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
Themes in Modern European History, 1830–90

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**Themes in Modern European
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**Edited by
Nicholas Atkin and Michael Biddiss**

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7 Fascism: a 'revolutionary right' in interwar Europe

António Costa Pinto

When, on 23 March 1919 in Milan, around 100 people attended a meeting at which Benito Mussolini officially launched fascism, those present could not have imagined that they were coining what would become one of the twentieth century's most used concepts.¹ Yet it is here that we must begin, as part of the ideological and political character of the founding group gave identifying traits to a 'generic fascism' that appeared throughout Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. The 'revolutionary', 'anti-capitalist' and radical nationalist discourse; the 'militarized party', the anti-communism and the radical critique of liberal democracy; the electoral tactics and the political violence – all of these became regular features of fascism, irrespective of its national variations.²

At the beginning of the 1930s, when Mussolini was creating his New State from his position of authority, and National Socialism was being transformed into a movement with large electoral support, almost all European countries had parties of their own broadly similar to these. Although the factors that conditioned their emergence and the degree of their success varied from case to case, they were all easily identified by the common citizen as 'fascist'. The speed with which at least some of them obtained power had an appropriate symbol: Mussolini had become head of government only three years after the foundation of his party.

In 1932, Oswald Mosley founded the British Union of Fascists in the UK and Rolão Preto created the National Syndicalist Movement (*Movimento Nacional-Sindicalista*, MNS) in Portugal.³ The following year, José Antonio Primo de Rivera established the Falange (*Falange Española*) in Spain, and Vidkun Quisling set up National Unity (*Nasjonal Samling*) in Norway.⁴ Despite failing to achieve significant electoral success within the democracies, the diversity of their destinies typifies much of the history of fascist parties between the wars. While Mosley

never seriously troubled Britain's democracy (see Chapter 8), the MNS was banned in 1934 by Portugal's new Catholic dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar. In neighbouring Spain, following the execution of its leader and despite its weak electoral support, the Falange lent some of its programme and political activism to General Franco, where it was transformed into the founding nucleus of his single party after his victory over the Spanish Second Republic. In Norway it was thought that, following defeat after defeat within the parliamentary system, there was no room for local fascism; however, the German occupation in 1940 changed Quisling's luck and raised him to a position of prominence even if the Nazis never allowed him real power. The 'new order' in Nazi-occupied Europe was incoherent, and many fascist groups died at the hands of their right-wing competitors. This was to be the fate of what had been perhaps the most successful fascist movement in eastern Europe, the Iron Guard (*Garda de Fier*), which, after briefly holding power in Romania, was eliminated by General Antonescu.⁵

The enemies of fascism readily bracketed it with many other movements of the extreme right. Yet its relations with rival conservative and right-wing parties and groups were not always easy. The consolidation of dictatorships involved various combinations. In the cases of Italy and Germany, the fascists dominated. In some instances, such as Franco's Spain and Dollfuss's Austria, they became junior parties in right-wing anti-democratic coalitions. There was also the kind of relationship which, in the further case of Salazar's Portugal (or indeed, overseas, in Getúlio Vargas's Brazil), led to fascism's eventual elimination.

Such tactical ambiguities, together with the Nazis' radical contribution to bringing about World War Two and the Holocaust, have made fascism and its legacy a fiercely debated topic. Since the 1930s, many observers and researchers have regularly returned to the classic questions: who were the fascists? how did they grow? who supported them? and what were the conditions most conducive to their rise? The structure of this chapter chiefly follows the three-stage cycle of fascism: (1) the creation of the movements and their role in the interwar political spectrum; (2) the seizure of power; and (3) the exercise of power. However, we need first to make a small detour into the world of definitions, which are particularly extensive in this subject.

Defining fascism

The sociologist Michael Mann has presented a particularly useful definition of fascism, in which he identifies three fundamentals: 'key values, actions and power organizations'. He sees it as 'the pursuit of a

transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism.⁶ This suggests five essential aspects, some of which have internal tensions:

- 1 Nationalism: the 'deep and populist commitment to an "organic" or "integral" nation'.
- 2 Statism: the goals and organizational forms that are involved when the organic conception imposes an authoritarian state 'embodying a singular, cohesive will [as] expressed by a party elite adhering to the "leadership principle"'.⁷
- 3 Transcendence: the typical neither/nor of fascism as a 'third way' – that is, as something transcending the conventional structures of 'left' and 'right'. Mann stresses that the core constituency of fascist support can be understood only by taking their aspirations to transcendence seriously. 'Nation and state comprised their centre of gravity: not class.'
- 4 Cleansing: 'Most fascisms entwined both ethnic and political cleansing, though to differing degrees.'
- 5 Paramilitarism: as a key element both in values and in organizational form. Like previous analysts, Mann stresses 'what essentially distinguishes fascists from many military and monarchical dictatorships of the world is [the] "bottom-up" and violent quality of its paramilitarism. It could bring popularity, both electorally and among elites.'

All this is not too far removed from other definitions of fascism, notably that suggested by Stanley Payne in his wide-ranging study.⁷ For Robert Paxton, 'Fascism may be defined as a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation or victimhood, and by compensatory cults of unity, energy and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elite groups, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.'⁸

Some points are common to the definitions offered by Mann and Paxton. Perhaps the most important is the emphasis on ideology, collective action and organization. This allows Paxton to stress that 'what fascists did tells us at least as much as what they said.'⁹ Or, as Mann puts it, 'without power organizations, ideas cannot actually do anything' – which means that we must add programmes, actions and organizations to the analysis.¹⁰ Such approaches illustrate the more general point that, in recent years, the comparative study of fascism has become increasingly concerned with ideological and cultural dimensions – at times becoming ideology-centred. We could even say that the

analysis of so-called generic fascism has moved from a sociological to a more political perspective, giving both ideology and culture much more importance than previously.

The fascists: where, when, who, how and why?

While acknowledging that the culture of fascism extended to other continents (most notably Latin America), most historians would agree with Roger Eatwell's description of it as being 'European-epochal'.¹¹ This reflects a consensus about its main placement in terms not simply of geography but also of periodization, with particular reference to the years between 1918 and 1945.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, several movements and ideological currents were already coming to embody some of the cultural and political principles from which the magma of fascism was to emerge. Historians such as Zeev Sternhell attempted to prove that the ideological synthesis of fascism was born in France on the eve of World War One.¹² Without doubt, it is possible to identify doctrinal precursors of fascism within that country: the radical 'socialist nationalism' of Maurice Barrès; the integral nationalism of Charles Maurras's neoroyalist *Action Française*; and the revolutionary syndicalism of Georges Valois. A large part of what was to become the fascist programme – with its radical nationalism, its antidemocratic stance, its communitarian and corporatist alternative and its antisocialist 'third way' – were all present in the European cultural milieu from the beginning of the century. However, it is equally important to recognize that fascism cannot be separated from a new type of political formation that appeared in the wake of the 1914–18 conflict: the 'revolutionary' militia party. Adopting the rhetoric of 'neither left nor right', the fascists relied here on an innovative brand of organization that was characteristic of the era of mass movements and of postwar European democratization.

Where do the fascists fit into the political scene of interwar Europe? Michael Mann frames the growth of fascism around four crises: 'war between mass citizen armies; severe class conflict exacerbated by the Great Depression; the political crises arising from the attempts of many countries at a rapid transition toward a democratic nation-state; and a cultural sense of civilisational contradiction and decay.'¹³ Although these crises weakened the ability of elites to perpetuate their natural role as leaders within society, fascism offered solutions in every case. With further reference to these challenges, Mann suggests that this type of movement 'was strongest where we find distinct combinations of all four'. The problem remains, however, that many of the

cleavages analysed previously are really those of authoritarianism in general.

Italian Fascism presented itself as an anti-party that was particularly hostile to communism. It had its own progressive social programme, with nationalism as the driving force of its political action. The initial anticapitalist features were very quickly removed from the movement's agenda following its failure in the 1919 elections. However, the most important change took place in 1920, with the emergence of *squadristo* in the agricultural areas of the Po Valley and Tuscany. Having begun as a largely urban Jacobin and revolutionary movement, fascism now acquired the profile of an armed militia financed by the rural landowners and in violent conflict with the socialists and agricultural unions. In a very short space of time, it won over many supporters through a more authoritarian nationalist programme. At the end of 1920, the movement had more than 20,000 members. In May 1921 it possessed 35 parliamentary deputies, and by July its membership was approaching 200,000.¹⁴

The confirmation of Mussolini as the undisputed leader of the party was no easy task, as part of his success rested with the *ras* (powerful local party chiefs) who did not always accept the pacts he attempted to negotiate with the conservatives when they imposed limitations on *squadrista* violence. It was only with some difficulty that Mussolini was able to transform the Fasci into the National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*, PNF), which consecrated the position of *Il Duce*. Although it was a minority element at the parliamentary level, the PNF very rapidly developed into a mass party of the new militia kind – not only because of its armed units, but also 'because its organisation, its political culture, its ideology and its way of life were derived from *squadristo*.'¹⁵

The seizure of power in Italy was the product of a series of crises, in which the fascists became active participants. Despite the choreography of the March on Rome, they were called to power by the King under the terms of the constitution. However, a role was also played by the fascist activities that were taking place under the cover of a semi-peaceful insurrection – one that resulted in the occupation of dozens of public buildings, train stations and other locations without any repressive response from the government. Military intervention might have resolved the situation, but, as this did not occur, Mussolini was able to negotiate his takeover of power with the liberal politicians. While Italy had to wait one more year for fascist dictatorship to assert itself fully, the truth remains that 'for the first time in the history of the European liberal democracies, parliamentary government had been entrusted to

the leader of a militia party who repudiated the values of liberal democracy and proclaimed the revolutionary intention of transforming the State in an anti-democratic direction'.¹⁶

Compared with the Italian fascist movement, Nazism in Germany consolidated itself much more slowly, but then arrived in power with a greater political and electoral strength. When, in 1921, Adolf Hitler imposed himself as the leader of the small extremist racist grouping that Anton Drexler had founded two years before, the programme of the new National Socialist German Workers' Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, NSDAP) underwent some conservative alterations. The most fundamental changes took place in the party's discourse and in its organization. Hitler's targets were the humiliation caused by the Versailles Treaty, together with the Jewish and Marxist conspiracies that had served to bring this about. As for the structural shifts, these included a concentration of leadership in one person who was renowned for his oratorical skills, increased discipline within the party's paramilitary formation, and the creation of the Protective Squadron (*Schutzstaffel*, SS) as a squad of personal bodyguards for the Führer.

In November 1923, Hitler became increasingly visible in the press, having led, with General Ludendorff, the attempted Munich Putsch, following which the Nazi party was banned and Hitler sentenced to five years' imprisonment. However, the Nazi leader was only to serve nine months, during which time he wrote the first part of *Mein Kampf*, a confused mixture of political ideas. In 1926, the party was restored to legality, and Hitler succeeded in controlling its local bosses and in returning to its leadership after outmanoeuvring his rival Gregor Strasser.

The economic crisis and its impact on the young Weimar democracy was reflected in the electoral polarization that favoured Hitler much more clearly than fascists in any other democracy. Between 1928 and 1930, the Nazi party's support increased from 2.6 to 18.3 per cent. Under conditions of mass unemployment, increasingly authoritarian measures and some political violence, the NSDAP won the biggest share of the vote (37.3 per cent) in the elections of June 1932. Although this decreased to 33.1 per cent in a further poll five months later, Nazism had more popular backing than its Italian counterpart ten years earlier, maintaining the characteristics of a fascist party with an extremist programme and a paramilitary praxis. Like Mussolini, Hitler arrived in power by broadly constitutional means, occupying the Reich Chancellery at the invitation of President Hindenburg. Although several conservative politicians pressed for this choice in January 1933,

Hitler then proceeded swiftly to marginalize them. Furthermore, the pace at which he dismantled the democratic system and dealt with dissident elements among his own *Sturmabteilung* stormtroopers was similarly impressive.

What did fascism offer the conservatives in Italy and Germany that led them to choose the fascist option instead of other possible alternatives? As Paxton puts it, 'the fascists offered a new recipe for governing with popular support, but without any sharing of power with the left, and without any threat to conservative social and economic privileges and political dominance. The conservatives, for their part, held the keys to the door of power.'¹⁷ At the beginning of the 1930s, with the rise of German National Socialism and Italian Fascism, the effect of contagion began to be very significant, and in almost every European country, broadly similar parties emerged. However, the successes of Hitler and Mussolini were not easily replicated. Not all the crises of democracy provoked a distinctively fascist response. This is particularly true where the authoritarian elite held power without fascist help. As we will see below, conservative regimes often provided unfavourable terrain for fascism to reach power. In some other cases, it was the decision of the conservatives that was at the root of fascist success. In Italy and Germany, the crises favoured the fascists and they were co-opted into power.

The role of the masses in the crisis of interwar democracies also needs some clarification. Most cases of authoritarian takeover in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s involved a problem that can be usefully analysed through the model of 'polarized pluralism' developed by Giovanni Sartori. He states that 'party systems (and the party elite) must restrain the forces of polarity inherent in political democracies. If party systems fail to constrain both the ideological range and the number of parties ... centrifugal forces will tear democracy apart.'¹⁸ However, as Nancy Bermeo suggests, ordinary people are the 'stone-masons of polarization' in only a very small number of cases.¹⁹ Thus it can be argued that elite polarization was much more important in the breakdown of democracy during the epoch in question.

In the case of France, historians have devised an abundance of classificatory polemics concerning extreme right-wing movements during the interwar period, and it has often been asserted by French writers that the country possessed an allergy to fascism.²⁰ Although these organizations came close to subverting the democratic order in 1934, their success had to await the coming of World War Two. During the 1930s, the many French extraparliamentary leagues developed more or less obvious links with employers' groups, the royalist elite, and

traditionalist Catholics.²¹ They also joined together in 1934 in a number of violent antigovernment demonstrations with conspiratorial undertones. Of the numerous extreme-right bodies, the most important was Colonel de La Rocque's *Croix de Feu* (Cross of Fire). However, the victory of the left in the 1936 elections and the formation of a Popular Front government led to bans on most of the leagues. In this same year, Jacques Doriot, a dissident communist, created the French Popular Party (*Parti Populaire Français*, PPF), which was the most 'working-class' of the fascist groupings. However, the most serious challenge once again stemmed from the *Croix de Feu*, which translated itself into a political party, the French Social Party (*Parti Social Français*, PSF). According to Paxton, the PSF was the only far-right movement 'that achieved mass catch-all party status between 1936 and 1940', with a radical nationalist and antiparliamentary programme that was nevertheless not antisemitic.²² When La Rocque turned to the electoral struggle, he moderated his programme and abandoned his paramilitary style; however, he was never to compete directly for votes, as the 1940 elections did not take place because of the advent of war.

The Rexist movement founded by Léon Degrelle in Belgium sprang from Catholic traditionalism. Degrelle was a young militant, whose journal *Christus Rex* (*Christ the King*) challenged the Catholic Party's moderation. Rexism was largely inspired by Italian Fascist corporatism and by the traditional Catholic values of order and family. It erupted onto the political scene in 1936 when, even while still being organizationally weak, it obtained 11.5 per cent of the overall vote and showed some particular appeal to the Walloon community. In the same elections, its counterpart in the Dutch-speaking areas, the Flemish National League (*Vlaams Nationaal Verbond*, VNV), won 7.1 per cent. Waving the banner of authoritarian independence from francophone domination, the VNV was in contact with the Nazi movement from an early stage, and was chosen in 1940 by the German occupiers as their main point of positive contact with Belgian sympathizers. Isolated by the Catholic church, Rex was electorally and politically finished in 1939, when the VNV took 15 per cent of the vote in Flanders. The two movements were to converge in their collaboration with Nazism after the occupation, when both became active within the SS.²³

Several other democracies survived until 1939. This was notably true of the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, where small fascist parties, strongly influenced by Nazism, attempted to destabilize democracy. In the Netherlands, this influence was flagrant in the National Socialist Movement (*Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging*, NSB), which was

founded in 1931 by Anton Mussert, and which had a programme that was practically copied from that of the Nazis. The NSB enjoyed some success in the 1935 regional elections, when it managed to elect four deputies, yet Mussert was isolated by both left and right until the German occupation.²⁴ In neighbouring Denmark, the Danish National Socialist Workers' Party (*Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Arbejderparti*), founded in 1930, never managed to attract more than 1.8 per cent of the electorate, and was largely ignored during the German occupation. The same happened in prewar Norway and Sweden, where the coalitions of conservatives and socialists were powerful obstacles to fascism's antisystem dynamic.

The fascist movements were important actors in the democratic crises of the interwar period, even though in most countries they failed to achieve power at that stage. Some of the transitions to authoritarianism that occurred during the 1920s and 1930s involved ruptures with democracy that were simply violent, while others (such as the German and Italian cases) featured a more 'legal' assumption of power. There was, however, no strict correlation between either of these initial modes and the particular form taken by the radicalization that then occurred during the process of consolidating such dictatorships. Salazar in Portugal and Smetona in Lithuania, who arrived in power after a *coup d'état*, or Franco, whose rise was the result of a civil war, had much greater room for manoeuvre than either Mussolini or Hitler, who both achieved their positions through 'legal' routes and with the support of a radical right that was less inclined towards charismatic and totalitarian adventures.²⁵ The differences between these cases lay, above all, in the type of party and of leader that dominated the transitional process.

Exercising power

It is much easier to identify a fascist movement than a fascist regime. For many historians, only the dictatorships of Mussolini and Hitler can be truly classified as fascist, although it is obvious that their 'political engineering' once in government partially inspired some other European regimes during the 1930s. What was it, then, that distinguished fascism in power from the other right-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century?

Fascism in power was a powerful amalgam of different but broadly compatible conservative, fascist and radical-right ingredients 'bound together by common enemies'.²⁶ The question as to who dominates seems to be the vital issue. Paxton distinguishes between the regimes according

to those tensions between certain poles of power that he describes as 'the four-way struggle for dominance':

The fascist leader; his party (whose militants clamoured for jobs, perquisites, expansionist adventures, and the fulfilment of some elements of their early radical programme); the state apparatus (functionaries such as police and military commanders, magistrates, and local governors); and finally civil society (holders of social, economic, political, and cultural power such as professional associations, leaders of big business and big agriculture, churches, and conservative political leaders). These four-way tensions gave these regimes their characteristic blend of febrile activism and shapelessness.²⁷

While the taking of power was possible only with the support of other conservative and authoritarian groups, the nature of the leadership and its relationship with the party appears to be the fundamental variable. As several historians have observed, the crucial element is 'to what extent the fascist component emancipated itself from the initial predominance of its traditional conservative sponsors and to what degree it departed – once in power – from conventional forms/objectives of policy-making towards a more radical direction.'²⁸

Italian Fascism and German National Socialism were each attempts to create a charismatic leadership and a 'totalitarian tension' that was, in one form or another, also present in other dictatorships of the period.²⁹ After taking power, both these movements became powerful instruments of a 'new order', agents of a 'parallel administration', and promoters of innumerable tensions within dictatorial political systems. Transformed into single parties, they flourished as the breeding ground for a new political elite and as agents for a new mediation between the state and civil society. The ensuing tensions between their own monolithic structure and the apparatus of the state produced new patterns of political decision-making that concentrated power in the hands of Mussolini and Hitler, but which also removed it from the government and the ministerial elite, who were often increasingly subordinated to the single party and its 'parallel administration'.

Even so, the party and its ancillary organizations were not simply parallel institutions. They attempted to gain control of the bureaucracy and select the governing elite, thereby not only forcing some dictatorships towards an unstable equilibrium, but also becoming the central agents for the creation and maintenance of the leader's charismatic authority. The gradation of these tensions, which may be illustrated by

the eventual emergence of a weaker or stronger 'dualism of power', appears to be the best determining factor when trying to classify the kinds of dictatorship that historically have been associated with fascism. These have been most typically categorized either as 'authoritarian' and 'totalitarian', or as 'authoritarian' and 'fascist'.³⁰

Mussolini and Italian fascism

While Mussolini obtained power with the assistance of the PNF, the subsequent dismantling of the democratic regime was slow, and the reduced social and political influence of the party obliged Mussolini to accept compromises with the monarchy and the armed forces, as well as with other institutions such as the Catholic Church. The consolidation of the dictatorship had to involve the imposition of a greater degree of discipline within the party, whose actions during the initial phase of Mussolini's regime had not simply undermined the compromises essential for its institutionalization, but also threatened to increase the tensions within the tripartite system of party, dictator and state. Viewed overall, this Italian case was illustrative of takeover by a 'united political elite', whose base was a fascist party that was transformed into the primary motor for the institutionalization of the dictatorship and, from the 1930s, into the main instrument for the 'totalization' of power.

At times, Mussolini did use the party to abandon his concessions to bureaucratic-legal legitimacy, although he lacked the courage and the opportunity to abolish the monarchy and thus to eliminate the diarchy he had inherited.³¹ When what remained of the liberal legacy was crushed during the latter half of the 1930s and when, under Starace, the PNF proposed the conquest of civil society, Mussolini's attempts to enhance his personal and charismatic authority through the party, state and cultural machines culminated in the creation of the 'cult of *Il Duce*'.³² Several historians have suggested that it was this which signalled the completion of a shift from 'authoritarian' to 'totalitarian' fascism, both of which tendencies had coexisted during the earlier phases of the dictatorial consolidation.

Mussolini progressively abolished the formal limits to his power. In 1926, the PNF became *de facto* Italy's sole party. Two years later the Fascist Grand Council, the PNF's supreme body since 1923, was transformed into a state institution under Mussolini's leadership. This marked, at the very peak of the fascist political system, a fusion of party and state effected in a manner that did not subordinate the former to the latter. If the government had ceased to be a collegiate body when confronted by the Duce's all-powerful secretariat, the

Grand Council was transformed into the main focus of state-party union from above, even while remaining subordinate to the dictator. The secretary of the PNF, who was also secretary of the Grand Council, became the second most important figure of Italian fascism. The abolition of the Chamber of Deputies, the last vestige of liberal representation, led to the creation of the Fascist and Corporate Chamber (*Camara degli Fasci e delle Corporazione*), of which the PNF's leaders became automatic members.

Once Mussolini's regime had been consolidated, its ministerial elite was overwhelmingly dominated by men who had been fascists from the very earliest days. With the exception of military officers, nearly all of them were also members of the Fascist Grand Council. Ministers, undersecretaries and presidents of both Parliament and Senate came, almost without exception, from this inner circle. Before they entered government, the main emblematic figures of Italian fascism – men such as Dino Grandi, Italo Balbo and Giuseppe Bottai (PNF *ras* in Bologna, Ferrara and Rome respectively) – had all participated in the *squadristi*-led violence of the early 1920s. The few mainly conservative and monarchist officers of the armed forces who also rose to ministerial rank generally followed a path similar to that of Emilio de Bono, who joined the PNF in 1922 and then served in the fascist militia before achieving this political promotion.

As the sole arbitrator of an often unstable equilibrium between the party, the government and the administration, Mussolini reserved to himself the final say on all disputed political issues. From this perspective, the Duce matches the classic model of the 'strong dictator'. Yet his powers should not be overstated. Even though his cabinet was undoubtedly devalued in relation to the Grand Council, the relationship between Mussolini (who himself at times took direct responsibility for up to six departments) and his ministers remained a significant element in the policy-making process.

Despite having been transformed into a heavy – and sometimes clientelistic – machine, the PNF elite always included a large number of fascists who had joined the movement before the March on Rome.³³ The militia was the first institution to be taken out of the party's control and placed under Mussolini's direct command. The political police were never independent of the state, although several of the mass organizations (and particularly those involving youth, women or the working classes) were subjected to many different transfers. In this way, the PNF gathered to itself increasing control over the popular mass bodies. The National Workers' Recreational Organisation (*Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*), a cultural grouping within the economics ministry, was the object of some rivalry between the ministry of

corporations and the PNF before responsibility for it was finally placed with the latter in 1927, by which stage it was the largest mass organization within the regime.³⁴ A similar process was to take place in relation to the youth groups, which were initially voluntary bodies within the PNF. In 1929, however, responsibility for them was transferred to the ministry of education. A few years later, with Starace as its Secretary, the party regained control over them, and in 1937 they were amalgamated into a single youth movement, the *Gioventù Italiana del Littorio*. The monopoly over the political socialization of youth was not only a source of tension between the PNF and the state, but also involved the Catholic Church, which saw its independent Catholic Action youth organizations alternately tolerated and dissolved.³⁵ The PNF was also involved in the trade unions (syndicates). During the initial period, it had its own syndicates over which it maintained indirect control, as the interference of party organizations was recognized by the corporatist apparatus. The complementary nature of the relationship between the state and the party was also significant within the women's organizations, from the *Fasci Femminile* to the *Massaie Rurali*, in which the PNF invested heavily throughout the 1930s after earlier hesitations.³⁶

By the eve of World War Two, Italian fascism had clearly evolved from one phase, which many historians describe as 'authoritarian', to another that was more 'totalitarian'. This was evident in the alliance with Nazi Germany, in the introduction of antisemitic legislation (1938), in the attempts to permeate Italian society with fascist values, and in the regime's expansionist imperialism. The decision to enter the war on the side of Germany was taken against the opinion of the most conservative sections of the Catholic Church, and was pursued partly through an imperialist desire to secure Italy as the hegemonic power in the Mediterranean and the southern Balkans. The military disasters experienced by the Axis after 1942 led, on the night of 25 July 1943, to the Fascist Grand Council dismissing Mussolini and restoring power to King Victor Emmanuel: a move that provoked the collapse of the Fascist regime. Having escaped detention with the assistance of Nazi forces, Mussolini established the Republic of Saló in German-occupied northern Italy. This new regime was riven by conflict between anti-fascist partisans and 'fascist republicans', and never amounted to anything more than a puppet of the Nazi Reich.

Hitler and German National Socialism

Hitler's dictatorship was much closer than Mussolini's to the model of charismatic leadership associated with fascist rule, and the Nazi party

and its militias exercised a greater influence over both the political system and civil society.³⁷ Although in the immediate aftermath of Hitler's rise to power he had to overcome some opposition from elements within the NSDAP's own *Sturmabteilung* militia, it was his own firm control over Europe's most powerful fascist party that contributed towards the weakening of authoritarian decision-making within strictly state structures. Thus the Führer came to operate personally at the top of a system in which the 'coexistence [of] and conflict [between] uncoordinated authorities very often undermin[ed] solidarity and uniformity in the exercise of power.'³⁸ Whether as part of a deliberate strategy, or merely as a consequence of Hitler's leadership personality, this also provoked a multiplication of *ad hoc* decisions and ensured there would be no real or formal limits to his authority. Despite this concentration of power, his political and ideological beliefs led him to immerse himself excessively in such matters as the military and strategic defence and expansion of the Third Reich, at the expense of the 'command and control' dimension of the administration and of day-to-day domestic politics.

The Nazi cabinet was quickly transformed into a bureaucratic body totally subservient to Hitler. Even in this condition, it ceased to exist as a collegiate body because political power within the state was simultaneously concentrated in Hitler and dispersed throughout the various Nazi institutions, thus severely undermining ordinary governmental processes. In 1937, with Hans Heinrich Lammers as head of the Reich chancellery, ministerial access to Hitler became more difficult as he deliberately reduced the cabinet's status.³⁹ At the same time, the party-based secretariat of the Deputy Führer, headed by Rudolf Hess and later by Martin Bormann, moved closer to Hitler.

The tensions created by the legality of the Nazi takeover and the rapid development of Hitler's charismatic leadership were resolved by the publication of a series of decrees that conveyed total power to him, obliging the ministers to answer only to the dictator.⁴⁰ The NSDAP, even while experiencing internal crises, set about assuming control of the existing state apparatus and creating a parallel structure, in the process of which it multiplied and confused the spheres of decision-making in several areas of national and regional authority.⁴¹ The existence of a large administration of NSDAP functionaries was symbolic of a revolutionary strategy. This aimed at undermining much of the previous pattern of bureaucratic control (although 'the Nazi leadership always relied on the old elite to maintain the essential functions of government', particularly within German territory as distinct from the eastern occupied territories, where party officials were more important).⁴² The

increasing legislative confusion that surrounded attempts to interpret the leader's will represents the most extreme subversion of the traditional methods of political decision-making employed by dictatorships. Not only did the bureau of the Deputy Führer as administered by Bormann become the most important channel to Hitler, but it also obtained some control over the government. Simultaneously, the party achieved political and financial autonomy, and developed as a parallel state apparatus.

According to Martin Broszat, three distinct centres of power began to emerge within a structure that was in a tense and unstable balance: 'the single party monopoly, the centralised governmental dictatorship and the absolutism of the Führer ... undermin[ed] the unity of the government and the monopoly of government by the Reich cabinet.'⁴³ Special authorities, which were under Hitler's direct control, soon developed alongside the ministries at the same time as several political and police organizations, some of which were controlled by the NSDAP and others by the SS, began to act independently of the government. Among the former were organizations such as the German Road System and the German Labour Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*, DAF), together with others that were more overtly political and repressive. Within the second category, we must include the Hitler Youth (*Hitler Jugend*). While still under the party's control, this was transformed into a Reich authority completely independent of the Ministry of Education. Thus it became a counterweight both to that ministry and to the armed forces in matters of political and ideological training. Heinrich Himmler's SS is a further example of this pattern. Its gradual assumption of the policing functions previously assigned to the interior ministry operated in a complex manner that generated innumerable tensions. Although the SS remained at least formally reliant on the party and on the state, it 'had detached itself from both and had become independent'.⁴⁴ Wilhelm Frick's interior ministry was thus emasculated of any practical authority over the police, just as the position of the minister of labour was partially weakened by the DAF's independence. It has to be admitted that the 'Nazification' of government bureaucracy was at times more superficial than real. Even so, those organizations that developed under Hitler into parallel party-based administrations represent the most extreme examples of the ways in which a fascist dictatorship might subvert the autonomy of the state.

By 1938, Hitler was the most powerful of Europe's dictators. The conservative constraints on his authority had been removed and the territorial enlargement of Germany had commenced through the annexation (*Anschluss*) of Austria. It was soon plain, however, that the Führer's

ambitions were not limited merely to revision of the Versailles Treaty. The still bolder expansionism that led to the outbreak of World War Two continued even after 1939 as a form of new imperialism, whose ideological and ethnic violence was particularly obvious in the east. Some of the characteristics of the Nazi dictatorship help explain the increase in its ideological radicalization.⁴⁵ Although antisemitism and racial nationalism had been central elements in the NSDAP's political programme from the outset, it was in the context of the war, and especially the invasion of the Soviet Union, that the *ad hoc* means of annihilation became superseded by the systematically organized Holocaust. This decisive shift was possible only as a result of the independent development of institutions such as the SS and the Nazi party's 'parallel administration'. In the 1930s the euthanasia campaigns, the extermination of asylum patients, the enforced sterilizations were already extremely important examples of brutalization.

Fascism and other right-wing dictatorships

The regimes operated by Hitler and Mussolini affected even those other right-wing European dictatorships that opposed their own home-grown fascist movements and represented more traditionalist forms of authoritarianism. These further cases demonstrate the adaptability of fascist institutions, models and ideological components within the wider context of right-wing politics during this era. The most paradigmatic example was undoubtedly General Francisco Franco's dictatorship in Spain, although neighbouring Portugal was also significant for its emulation of some aspects of Italian fascism.

Iberian cousins

The main characteristic of Franco's regime, which eventually lasted until the mid-1970s, was its radical break with the Second Republic. His rule was the product of a protracted and bloody civil war, waged from 1936 to 1939, in which there were a greater number of political purges and executions than during the overthrow of any other democratic regime in the era after World War One. Francoism as a political system rejected the fundamentals of the liberal legacy and was inspired by fascism to a much greater degree than the Salazar regime in Portugal.

It was within those areas that had been occupied by his military forces that Franco created the embryo of his future political system – one marked by a reactionary and militaristic coalition of Catholics, monarchists and fascists. He formed a single party, based on the small,

pre-existing fascist movement known as the Phalanx or *Falange Española*. The latter had been formed in 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, who was soon to be executed by the Republicans at the beginning of the Civil War.⁴⁶ Franco developed this into a broader organization under the amended title of *Falange Española Tradicionalista* (FET).⁴⁷ He did so by forcing the original Falangists to integrate with the Catholics and the monarchists, thus setting in motion his ambition to build a regime that was close to fascism from the very beginning. During the civil war, the old-style Falange lent Franco its ideological backing as well as the support of its political activists and its modest militia, in the hope that, after its enforced 'unification' with other right-wing elements, it would still be allowed to play 'a genuinely fascist role in the implementation of a mobilised society'.⁴⁸ However, the fascists saw their position weaken as a result of their inclusion within a single party that also incorporated several other 'political families'. This Francoist union was a heterogeneous one that maintained several identities, particularly at the intermediate levels.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Franco and the victors of the civil war initially outlined the creation of a Spanish New State, even though the tentative outlines of its proposed totalitarianism were to be rapidly eliminated as the defeat of Nazi ambitions became more predictable.

In terms of legitimacy, Franco's regime resembled the charismatic model of fascism, even though his regime included a strong religious aspect that was practically absent in the Italian example and completely non-existent in the German one. His concessions to Spain's liberal past were very few and far between. Here the dictator did not have to deal with either a president or a king, subordinate or otherwise; nor, unlike Mussolini and Salazar, did he need to pervert a parliament. As Stanley Payne noted, in 1939 the Spanish dictator 'was the European ruler who, both formally and theoretically, retained the most absolute and uncontrolled power'.⁵⁰

Some of Franco's personal characteristics, and his relationship with the institutions that were the basis of his victory, would influence the nature of the new political system. He was a general of very average ability with very few political ideas beyond the values of order, anticommunism, traditionalist Catholicism and an obsession with the 'liberal-Masonic conspiracy'.⁵¹ His relationship with the FET was also more utilitarian than ideological. He was not the leader of the original Falangist movement; nor had its organization been a determining factor in his taking power, sensitive as he was to both the armed forces and the Catholic Church, which were the other significant institutions involved in founding the new regime. His educational background and

professional career made it difficult for him to position himself as an outright fascist once he was in power; despite his pro-Axis sympathies, he maintained Spanish neutrality during World War Two.⁵²

Franco placed the FET under the strict control of himself and his government. Nevertheless, the movement managed not only to provide itself with a party apparatus, but also to improve its access to both national and local administration. However, it is possible to detect the existence of some 'political families' (including Catholics and monarchists, as well as the original Falangists) within the single party. Until 1944, with 66 per cent of the leadership positions under its control, the last of these groupings dominated the party, while the Catholics were the second largest 'family' followed by the military. Despite being subordinated to Franco's firm control, the FET was initially integrated into certain administrative bodies within the state apparatus: for example, by uniting the position of civil governors with those of the party's regional secretaries. One important struggle that was immediately lost was the attempt to prevent its independent militia from falling under military authority. However, the party did maintain a considerable collection of ancillary organizations, such as the Youth Front, the Spanish University Union, the Women's Section, the Trade Union Organization, and the Education and Recreation Union Organization (equivalent to Mussolini's *Dopolavoro*). More importantly, the party retained responsibility for propaganda within the regime.

While never promoting the conquest of the state, 'the existence of a single party that was quite clearly subordinate was a notable counter-weight'⁵³ to other means of access to the government during this period. Despite the FET's origins in the enforced unification of several heterogeneous movements, the Falangists managed to exert their supremacy, and ensured their position as the principal force within the new Francoist political elite. Tensions between the party and the state were infrequent and largely episodic in a situation where the government's domination was almost total, and where indeed the position of the party and of its Falangist core was rapidly diminished after 1945.

In the case of Portugal, a so-called New State was consolidated in the 1930s out of a military dictatorship that had been implanted in 1926.⁵⁴ Its leader was Oliveira Salazar, a university professor with links to the Catholic Party, who had become minister of finance in 1928 and who then went on to hold the premiership from 1932 until 1968. Salazar could not be considered a charismatic figure. Moreover, the military origins of his regime ensured that his position was linked to that of the president of the republic, General Carmona, who had been formally legitimated in direct elections and who retained the authority to dismiss him. The

regime's single party, the National Union (*União Nacional*), was weak and elitist, created from above by the interior ministry and initially controlled by an administration over which the premier's rule was complete.⁵⁵ Salazar also benefited from a new constitution – the product of a compromise between corporatism and liberalism that had been approved by popular plebiscite in 1933. Within this structure, the *União Nacional* exerted no real control over either the government or the administration. It was merely a political tool, used to select members for the chamber of deputies and the local administration, and to provide some veneer of legitimacy in the regular 'non-competitive elections'.

In several of the dictatorial regimes associated with fascism, both the government and its administration were to some extent subjected to interference from a single party that had become an influential organization. This did not happen in Portugal, where a centrally controlled public administration was instead the main instrument of dictatorial political power. When the New State created such organizations as the paramilitary Portuguese Youth movement (*Mocidade Portuguesa*) and the anti-communist Portuguese Legion militia (*Legião Portuguesa*), these were controlled by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior, respectively, upon whom they remained dependent for the duration of the regime. The same was true of Salazar's political police (*Polícia de Vigilância e de Defesa do Estado*, PVDE), which was similarly responsible to the Minister of the Interior.

The main characteristic of the New State's governing elite was that its members belonged to a small and exclusive political and bureaucratic class that almost completely dominated the senior ranks of the armed forces, the senior administration and the universities – within which the legal profession was strongly represented. Portugal's single party, being kept organizationally weak and dependent, was never an important element either in the political decision-making process or in the selection of the ministerial elite. Several organizations, such as the *Legião Portuguesa*, the *Mocidade Portuguesa* and the PVDE, were kept entirely dependent on the ministers. National propaganda was administered by a directorate-general within the state apparatus, equipped with its own autonomous leadership that was responsible to Salazar personally rather than to the party. Similarly, the National Federation for Happiness at Work (a modest Portuguese version of Mussolini's *Dopolavoro* and Hitler's DAF), was dependent on the Under-Secretary of State for Corporations. The party's main function was to select the local and the parliamentary elites, and it remained small and devoid of organizations capable of mobilizing political influence.

In sum, despite early Francoism's proximity to fascism, both Iberian regimes represented a dictatorial model that was closer to that of Catholic and corporatist traditionalism, complete with a strong military elite and a controlled fascist minority.

Central and eastern Europe

Compared with their contemporaries in southern Europe, the right-wing dictatorships that developed in central and eastern Europe were generally of much shorter duration and less institutionalized. They also tended to become more deeply conditioned by World War Two, and some were, to a greater or lesser degree, forced into agreements with home-grown fascist movements.⁵⁶

The Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime that was formed in Austria in 1934, and that ended with the country's annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938, has often been described as 'clerico-fascist' and compared with the Iberian dictatorships of Salazar and Franco.⁵⁷ It was a regime established from above and rooted in social Catholicism, with a corporatist constitution anchored in traditionalist Catholic values and in the establishment of a one-party state under the Fatherland Front (*Vaterländische Front*, VF). It suffered from the impact of an Austrian Nazi party that had strong links with Hitler's movement, and of a home-grown fascist movement, the *Heimwehr*. The course of the dictatorship was marked dramatically by the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss in June 1934, undertaken by a group of conspirators from the banned Austrian Nazi party.⁵⁸ His policies were continued by his successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg. The latter strengthened Austria's links with Italy, despite his room for manoeuvre being increasingly restricted by the clandestine Nazi party and the growing alliance between Hitler and Mussolini from 1936 onward. Internal conflicts with the *Heimwehr* led it to leave the government and forced its integration into the VF, a symbol of the classic tension between the authoritarian elite and native fascism. Hitler's pursuit of *Anschluss* approached its climax in February 1938, when he forced Schuschnigg to legalize the Austrian Nazi party and include it in his government. Presented early the following month with an ultimatum from Hitler to nominate the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, Schuschnigg resigned, leading Hitler to announce an annexation that was generally welcomed by the Austrians themselves.

Poland was similarly fertile territory for the development of fascist movements, in a situation where national minorities comprised 35 per cent of the population, where significant levels of antisemitism existed,

and where the consolidation of parliamentary democracy within the post-1918 republic had proved problematic. However, as in some other countries of the European periphery, a preventative *coup d'état* had limited the development of native fascism. After this was carried out in 1926 by General Pilsudski, he was able to establish a form of single-party rule. Yet his dictatorship did not establish authoritarian institutions on a scale comparable with its southern European counterparts. Nor did the German occupation (let alone the Soviet one) in 1939 help the local fascists, some of whom, particularly those involved with Boleslaw Piasecki's National-Radical Camp (*Obóz Narodowo Radykalny*), participated in the resistance.

The origins of Hungarian fascism are much stronger and clearer, with an important national socialist mark. Rooted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the counter-revolutionary movements that followed in 1918, the emergence of extreme right-wing paramilitary movements deeply affected Hungarian political life. Admiral Horthy, who was from 1920 theoretically the regent of a Hungary awaiting some form of restored monarchy, presided over the country's destiny until 1944. At that point, the leader's futile attempts to break his alliance with Germany and strike a deal with the advancing Red Army led to a phase of Nazi occupation.⁵⁹ The Hungarian fascist groups were highly antisemitic, blending their racism with a Christian fundamentalist mysticism. Several right-wing governments entered into conflict with the oft-banned fascists. In 1938, Ferenc Szálasi established a Hungarian national socialist party. Although swiftly proscribed, it equally quickly reappeared as the Arrow Cross Party. This was the banner under which the Hungarian fascists gained parliamentary representation with 48 deputies. The country's participation in World War Two on the side of Germany did not provide the fascists with access to power, however. It was only in 1944, following the Nazi occupation, and particularly after the Germans had provided support for an Arrow Cross coup against Horthy, that Hungary (now as a mere puppet state) came under fascist control for a few short months. Although antisemitic activities preceded Szálasi's arrival in power, a significant number of Magyar civil and military officials now became important actors in the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.

In Romania, the parliamentary regime endured several crises until 1938. As noted previously, this country was the birthplace of eastern Europe's most successful fascist movement, the Iron Guard. Founded in 1927 as the Legion of the Archangel Michael, and named after the famous Orthodox icon, this organization had a strong religious and mystical component.⁶⁰ It was strongly antisemitic and pro-rural, and attracted a

significant number of young intellectuals. The movement was always at crossed swords with the liberal governments; its leader, Corneliu Codreanu, was often arrested and its activities were banned. In 1932, the party won five seats in Parliament – although the following year it was once again outlawed. Political violence was one constant of its existence, but the life of its legionnaires was to become much harder in 1938, with the establishment by Carol II of a royal dictatorship, which swiftly ordered Codreanu's own execution. In September 1940, Carol nominated General Antonescu as his prime minister. At a stage when concessions (such as the transfer of Transylvania to German control) were being made to Hitler, Antonescu himself speedily took over dictatorial powers and forced the king to abdicate in favour of his son Michael. Preparing to enter the war on the side of the Nazis, Antonescu called the Iron Guard's legionnaires into his government. Early in 1941, however, fearing a fracture in the authoritarian state's bureaucratic structure and acting with Hitler's approval, he dissolved the Iron Guard in response to a fascist rebellion and exiled many of its leaders to Germany. Antonescu's own brand of conservative military dictatorship then survived until 1944, when he was arrested on the authority of King Michael.

War and occupation

It is clear that the development of a number of existing dictatorships was strongly conditioned by the outbreak of World War Two. Yet certain other dictatorial regimes, including some that were rooted in local elites and that possessed various degrees of autonomy, came about only as the direct products of German occupation. The Vichy government led by Marshal Pétain is perhaps the best known of these, but they include Quisling's administration in Norway and Mussolini's Republic of Salò, among others. There were also cases, such as Tiso's regime in Slovakia and that of Ante Pavelić's Ustaše in Croatia, where dictatorships emerged in new countries with a view to fulfilling demands for autonomy or independence.

When in June 1940, following the German invasion, what remained of the French government led by Pétain installed itself in the town of Vichy, the old Marshal had complete power to write a new constitution and to govern by decree. He was to rule the part of France that was not under German direct control between 1940 and 1944, in an attempt to promote a 'National Revolution' that would make France 'authoritarian, hierarchical, corporatist, antisemitic, and Catholic'.⁶¹ In its early incarnation, Vichy was strongly influenced by the ideology

of *Action Française* and of conservative Catholicism. Under the slogan 'work, family and homeland', and beneath the gaze of bronze busts of Pétain, the regime undertook projects of corporatist organization, supported Catholic schools and abolished divorce. There was no single party in the dictatorship, which governed through an administration not so dissimilar in structure from the Third Republic. This pursued the antisemitic policies that, since 1940, had characterized the regime's active collaboration with the German occupiers. The majority of French fascist groups (for example, Doriot's PPF) remained in Paris with the Germans, where they criticised Vichy. In 1944, faced with conservative hesitation, Vichy increasingly became a police state in which the fascist influences increased – particularly those of Marcel Déat and Joseph Darnand.

The first Slovak republic was established in 1939 as a mere puppet regime after the Germans had partitioned former Czechoslovakia and directly occupied its western regions of Bohemia and Moravia. Under those circumstances, Hitler offered Slovakia its formal independence, which was immediately proclaimed by the Catholic priest Monsignor Tiso. The Slovak People's Party (*Slovenská ľudová strana*) – renamed Hlinka's Slovak People's Party – Party of Slovak National Unity (*Hlinkova Slovenská ľudová strana – strana Slovenskej národnej jednoty*) following the death of its founder, Father Andrej Hlinka, in 1938 – very quickly transformed itself into a single party with a youth section and a militia, the Hlinka Guard (*Hlinkova garda*).⁶² Dominated by Nazi Germany until the collapse of 1945, the movement that ran this Slovak satellite state was constantly marked by tension between its authoritarian Catholic section and the radical faction led by Vojtech Tuka, which was much closer to German National Socialism.

Extremist nationalism was also present in the short-lived independent state of Croatia between 1941 and 1945, which was led, under the protective wing of Germany and Italy, by Ante Pavelić's Ustaše movement.⁶³ This regime was characterized by its severe ethnic violence against Jews, gypsies, and particularly Serbs. The Ustaše's authority was quickly contested and, from 1942, it was only able to continue by means of the German military support that protected it from increasing antifascist guerrilla attack until 1945.

In the north of Nazi-dominated Europe, the most complete institutionalization of a local fascist regime with German support took place in Norway where, following the German occupation that began in April 1940, Vidkun Quisling's minuscule National Unity was installed in power. Inspired directly by Nazi Germany, with a Führer and a monopolistic party, tensions soon emerged between Quisling and the

German administration which, according to internal reports, did not give his government the respect it had expected.⁶⁴

Conclusion

When, in 1945, Europe celebrated victory over fascism, and when what became generally known as ‘the quislings’ faced trial and even execution, the major political actors had no doubts about the end of fascism. While the extreme right had not disappeared in the rubble of World War Two, and while the Iberian dictatorships had survived the conflict, the ‘fascist era’ was over. During the interwar period, the two main challengers to liberal democracy had been fascism and communism. While the former had been limited both geographically and culturally, the latter now emerged not only partially victorious, but also with the capacity greatly to expand its influence during the later 1940s.

Even though fascist movements were a decisive feature of the interwar period, it was their arrival in power in Italy and Germany that provided a template for elsewhere. Certain characteristics of fascism in power were the common patrimony of the modern right-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century, with some even prospering after the ‘end of fascism’ in 1945: the ultranationalism, the communitarian and/or corporatist relationship between the state and civil society, the single party and the anticommunism. But could it be that the stage of radicalization shows us fascism at its most distinctive? Some historians perhaps exaggerate when they claim that the ‘fascist regimes tried to redraw so radically the boundaries between private and public that the private sphere almost disappeared.’⁶⁵ However, it seems obvious that the ‘totalitarian tension’ is an area in which the fascists differed from the other right-wing dictatorships of the period. It is only recently that, regarding Mussolini’s regime, certain aspects of this tension have been ‘grouped’ to underline the eventual radicalization of Italian fascism in power: the Ethiopian war, the ‘totalitarian leap’ (*svolta totalitaria*) of the 1930s, and the racist legislation against Jews (albeit more limited in scope than Hitler’s decrees).⁶⁶ In the Nazi case, however, no doubt at all surrounds the completeness of extremism. There, as Paxton concludes concerning the issue of a total radicalization, ‘comparison is hardly possible: only one fascist regime really reached it’.⁶⁷

Further reading

The bibliography on fascism is so large that the main task is to pluck only the most important works from the shelves. As indicated by many

of the detailed citations given in the Notes, fascism continues to attract a considerable degree of attention and many works have been published over the past few years. However, it is an area that has become more restricted in disciplinary terms, with historians clearly predominating, while sociology and political science seem to be paying less heed to the subject.

For many years, analysts of this topic paid little attention to what was written and said by fascists themselves. Yet that may well be the best place to begin here. Among the anthologies containing primary sources, Roger Griffin’s *Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) is the best introduction. This should be supplemented with *The Fascist Reader* (London: Routledge, 2002), edited by Aristotle Kallis, which is an excellent secondary source. If the aim is to know almost everything on the subject, then the most up-to-date encyclopaedia is Cyprian P. Blamires’s *World Fascism: A Historical Overview* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006, two volumes). At the opposite end of the scale, the best short history is Kevin Passmore’s, *Fascism: A Very Brief Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

The most informed and complete history of fascism remains Stanley G. Payne’s *A History of Fascism* (London: UCL, 1996). As well as its excellent introduction to theories and interpretations, Payne discusses all the national variants with great analytical rigour. More recently, Robert O. Paxton’s *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London: Penguin, 2005) has managed to achieve a synthesis where the analysis is particularly perceptive concerning the relationship between movements and regimes.

In his very thorough work, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Michael Mann offers us the most interesting account of European fascist movements and the conditions that led to their political success during the interwar years. Mann’s work should be complemented with Nancy Bermeo’s excellent *The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), which is a study of the mass support for extremist right-wing groups that also compares interwar Europe with Latin America.

The most complete comparative study of the crisis of democratic politics during the ‘fascist era’ is *Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919–39: Systemic Case Studies* (London: Macmillan, 2000), edited by Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell; note also their *Authoritarianism and Democracy in Europe, 1919–39: Comparative Analyses* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). The fullest work on fascism and the extreme right-wing movements that it inspired overseas is *Fascism Outside Europe* (New York: SSM-Columbia University Press, 2001), edited by Stein U. Larsen.

There is an abundance of histories of German National Socialism, and an ample literature on Italian fascism too. Most of these works repeat – to a greater or lesser extent – what the others say, but there are few comparative studies of the two most emblematic dictatorships. One recent exception in the field of cultural history is Roger Griffin's *Fascism and Modernity: The Sense of a New Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), while another is the excellent comparative picture provided by MacGregor Knox in *To the Threshold of Power, 1922–33: Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Notes

- 1 See Adrian Lyttelton, *Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929*, (London: Routledge, 2004, 2nd edn). The concept itself derives from the Latin *fascis* (plural *fascēs*): a bundle of rods lashed together around a protruding axe blade so as to symbolize the unity, strength and discipline of the magistracy in ancient Rome. This image would feature strongly in the visual propaganda developed by Mussolini's movement.
- 2 See Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1993, 2nd edn), pp. 26–52.
- 3 See R. Thurlow, *Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918–1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); A. C. Pinto, *The Blue Shirts: Portuguese Fascism in Interwar Europe* (New York: SSM-Columbia University Press, 2000).
- 4 See Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999); Hans F. Dahl, *Quisling: A Study in Treachery*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- 5 See R. Ioanid, *The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania* (New York: EEM-Columbia University Press, 1990).
- 6 M. Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 13. Further elements quoted from Mann's definition come from the pages immediately following.
- 7 Based on the Table 'Typological Description of Fascism' in S. G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 7.
- 8 R. O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 218.
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 M. Mann, *Fascists*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 11 See R. Eatwell, 'Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4 (2): 161–94 (1992).
- 12 See Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- 13 M. Mann, *Fascists*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
- 14 E. Gentile, 'The Fascist Party', in C. P. Blamires (ed.), *World Fascism: A Historical Overview*, Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), p. 226.

- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 227.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 228.
- 17 R. O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
- 18 Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 132–34.
- 19 This is the term used by N. Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
- 20 Michel Winock, *Nationalism, Anti-semitism and Fascism in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
- 21 See Chapter 9 in this volume, and Brian Jenkins (ed.), *France in the Era of Fascism. Essays on the French Authoritarian Right* (Oxford: Berghahan, 2004).
- 22 Robert O. Paxton, 'France', in C. P. Blamires (ed.), *World Fascism*, *op. cit.*, p. 246.
- 23 Martin Conway, *Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement, 1940–44* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
- 24 Gerhard Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German Occupation* (Oxford: Berg, 1988).
- 25 See J. J. Linz and A. Stepan (eds), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); D. Berg-Schlosser and J. Mitchell (eds), *The Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan, 2000).
- 26 R. O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 123–24.
- 28 A. Kallis, 'The "Regime-Model" of Fascism: A Typology', *European History Quarterly* 30: 96–97 (2000).
- 29 See A. C. Pinto, R. Eatwell and S. U. Larsen (eds), *Charisma and Fascism in Inter-War Europe* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- 30 See J. J. Linz, *Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
- 31 See Pierre Milza, *Mussolini* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).
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