and Pierre Anouilh, University of Bordeaux  
185

11 Conclusion: Between Land and Sea: Portugal’s Two Nationalisms in the Twenty-First Century  
José Pedro Zuquete, University of Lisbon  
205

Appendix 1: Map of the Lusophone Global Society  
227
Appendix 2: Religious Composition of Countries in the Case Studies (in percentages)  
229
Appendix 3: Contemporary Lusophone Countries  
231
Appendix 4: Portuguese-Influenced Areas  
233
Appendix 5: List of Meetings of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa, or CPLP)  
235

Bibliography  
237
Index  
245
About the Editors  
251
About the Contributors  
253

Acknowledgments

Applying the insights derived from three theoretical schools (religious society, political institutions, and cultural toolkit), this volume asks how religion and politics function in the global Lusophone society. It brings together scholars from a variety of disciplines, who offer in-depth case studies on Angola, Brazil, East Timor, Goa, Mozambique, and Portugal—societies connected by a shared colonial past and common cultural and sociolinguistic characteristics. In the end, the comparisons, considerations, and theoretical observations of this volume hold considerable promise for the broader field of religion and politics.

This current work builds on our earlier effort, The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives (2006), and is a result of discussions and papers presented at four scholarly meetings. The first round of papers and discussions took place when we first came together at a research symposium entitled “Of Crucifixes and Swords: The Relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the State in Regional and National Perspectives,” which took place at the New Hampshire Institute of Politics at Saint Anselm College on 23–24 April 2004. That successful meeting and subsequent book led to the development of this current project, which was designed to drill deeper into the relevant theoretical issues within a specific sociocultural context. We next met at a panel called “Religion and Politics in the Portuguese-Speaking World” at the 2008 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Boston, Massachusetts, and formally decided at that point to develop this book.

Over the next few years, we researched for our chapters and recruited new contributors. We came together again at the “Religion and Politics in the Portuguese-Speaking World” panel at the August 2011 meeting of the Global International Studies Association in Oporto, Portugal. The Oporto meeting
Chapter Eleven

Conclusion: Between Land and Sea: Portugal’s Two Nationalisms in the Twenty-First Century

José Pedro Zuquete, University of Lisbon

“A people with one million inhabitants at the beginning of the sixteenth century, with one hundred thousand men available, that expands from this corner of Europe into the new—Brazil and then Asia—... It was such a disproportionate enterprise that the feeling that we are a special people would remain. Why us?”

—D. Manuel Clemente

Our concluding contribution, “Between Land and Sea: Portugal’s Two Nationalisms in the Twenty-First Century,” nicely blends the volume’s three theoretical slices. It explores the coexistence of and tension between two breeds of nationalist thinking in contemporary Portuguese political culture. One, associated with the extreme right of the political spectrum, is ethno-nationalist, exclusive, and restricts itself to the territorial borders of the nation. The other moves and operates beyond political divisions, expands over the European soil, and is inherently cultural by anchoring itself around the belief system of Lusophobia. This final chapter discusses and analyzes the two nationalisms, their sources and manifestations, and particularly the widespread affirmation of a Lusophone cultural-nationalist worldview that seeks to reshape and elevate Portugal’s world stature in the twenty-first century.

WHAT TRAGIC DESTINY IS THIS?

In his epic poem Os Lusíadas, which sings the glories of Portuguese seafaring explorers, the sixteenth-century poet Luís Vaz de Camões describes the Portuguese kingdom as an awe-inspiring place “where the land ends and the
parameters of its original borders only deepens its malaise with its contempo­
ring Europe, launched a series of long-distance oceanic enterprises in search of
dividends and glory during the “Age of Discovery,” which set off the modern
era and the first, or at least one of the first, wave of globalization.

To bring up such a luminous tale of the pioneering role of Portugal in the
deepening of global interconnectedness is unavoidable when writing about
Portugal’s sense of nationhood shines a receding light that casts a long shadow. A
past golden age in which the country was elevated to an unrivaled height is
countered by a subsequent history of periods that pale in comparison and that
together constitute—in the minds of priests, poets, historians, philosophers,
and writers of every kind—a wretched condition. At every point in history,
the memory of (and longing for) greatness constitutes the standard of com­
parison by which the crisis of the present is evaluated. It is as if such periods
of crisis, even if they have been triggered by the conjunction of different
factors, always constitute, in essence, the same crisis that keeps reemerging
throughout the ages—a deep-seated, pervading lack of direction, of collective
purpose, or of a national project. Writing in 1921, the historian Jaime
Correia wrote an example of such a mindset: “Above all, the crisis is
not political, it is national. With the current dominant human type there is no
political regime that can make the nation prosper. It is not the regime, agri­
culture, industry, or the finances that are really in crisis. What has been in
crisis for centuries in Portugal is the Portuguese.”1 Such a pervading existen­
tial sense of decline, coupled with a relentless search for a “Lost Portugal,”
impelled the philosopher Eduardo Lourenço, in the late 1970s, to call for a
“psychoanalysis” of the country’s self-image and collective behavior.2

Naturally, the mid-1970s decolonization—in the wake of the fall of the
authoritarian New State regime—and the effective end of the centuries-long
crisis that keeps reemerging empire only accentuated feelings of national disorientation by giving concrete,
physical, and geographical form to the downsizing of Portugal’s stand­
ing in world affairs. The subsequent emergence of Portugal as a member
state of the European Union was, on the whole, greeted with enthusiasm and
seen as embodying the promise of material improvement, “modernization,”
the struggle between the nation and the world. The country is being forced to look at what it currently is, and, most importantly,
to remember what it is not anymore. If the EU served as a palliative, the
medicine was not strong enough to prevent, particularly since the 1980s, the
fall of Portugal into yet another well of what has been characterized as
identitarian ambiguity.6 Such existential discomfort is abundantly clear in
the historian Martim de Albuquerque’s proclamation that “the country needs
urgently a new purpose, and the ideas of greatness are not useless because they correspond to the ambition that is specific to humankind,”7 as well as in
Vitorino Magalhães Godinho’s contemporary call for “a national project . . .
that defines what we want to be and can be in a ruthless world.”8 “We lost
ourselves,” Godinho writes, “between a Portugal [whose identity] we do not
know anymore, and the dream of an empire also lost.”9 The truth is that, since
the last decades of the twentieth century, the Portuguese politics of
memory have been directed to a search for “new anchors” that could “sym­
bolically hold the Portuguese space,” while boosting the country’s “ontologi­
cal security” in its interaction with aggressive global dynamics.10 Manuel
Maria Carvalho, a former Socialist minister of culture, calls for the rise of a
“New Republic” that will put Portugal on the path of a “new collective
project.”11 He says that “we need to change our way of life, to stimulate and
refine our historical sense, unfortunately and paradoxically more and more
lost since we have joined Europe.” The time has come in which “our destiny
will be sealed for decades.”12 It is no wonder that policy errors are often
interpreted as signs of a metaphysical dysfunction, as when a commentator
writing about problems in the justice system asks, “What tragic destiny is this
that holds back our advance? Why is it that we cannot have a direction and a
strategy?”13 There is an overwhelming feeling—a mix of verifiable facts and
intuitive awareness—that the country is at a crossroads and has been pushed
to the barricades; this sentiment is expressed with increased vigor at times of
political and economic turmoil, such as those of the first decades of the
new century, and such bewilderment pervades much of the Portuguese intel­
lectual and political establishment.

This is the “state of emergency”13 of contemporary Portugal: a persistent
search for something that will reinvigorate its national purpose and rechart
the course of its history. It is in this context that the two varieties of Portu­
guese nationalism operate.14 Their nature and the paths they offer are dis­
tinct; nevertheless, both are determined to rethink Portugal, chart its
emancipation, and lead to its ultimate fulfillment. One variety blatantly
flaunts its nationalist street cred; the other is more subtle, but no less passion­
te. One proclaims itself to be nationalist, while the other eschews such a
description in favor of the rhetoric of patriotism. The torch of the first nation­
alism is carried by a tiny minority and is symbolized in a specific political
party; it is linear and identified with the extreme right. The second national­
ary geographical and statistical smallness in Europe and in the world. The
conclusion
ism is transverse, promoted by a majority, and identified with mainstream forces of the state and civil society, even though it does not admit to being nationalism. If the first nationalism perceives Portugal as embodied in an ethnic people within one territory, the second nationalism sees Portugal as embodied in cultural and spiritual values that are attached to a worldview called Lusophonia, which is spread out over many territories.

It is little wonder that such a word as nationalism is rejected in contemporary Portugal. Nationalism was the raison d'être of the former antidemocratic regime, as well as of some of the most virulent regimes of the twentieth century, and therefore the term became a radioactive one and is associated with all sorts of evils, real and imaginary. There has been a tendency, at least in the collective memory, to “hide” the word by applying it to past behavior, as if locking it away in older and superseded historical periods in the hope that it will not interfere with the new historical moment. The use of such word in contemporary settings—especially if employed to describe dynamics that are not immediately viewed as nationalist—risks shattering the consensus. Therefore, before diving into the waters of the twofold Portuguese nationalism, it is necessary to take a more detailed look at terminology.

BEYOND PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM

A normative approach dominates the public discourse when the discussion turns to the matter of one’s attachment to a given community; the distinction between a good patriotism and a bad nationalism has become commonsensical; and hardly any public leader, at least in the Western world, would describe his mindset and behavior as “nationalist.” It is not a coincidence that Charles de Gaulle, a witness to the horrors of jingoism and national aggressiveness, has made the distinction in the following manner: “Patriotism is when love of your own people comes first; nationalism, when hate for people other than your own comes first.”15 Around the same time, George Orwell extolled the “defensive” nature of patriotism, both militarily and culturally, as opposed to the nationalist “desire for power.”16 Such postulates offer powerful illustrations of a sensibility that would gradually marginalize the word nationalism by making it off-limits in respectable public speech.

Such a normative approach has made vast strides in the field of social sciences, as when the liberal defenders of patriotism, exemplified by the philosopher Stephen Nathanson, promote the “love of country.” Such a love constitutes a “patriotism consistent with morality . . . because it alone combines concern for one’s nation with respect for people of other nations and recognition of moral constraints on what we may do for our country,” as opposed to any improper and immoderate nationalism.17 The tendency of academics to see nationalism as wrong and immoral—even a disease—is evident. As John Keane writes, “Nationalism is a scavenger. It feeds upon the pre-existing sense of nationhood within a given territory, transforming that shared national identity into a bizarre parody of its former self—it is a pathological form of national identity.”18 But the absence both of a clear-cut framework and of unambiguous criteria (rather than a subjective, wishful disposition) to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism has led to the development of a counter-movement, whose representatives argue that the distinction is mainly imaginary and rhetorical. As argued by Zygmunt Bauman, “Patriotism, more postulated than empirically given, is what nationalism could be but is not. Patriotism is described through the negation of the most disliked and shameful traits of known nationalisms . . . It is the naming that makes the difference and the difference made is mainly rhetorical.”19 In this view, nationalism is the evil twin of patriotism.

Another approach to the concept of nationalism is to accept the term but divide its manifestations into two main categories: civic (or constitutional) nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism, in this view, represents a rational, formal attachment to the nation as a political entity. It denotes a choice that one makes to adhere to the nation’s laws, civil rights, and privileges. Ethnic nationalism is emotional, implying a genealogical attachment to the nation as an ethnic entity joined by genetic and cultural ties. At its base is a filial relationship that is rooted in heritage, not in choice.20 Again, in a different manner, the good-bad dichotomy is present in this approach, and civic nationalism becomes a devitalized, legalistic, and acceptable form of nationalism, purged of all cultural and atavistic evils. The distinction is problematic. First, there is a cultural component in all nationalisms. The existence of an interplay between civic and cultural dynamics, in a creative and nervous dialogue, can be more clearly seen in a realistic view of any nation.21 Moreover, even if all nationalisms are cultural, “not all cultural nationalisms are ethnic.”22 Cultural nationalism arises when a people “cherishes in marked degree, and extols, its common language and traditions,”23 and by “sharing a common history and societal history have a fundamental, morally significant interest in adhering to their culture and in sustaining it for generations.”24 As a consequence, cultural nationalism is not necessarily rooted in a “blood and belonging” attachment to the nation. Such is the conceptual framework with which to analyze the dynamics and manifestations in contemporary Portugal of ethnic and cultural nationalisms that, as will become clear, are at odds with each other.

PORTUGAL FOR THE PORTUGUESE!

To read a manifesto of the Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renewal Party, or PNR), founded in 2000, is to enter a world in which Portugal is
about to see its ancestral values debased by the antinational path undertaken by pernicious elites, in collusion with global forces fanatically committed to creating one amalgamated and unified world. Against the armies of such rootlessness, the self-proclaimed Portuguese nationalists guard the sacred territory of the homeland, constituting its sole line of defense against the widespread treason of politicians and the torpor and passivity of the general population. Although their electoral impact is insignificant, and the label “extreme right” has until now been enough to stigmatize them in the eyes of the media and public opinion, their mental map reveals a new, clean-shaven, nationalist group, especially if compared with the ones that came in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the old regime. Nostalgia for the lost empire—and visions of a greater Portugal scattered across five continents—is no longer the driving force of the new nationalists. They say it themselves: “We reject any imperialist, expansionist, or colonialist temptation.” Instead, nationalists have retreated into a cloistered environment in which the overriding priority is to protect the nation, rooted in a European territory, from free-market globalization and its disruptive dynamics (such as mass immigration), as well as from the supranational, tyrannical Union technocrats. Only the reversal of these evil trends can lead to a regenerated Portugal.

“It is totally natural and healthy that a Nationalist [sic] today has other concerns than those of 30 years ago. There are things that stopped making sense and others that started to make sense,” said José Pinto-Coelho, the PNR president. Rejecting any sort of “anachronisms” and other “unhealthy manifestations of longing,” he added that the “essence” of Portuguese nationalism had still not changed, and committed his party to “the steadfast defense of our independence and identity.” At the very center of the party’s worldview is the idea that a fulsome protection of the battered nation requires ethnic homogenization within its original territory. Nation cannot be dissociated from ethnicity. From this notion derive the entire party’s philosophy, policies, and sense of ideological righteousness. The issue of immigration provides a case in point. For the first time in history, and particularly since the mid-1990s, Portugal has become more a destination for immigrants (mostly from Brazil and Eastern Europe, but also from Portuguese-speaking African countries) than a country of origin for emigrants. The PNR views immigration not only as a problem for the job market—hence the defense of national preference in filling jobs—but also as a threat to the survival of the nation, because it constitutes a forced replacement of the “original” people, who share a specific culture rooted in a specific space, by other peoples with alien cultures. No wonder that an investigation of the sentiments of PNR militants has shown that the rejection of immigration is mostly based on the need to guard the “ethno-cultural identity” of the country. The passage in 2006 of a new nationality law that makes it easier to attain Portuguese nationality and consolidates citizenship by birthright (ius sanguinis) triggered a strong reaction from nationalists, who believe that the only legitimate and historically valid criterion for determining citizenship is the inherited flow of blood ties across generations (ius sanguinis). The repeal of such an “anti-national” law is one of the mainstays of the party.

At the heart of PNR’s nationalism—as well as of other European nationalisms associated with the extreme right, with whom the party has established links—lies a nativistic view that existentially and ontologically separates the members of the native group (in this case the “authentic” Portuguese) from nonnative elements, such as “foreign” ideologies or persons who have different mores. However, this segregation, at least in public speech and in official narratives, is based not on race, but on culture. Overall, the party has adhered to the differentialist notion that no one people is superior, but rather that differences exist among nations and that, in the midst of a homogenizing globalization, such differences between ethnic communities on Earth should be cherished and preserved, instead of crushed. Particularism and differentiation hold together the PNR’s anti-universalist stance, which manifests itself in many ways. For example, consider PNR dogma on the “plague” of multiculturalism: “Contrary to what proponents of immigration say, Portugal is not a multicultural country. We have our own culture, unique and solidly European, [which our enemies] want to dilute . . . in a hybrid multiculturalism, the gospel of a new universalism promoted as the embodiment of goodness.” Accordingly, pro-immigration groups are accused of racism against the native populations, because by imposing a disembodied vision of humanity, they sacrifice the particular at the altar of the universal.

The nation is not conceived as an abstract or imagined community, but is worshiped as the objectification and concrete realization of the collective will of the people. According to the party program, “Nationalism represents the attitude of those for whom the nation, above all, is as a collective and permanent work, constructed throughout history, a land patrum, a collective genius, of generations hereditarily connected.” Hence the politics of memory of these nationalists is rooted in a geography of the sacred, constituted by concrete lands, places, and historical events that embody and objectify the identity of its people. Prominent among them is the Battle of Aljubarrota (1385), a glorious and against-the-odds victory that sealed Portugal’s independence, as well as the annual celebrations of 1 December, which celebrate Portugal’s independence in 1640 after sixty years of rule by the Philippine dynasty. Testifying to the territoriality of the party’s nationalism is PNR’s anti-Iberian sentiment, with Spain as an ever-present danger at the door, as stated in the party program. Any defense of such an unnatural construction as “Iberia” is nothing more than a sign of the treacherous path that is leading Portugal to its destruction. It is not without a touch of irony that the party chose to celebrate 10 June, which marks the death of Camões, the poet of the discoveries,
Lusophonia draws its strength, and an important aspect of its wide appeal, from the cultural and sacred sources of Portugal's national identity. These cultural and spiritual springs pre-exist modern polity. Mircea Eliade has famously described myths as narrations of a fabulous beginning, of “how something came into being,” from which a narrative of a sacred history follows, while Ernst Cassirer emphasized myths’ “dramatic character,” the struggle they present between light and darkness, and their role as a crucial dimension of man’s “symbolic universe.” This dual mythical-symbolic universe fuels Portuguese cultural nationalism. Charting the Portuguese cultural space marked by the ideas of election and destiny is consequently of utmost contemporary importance. The theme of Portugal’s exceptionalism runs throughout the country’s history, from its foundation in the twelfth century. Hence, Portugal is located with the tradition of “missionary peoples,” who are uniquely chosen to lead and ultimately entrusted with the mission of transforming the world. If France was devoted to a “Gesta Dei per Francos,” and England and the United States, at different periods, were identified as the “New Israel,” Portugal was a “Baby Jesus of nations,” which was destined to spiritually regenerate the universe. In this creed, which remerges in different modes and fashions according to the times, the prowess of past navigators and the discoveries of old have a powerful presence. As stated by the historian Joaquim Barradas de Carvalho, “The entire history of Portugal revolves around the maritime discoveries and the expansion of the XV and XVI centuries.”

In order for Portugal to emerge from the long night of decadence and defeat the forces arrayed against it, in this view, it must turn inward. The community must be ethnically and culturally homogeneous, sovereignty must be reestablished, the borders closed, and the European Union rejected; the country should then be part of a Europe of Fatherlands in which the distinctiveness of each culture is preserved, even though they are all united by a common European civilization and destiny, against common enemies such as Islam and America’s hegemony. Even if the political project comes to an end (in the form of the disappearance of the PNR), it is safe to assume that this kind of nationalism will continue in groupuscular, even if active and feisty, cultural environments.

THE CALL OF LUSOPHONIA

The etymology of the word Lusophonia can be traced all the way back to Roman mythology and to Lusus, a chieftain and companion of Bacchus, as well as to Lusitania, an ancient Roman province inhabited by an Indo-European-speaking tribe called Lustianos, which part of modern Portugal is today. If the roots of the term are ancient, the word itself is relatively recent, and its wide use even more so. Lusophonia exploded into common vocabulary only after the start of the twenty-first century, and now its usage is tremendous in academia and in the media, as well as in political environments and in broader civil society circles. At a basic level, the word calls to mind the eight countries in which Portuguese is the official language (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe), as well as scattered Portuguese-origin communities, such as Macau (now a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China) and India’s Goa State. Overall, even though not all residents of Portuguese-speaking countries use the language (especially in Africa, in places where Creole languages and local dialects dominate), the Lusophone universe is home to a population of more than 200 million people. At a wider level, Lusophonia signifies a deeper and ambitiously interwoven network that is conceived of both as a community of shared values, affinities, and interests, and as a way of redefining and reinterpretting Portugal’s importance in the contemporary world. In Brazil, the largest Lusophone country, in the midst of widespread indifference, one also finds some of the most vocal critics of Lusophonia (as a “neo-colonial project”), as well as some of the most fervent apostles of the Lusophone creed in academia and in politics.

It is telling that the word Lusophonia is linked both to myth and to history, because the potential that many ascribe to it has as much to do with imagination as with reality. The Lusophone worldview has an obvious pragmatic and realpolitik aspect to it: it aims to take political, economic, and cultural advantage of a “special” relationship among countries united by the same language. From a purely utilitarian view, this is a sound and logical step to take. But it is crucial not to limit our understanding of Lusophonia to what can be seen through the lens of reason, as this would undervalue deeper historical and spiritual currents that inform both individual and collective mentalities.

Lusophonia draws its strength, and an important aspect of its wide appeal, from the cultural and sacred sources of Portugal’s national identity. These cultural and spiritual springs pre-exist modern polity. Mircea Eliade has famously described myths as narrations of a fabulous beginning, of “how something came into being,” from which a narrative of a sacred history follows, while Ernst Cassirer emphasized myths’ “dramatic character,” the struggle they present between light and darkness, and their role as a crucial dimension of man’s “symbolic universe.” This dual mythical-symbolic universe fuels Portuguese cultural nationalism. Charting the Portuguese cultural space marked by the ideas of election and destiny is consequently of utmost contemporary importance. The theme of Portugal’s exceptionalism runs throughout the country’s history, from its foundation in the twelfth century. Hence, Portugal is located with the tradition of “missionary peoples,” who are uniquely chosen to lead and ultimately entrusted with the mission of transforming the world. If France was devoted to a “Gesta Dei per Francos,” and England and the United States, at different periods, were identified as the “New Israel,” Portugal was a “Baby Jesus of nations,” which was destined to spiritually regenerate the universe. In this creed, which remerges in different modes and fashions according to the times, the prowess of past navigators and the discoveries of old have a powerful presence. As stated by the historian Joaquim Barradas de Carvalho, “The entire history of Portugal revolves around the maritime discoveries and the expansion of the XV and XVI centuries.”

He goes on to argue, “Everything that happened before it was nothing more than a preparation for those great enterprises. Everything
that happened after were, and still are, consequences of those great enterprises.41 Recent surveys show that there is a consensus among young Portuguese that the voyages of discovery were key events, the memory of which elicits admiration, pride, and happiness.42 And, together with the United States and Venezuela, Portugal is the country whose citizens have the highest levels of pride in its history.43 Accordingly, this theory of national destiny and tradition of being chosen can be traced to the "miracle of Ourique" (1139), when, so the story goes, Jesus Christ appeared to and inspired D. Afonso Henriques, the first Portuguese king, to lead his troops into victory against the Moors. This legend emerged ex eventum, at the very beginning of the period of the discoveries, and contributed to the popularization over subsequent centuries of the notion that the country had a "special relationship" with the divine. This founding myth was then reinforced by narratives of fall and redemption, particularly active in acute times of crisis,44 as with the eruption of messianism after the death of the "boy emperor" D. Sebastião in the sixteenth century and consequent loss of independence; it was believed that the king would return on a "misty morning" (a Portuguese equivalent of King Arthur's return from Avalon) to redeem the fallen country and inaugurate a new golden age. Sebastianismo was thus born. This messianic humus was further enriched in the seventeenth century by the Jesuit priest and missionary António Vieira, who, influenced by the apocalyptic writings of Joachim de Fiore, prophesied a spiritual rebirth of the world, a cosmic renewal, in the form of a new kingdom of God on Earth; a final "Fifth Empire" (after the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Roman empires) would then arise with the Portuguese, the "chosen people," at the helm.45 This disconnection of Portugal from its geographic limitations, and its elevation to a quasi-spiritual reality, an "idea" to expand to the world—as if in a state of permanent vigil, only awaiting the right moment to rise again—is at the very center of Portugal's "manifest destiny." When twentieth-century poet Fernando Pessoa famously proclaimed, "'Tis the hour!"46 he was giving poetic urgency to the sacred narrative of a country destined, from the moment of its creation, to be different, as if containing the spiritual sources that, in the end, would allow it to rescue itself and redeem a humanity that had strayed from the right path.

Some authors see in Portuguese history a struggle between logos and mythos, with two major schools of thought, rationalist and mythical, grappling with each other for control of the country's destiny.47 It would be erroneous, in the case of Lusophonia, to assume that contemporary mythmakers alone continue to share this worldview; on the contrary, many bearers of intellectual and political authority, known to exhibit a matter-of-fact mentality, have also subscribed to the healing power of Lusophonia.

For a start, the notion at the core of Lusophonia—Portugal's universalism—is far from being a mere chimera of priests and poets. During the centuries, many people have shared the conviction that Portugal has proved through its history that it is uniquely gifted to coexist with the otherness and diversity of cultures around the world—and therefore created a unique and better model of coexistence between peoples. This belief system—from which Portugal's intrinsic humanism and ecumenism derive their vitality—is indebted to persistent intellectual labor. Such a compelling view of Portugal's encounter with other cultures was of course explored by the New State—particularly in a later period in which "multiracialism" became the official policy—giving ideological fodder to the nationalist imagery of the greatness of the "Portuguese genius." But these views must not be associated exclusively with any one period of Portuguese history. The tone and rhetoric may change across times, but the substance has remained. Cortesão, for example, an anti-New State intellectual, defended throughout his career as a historian the revolutionary "Universalism humanism" of the Portuguese, which consists "above all [in] a vast, generous, and fraternal understanding of other humans and other peoples. Here lies, in this capacity to understand and love the diverse humanity . . . the Lisitano imprint."48 António Sérgio, a pro-democratic voice during the New State, offers a powerful example of such a universalist view of the Portuguese as "a people whose historical role was to be, in its essence, the navigator [of human destiny], and because of its cosmopolitan origins, held the mission to embrace the earth and communicate with all the races. [Thus] one is only authentically Portuguese if one is a citizen of the world."49 Or, as the anthropologist Jorge Dias puts it, "Portuguese culture has an expansive character, originated in part by a geographical location that gave it the mission of approximating the ties between continents and human kind."50 The following passage of the historian Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, a regime sympathizer, paints a vivid picture of a shared mindset:

To Portugal is owed the respectability of the person and the narrowing of links with the diverse peoples of the earth, and those links—which created a coexistence that put together different races and expanded a civilization for which Portugal offered the sacrifice of many generations—never will be erased. No impartial historian can diminish the worth of such a legacy that is enough to elevate the voice of a country that made ecumenism the reason for its existence. Do not be afraid to say that no other European nation was able to realize such a high purpose. This should not be interpreted as a manifestation of pride but instead as an act of justice for all those in the past who knew how to defend and disseminate the Portuguese message.52

The intercultural "Portuguese message" is at the heart of the view of Portugal's empire as a unique and unsurpassed one. This position found a major proponent in the Lusotropicalismo thought of the mid-twentieth-century Brazilian social scientist Gilberto Freyre.53 Compared to other colonial powers,
the "world created by the Portuguese" was exceptional because of its powerful blending of peoples: the Portuguese had a natural, prejudice-free inclination to mix with other peoples, creating, in Freyre's metanarrative, an integration based on racial, social, and ultimately peaceful harmony. Thus, the transnational world originated by Portugal's maritime expansion should not be devalued but instead praised, because its model of society is intrinsically more humane and worthy of emulation than are the models of the other, so-called superior European nations, which ruled mostly by imposition and force.

The idea of the interculturalism of the Portuguese encounter with the outside world is omnipresent in contemporary narratives of the country. "The cultural interaction that marked the Portuguese expansion, in many aspects, distinguishes it from other European expansionisms," declare the historians João Paulo Oliveira e Costa and Teresa Lacerda. "Our identity will not be lost only if it continues to be an identity of fusion and miscegenation," says a former high commissioner for immigration and ethnic minorities, while Roberto Carneiro, a former minister of education, concludes that "the memory of the Portuguese is unequivocally intercultural [and] the future of the Portuguese can hardly be otherwise." This vision of Portugal's universalism—that it is a special country with a message of understanding between peoples—can be clearly discerned in varied contexts. The main character of Thomas More's Utopia was a Portuguese named Raphael, a "Lusophone . . . because at that time only the Portuguese could have a view of humanity and universality," while the fact that the Portuguese philosopher Pascoal Martins inspired the revolutionary motto "liberty, equality, and fraternity" serves as one more indicator of the universalism disseminated by Portugal. All of these notions of the exceptionalism, authenticity, and uniqueness of the Portuguese experience have come together, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, within the horizons of Lusophonia.

BUILDING LUSOPHONIA

The sociologist António Barreto, for whom Portugal is on the "verge of irrelevance, if not vanishing," observes that "the Portuguese for 500 years went everywhere, immigration, Africa, the conquests, to the Orient, to Brazil, or the Atlantic . . . and now they do not know where to go." Around the same time, Manuel Clemente, bishop of Porto, reflected in a similar way: "We can compare ourselves, for example, to the Phoenicians. There are peoples—ports, in which one arrives and from which one departs. I believe that is our condition." These interpretations of Portugal's liminal collective identity demonstrate that important sectors of society increasingly see Lusophonia as a reinvented destination for a country in search of itself. Lusophonia has acquired the status of a myth of national re-foundation; it represents a cultural nationalism that resonates across the ideological spectrum. The novelist António Lobo Antunes says "I find it insufferable to hear that 'we are a small and peripheral country.' To me Portugal is central and very big." If a foreigner could find these words paradoxical, the average Portuguese citizen knows exactly what the novelist means, and would also know that Portugal's stature, because of its history and legacy, is not parochial but intrinsically global. Such a cultural nationalism is intuitive and instantaneous; it is commonsensical and rarely rationalized or acknowledged as nationalism. Like the remnants of the lost empire, it is almost everywhere.

As a result of this creedal dimension—and of the absolute conviction that Portuguese-speaking countries share a deep unity that goes beyond the language—several different attempts to concretize and give new shape to a common identity have emerged, particularly since the last years of the New State. Congresses were held that pushed for the creation of a Luso-Afro-Brazilian community, an idea that was defended by Barradas de Carvalho, a Marxist historian, while General Spinola, in the midst of the colonial wars, promoted the creation of a federated Lusíada community as the only possible way for Portugal to retain its greatness. But it was only when the twentieth century was drawing to an end that that there was a decisive push to create the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP, in its Portuguese acronym), which was founded in 1996. In tandem with the commercial and utilitarian reasons for the creation of such a community, there lies within a deeper current that helps to explain Portugal's involvement. CPLP's founding document describes these countries as sharing a "unique identity," cemented by a language that spreads globally "its cultural values, in an open and universalistic way." As stated by Pinto Ribeiro, a former Socialist minister of culture, "[The emphasis] on miscegenation is, politically, the future. It means that [individuals] are the same while being different, it is what we are, what we have done. To understand this is to understand the CPLP." Adriano Moreira, a conservative thinker and longstanding advocate of such a community, sees the creation of the CPLP as the "descent of utopia to reality." Although the CPLP is incipient and still not running at full throttle (to the despair of some, although it is progressing), its ambitions are vast. Lourenço sees a symbiosis between the CPLP and Portuguese identity: "The CPLP was founded in the name of the Lusophone mythology. Naturally, some truth is in it [Lusophone mythology] so that [such a community] could be imagined." But in such a sacred foundation lies the potential for the success of the project, because "Lusophonia without a minimum of shared cultural mythology can only be a community in a practical way, and not in spirit and imagination that are its essence."
The existence of such a shared cultural mythology helps to explain the wide political consensus in regard to projects aimed at promoting the uniqueness and originality of the Portuguese experience in the world. In a 1995 official document explaining the reasons behind the cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, José Manuel Durão Barroso, at the time minister of foreign affairs, says that “we had in mind the ‘Portuguese way of being,’ that is, a vocation, unanimously recognized, to keep the national and European borders open. . . . Portugal never resigned itself to closed environments, searching in non-European spaces and in the socialization with other peoples and civilizations for the elements of its identification as a nation.”

The political emphasis on a distinct “Portuguese way of being” is overwhelming. Moreover, this Portuguese way of being is celebrated on dates such as the National Day. For example, the former president of the republic, Mário Soares, in a speech titled “The Portuguese Language, A Homeland of Many Homelands,” reaffirmed the “universalist values that made us singular in history, and constitute one of the greatest foundations of trust in a future of greatness for our country,” and another former Socialist president, Jorge Sampaio, calling for a “modern and democratic patriotism,” praised Portugal as “an independent nation by willpower, and universalist by vocation.” Fernando Nobre, a 2010 candidate for the presidency with no party affiliation, powerfully expressed this everlasting truth: “I am a Portuguese. And to me to be Portuguese means the world, miscegenation, interculturality. That gives me attributes that allow me to look at the world, at other cultures and other peoples in a different manner.” Finally, in 2012, a minister for the center-right nineteenth constitutional government of Portugal declared that “in the last twenty years we have been too concerned with Europe,” and “if we look at our history we know that every time we have been pushed to the ocean those were the moments of greatest glory of our history . . . Portugal is stronger when it looks at the world.”

This set of views is also reflected in the politics of the Portuguese language. If the quest for a standardized Portuguese orthography lasted for almost one hundred years, such efforts intensified as the twentieth century drew to a close and were met by a wide consensus in the political establishment, with the approval of almost all of the political parties and few votes against, until the Orthographic Accord was finally signed into law in 2008. Although it triggered a vocal reaction from a minority, the spelling reform has generally been viewed as a sound strategy to boost the Portuguese language in the international arena and increase its competitiveness in the context of an English-driven globalization. Ultimately, the reform was understood as a required step to strengthen a geolinguistic space and jumpstart a wide cultural and political strategy in the world. As argued by the president of the Instituto Camões (Camões Institute, IC), the organization charged with promoting Portuguese language and culture abroad, “The language can be a tool of power. The countries with the most spoken language have more power, in business and in culture.” No one could lend more legitimacy to such a view than the president of the republic, the social-democratic Cavaco Silva, who declared in a conference of heads of state of the CPLP that “in an increasingly globalized world in which we live the Portuguese language is an essential tool to defend and assert internationally our countries and our way of seeing the world.” A language is thus much more than a vehicle of communication; it also transports values, spreads a Lusophone worldview, and is a source of power for the Portuguese way of “seeing the world.”

AN ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION

The call of Lusophonia is not heard in the same way by everyone. This manifestation of cultural nationalism exists on a continuum, with low, moderate, and high levels of intensity. The level of Lusophonia among ethnic nationalists is almost nonexistent. The word is never mentioned in the discourse of the ethno-nationalist party, and their ethnic vision of what makes Portugal great naturally clashes with any worldview that emphasizes interculturality, especially with non-European peoples. Disparaging a Left that looks strangely “like Salazar” in its constant talk about “our political obligations” to the Lusophone world, Duarte Branquinho, a PNR militant and official, is no less dismissive of the Lusophone mental universe; he states that “the idea that Portugal can accomplish itself outside of our country is, at a minimum, dangerous for any nationalist.”

Among those displaying high levels of Lusophone commitment is the civic and cultural International Lusophone Movement (MIL), founded in 2008, with the slogan “For a new Portugal, a new Lusophone community, and a new world.” Much indebted to the destinarian thinking of the heterodox philosopher Agostinho da Silva, for whom Portugal’s mission was to spread universal fraternity, the movement celebrates the sacred sources of Portugal’s cultural nationalism shining in all their splendor, as in the manifesto of their organ Nova Aguia: “The promotion of the great ideas and values of Portuguese and Lusophone culture is a service to all humanity and a contribution to a new world.” In this manner, “Portugal and the Lusophone community may be a sort of world alternative homeland, the embryo of a new planetary community, whose vision is so present in our tradition . . . Such a homeland of the spirit can transmit ideas, values, and practices so universal and beneficial that all citizens of the world can recognize them, regardless of nationalities, languages, cultures, ideologies, and traditions.” Racism, in the Portuguese case, is not just futile, “it is anti-patriotic” and an “affront to the genuine historical sense of our culture.
which, regardless of a couple of deviations, has always been characterized by the healthy communion between all varieties of the human species.\textsuperscript{80}

The refoundation of Portugal will either be Lusophone or it will not be.\textsuperscript{81} The following passage typifies the vision of Portugal as a redeemer nation:

Portugal is not destined to be just a tourist destination for northern Europeans, (Portugal) is much more than a “State” . . . It is above all an idea, a unique “worldview,” a direct consequence of the great mix of cultures and ethnicities. . . . This special sentiment is what we felt as a perennial legacy to the world, a legacy that is frequently denominated “Lusophonia” and that besides being the greatest feat of Portugal in the past, could become, through the mission of MIL, the anachronism of a new “Portugal,” no longer imperial nor enclosed in its little European borders, but as ample and extended as humanity.\textsuperscript{82}

Europe cannot be the destiny—or at least not the most important destiny—of a country such as Portugal: “We are the Turkey of the West. In the same way that Portugal was, in fact, a European country, Portugal is neither, or it is just a small part of the continent.” . . . The patria lusa has a European part (the Portuguese nation), but extends itself through Africa, America, and the Orient.\textsuperscript{83} As a testimony to the blurry conceptual boundaries between nationalism and patriotism, the way that the founders of MIL define their attachment to Lusophonia varies. Paulo Borges, a former member, calls for a “patriotism trans-patriotic and universalist” and aimed at a universal common good,\textsuperscript{84} while Renato Epifanio says that MIL stands for a “Lusophone trans-nationalism” that represents a “dynamic” toward a civilizational Lusophone bloc that may constitute “an example for other peoples of the world” at a moment of failure of the current “Anglo-Saxon model of civilization.”\textsuperscript{85}

Crucially, within the MIL but also beyond it, there is the deep-seated belief that Lusophonia may provide an alternative globalization to a world thrown into disarray by a free-market capitalist, Anglo-Saxon model of civilization. Lusophonia’s humanizing power and harmonious model of livelihood can relieve all the human woes caused by a globalization of misery, based on gloomy materialism, individualism, and human selfishness. Against a soulless material and technological civilization that destroys the diversity and integrity of cultures stands the conciliatory, just, and wise paradigm of a spiritual and ethical Lusophonia.\textsuperscript{86} Fernado dos Santos Neves, the dean of the Lusophone University, decries the allure of myths and imaginary empires, but that does not keep him from sharing a similar confidence in Lusophonia’s promise of moral and political emancipation of the world: “The hour of Lusophonia is the hour to make the sociocultural, economic-political, and geopolitical analysis of the contemporary world, and therefore [to] find [in it] the irreplaceable place for Lusophonia, for the good of all the ‘Lusophone Spaces,’ and for the good of all the ‘Human spaces.’”\textsuperscript{87}

At this high end of Lusophone devotion, it is common to find people promoting a Lusophone Union as a new name for a more integrated CPLP. After all, as stated by Fernando Cristóvão, a former president of the IC, there is a geopolitical ambition: “Starting from this linguistic Union, it is obvious that other [unions] must and should be built: economic, religious, political . . . and thus gradually pass from mythical ideals to reality, especially because without [myths] not even our own nation would have a conscience.”\textsuperscript{88} D. Duarte de Bragança, who would be the Portuguese king if Portugal were a monarchy, is a staunch defender of the creation of a Confederacy of Lusophone States,\textsuperscript{89} for example, while ideas such as the making of a Lusophone passport, a Lusophone bank, and even a Lusophone parliament have gained ground, and increased vigor, in Lusophone circles.

This cultural nationalism articulates what Manfred Steger has called a “global imaginary”; it gives support to the notion that in today’s world, crucial ideologies on the rise constitute “reconfigured ideational systems” that have elements of both national and global imaginaries.\textsuperscript{80} In the case of Lusophonia, such a reconfiguration has not been so difficult to achieve, given the universalist belief system at the core of the country’s identity. The concept of cosmopolitan nationalism, as a reworking of nationalism toward transnational ends at a time of intensification of globalization processes, may come to mind.\textsuperscript{91} However, even if there is a global imaginary with elements of cosmopolitanism, it is impossible not to note the Portuguese nature of the whole belief system. It may evolve into a transnational and transcontinental global project, but at its core it is still, and probably will continue to be, a cultural, spiritual, and authentic fruit of Portuguese national identity.\textsuperscript{82}

**BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE.**

Ethno-nationalists are known for proclaiming that they are the “only ones” who defend the nation. But for all those who have heard the trumpet of Lusophonia, the nation that ethno-nationalists defend is only a part of what truly and spiritually is the Portuguese presence in the world. The mystical poet Teixeira de Pascoaes said that the genius of adventure of the Portuguese was overshadowed by a “lack of persistence.”\textsuperscript{92} Time will tell if that will be the fate of Lusophonia. In any case, from the depths of national identity, a new adventure has arisen, and Portugal’s cultural resources—a potent mix of historical experience and mythical expectations—have once again provided a new, redefined but still great, role for the “Heroes of the Sea” in the twenty-first century.

But there may be a more important lesson to learn. As was noted in the introduction, particularly after the fall of the colonial empire, the “European destiny” has been overwhelmingly seen by the Portuguese elites as the only
available option for the country. And from that moment on, the relationship with the former colonies would be recreated through the institutional apparatus of the European Union. The need to tie the post-revolutionary identity of the country with a broader European project was felt to such an extent that the renowned historian José Mattoso lamented in the early 1990s the damage that the obsessive “desire” to imitate European patterns could do to the country’s identity. “The excitement for European integration led [Portugal] to lose sight of all other goals,” he said. “What matters is to be a part of Europe, if we lose our identity or not, it doesn’t matter. [This view] is rubbish.” Obsessive or not, the consequence was the “Europeanization” of Portuguese society in the last decades of the twentieth century, buoyed by an elite consensus on the benefits of the European Union and supported by a relatively high popular attachment both to national and to European identity. The deeper question underlying this study regards the possibility of a paradigm shift. With the passage to the third millennium, a new identity—a Lusophone identity—has undoubtedly arisen, and manifests itself beyond ideological divisions through the state, the media, and civil society. Whether the elite consensus on the European project is still holding together is a proposition that needs to be investigated further. Apparently, it still is; Europe is still the strategic “priority,” in comparison with the “Atlantic” route. But it is hard to deny or close our eyes to the rise of Lusophopia—and to the sources, both material and immaterial, that fuel it—as a complement or even potential rival to the European identity. Even the most detached observer may witness the increasing presence of the Lusophone identity in contemporary Portugal. But its presence is not solely based on an impressionistic level; this study, which is far from exhaustive, has shown its interwoven narratives, both diffuse and explicit, that are both state-sponsored and societal. Scholars have noticed that elite support for the European Union could help to explain the absence of a strong exclusive national identity. The question is whether a potential “erosion” of such an elite consensus could lead, and may already be leading, to a stronger, inclusive version of national identity in the form, shape, and reach of Lusophonia. If one takes for granted the assertion that national identity is an ongoing cultural construction, made and remade throughout the ages, and if one is aware, with history as one’s guide, that moments of crisis are usually moments of national reassertion, one must be open to the possibility that Portuguese national identity is currently undergoing such a process, even if it is hard to categorize and systematize it in the flux of such times. Because that story is yet to be written, this chapter may ultimately serve as a foreword.
64. In the same manner, it is interesting to note how non-Portuguese scholars are still more at ease at connecting Lusophonía with the sources of Portugal’s cultural nationalism. See Adriano de Freixo, Minha Pátria é a Língua Portuguesa: A Construção da Identidade Lusófona em Portugal (Rio de Janeiro: Apicuri, 1940); James Sidaway and Marcus Power, “The Tears of Portugal: Empire, Identity, ‘Race’, and Destiny in Portuguese Geopolitical Narratives,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 23 (2005): 37–34.
65. Barradas de Carvalho (Ramo de Portugal, 81) defended the Luso-Afro-Brazilian community as a “condition for Portugal to be itself again.”
69. Lourenço, A Nau de Écaro seguido de Imagem e Miragem da Lusofonia, 172, 176.

Conclusion

225
Appendix 1: Map of the Lusophone Global Society