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Cultural differences and hetero-ethnicization in Portugal: the perceptions of White and Black people

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Abstract
An analysis of some socio-psychological processes of discrimination against black people is presented. This analysis is framed on the hypothesis according to which cultural categories are now functional equivalents of racial categories. Folk-cultural categories offer criteria that allow the organization and the accentuation of differences between human groups, and sustain the implicit process that transforms the difference into inferiority (the process of hetero-ethnicization). In favour of this hypothesis, the first part of the paper analyses the main elements of social representations of differences between human groups based on the idea of human races, and then the representations of differences based on cultural classifications. Empirical arguments are then presented. The authors revisit data showing that white Portuguese who accentuate the differences between themselves and black people are more discrimination-oriented than 'non-discriminationists'. In this same vein, a study carried out on young black people living in Portugal shows that those who most believe they are perceived to be culturally different by white Portuguese are also those who most believe themselves to be discriminated against.

The idea that Portuguese society both past and present was able to deal with differences between peoples in a manner that sheltered it from prejudice and its consequences is a recurring theme in Portugal: in common-sense discourse, in the media, and even among political analysts. Is this belief so strongly entrenched that it can hide the everyday expressions of racial discrimination and xenophobia from social visibility? Or is it really true that this kind of discrimination is not as significant in social terms in Portugal as it is in other countries? These questions have gained new relevance as Portugal finds itself a country of immigration and diversity.

It was in this context that we embarked on a research programme in 1995 on the expressions of racism in Portugal. In the first phase this programme adopted an extensive methodology, and was based on a co-relational survey or study using a representative sample from the city of Lisbon and neighbouring municipalities (Vala, Brito and Lopes 1999). This is the part of the country with the largest number of Africans, whether Portuguese nationals or immigrants. This research project looked at the structure of racist beliefs regarding Black people residing in Portugal, whether they be immigrants or Portuguese nationals; it studied the impact of those beliefs on orientations towards discriminatory behaviour; it identified the psychological and social factors
which sustain the organization of racist representations and beliefs; and it compared data obtained in Portugal with data obtained in European countries which were traditionally host nations for immigrants. In the conclusion to this study, Vala and his colleagues (1999) stress that racist beliefs in Portugal are structured in a similar way to that in other European countries; and that the overall terms, even though in this case the authors do identify some theoretically and socially relevant differences relative to other European countries. This study also showed that there is a pattern of blatant and subtle racism in Portugal similar to the one identified in other European countries by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995).

In that study the authors undertook an empirical analysis of the process whereby racialization has changed to an ethnicization of Black people. Developing the theoretical position of Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) on subtle racism, the working hypotheses of Vala and colleagues were as follows: in societies which are legally anti-racist, and in which everyday social relations are predominantly governed by the rule of anti-racism, social representations on differences between peoples have shifted from explaining these differences in terms of race to explaining them in terms of culture. Social representations on differences between peoples based on the idea of culture are ethnicizing, in the sense that they embody an aspect of attributing cultural inferiority to groups that previously were racialized. Finally, the public expression of the inferiorization of one culture in relation to another has also come to be seen as socially unacceptable, so that ethnicity today is done in hidden ways by simply stressing the cultural differences between majorities and minorities. This is done when these minorities present phenotypical traits that were previously used to infer racial difference. This article revisits and further develops these hypotheses.

We begin by presenting the main elements of social representations on the differences between peoples based on the idea of human races (racialization). This will help us place in context the main elements of representations on differences based on the idea of cultures (ethnicization). We will also discuss the role of psychological essentialism and of objectivation processes in structuring these representations and to what extent it renders their effects equivalent. We will next examine the hypothesis that to regard another culture as inferior has become unacceptable, in the same way that to regard another race as inferior is considered unacceptable, so that the belief that another culture is inferior is today expressed in hidden ways, through the simple accentuation of cultural differences rather than through the open expression of a belief in a hierarchy of cultures or civilizations. To support this hypothesis we will use empirical arguments that we have already published.

In a third step, we will present further empirical examples to support the hypothesis that the exaggeration of cultural differences is used as a means of inferiorizing minorities. These empirical arguments are based on a study carried out on young Black people (both Portuguese nationals and immigrants) living in the Lisbon region. The previous results with White people showed that the greater the attribution of cultural differences (or the more people establish a hidden hierarchy of cultures), the greater the orientation towards discrimination. These new results show that those who believe they are perceived as being culturally different (or that they are believed to be culturally inferior) associate that belief with the perception that they are discriminated against at various levels of social life.

The problem discussed in this article has been analysed in the framework of studies on racist and cultural differentiation (e.g. Wierzbicka 1997; Taguief 1987), and in the framework of the new subtle and indirect forms of racism in Europe (e.g. Pettigrew and Mertens 1995; Arcuri and Bocca 1999; Rueda and Navas 1996) and in the USA (e.g. McConahay 1986). But there is as yet little empirical illustration of this phenomenon, and hypotheses regarding its psychological, social, and ideological bases have been little developed. This article thus focuses on the hypothesis of the exaggeration of cultural differences as a form of ethnicization and consequently of regarding another culture as inferior. The target group for the process of racialization and ethnicization are Black people who are either Portuguese nationals or immigrants in Portugal. This article focuses, then, in its first part, on attitudes of White Portuguese towards Black people and, in its second part, on the reactions of Black people to the attitudes they attribute to White people. The reading of the results we present here should take into account preceding research on immigration in Portugal (see Pires 1999), on the integration of immigrants in the job market (Baganha, Ferrao and Malheiros 1999) and in urban contexts (Justino et al. 1999) and, in particular, on the construction of their identities (see Saint-Maurice 1997, on the Cape-Verdian community and Machado 1998, on the Guinean community).

Racial differences as social representations of differences between human groups

The idea of race and racial hierarchy sustained the European colonial empires and was used to legitimate the annihilation of human groups. With the support of biology and physical anthropology (Bracinha-Vieira 1996), and later other disciplines of human and social science, particularly psychology (Billig 1981), the idea was focused on human groups with different phenotypes of terms of skin colour, for example, but also in the shape of the head or other physical characteristics; for a critical and dated review, which is therefore of particular interest, see Klineber 1957) were genetically different due to the presence of 'a causal relation between human groups'. This social representation associates the principles of the biological basis of cultures and racial hierarchies with the idea that groups of genetically different human beings have different ancestries as between each other, but common ancestries within themselves. In addition, and according to this representation, since groups of human beings are naturally separate, these
Traits that evoke ‘nature’ or ‘natural traits’ are used to characterize people and animals, by contrast to traits used to characterize people exclusively (Moscovici and Perez 1999). Both types may include positive and negative traits.

Groups should remain separate, and this means that there should not be marriage, sexual intercourse or mutual progeny between them (see Allport 1954; Lemaine and Ben Brika 1997). This rejection of relations between separate racial groups is aimed at preserving the purity of each group and, in particular, the perceived superiority of one group over another.

With the exception of an unpublished study by Rodriguez-Torres and Rodriguez-Perez (1997), we are not aware of any systematic studies on this form of social representation, but it is possible to deduce it from partial studies of ‘racial attitudes’. These studies generally include questionnaire items tapping attitudes that reject sexual intimacy, marriage and mixed progeny, and beliefs related to the notion of racial hierarchies (e.g. ‘Blacks are a less gifted race’). In addition, a study carried out on anti-Black racism in Portugal (Vala, Brito and Lopes 1999) showed a degree of association between these beliefs, sufficient to enable us to say that there is a racial social representation which legitimizes discrimination, and not just diffuse prejudice against Black people.

Using an intuitive sociology (Hirschfeld 1998), an ideology which legitimized colonial exploitation (Alexandre 1999; Castelo 1999), and also ‘scientific racism’, common sense and institutional apparatuses constructed and deconstructed racial groups in accordance with more or less explicit strategies of dominance, or other socially functional uses. Despite its archaism and scientific discredit (Gould 1991), this social representation of race as the key to the description of groups of human beings survives, even though it is to be found more frequently in the description of some social groups than of others.

In actual fact the empirical evidence shows that social sanction against blatant racism does not impact equally on the various groups which have traditionally been the object of racialization. For example, in a study on racism against Gypsies conducted by Correia, Brito, Vala and Perez (2002), authors found that university students openly expressed racial prejudice against this group, a result which was all the more significant because university students are, as a group, among those whom we expect to be most aware of the sanction against racism. To be more specific, the results of that study show that in order to describe Gypsies, interviewees used negative traits which evoke ‘nature’ (traits that we use to describe people and animals as opposed to ‘cultural’ traits) more than any other type of trait? This combination of negative valence and the negative content of traits reveals blatant prejudice against Gypsies. But in relation to Black people, all our results indicate that there is more veiled racism than overt racism. A more recent study with a representative sample of the Portuguese population (Vala, Cabral and Ramos 2002) asked interviewees to indicate the categories of people ‘that they would not like to have as neighbours’. Only 8 per cent of interviewees mentioned ‘Black people’ and 7 per cent ‘persons of another race’, while 37 per cent noted ‘Gypsies’. Given that this question is a clear indicator of blatant racism, the results show that there is a stronger social sanction against racism toward Black people than there is against racism directed at Gypsies.

In fact it would be hard to find, whether in Portugal or in any other European country, a significant number of people who would agree with the statement by Oliveira Martins, a famous nineteenth-century Portuguese historian and founder of a socialist party, that: The idea of educating the Negroes is absurd, not only in the light of history, but also taking into account the mental capabilities of those inferior races’ (Martins 1881 [1995]; cf. Alexandre 1999). However, in the 1997 Eurobarometer, 38 per cent of Europeans still stated that they would find it ‘hard to accept having descendants who belonged to minority groups’. This is a core belief in the social representation on racial differences. In another work, on the images of other peoples in Western consciousness, from the monster races described by Pliny in the first century BC to the present day, Jahoda (1999) shows how those images, and the myths on which they were based, are still present in modern thought, and continue to nurture prejudice.

Despite the large numbers of Europeans who still look at differences between human beings from a racialized perspective, and do not regard racism as a crime (see the 1997 Eurobarometer), the majority of Europeans today are aware that racist beliefs are not socially condoned (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). These beliefs supported the formation of colonial empires, became more entrenched with the emergence of nationalism and became institutionalized with Nazism. But after the Second World War, and once the horror of a racist state had been uncovered, the Universal Charter of Human Rights (1948), the UNESCO Declaration on Race (drawn up in 1950 by a group of anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists), different social movements in Europe, and the struggles of Black Americans and of African liberation movements started a process which gradually made racial discrimination illegal and racist beliefs socially unacceptable.

Once the legitimacy of the idea of race had been discarded, what new social representations on the differences between groups of human beings emerged to justify prejudice and everyday and institutionalized discriminatory behaviour against persons of a different-coloured skin or otherwise phenotypically different? How do we in fact explain the persistence of racism in societies that are formally anti-racist? We shall revisit the hypothesis proposed and studied by Vala, Lopes and Brito (1999), according to which racial theories were replaced by theories regarding the differences between human groups based on cultural classification criteria, and that these are the criteria underlying those theories which are analysed as new forms of racism, conceptually labelled modern racism (McConahay 1986) and symbolic racism (Sears 1988) in the USA, and in Europe as subtle racism (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) and latent racism (Perez, Mugny, Lavata and Fierres 1993). The common factor in all these types of racism is the fact that these phenomena refer to a categorization based on cultural differences and no longer on racial differences.

As early as the 1950s Levy-Strauss had in fact warned that this possible shift might take place:

We should ask ourselves what makes us think that we will be able to form new areas. We need to know if the historical and intellectual significance of the fact that a person is white or black, or has more or less of a particular attribute, has been removed from its merely intellectual or moral significance to the fact that a person has white or black skin, or straight hair or curly hair, if we were to remain silent in relation to another issue which experience has shown he cannot deal with immediately. If there are no innate racial aptitudes, how does one explain the fact that the civilisation developed by the White man has made the
enormous progress that we have seen? ... We cannot claim to have solved the problem of inequality between human races, if we do not also look at the issue of inequality – or of diversity – of human cultures, which in fact, even if not by right, are closely associated with it in the public mind (Lévy-Strauss 1952 [1973]: 11).

Cultural classifications as the basis for new social representations on the differences between human beings

In order to understand the new common-sense theories on the classification of human beings based on cultural criteria, we should recall that the social sciences also replaced the concept of race by new typologies based on the concepts of culture and ethnicity, with a cultural label being applied to each human group considered to have its own specific cultural features.

Science not only produced cultural classifications, it also often explicitly idealized Western culture, representing it as the prototype of human culture (for a discussion of this in anthropology, see Schurz 1966). In the specific case of social psychology, for example, Triandis et al. (1988), in a research project on cultural individualism versus collectivism (or the representation of self as an independent versus interdependent being), take an idealized view of individualism as being the precursor of economic development and, at the same time, as a structure of thought regarding the self which can only occur within the framework of a certain degree of economic development: 'affluence implies the ability to “do one’s own thing”, but “doing one’s own thing” implies greater creativity for the society, hence more innovation and economic development' (324). In the case of the cultural classifications produced by sociology, a typical case of implicit idealization of WASP culture is that of the dilemmas which underlie Parsons and Shils’ (1953) ‘pattern variables’.

Following a more general hypothesis by Moscovici (1984), we propose that this typological and tendentially hierarchical logic produced within the social sciences (and which in any event did help generate an understanding of the diversity of norms and values, and of the heterogeneity and richness that difference represents), was appropriated, transformed and disseminated by the media. They became part of everyday conversation, and so came to provide the basic structure for a new social representation on the differences between human beings.

In our hypothesis the cultural and historic classifications produced by the social sciences in the West sustain the cultural classifications produced in day-to-day conversation and use. These classifications are generally arranged in the form of opposites (for example, individualism/collectivism, masculine/feminine, protestant ethic/Catholic ethic), and are then subsequently transformed into evaluations of the good/bad, modern/non-modern, civilized/non-civilized, better/worse kind. These classifications give names to differences, they evaluate, arrange in hierarchical order and enable exclusion based on criteria that do not violate the social norm against racist behaviour. It should be noted, moreover, that as in racial classifications the point of reference, the referent which enables the comparison to be made, is the White man, so in the cultural classifications the same thing happens – the referent is White Western culture, and it is always the others who are ‘ethnic’.5

An etymological note may help us to understand how the term ‘ethnic’ can be used to exclude others. In the Dicionário do Morais (Moreno, Júnior and Machado 1961) it is mentioned that the term ‘ethnic’ was used by the Fathers of the Church to designate the ‘pagans’. And the Dicionário Etimológico by José Pedro Machado (1952; 1977) indicates that this term was used by the Jews to designate the ‘Gentiles’, while other references in the same dictionary associate the term ‘ethnic’ with ‘heretic’. So the discrimination inherent in the idea of the ‘ethnic’ is nothing new. In a sense one could say that in Western thought exclusion based on cultural classification preceded exclusion based on racial classification.

For example, Callier-Boisvert (2000), in a study on the categories used by the Portuguese in Brazil at the time of the Discoveries, mentions that they classified mankind into two major groups – Christians and non-Christians, with the non-Christian group being sub-divided into Jews, Moors/Muslims and Gentiles. This latter designation was applied to ‘the Indians’ and had a triple meaning: they were barbarians, they were pagans, and they were free. What distinguished them from the Christians was a cultural factor: the degree of civilization and religion, and not biological factors. In the same way, Hespanha (1999), in a paper on the work of Luís de Molina, a sixteenth-century Portuguese theologian, on the enslavement of Black people, notes that for this writer ‘the wild and savage nature of African customs ... are not signs of a total savagery and the immunity of these communities, but rather they are isolated characteristics of specific political regimes’ (13). Thus in Molina’s work, although the Africans are shown as being completely different from the Europeans and as uncivilized, ‘it is never stated that this derives from any special psychological or moral nature, nor even that its origins lie in the environment and climate of the tropics’ (13). Schwarz too (1996) draws attention to the fact that discrimination in Greek and Roman society was based on cultural differentiation, there being no evidence of prejudice based on colour of the skin, nor specifically of any prejudice against Black people.

The idea that cultural classification preceded racial classification is in a way also upheld by Lévy-Strauss (1952 [1973]) in his reflections on sociological evolutionism. As noted by Lévy-Strauss, Spencer and Tylor wrote and published their work on social evolutionism before Darwin published his work on biological evolutionism. We thus have a path which runs from the cultural to the racial, and comes back to the cultural, or a coincidence of racial and cultural differentiation. In our recent history we have witnessed the move from the description and ordering of differences based on the idea of race to those based on the idea of culture.

According to our hypothesis, common sense has naturalized cultural classifications, as it has the racial, and has established its own hierarchical order of them. Below are some theoretical arguments in favour of this idea. It is also possible to advance some empirical arguments regarding the common-sense hierarchical ordering of cultures and the consequences of this for discrimination, and this we will do subsequently.

The naturalization of taxonomies and the naturalization of cultural differences can be clearly deduced from their interpretation as social representations. In fact it is a characteristic of a social representation to regard concepts not as mental constructs, but as imputations of meaning, as reproductions of what is real, as representing in the mind an objective reality
which is outside it (Moscovici 1969; 1976). It is in this sense that social thought is described as being anti-nominalist: each concept is thought to be matched by an objective reality (Ibanez 1988) and cultural classifications are therefore seen as facts, in the same way that colour is seen as representing race. In the latter case, one moves from the observable to a concept, while in the former one moves from a concept (culture) to an observable fact (behaviour). In both cases, the concept becomes as established as the observable facts.

In Moscovici’s theory social representations are described as being controlled by two psychological processes: objectification and anchoring. Through the process of objectification, an abstract concept becomes concrete and, consequently, becomes observable things or facts, and are no longer seen as images or as metaphors. The process of anchoring is the way new things are absorbed by the pre-existing way of thinking. This process indicates how the new cultural classifications can acquire the same properties as the old racial classifications. As the latter are seen as natural facts, so too the new ones will be. The assimilation of the unfamiliar to the familiar is a characteristic of everyday patterns of thinking, and specifically of the type of social thinking known as social representations (Moscovici 1984).

But there is another theoretical orientation that can help us to uphold the hypothesis that, at least in some circumstances, ‘common sense’ will tend to view cultural categorizations as natural facts. A number of writers have come to view essentialism as a characteristic of everyday thinking which is to be found when people categorize (see Hirschfeld 1998). Medin and Ortony (1989) suggested the specific term ‘psychological essentialism’ to denote the belief whereby categories reflect specific essences. Allport (1954), many years earlier, clearly mentioned this essentialist orientation within the categorization process, manifest, for example, in expressions such as ‘the oriental soul’ or ‘Latin passion’. Along the same lines, Rothbart and Taylor (1992) distinguish between natural categories (e.g. apple), artificial categories (e.g. car) and social categories (e.g. race). Now these writers put forward the hypothesis that common sense sees these social categories as natural categories and not as artificial categories, when in fact they are closer to the latter. Given that social categories are seen as natural categories, they are then perceived as having the same characteristics as these. In other words, they are perceived as having an essence and, consequently, homogeneity, exclusivity, permanence and strong inductive potential.

Given that cultural categories are social categories, we can accept that common sense perceives them, like other social categories, as natural categories, and similarly endowed with essence, of an immutable nature. It is in the light of this that we interpret the fact that some 40 per cent of European interviewees regarded ‘those belonging to minorities (cultural, racial or religious) as being too different to be able to be accepted’ – in other words, to be able to change (Eurobarometer 1997). It is also in this sense that we interpret the limits which the same interviewees place on assimilation, in the sense that they believe the minorities should preserve their culture. In many cases such a position does not mean that the other’s difference is positively valued, but indicates rather that the other is considered to be unable to change, unable to alter his deep-set cultural nature (for an experimental illustration of this belief, see Lima and Vala 2002).

What brings the cultural and racial classifications of human beings together is that underlying both there is an essentialist perspective. As Young (1999) sums up: essentialism may involve either the belief that groups’ traditions generate an essence (cultural essentialism), or the belief that biological differences underlie culture and patterns of behaviour (biological essentialism). From our point of view, the first type of essentialism corresponds to the process of ethnicization and the second type to racialization. In the same way, Lopes and Brito (1999) suggest that in the process of racialization the stimulus is provided by the physical phenotype, from which a deeper or genotypical difference is inferred (race) which in turn enables cultural and behavioural differences to be inferred. In the process of ethnicization, the stimulus comes from behavioural differences which, once arranged into cultural categories, enable deeper or genotypical differences to be inferred (race). For these authors, the essence which operate in the process of social categorization are always referenced to a natural base, while for Young (1999) and Leyens et al. (2000), these essences may be of various different types (e.g. biological, cultural or religious).

From the psychological point of view, negative reactions to cultural difference was from an early stage posed as one of the fundamental pillars of prejudice (Rokeach 1968) and, although the hypothesis is currently controversial (for a review, see Brown 1995), it has found support in a number of fundamental psychological processes. A negative reaction to difference can be interpreted in the framework of motivational factors, in so far as difference can be seen as a threat to cognitive congruency or to cognitive balance (Heider 1958). The same negative reaction can be interpreted against the background of perceived threats to the values of the in-group, in so far as the group believes that the different values of the out-group may ‘contaminate’, violate or even destroy the values of the in-group (Haddock, Zanna and Esses 1994; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986). Finally, epistemic factors may also underlie a negative reaction to difference: if we follow the social comparison theory of Festinger (1954) we can assume that the perceived differences between the values of the in-group and the values of the out-group could be seen as a threat to the validity of the values of the in-group, in the sense that the mere fact of understanding that there is another system of values renders the in-group’s value system no longer universal, consensual and natural, as it supposedly was until then, and therefore questions its indisputability and validity. As Campbell and LeVine (1968) suggest: members of groups see their way of thinking and behaving as natural and correct, and use their normative traditions generate an essence (cultural essentialism), or the belief that biological differences underlie culture and patterns of behaviour (biological essentialism). From our point of view, the first type of essentialism corresponds to the process of ethnicization and the second type to racialization. In the same way, Vala, Lopes and Brito (1999) suggest that in the process of racialization the stimulus is provided by the physical phenotype, from which a deeper or genotypical difference is inferred (race) which in turn enables cultural and behavioural differences to be inferred. In the process of ethnicization, the stimulus comes from behavioural differences which, once arranged into cultural categories, enable deeper or genotypical differences to be inferred (race). For these authors, the essences which operate in the process of social categorization are always referenced to a natural base, while for Young (1999) and Leyens et al. (2000), these essences may be of various different types (e.g. biological, cultural or religious).

6 There are very few empirical studies of the process of essentialization (for an exception see Yzerbyt, Rogier and Fiske 1998). And we are aware of only two studies on how essentialization impacts common sense: Brito and Azzi (2001) and Haslam and Rothschild (2000). Both studies suggest that essentialization is not one-dimensional. In addition, Haslam and Roshchild’s (2000) study looks at another important issue – the relationship between group status and essentialization. Despite the fact that we have to exercise a great deal of caution in our approach to this study, for reasons of methodology – and particularly because of the sample involved – the data show that higher status groups (e.g. males, White people, etc.) are not essentialized in the same way as lower status groups. For example, the essentialization of higher status groups does not homogenize group members, while it does so for lower status groups. We also believe that the in-group is unlikely to be essentialized in the same way as the out-group and that, since social thought is ethnocentric, its aims are to service the objectives of the group, and so essentialization of a particular out-group
regarding them as culturally inferior, is today done in a veiled way, through
the simple accentuation of cultural differences. Note that, in the context of the
war in Afghanistan, it was considered incorrect to state publicly that Western
 civilization was superior to Islamic civilization. For many, this superiority was
obvious, though this should not be openly stated because it went against the
social norm.

In order to evaluate the hypothesis that inferiorization of the culture of
minorities underlies the perception of cultural differences, Vaia et al. used a set of
indicators of perception of racial differences and racial inferiorization of
Black people and a set of indicators of simple perception of cultural differences
between White people and Black people. The results obtained were subjected

8 Note that in Pettigrew and Meertens's racism scale (1995), one of the
sub-scales is indeed a measure of open cultural
inferiorization (e.g. Black people do not teach their children the values necessary
for success in life; Black people do not attribute value to hard work, etc.). The
indicators mentioned in the previous footnote only refer
to differences.

9 All those respondents
with higher than average points on the
scale of racial
differences also
scored higher than
average on the scale of
cultural differences. This is a
further argument in
favour of the notion
that the scale of
cultural differences
measures prejudice.

a principal Components Analysis with oblimin rotation yielded two
factors, which account for some 52 per cent of the variance. On the basis of
these results, two scales were computed, one of cultural differentiation and the
other of racial differentiation. In line with our hypotheses, these indicators
 correlated very acceptably with each other (r = .33, p < .001). Also in line with our
hypotheses, the regression analysis showed that both the scale of racial
differentiation and the scale of cultural differentiation were significant
predictors of attitudes towards Black people, although, as is to be expected, the
coefficient of standardized regression was higher for racial differentiation.

Finally, on the basis of the above-mentioned indices, the authors established
two groups of respondents: those who do not differentiate, either culturally
or racially (non-differentialists); those who only differentiate culturally
(ethnocentrists); those who only differentiate culturally (ethnocentrists); and those who differentiate both
culturally and racially (racializers). As can be seen in Table 1, those who differentiate racially are
those who are most orientated towards discrimination, but in all cases those
who differentiate culturally discriminate more than non-differentialists.

We believe that these results, taken as a whole, are a very plausible
illustration of the idea that the exaggeration of cultural differences often
embodies an idea of cultural hierarchy and that its correlation with racial
inferiorization makes it an aspect of racism. Of course the problem does not lie
in difference itself, but in the meaning people give to it. The above-mentioned
results show that a large number of people implicitly associate cultural
difference with cultural inferiority.

Along the same lines as these results, the study by Pettigrew and Meertens
(1995) on prejudice in Europe shows that inferiorization of the values
of minorities (as measured on the 'traditional values' scale) is correlated with
the simple accentuation of cultural differences (as measured on the 'cultural
differences' scale). A re-analysis of the 1987 Eurobarometer data carried out
by Leach, Peng and Volckens (2000) also shows that the simple perception
of cultural differences is associated with a negative attitude towards North
Africans and Vietnamese in France, Surinamese in Holland, Indians and West
Indians in England, and Turks in Holland and Germany. However, Coenders,
Weertens (1995) our hypothesis, not the blatant-subtle differences is 'acknowledging a social reality, not necessarily expressing a prejudice scale...'

were adapted from only two of the four discrimination scales. For them, highlighting cultural..."

These items perception of cultural differences on orientation towards discrimination to..."

"Wha,t percentage of "White" Portuguese..."'

"Yes, I would feel..."'

"Yes, I would feel..."'

"Yes, I believe Black people are part of a less gifted race..."'

"Believing that Black..."'

Scheepers, Sniderman and Verbeek (2001), in another re-analysis of the same research, argue that the perception of cultural differences does not denote prejudice. In fact, based on new scales, these writers report the effects of the perception of cultural differences on orientation towards discrimination to only two of the four discrimination scales. For them, highlighting cultural differences is 'acknowledging a social reality, not necessarily expressing a subtle prejudice' (288). We must therefore find further empirical support for our hypothesis, not in the context of those who express a perception of cultural differences (the majority), but in the context of those who are labelled as being different (those belonging to minorities). In a new research project, we interviewed a sample of young Black people to find out if they felt that White Portuguese viewed them as culturally different, and to establish whether being labelled as different was associated with the feeling that one is a target of discrimination. Empirical support will be given to our hypothesis if the results of this new study show (a) that interviewees feel that they are viewed as being culturally different; (b) that they associate such perception with being discriminated against.

Young Black people and the perception of racialization and ethnicization

In a study carried out with a sample of 400 young Black people, 42 per cent of them Portuguese nationals and 58 per cent immigrants, residing in Lisbon or in those neighbouring municipalities where the largest percentage of people from the former Portuguese colonies in Africa is to be found, one group of questions focused on the perception of discrimination (Vala 2002). A subset of those questions tapped the perception of racialization and ethnicization. A first analysis of the answers to those questions was carried out by Lopes and Vala (2002).

In order to assess perceptions of racialization, interviewees were shown a certain number of the racialization indicators used in the previous study by Vala et al. (1999) on racism against Black people. We then asked interviewees what percentage of Portuguese would, in their opinion, agree with each one of those indicators. For example, as can be seen in Table 2, 63 per cent of young interviewees believed that Portuguese regard Black people 'as a less gifted race'.

Table 3: Perception of cultural differences (perceptions of young Black people in relation to answers given by White Portuguese and effective responses of White Portuguese).

Table 4: Bi-variate correlations between perception of racialization, perception of being perceived as being different and other indicators of discrimination.

Black interviewees believe that White Portuguese regard Black people 'as a less gifted race'. The same table also shows the actual responses of White Portuguese.

As the table shows, young Black people believe that the majority of Portuguese racialisize Black people on all the items in question. However, it should be noted that, in accordance with the anti-racism norm, even though the percentage of Portuguese who exhibit overt and blatant racial prejudice, though still high, is significantly lower than the percentage imagined by the respondents.

In order to analyse perceptions of ethnicization, we used indicators from the cultural differentiation scale used by Vala et al. (1999), mentioned above. Table 3 shows the responses of the young Black participants and the actual responses of White people.

The answers given by White Portuguese show that they regard Black people as being culturally different. Young Black people in turn believe that their group is perceived as being culturally different. It should however be noted that young Black people believe they are perceived as being different less than they in fact are perceived to be, except in the case of the indicator relating to 'sexual values and behaviour' (see Table 3).

Figure 1: Perception of racialization and satisfaction with life and with living in Portugal.
The question we now ask ourselves is the following: could it be that when young Black people feel that when the Portuguese regard them as being culturally different they are actually regarding their culture as inferior? In order to answer this question, Lopes and Vala (2002) correlated the racial differences and cultural differences scales with each other and further correlated each of them with other indicators of perceived discrimination. They considered that: (a) if the two indicators were correlated; (b) if the index of cultural differences is correlated with other measures of discrimination; and (c) if that correlation is similar to the correlation between the racialization scale and those same measures of discrimination, then it is legitimate to argue that the perception of difference is felt as discrimination, that it embodies the ascribing of cultural inferiority or, in other words, that it is perceived as being ethnization.

The correlation between the two indices is .38 (p. 0.00), which indicates that they refer to equivalent phenomena, or to two dimensions of the same phenomenon. At the same time, the index of cultural differences correlates with other measures of perceived discrimination (Table 4). More importantly, the correlations between the cultural differences scale and other measures of discrimination are not lower than the values of the same correlations for the racialization scale. Thus our results show that the perception of cultural differences not only is not simply a description of objective reality, but that it is also felt as a form of inferiorization. In this way, just as racialization is a form of racial inferiorization, the exaggeration of cultural differences is an implicit form of cultural inferiorization.

In order to reinforce their argument, Lopes and Vala (2002) also analysed the impact of ethnization and racialization on how satisfied respondents were with life and how satisfied they were to be living in Portugal. For this purpose they carried out analyses of variance with the perception of racialization and ethnization as independent variables, and indicators of satisfaction with life and with living in Portugal as dependent variables. The results of these analyses are shown in Figure 1.

As the results show, the consequences of the perception of racialization are visible in the degree to which young Black people are satisfied with life and with being in Portugal. In other words, the more they perceive themselves as being racialized by the Portuguese, the less they feel satisfied with life and with living in Portugal. Although the effects of racialization are stronger than those of ethnization, the latter remain clearly significant.

To sum up, we have shown that the young people we interviewed feel racialized and that their culture is perceived as being different. This perception of being seen as culturally different is felt as a form of ethnization, or of being regarded as culturally inferior, and is associated with other forms of perception of discrimination, as well as with the a lower degree of satisfaction with life and with living in Portugal.

Conclusions
This article analysed the meanings attributed to cultural differences in the framework of the new expressions of racism. Following a line of studies open by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), the hypothesis we have explored is that, since the idea of race and the idea of a hierarchy of cultures has become unacceptable, accentuating cultural differences has become an apparently legitimate way of regarding certain social groups as inferior, namely those who were previously racialized. In the 1950s Lévy-Strauss had already drawn attention to the possibility of cultural classifications becoming the functional equivalent of racial classifications in common-sense thinking. In our hypothesis cultural classifications, like racial classifications, reflect hierarchies and are perceived as being the expression of naturally accepted facts.

In empirical terms, our results show that the White Portuguese who most emphasize cultural differences between themselves and Black people are also those who are most likely to discriminate against Black people in terms of social benefits, and are also those who are in favour of more restrictive immigration policies. Response patterns for ‘cultural differentiation’ follow the response patterns for blatant racism. These and other results reported offer a very plausible illustration for the argument that the amplification of cultural differences is an implicit form of regarding others as culturally inferior. At the same time, the correlation between accentuation of cultural differences and blatant racism may indicate that the former is often a new way of expressing racism.

These theoretical and empirical arguments are reinforced by the second study reported in this paper, which shows that those young Black people who most perceive themselves as being seen to be culturally different by the White Portuguese are also those who (a) believe that they are regarded as racially inferior, and (b) believe themselves to be discriminated against in Portuguese society. This proximity between processes of perceived racialization and discrimination, and the perception that one is seen as being culturally different, leads us to propose that the attribution of cultural differences is a form of cultural inferiorization or ethnization.

This phenomenon has implications in processes of discrimination in general, but also in terms of how cultural relations develop between majorities and minorities who were previously the object of racialization, and are now the object of ethnization. In fact, the association between the perception of difference and discrimination might imply that the majority wishes culturally to assimilate or integrate minorities. But it can also happen that integration or assimilation are perceived as a threat to the identity of the majority, or as a threat to the purity of their cultural prototype. This hypothesis matches the
The higher the values of the indicators of relative intergroup deprivation, wage deprivation, institutional deprivation and procedural injustice, the greater the feeling of deprivation, and therefore perceived discrimination.

It may be objected that the correlations are low, which is in fact true. But note that the interview sample is highly diversified, particularly in terms of educational attainment levels, a factor that, as we know, causes problems in this type of study. The important thing is to note that the correlations with the racialization index are no higher than the correlations with the ethnicization index. And no one will deny that racialization is discrimination and is felt as such by those who are its targets.

Racialization and ethnicization were dichotomized (responses above and below the average) for the purposes of the analyses of variance. These indicators are as follows: Personal happiness: "Taking into account all aspects of your life, do you feel - unsatisfied (1), very satisfied (5)?" Satisfaction with living in Portugal: Do you feel unsatisfied or satisfied with living in Portugal - unsatisfied (1), very satisfied (5).

Figure 2: Perception of ethnicization and satisfaction with life and with living in Portugal.

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theory of social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and has been observed in some studies (for a review, see Lima and Vala 2002). The desire for separation, so often manifested in the exacerbation of differences, may therefore be a mechanism used by the majority to defend its identity. But minorities also need to claim a certain cultural specificity in order to establish their own identity: this process, as we have shown, may often give rise to discriminative reactions on the part of the majority, and thereby breed new forms of social conflict.

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Women under Salazar’s Dictatorship

Anne Cova and António Costa Pinto

Abstract
This article addresses Salazarism’s attitudes towards women and women’s organizations, providing some elements that may be used in comparisons with the other dictatorships (e.g. Italian Fascism) that inspired, to some extent, some of the Portuguese New State’s institutions.

If the southern European dictatorships of the inter-war period have anything in common, it is their attitudes towards women (Bock and Cova 2003). Initiated during a period of democratization, of the emergence of feminist movements, and the significant increase of women in the labour market, all of these dictatorships paid homage to ‘women at home’, and glorified ‘motherhood’ and the family in its primordial function (Offen 2000; Bock 2001). These dictatorships were at the same time confronted with the ‘problem’ of the integration of women into politics. Some elevated this function to a nationalist goal and an important means of mobilizing their regimes.

The family: the cornerstone of society
The Portuguese Constitution of 1933 provided for the equality for all citizens before the law, and denied all privileges acquired through birth, nobility, sex or social status. However, it also noted that ‘women’s differences result from their nature and their duty towards the good of the family’ [article 5]. The 1911 Constitution, and the Republic’s family laws, which were drawn up on 25 December 1910, contained no such provisions.

Salazarism thus used female ‘nature’ to deny women complete equality with men. The idea of ‘nature’ derived from the old discussion of culture versus nature, in which the public dominates the private. Salazarism was deeply rooted in the traditional idea that women were situated on the side of culture versus nature, in which the public dominates the private. Salazarism was thereby an institutionalized manifestation of this tradition.

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