CHAPTER SIX

SOCIAL VALUES, PREJUDICE AND SOLIDARITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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1 Introduction

According to the UNO forecasts, the EU will have to receive 1.3 million immigrants each year, the equivalent to 32.5 million immigrants in the next 25 years, if it wants to maintain its economic growth and its welfare system. Even if the forecasts of international agencies regarding labour requirements are excessive, the number of new immigrants that Europe will take in should necessarily remain high. Will Europeans be open to take in these new immigrants and to help them integrate into the European society?

A number of findings lead us to believe that, nowadays, open prejudice is perceived as anti-normative in Europe.1 In fact, the end of the Second World War and the unveiling of the horrors of a racist state, the Human Rights Declaration (1948), the UNESCO Declaration on Race (1951), social movements of various kinds in Europe, the civil rights movement of the African-Americans and the African liberation movements set in motion a process which gradually made racial discrimination illegal and racial beliefs anti-normative. But although racism became anti-normative, negative beliefs in relation to immigrants and towards people seen as belonging to different races or cultures still persist. According to the Eurobarometer n° 47.1 (Ben Brika, Lemaîne & Jackson, 1997; Deschamps & Lemaîne, 2001), and a survey carried out by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Thalhammer, Zucha, Enzenhofer, Salfinger &

1 According to EVS results intolerance against people of ‘another race’ or against immigrants was, in 1990, respectively: 10% and 13%. In 1999 these figures were similar: 10% in the case of people of ‘other race’ and 11% in the case of immigrants. For a detailed analysis, see Halman (1994)
Ogris, 2001), 48% of Europeans in 1997 and 52% in 2000 consider that people of ‘other races, cultures or religions’, ‘take illegitimate advantage of the social welfare system’; 64% in 1997 and 58% in 2000 believe that such people ‘are more often involved in crime than the average person’; 46% in 1997 and 52% in 2000, consider that ‘in schools where there are too many children from these minority groups, the quality of education suffers’. Open prejudice, manifest racism and xenophobia are therefore a problem that still persists in Europe today. According to these results, the behaviour of immigrants and of minority groups is perceived as being different from the behaviour of the majority. It is seen as a problem, it creates concerns, and it is viewed as transgression and as an abuse.

Prejudice gains new meaning at a time when Europe needs more immigrants, when there is a growing pressure of non-European citizens trying to enter European countries, and when European borders remain closed. How many Europeans are aware that since 1997 an estimated 6,000 people have died trying to get into Europe? This problem is particularly salient in some EU countries like Spain, Italy, and Portugal, traditionally countries of emigration rather than immigration. How do the Spanish react to the deaths of immigrants occurring on the beaches of southern Spain? And how do the Italians react to immigrants’ death on the beaches of the Adriatic? What do the Portuguese think of the 150,000 immigrants from Eastern Europe who entered Portugal over the last two years, in the wake of those who came from Africa? And what do Italians have to say about the fact that 14,000 of the 56,000 people arrested in Italian prisons are immigrants?

The social sciences in general and social psychology in particular have been giving in recent years a great deal of attention to the new expressions of prejudice. These are based not so much on the notion of race and racial inferiority, but on the idea of culture and on the hierarchy of cultures. These new forms of expressing prejudice have been labelled subtle racism in Europe (see Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and symbolic or modern racism in the USA (see McConahay, 1986).2

2 Despite their small differences, we will use the words open, blatant, traditional or old-fashioned prejudice as equivalents. All these terms refer a prejudice or a racist attitude rooted in the idea of race and racial hierarchies. We also use the words modern, symbolic, subtle or covert prejudice as equivalents. For the conceptual differences between these concepts see Brown (1995).
Moreover, and in order to understand why racism and discrimination persist in societies that are formally anti-racist, several models in social psychology have also studied the indirect or unintentional forms of racism, and even its unconscious or automatic expression (for a review, see Dovidio, Kawakami, Johson, Johnson & Howard, 1997). But the attention given to these new forms of racism and xenophobia has had the indirect effect of making people forget that overt racism persists and, at the same time, that there are also egalitarian and non-differentialist positions or, in other words, that racism is not inevitable.

In this chapter we will look at overt prejudice, specifically to the dimension of overt prejudice and racism that associates minorities, people perceived as culturally different, and immigrants with economic threat. We will also look at attitudes of solidarity towards these people. In the first part, we will compare these positive and negative orientations towards minority groups in countries that represent two different traditions in relation to migrations. We will look at Germany, Belgium and France as examples of countries with traditionally net immigration. We will then look at Spain, Portugal and Italy as examples of European countries that moved from being countries of net emigration to being new host countries for immigrants.

In the second part of this chapter, we will analyse positional variables and social values underlying prejudice and solidarity. In fact, while measures of prejudice in the European Values Study (EVS) questionnaire are few (Halman, 2001), this survey is a valuable source in terms of data on social values. It is therefore an excellent database for studying the predictors of prejudice, in particular those related to egalitarian and meritocracy values.

2 Overt prejudice and solidarity in countries with a tradition of emigration and of immigration

Three kinds of beliefs underlie traditional overt prejudice and are frequently identified in several studies in this domain (e.g., Pederson & Walker, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). One belief supposes the existence of superior and inferior human races. Another supports the idea that people perceived as belonging to other races or cultures represent an economic threat. A third belief sustains that these people are also a threat to the personal security of citizens of the host society.
Although the 1999 EVS questionnaire does not contain specific questions on these set of racial beliefs, it includes two measures of general overt prejudice: a classic measure of social distance (the rejection of members of a group on account of the perception of this group as racially, culturally or religiously different); and a measure of the perception of immigrants as an economic threat.

As referred, we will look at the answers to these questions obtained in the two groups of countries discussed above—Germany, Belgium, France and Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Our hypothesis is that the different experience of these countries with migrations will result in different attitudes towards immigrants. Specifically, a tradition of emigration, observed in countries like Spain, Portugal, and Italy, may generate more tolerance and greater solidarity towards immigrants. The social memory of the experience of emigration and the great number of people with direct or indirect experience of emigration can generate a sense of identification with immigrants and consequently positive attitudes towards them. However, these same countries are not used to dealing with immigrants and their adaptation problems, and are also economically less developed and less stable. Consequently, they can develop anxiety and fear towards immigrants coming from non-European countries and can see them as an economic threat.

Could it be that countries where there is highest orientation towards discrimination are also those where there is lowest solidarity? This question derives from the assumption according to which prejudiced attitudes may be conceptualised as ambivalent. This means that a target of a prejudiced attitude may also be the target of solidary behaviour. Katz and Hass (1988) show how prejudiced attitudes are complex, consisting of a mixture of feelings of friendliness and rejection. Moreover, some psychological models suggest that the motivational factors underlying a positive evaluation of a given stimulus may differ from those underlying a negative evaluation of that stimulus (Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson, 1997). Consequently, our hypothesis is that countries that discriminate less are not necessarily those that manifest higher solidarity.

2.1 Method

The first question under study is, thus, a classic measure of social distance or general prejudice. The groups included in this question
on the EVS belong to three different categories:3 stigmatised people (e.g. people who are mentally disturbed, people with a criminal past), political categories (right and left-wing extremists), and categories of racialised or ethnicised people. This latter category, which is the one we will analyse in this chapter, is constituted by 'people of a different race', 'immigrants or foreign workers', 'Muslims', 'Jews' and 'Gypsies'.

The second question we analysed measuring overt prejudice concerns the perception of immigrants as an economic threat. Specifically, this measure assesses subjects' orientation towards job discrimination of immigrants.4

Concerning attitudes of social solidarity towards immigrants, we analysed two EVS items. One item measures the orientation towards hosting immigrants from non-EU countries,5 i.e., the solidarity towards immigrants at the level of immigration policies. The other item measures personal orientation towards supporting the improvement of immigrants' living conditions.6

2.2 Results

Table 6.1 shows that the countries studied in this chapter are significantly different according to the number of rejected racialised or ethnicised groups.7 Indeed, the highest number of rejected groups was found in Italy, followed by Belgium. Former Western Germany8 is the country with the lowest levels of rejection of immigrants or racialised groups. Portugal and Spain are in an intermediate position.9 Note

3 The question was as follows: 'On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?' Respondents could choose more than one group.

4 This measure asked subjects: 'Do you agree or disagree with the following statement—when the jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to ... (nationality) ... people over immigrants'. Agree (3), Neither agree nor disagree (2), disagree (1).

5 The question was the following: 'How about people from less developed countries coming here to work. Which one of the following measures do you think the government should do?' 1—Anyone can come who wants to; 2—Come when jobs are available; 3—Strict limits on the number of foreigners; 4—Prohibit people coming here.

6 'Would you be prepared to actually do something to improve the conditions of immigrants in your country?' 5—absolutely yes, 1—absolutely no.

7 The number of rejected groups could vary between none (0) and 5.

8 Given that we obtained significant differences between the two German samples, and according to our hypothesis, we only took into account the responses from former West Germany.

9 In all of these countries, the most rejected group is the gypsies (percentage of
that the mean of rejected groups in all European countries is different from zero. At country level, the mean of rejected groups is also different from zero.

Concerning attitudes towards job discrimination, Italy, Portugal and Spain, countries with an emigration tradition, agree more with the idea that when jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to natives. German, Belgium and French people show more agreement with immigrants’ rights of non-job discrimination (Table 6.2).

Note that despite the differences in the responses to both questions analysed above, they are moderately correlated at the EU level ($r = .25, p < .000$). Furthermore, and although the differences between countries concerning job discrimination and group rejection are statistically significant, their associated effect sizes are small, meaning that differences between countries are not strong.

Table 6.1 Rejection of racialised or ethnicised groups—EVS 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former West Germany</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of rejected groups ranging from 0 to 5. $F (5, 9390) = 61.425, p < .000$; Eta Squared = .03; means with different subscripts are statistically different.
As shown in Table 6.3, orientation towards active personal solidarity in order to improve immigrants’ living conditions is higher in Spain and in Italy, countries that are traditionally emigrant countries.  

Concerning solidarity at the level of immigration policies (Table 6.4), the countries showing less solidarity are former West Germany, France and Belgium. Portugal and Spain show more solidarity. In fact, they are the less restrictive countries concerning immigration policies, with Italy occupying an intermediate position. Thus, the expression of solidarity is higher in the traditionally emigrant countries. However, as previously shown, these countries are also those that express more orientation towards discrimination at the job level (Table 6.2). Analysing the European countries as a whole, we found a positive correlation between the two items measuring social solidarity ($r = .34$, $p < .000$).

In order to compare discrimination and solidarity attitudes in the analysed countries, and in order to test our hypothesis concerning specific patterns of attitudes in traditionally immigrant host countries and traditionally emigrant countries, a cluster analysis was carried out (Figure 6.1). This cluster analysis was based on the four questions we analysed, and shows that Belgium, France and Germany are closer to each other than to the other three countries. Despite Italy’s particular position, this country is closer to Spain and Portugal than to the other countries.

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13 Percentage of people answering yes (to solidarity): France: 23%; Germany: 24%; Belgium: 31%; Portugal: 21%; Spain: 36%; Italy: 46%.

14 Percentage of people approving strict limits or prohibition of immigration: France: 51%; Germany: 63%; Belgium: 60%; Portugal: 27%; Spain: 24%; Italy: 43%.

15 Values for these variables at the EU level: personal solidarity—$M = 3.06$, $SD = 0.97$; solidarity at the level of immigration policies—$M = 2.48$, $SD = 0.73$. 
Table 6.3 Personal solidarity—EVS 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former West Germany</td>
<td>2.98&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.75&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.29&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.96&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.95&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.39&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: ‘Absolutely yes’ (5) to ‘absolutely no’ (1). F (5, 9196) = 99,976, p < .000; Eta Squared = .05;

Table 6.4 Attitudes towards Immigration policies—EVS 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former West Germany</td>
<td>2.64&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.66&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.08&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.19&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.60&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.38&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: ‘Anyone can come who wants to’ (1) to ‘prohibit people coming here’ (4). F (5, 9004) = 153,384, p < .000; Eta Squared = .08.

In general, these results show that the experience of emigration and immigration shapes different patterns of attitudes. People from Belgium, France and Germany, traditionally immigrant countries, show less solidarity but more egalitarianism concerning job rights. On the contrary, Portugal, Italy and Spain, traditionally emigrant countries, show greater solidarity but more job discrimination. Thus, we can suppose that this feeling of solidarity is framed within the memories of emigration and that job discrimination attitudes are anchored in the perception of economic threat.

3 Predictors of prejudice in EU countries: the role of values of egalitarianism and meritocratic individualism

The previous section showed that different migration experiences can be related with different attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. Using a wide range of variables, we will now look to a more systematic analysis of the social and psychological factors underlying prejudice.
These variables were chosen according to their theoretical relevance, their association with prejudice measures in previous studies, and their independent association with at least one of our dependent variables. They were classified into the following groups: positional variables; psychological individual differences; individual differences concerning orientations towards the political system; political identity; national identity; social and political values; and egalitarian values vs. meritocratic individualism. Below we present a brief review of research on prejudice and discrimination that justifies the inclusion of these variables in this study, even though their effects are often controversial.

Positional variables. Age, schooling and income were the variables included on this group. Age has been associated to prejudice, both as a life-cycle indicator and as an indicator of generation effect, even though several studies do not show clear effects of this variable. Some researches carried out in the USA (see McConahay & Hough, 1976)
and in Europe (see Pettigrew, & Meertens, 1995) show that the older a person is, the more likely the exhibit of racial attitudes. But in the study of Pettigrew and Meertens the effect sizes of age are not homogeneous across samples. For example, in Britain, and contrary to the European pattern, the greater the age the lesser the probability of prejudice. Moreover, in Portugal a study on racism towards Blacks (Vala et al., 1999) found that age had no effect on the expression of prejudice; and Pedersen and Walker (1997), in a study on prejudice towards the aborigines, also found no significant association between age and prejudice.

Regarding educational level, many studies show an association between this variable and prejudice (for a review, see Wagner & Zick, 1995). But in some other studies, this variable is not relevant (Pedersen & Walker, 1997), or its relevance is only demonstrated in predicting the traditional forms of racism (Vala et al., 1999). From an empirical point of view, the mediators of the effects of educational level haven’t received that much attention. However, it does seem plausible that low levels of education should be associated with lower cognitive flexibility and complexity, which would make those with lower schooling levels more likely to accept the ideological simplicity of traditional racism (Tetlock, 1985). Consequently, the effect of this variable is unlikely to be noticed in cases of subtle racism, which is a more complex form of expressing prejudice. Such a hypothesis was verified in a study of Vala and colleagues (1999). Nevertheless, it should be noted that when high levels of schooling are associated with political conservatism, this combination might encourage approval of open forms of racism.

The third variable in this group is income. Income may be conceived as an indicator of objective deprivation and economic frustration. If one follows the argument underlying frustration-aggression theory hypothesis, as it was first formulated by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939), economic frustration may, in certain circumstances, lead to aggression against members of minority groups. In fact, these authors analyse racism as an aggression by one economically deprived group against another group judged as responsible for their economical deprivation. This aggression is not aimed at the target which triggers deprivation (for example, the economic system or the ruling classes) but rather at a target which is perceived as responsible for that deprivation (for example, Blacks or immigrants). That target is usually a vulnerable group. This hypothesis came to be known as the scapegoat hypothesis (Hovland & Sears, 1940).
In sum and according to the studies described above, a correlation between age and open prejudice is not probable, but we should expect that the lower the educational level or the income the greater the open or blatant prejudice.

**Psychological individual differences.** At this level of analysis we looked at two variables included in the EVS questionnaire: life (in)satisfaction and interpersonal trust. Life(in)satisfaction may be interpreted as a measure of frustration and, like income, may be associated with discrimination, as we explained above. Concerning interpersonal trust, it is a dimension of authoritarian personality in the theory of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) and, consequently, a factor that may be associated to prejudice, as predicted by this theory.

**Individual differences regarding the political system.** Recently, attitudes towards immigrants began to be viewed as part of a more widespread negative reaction to the political system, and also as derived from a feeling of insecurity brought about by the perception that political institutions are not effective in protecting citizens. In this chapter, these attitudes are evaluated through measures of confidence in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy that are dimensions of political efficacy, a factor that has been linked to prejudice. In particular, Pettigrew (1999), in a study on the predictors of racism in Europe, shows an association between the feeling of political efficacy and prejudice. In other words, his results present evidence that the less a person feels able to influence the political system, the less the trust in political system, and the less the perception that this system reflects the interests of citizens, the greater the prejudice. In this study we revisit this hypothesis.

**Political identity.** Since the research on prejudice by Adorno et al. (1950), and more recently by Altemeyer (1994), political identity, or individual positioning in the left wing/right wing political spectrum, has usually been taken into account as a variable in studies on racism and xenophobia. Moreover, the simple observation of the political arena also shows that it is on the extreme right wing that we find positions that most clearly reject immigration and that are openly racist. In fact, in European countries, official policy regarding minorities and immigrants has varied systematically according to the ideological (left/right) orientation of political parties, with those on the left generally adopting more open policies towards immigration. This seems to be reflected in the positions of individuals who state they are more to the left or more to the right of the political spectrum.
Indeed Pettigrew and Meertens’ study (1995) shows that political positioning is a good predictor of racism. However, left political parties have in recent times argued in favour of the so-called realistic (restrictive) immigration policies. This new position can contribute to change the traditional relationship between political identity and racism or xenophobic prejudice, as empirically found by Pederson and Walker (1997) in Australia, and by Vala and colleagues (1999) in Portugal. In the present study, however, once the measure of prejudice used is a measure of blatant prejudice we should expect that the more the identification with the right-wing political spectrum the more likely are the prejudiced attitudes.

National identity. We propose the hypothesis that the more prominent a national identity (measured in terms of national pride) is, the greater the orientation towards racism and xenophobia. In fact, national identity is usually experienced as an exclusive and not an inclusive identity. For example, despite the fact that the association between national identity and prejudice is not among the strongest associations found by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), and even though there are some differences between European samples concerning this association, these authors do find an association between national identity and prejudice.

Nevertheless, the study by Pedersen and Walker (1997) carried out in Australia found an association between national identity and modern racism towards aborigines, but not between national identity and traditional racism. At the same time, it should be noted that Inglehart (1995), in a study covering 43 countries, found a clear association between national identity and conservatism, but not between national identity and ethnocentrism.

Other results, reported by Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998), suggest that the concept of national identity is a multi-dimensional concept, and that we should distinguish between ‘patriotism’ (a strong emotional attachment to one’s country) and ‘nationalism’ (a strong orientation towards competitiveness in international comparisons). According to their results, it is only nationalism that correlates with ethnocentrism. Also in the United Kingdom, Dowds and Young (1997) showed that only exclusive nationalism was positively correlated with xenophobia.18

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18 According to a new interpretation (Mummendey, 1995) of the Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), ingroup identification may trigger ingroup
Despite these conceptual specifications, we can assume that national identity is more often associated with exclusive beliefs, and that, consequently, the more the national pride the more probable the exhibition of prejudice.

**Social and political values.** We considered three dimensions of social and political values: *moral conservatism, political conservatism* and *materialistic/post-materialistic* orientations. The distinction between moral and political conservatism derives from the hypothesis that, at least as far as prejudice is concerned, these two aspects of conservatism may produce different results. For instance results reported by Vala et al. (1999) show a clear association between moral conservatism and racism, but not between political conservatism and racism. This result may be just a reflection of the specific ideological context in Portugal, or it may be an indicator of change in attitudes identified by Adorno and colleagues in the fifties. In relation to post-materialistic/materialistic values, the study by Inglehart (1997) shows that the more the adhesion to materialistic values the more the orientation towards discrimination, even though the measures used in his data tap overt prejudice. In summary, we should expect a positive correlation between moral conservatism and prejudice, and a negative correlation between this attitude and the support of post-materialistic values.

**Values of egalitarianism and meritocratic individualism.** The variables mentioned above have been analysed in numerous studies on prejudice and racism. However, little attention has been given to the role played by *egalitarian* values and *meritocratic individualism* in generating and legitimising prejudice and racist beliefs.

In European culture there is a profound ambivalence between the egalitarian values on which modernity is based and the values of competition and meritocratic individualism on which economic success is supposed to be based. According to our hypothesis, the former generate solidarity and anti-racism, and the latter generate a hierarchisation of human groups and an orientation towards competition and discrimination. Some studies support this hypothesis. For instance, in a transnational research project Doise, Clémence, and Spini (1999) found a positive association between the values of universalism and
egalitarianism and the belief in Human Rights. Schwartz (1996), in a recent review on the study of human values, describes various studies which show that the values of universalism and benevolence (for example, equality, social justice and intellectual openness) are associated with openness to inter-group contact. These same studies show that values of power and achievement, which are close to the pattern generally designated as meritocratic individualism (for example, orientation towards power, social recognition and ambition), are predictors of competitive strategies in inter-group relationships. In Portugal, a representative correlational study (Vala et al., 1999) shows that the belief in meritocratic justice, as opposed to the norm of egalitarianism, is a significant predictor of subtle racism. Katz and Hass (1988) put forward the idea that a tension between values of egalitarianism and meritocratic individualism is the foundation of ambivalent attitudes towards Blacks. Moreover this hypothesis takes up the approach to the analysis of racism in the USA proposed in the middle of the last century by Myrdal (1944) in a work entitled ‘An American Dilemma’. In this work, Myrdal analyses racism in the context of the conflict between a belief in humanist egalitarianism and the pressure of personal interests. But, as Schwartz (1996) demonstrates, the conflict between the values of universalism and the values of meritocrasy and power is not a conflict that is specific to the USA, and may therefore be relevant in explaining racism in other social and cultural contexts.

In agreement with this line of thought, we expect that the more the orientation to meritocratic values and the lesser the orientation to egalitarian values the more likely is the prejudice. In order to test this hypothesis the following variables were used as measures of egalitarian and meritocratic individualistic values: freedom vs. equality, non orientation vs. orientation towards secondary victimization (i.e., considering poor people as personally responsible for their current situation); non orientation vs. orientation towards competition, positive vs. negative attitudes to welfare rights as citizenship rights; and orientation vs. non orientation towards social and community participation.

3.1 **Method**

In order to analyse the contribution of the referred variables (see Appendix) to predict prejudice and solidarity towards immigrants
and people perceived as racially or culturally different, regression analyses were performed. In a first step data was analysed at the level of the EU as a whole, at the level of Portugal as an example of a traditionally emigrant country, and at the level of Belgium as an example of a traditionally host country for immigration.

In a second step, and in order to clarify the effects of egalitarianism and meritocratic individualism per se in the activation of prejudice and solidarity, we carried out specific procedures: in the first regression equation we only entered positional variables; in the second we added variables concerning psychological individual differences, and so on. Finally, in the seventh regression equation, all predictor variables were included. Thus, to test against the hypothesis of the importance of egalitarian/meritocratic values in the explanation of prejudice, these last variables were only included in the last regression equation. As these variables were the last ones to enter, their increase of the explained variance is a robust test of their predictive power. These analyses covered all the six selected countries and the EU as a whole.

3.2 Results

Considering the first set of results, at the level of EU as a whole (Table 6.5) we can observe that age, interpersonal trust, political identity, materialistic values and secondary victimisation are among the most important predictors of discrimination. These results are in line with most results obtained in the literature on prejudice. Note, moreover, that three of the five egalitarianism indicators are negatively associated with discrimination. Thus, people that don’t make secondary victimisation, that defend welfare rights as basic rights, and that declare to be involved in community associations are the ones that express less discrimination against immigrants or minorities.

In Belgium, the pattern of predictors is similar to that of the EU. Moreover also in this case three indicators of egalitarian values are associated to discrimination. Thus, lower levels of discrimination are associated with people that value equality over freedom, that do not

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15 Prejudice was measured through a new variable that joins the two indicators of open prejudice presented in the previous part of this paper. Solidarity was also measured through a new variable that integrates the two items of solidarity used.
### Table 6.6 Predictors of solidarity towards immigrants—EVS 1999
Regression analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positional variables</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological individual differences</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life satisfaction</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>.11***</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.12***</td>
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<td>Evaluation of political system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
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<td>Trust in political institutions</td>
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<td>.11***</td>
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<td>Political identity (left/right)</td>
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<td>-.18***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.09***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom/equality</td>
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<td>.11*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary victimization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>.10*</td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.11*</td>
<td>.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values are standardised beta ($***p < .000$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$).

Solidarity is associated with people that value equality, that do not make secondary victimisation, that defend welfare rights, and that participate in their community.

The pattern of predictors in the Belgium sample is very similar to the European pattern. In the Portuguese sample, there is a clear and stronger association between egalitarian/meritocratic values and attitudes towards solidarity than between these values and the orientation towards discrimination.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{20}\) Since the correlations between the two measures of solidarity as well as of the measures of discrimination were moderate (0.25 and 0.35 respectively), we performed regression analysis for each one of these measures. The results are very similar across the 12 regression analyses performed.
The previous analysis presented some evidence supporting egalitarianism and meritocratic individualism as predictors of solidarity and prejudice. Nevertheless, until now only indirect evidence supported the role of these values in the prediction of prejudice. Consequently, as referred above, we carried out specific procedures in order to clarify the effects of egalitarianism and meritocratic individualism per se.

In the case of regressions concerning prejudiced discrimination, the results presented in Table 6.7 show that the most important variables are positional variables, although the remaining groups of variables contribute more than 50% of the explained variance of discrimination. This result shows that the explanations of blatant prejudice based solely on positional variables are clearly insufficient. Furthermore, in all regression analyses, except for Spain, a significant increase of the explained variance occurs when egalitarian/meritocratic values are introduced. The impact of egalitarian/meritocratic values on prejudice seems to be more important at the level of EU, Germany and Belgium, than at the level of Portugal, France, Italy and Spain. This result was not expected in our hypotheses and deserves to be better explored.

In the case of solidarity (Table 6.8), results show that positional variables are less important predictors of solidarity than of blatant prejudice. Results also show a stronger increment of the explained variance when egalitarian/meritocratic values are introduced in the regression models than in the case of blatant prejudice.

4 Conclusions

In this chapter we analysed prejudice in the EU towards immigrants or people perceived as belonging to other races, cultures or religions. In the first part of this study, we studied two groups of countries with different traditions regarding to migration. A cluster analysis showed that in countries traditionally receptors of immigrants (former Western Germany, Belgium and France) beliefs were organised differently from countries with an emigration tradition (Portugal, Spain, Italy). These two groups of countries show ambivalent attitudes towards immigrants, but structure their ambivalent attitudes in different ways. Countries with an immigration tradition make less open job discrimination but show less solidarity towards immigrants.
### Table 6.7 Predictors of blatant prejudice
Regression analysis (Cumulative Explained Variance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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<th>West Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian vs Meritocratic values</td>
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<td>7%*</td>
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<td>18%***</td>
<td>24%**</td>
<td>18%*</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values are cumulative percentages of explained variance. In the first equation only positional variables were computed. In the following equations variables presented in the previous equations were added. In the final equation all categories of variables are present. Significance of the $R^2$ change: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

### Table 6.8 Predictors of solidarity
Regression analysis (Cumulative Explained Variance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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<th>France</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political identity (left/right)</td>
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<td>19%***</td>
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<td>28%***</td>
<td>18%**</td>
<td>16%**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values are cumulative percentages of explained variance. In the first equation only positional variables were computed. In the following equations variables presented in the previous equations were added. In the final equation all categories of variables are present. Significance of the $R^2$ change: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. 
Emigrant countries show more solidarity at the level of personal action and concerning immigration policies, but manifest more job discrimination. Despite the statistically significant differences found between countries, the associated effect sizes are small, i.e., the correlations between type of country and the measures of prejudice or solidarity are relatively low. This result indicates that differences between countries are effective, but less important than normally expected.

A second aim of this paper was to analyse the predictors of prejudice, specifically the association between social values and the orientation towards discrimination. This analysis was performed in two stages. In the first stage, we analysed different predictors of prejudice and solidarity together. The results evidenced the importance of positional variables as predictors of this kind of attitudes. But results also show the relevance of socio-political values and, specifically, the importance of egalitarian/meritocratic values on the explanation of the roots of prejudice and of solidarity. Moreover, all hypotheses we put received support except those concerning age and political conservatism. Contrary to our hypothesis and some previous studies, age is the main positional predictor of prejudice. This result should be clarified in order to disentangle if it is a generation effect or a life cycle effect. Also important are the results showing that moral and political conservatism still as predictors of blatant prejudice. Perhaps this will not be the case for new indirect forms of prejudice.

Note also that the explained variance by the variables included in the models is low, particularly in Spain, Italy and Portugal. This result was also found in other similar studies, specifically in the study of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Thalhammer et al., 2001). In this study, none of these three countries presented explained variance values equal or higher than 15%, against values between 15% and 21% in the remaining European countries. We can therefore hypothesise that in Spain, Portugal, and Italy attitudes towards immigrants are only beginning to structure, given that only recently immigrants began being seen as a problem in these countries. Also, the explained variance in the remaining countries (Belgium, former West Germany, and France) is not high but still higher than the one obtained in the European study of Thalhammer and colleagues. The reason why, in our study, the explained variance is not high may be due to the fact that in the EVS database we do not have any data concerning two of the more impor-
tant predictors of prejudice in the European context: interpersonal contact with immigrants or people belonging to minority groups; and relative intergroup deprivation (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

In a second stage of the analysis of the predictors of prejudice and solidarity, we analysed the specific role played by egalitarian vs. meritocratic individualistic values. The results show that these values significantly contribute to the explained variance of those attitudes. In fact, in the EU as a whole but also in emigrant countries as well as in immigrant countries, prejudice and negative attitudes towards solidarity to immigrants are associated to a higher value placed on freedom than on equality; to a blaming of the poor for their own situation (secondary victimisation); to the non valuing of social and welfare rights as citizenship rights; and the non orientation for social and community participation. This result is relatively new in the literature on prejudice and supports the importance of those values for the understanding of the roots of prejudice. This result should be integrated in the framework of larger typologies of values, such as the one proposed by Schwartz (1996). This articulation can provide an understanding of prejudice in the broader directions of values change.

This study shows that it is still important to analyse open and blatant expressions of prejudice, racism, and xenophobia. However, this is only a small part of this phenomenon. From the time of the seminal work of Allport (1954) to the present prejudice changed its expressions. In order to understand prejudice in formally anti-racist societies, it is important to study its new expressions, such as the ethnicisation of minorities or cultural racism. Cultural racism is a new implicit social theory according to which tradition generates a cultural essence and that some cultural essences are superior to others (Vala, Lopes, Lima & Brito, 2002). This implicit theory, or social representation, sustains, for instance, the set of beliefs that Pettigrew and Mertens (1995) call ‘subtle racism’, as well as the beliefs that organise modern or symbolic racism (McConahay, 1986). The new prejudiced attitudes also manifest themselves through other diffuse ways like outgroup infra-humanisation at the emotional level (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000) or outgroup naturalisation at the level of their attributes (Moscovici & Pérez, 1997, 1999; Lima & Vala, 2001). The articulation between these indirect expressions of prejudice and social values, namely egalitarian and meritocratic values, haven’t received
sufficient attention from mainstream research on prejudice, racism, and xenophobia. This articulation can be developed in future researches, namely in the context of the EVS project.

References


Appendix

Independent variables used in regression analyses

Positional variables

*Age:* v292—Can you tell me your year of birth, please 19... 
*Income:* v320—Here is a scale of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions. Scale: (1) Lowest to (10) Highest. 
*Educational Level:* v304—What is the highest level you have reached in your education? Scale: (1) Lowest to (8) Highest.

Psychological individual differences

*Life satisfaction:* v68—All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Scale: (1) Dissatisfied to (10) Satisfied

*Interpersonal trust:* v66—Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Options: (2) Most people can be trusted, (1) Can’t be too careful

Evaluation of political system

*Satisfaction with democracy:* v213—On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country? Scale: (4) Very satisfied to (1) Not at all satisfied.

*Trust in political institutions:* Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? v202—The education system; v205—The police; v206—Parliament; v211—Health care system; v212—The justice system. Scale: (4) A great deal to (1) None at all (Index: 1 to 4).

Political identity

v185—In political matters, people talk of the 'left' and the 'right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? Scale: (1) Left to (10) Right

National identity

v255—How proud are you to be a [country]citizen? Scale: (4) Very proud to (1) Not at all proud

Socio-political values

*Political conservatism*—An index composed by the three following indicators. A) I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? v216—Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (Scale: (4) Very good to (1) Very bad). B) I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them? v220—Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government; v223—Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order (Scale: (1) Agree strongly to (4) Disagree strongly). Index: 1—low conservatism, 4—high conservatism.
**Moral conservatism:** Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Obedience. Scale: (1) Important to (0) Not mentioned

**Materialism/Post-materialism:** There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. If you had to choose, which of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important? Options: Maintaining order in the nation; Giving people more say in important government decisions; Fighting rising prices; protecting freedom of speech. Recoding: (1) Materialists; (2) Mixed; (3) Post materialists.

**Egalitarian vs meritocratic values**

**Competition:** Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? Scale: (10) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. To (1) Competition is harmful it brings out the worst in people.

**Freedom and equality:** Which of these two statements comes closest to your opinion? Options: (1) Agree with statement A: I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance. (2) Agree with statement B: Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong.

**Welfare rights:** Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? Scale: (1) People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits. To—(10) People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want.

**Secondary victimization:** Why are there people in this country who live in need? Here are four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important? And which reason do you consider to be the second most important? Options: (1) Because they are unlucky; (2) Because of laziness and lack of willpower; (3) Because of injustice in our society; (4) It’s an inevitable part of modern progress; (5) None of these. Recoding: (1) Don’t make secondary victimization; (2) Make some secondary victimization; (3) Make a lot of secondary victimization.

**Social and community:** Look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say: which if one you belong to/which if any are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for? Scale: 0 (none) to 15 (involvement with all organisations).