

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Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999: Social Background and Paths to Power

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Regime discontinuities involving the replacement of the governing elite as well as the reshaping of fundamental institutions and values are a distinctive feature of the political history of modern Portugal. The purpose of this contribution is to assess the impact of these successive regime changes on the composition and patterns of recruitment of Cabinet ministers – the core group of decision-makers – and to point out the most significant trends over time: that is, from the mid-nineteenth century, when the Constitutional Monarchy was consolidated, until the present democratic regime.

PERIODIZATION AND NATURE OF REGIME CHANGES

In the political development of modern Portugal, five major regime changes can be identified: these chronological milestones are 1834, 1910, 1926, 1933 and 1974. In the aftermath of the 1834 civil war, the old absolutist order was finally dismantled, giving birth to a new political context and social environment. The establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy introduced a limited representative democracy – with the franchise being restricted by the application of property qualifications – as well as many of the institutions of modern governance. The social configuration of the ruling elite changed, with the sharp decline of the aristocratic element and the increasing predominance of individuals from a middle-class background. This trend is very clear during the second half of the nineteenth century, as some figures show. Between 1851 and 1910,

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only about 14 per cent of all Cabinet ministers were nobles, and most of them had been ennobled after 1834. Since 1870, no Prime Minister has been drawn from the older Portuguese aristocratic families. Also, fewer than one tenth of all members of the Chamber of Deputies between 1851 and 1890 were members of the titled nobility (Almeida 1995).

With the early years of the liberal regime being marked by successive violent conflicts between rival factions, a steady process of consolidation only began following a successful military coup in 1851 that led to an enduring 'elite consensus', with a regular and peaceful rotation in power that was anchored in a stable two-party system. For this reason, 1851 is the starting point for our inquiry into ministerial recruitment.

The two main elite parties that emerged during the 1850s incorporated the existing political factions and diverse networks of local notables. They were typical patronage-oriented parties, which were increasingly reliant on access to governmental resources as the state bureaucracy and its activities expanded. Although these parties had a low level of formalization, with weak organizational structures and volatile electoral support, they played an increasingly important role in screening and selecting the political elite. Hence, fewer and fewer independent and unaligned parliamentarians were elected. Moreover, with the Prime Minister effectively being the leader of one of the parties, Cabinet membership was based on personal and partisan loyalty.

The existence of Cabinet as a specialized political institution and the central role of the Prime Minister (which was granted legal recognition in 1855) were both innovations established by the liberals during the 1830s (Tavares 1909). According to the Constitution, the monarch was vested with the executive power – appointing and dismissing ministers at his discretion, and retaining prerogative powers to dissolve the elected chamber of the bicameral parliament. In practice, however, the Prime Minister was responsible for government policy and the selection of ministers, although he could ignore neither the monarch's personal antipathies nor the pressures exerted by the more influential leaders of his party. The principle of representative government also established a pattern of interaction between Cabinet and Parliament, with the former being derived from and controlled by the latter. Throughout the liberal period, however, the rules of the game were continuously subverted.

In fact, the fate of a Cabinet did not depend on the legislative election results, since it was the Cabinet that 'made' the elections, which were thus converted, in Rokkan's terms, into a mere 'ritual of confirmation'. In short, the *political engineering* worked as follows: when a Cabinet was

replaced – whether as the result of urban protest, opposition pressures, or by the mutual agreement of political leaders – the new Cabinet held early elections through which it legitimated its own authority and secured control of parliament. By mobilizing the state apparatus's coercive and distributive resources, and through a complex process of bargaining and trading-off with local notables, the party in office usually returned a large majority of deputies. Parliament was thus clearly subordinated politically, a fact that was underlined by the dominance of Cabinet in the law-making process (Tavares 1909; Almeida 1991).

Paradoxically, this perversion of the democratic rules did not affect Parliament's status as one of the central arenas for public discussion, and as the main channel for the selection and recruitment of the political elite. As we will show below, a parliamentary career was then an inherent feature of the *homo politicus*, and a major requirement for the attainment of senior leadership positions. It should also be noted that the persistence of high property qualifications for parliamentary candidates throughout this period resulted in a clear social bias in recruitment to the legislature, restricting access to elite positions to a small number of individuals. Hence, the relevance of family connections and oligarchic trends in the formation of the political elite (Almeida 1995).

Naturally, the mechanics of power alternation noted above was only viable on the basis of a pact, explicit or not, between the two major dynastic parties. While the so-called 'politics of agreements' (to use the language of the time) enabled the durable pacification of political life, it did not prevent governmental instability completely – the average Cabinet life span during the Constitutional Monarchy was 17 months (see Table 2) – nor did it prevent the gradual erosion of the policy-making institutions' legitimacy once rotation in office had crystallized into a competition for private accumulation and the clientelistic distribution of valuable state-controlled resources. These delegitimating factors were, of course, exploited in the political campaigns of the republican counter-elite that emerged during the late 1870s and founded an active and well-organized party that was to become an important force in the major urban centres.

A second regime change occurred in 1910 with the overthrow of the monarchy in a revolutionary coup led by republican officers aided by armed civilians. The establishment of the First Republic brought significant changes in the composition of the ruling elite. There was a clear discontinuity in respect of senior -and middle- ranking personnel (for example, ministers, parlamentarians, prefects), and political

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF CABINETS AND MINISTERS, 1851–1999*

Period	Cabinets	Prime Ministers	Ministers[1]
Constitutional Monarchy (1851–1910)	42	22	174
First Republic (1910–26)	46[2]	31	243[3]
Military Dictatorship (1926–33)	8	7	65
New State (1933–74)	3	2	103
Democracy (1974–99)	19	11	204[4]
15/5/74–22/7/76	*6*	*3*	*55*
23/7/76–25/10/99	*13*	*8*	*163*[4]
Total	118	72[5]	769[6]

* From 1 May 1851 to 25 October 1999.
[1] Includes Prime Ministers.
[2] Includes a Cabinet that was appointed and dismissed on the same day (15 January 1920).
[3] Includes individuals officially appointed to Cabinet, but who did not take office.
[4] Excludes the so-called 'Ministers of the Republic' for the Azores and Madeira, which have been considered autonomous regions since the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution.
[5] The number of individuals who were appointed Prime Minister. Excludes duplications (Salazar is counted twice as he was the last Prime Minister of the Military Dictatorship and first of the New State).
[6] The number of individuals who were appointed Minister. Excludes duplications, as some individuals were ministers during different periods.

TABLE 2

CABINET DURATION AND SIZE

Period	Average duration (months)	N° of ministers[1] (min : max)	
Constitutional Monarchy	17.0	7	9
First Republic	4.1	9	13
Military Dictatorship	10.1	11	12
New State	164.3	11	18
Democracy	15.3	15	21
1974–76	*4.3*	16	21
1976–99	*21.5*	15	18

[1] Including Prime Minister.

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF CARRY-OVER MINISTERS*

	Constitutional Monarchy (I)	First Republic (II)	Military Dictatorship (III)	New State (IV)	Democracy (V)
I					
II	1				
III	0	6			
IV	0	0	12		
V	0	0	0	1	

* Individuals who were appointed ministers in different political regimes.

recruitment was opened to a wider social spectrum that now incorporated a large number of people from lower middle-class backgrounds (Marques, 1967; 1991).

The new ruling elite seized power on the basis of a political programme that focused on two main goals: democratization and secularization. The latter was pursued through the implementation of radical anti-clerical policies, which created a religious-secular cleavage that was to have a negative impact on the regime's viability as it pushed the Church into a position of outright hostility. Democratization was to be achieved by the introduction, amongst other measures, of universal male suffrage and the establishment of a genuine parliamentary system. However, fearing that the Church and the monarchists would use an extended franchise to mobilize the peasantry, the republicans restricted the right to vote to literate adult males, with the result that the Republic's electorate was smaller than that of the Constitutional Monarchy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite the restricted size of the electorate, the First Republic experienced periods of intense social and political mobilization, which were partly caused by the emergence of new socio-economic cleavages.

The 1911 Constitution reinforced the role of Parliament – a bicameral legislature that was to be directly elected. The President was elected by Parliament and had no powers of dissolution, whereas the Cabinet was directly responsible to the legislature. The subordinate constitutional role of the President did not, however, prevent the incumbent from influencing the formation of Cabinets. In 1919, an amendment to the Constitution granted the President the power to dissolve Parliament. Yet, it was during the turbulent post-war period, when there were few parliamentary majorities and a profusion of coalition governments, that the legislature played a more active role in the making and breaking of Cabinets.

While a two-party system prevailed during the Constitutional Monarchy, the First Republic's political system can best be characterized as a 'dominant-party multiparty' polity. The Democratic Party, which inherited the organizational resources and Jacobin ideology of the original Republican Party (*Partido Republicano Português* – PRP) following its split in 1912, enjoyed almost complete electoral dominance – remaining in power, either alone or in coalition, for most of the First Republican period. The fragmentation and polarization of the political system during the post-war period, however, resulted in the emergence of several small and highly ideological parties that operated in both the

parliamentary and extra-parliamentary arenas, thus weakening the Democratic Party's internal cohesion and leading to a decline in its popularity (Martins 1998; Pinto 1998).

Political instability and elite disunity were endemic features of this period, and they are clearly demonstrated in the figures on Cabinet longevity and ministerial turnover. The average lifetime of republican Cabinets was little more than four months (see Table 2), and 83.5 per cent of Cabinet ministers remained in office for less than one year (see Table 4). It is also significant that the short-lived First Republic is the political regime in Modern Portugal that holds the record in terms of the total number of ministers (see Table 1). Cabinet instability certainly had a detrimental impact both on the effectiveness of policy-making and on the viability of the regime itself (Schwartzmann 1989; Lijphart 1984).

TABLE 4

DURATION OF MINISTERIAL CAREERS (%)*

Period	<1 year	1–3.9 years	4–7.9 years	>8 years
Constitutional Monarchy	53.5	32.6	5.8	8.1
First Republic	83.5	16.5	0.0	0.0
Military Dictatorship	58.5	38.5	3.1	0.0
New State	16.5	33.0	25.2	25.2
Democracy	42.1	43.6	11.3	2.9
1974–76	*69.1*	*30.9*	*0.0*	*0.0*
1976–99	*32.3*	*48.4*	*15.5*	*3.7*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 5

MOBILITY OF MINISTERS THROUGH PORTFOLIOS[1] (%)*

Period	Number of posts			
	1	2	3	4
Constitutional Monarchy	66.1	19.0	8.0	6.9
First Republic	69.8	21.1	4.5	4.5
Military Dictatorship	72.3	16.9	6.2	4.6
New State	78.6	15.5	3.9	1.9
Democracy	73.5	19.6	3.9	2.9
1974–76	*70.9*	*25.4*	*1.8*	*1.8*
1976–99	*75.0*	*17.5*	*4.4*	*3.1*

[1] Different portfolios held by ministers throughout their entire ministerial career in each period. Portfolios held on an interim basis are not included.

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

A major source of the First Republic's instability was the succession of military conspiracies and coups, two of which led to short dictatorial interludes: the first in 1915 and the second in 1917–18. While the former of these dictatorships simply sought to wrest power from the Democratic Party and hand it to the conservative republican opposition, the latter, led by Sidónio Pais, attempted a complete regime change: soon 'after coming to power, Sidónio exiled a good part of the republican elite, broke with the Constitution of 1911, and advanced the institutionalization of a plebiscitary presidentialist dictatorship' (Pinto 1998: 10). The *sidonist* dictatorship could not however survive the assassination of its charismatic leader. Regardless of its specific traits, the military coup that led to the collapse of the First Republic followed this trail of praetorian interventions.

The collapse of the First Republic took place during the post-First World War wave of European democratic regime crises and breakdowns, and was caused by a heterogeneous conservative military–civilian coalition rather than by a fascist party (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 1999). Mainly right-wing republicans, the generals who led the 1926 *coup d'état* sought support from certain elements in the conservative and Catholic elites in the creation of the first dictatorial governments. Nevertheless, the military retained control of the majority of ministerial portfolios and local administrative posts until 1932. Successive political and economic crises, however, forced them to negotiate with those civilian elites several pacts conducive to the institutionalization of a new regime.

The New State that emerged out of the Military Dictatorship was consolidated during the 1930s under the leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar – a young university professor and member of the Catholic Party who had joined the government as Minister of Finance in 1928. From within the government, Salazar created a weak and elitist single party, the National Union (*União Nacional* – UN). This party never had any power over the government, as its main functions were those of exercising political control over and selecting the members of the National Assembly (*Assembleia Nacional* – AN) and of the local administrations (Cruz 1988; Schmitter 1999).

The 1933 Constitution, a product of several compromises with the conservative military, formally maintained fundamental freedoms and ensured the direct election of both the President and the National Assembly, created a Corporatist Chamber with few powers, and ensured that the government was responsible only to the President. The actual

operation of the New State's political system altered very little throughout its long existence. The most significant change occurred in 1959 when the method of electing the President was altered in the aftermath of a dissident general's Presidential campaign that had led, with support from the democratic opposition movement, to an unprecedented degree of popular mobilization. From that time on, the President was to be indirectly elected (Pinto 1995).

Salazar was the manipulator of a perverted rational-legal legitimacy, and he made little use of charismatic appeals. His traditional Catholicism, combined with his juridical and financial education, distinguishes him from the other European dictators of this period. Cold and distant from both his ministers and his supporters, he cultivated a small circle of 'political counsellors' and stamped governmental and political management with his own style: an almost obsessive belief in centralization and interest in minutiae. Unlike the other dictators, who assumed personal responsibility for the most important portfolios, such as foreign policy, internal security, and the armed forces, Salazar took firm control of the more 'technical' ministries. The armed forces may have been the main threat to the institutionalization of Salazarism during the 1930s, yet the dictator succeeded, with the support of an ageing President, in overcoming the military elite when he became Minister of War in 1936. Nevertheless, some legacies of the Military Dictatorship remained visible well into the 1940s and 1950s with the continued presence of members of the armed forces as censors and prefects and at the most senior levels of the political police.

The *locus* of power and political authority within Salazarism rested always with the dictator and the government, who made the great majority of decisions. In several of the other fascist era dictatorships, single parties functioned as parallel political apparatuses. This never happened in Portugal: here the political control was mainly effected through administrative centralization, the political police, censorship, and the corporatist apparatus, rather than by the single party.

The relationship between Salazar and his ministers was typified by the concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of the former, and the decrease of the latter's autonomy. Moreover, Salazar also reduced the President's independence and denied the National Assembly any supervisory control over the government. The dictator effectively eliminated the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), which was soon substituted by meetings with individual ministers. Cabinet meetings had become purely symbolic by the mid-1930s, only taking place when there

were foreign and domestic policy problems that deserved to be shared with the nation, or when there were important Cabinet re-shuffles. The tradition of collective ministerial dismissals was also abandoned in 1936 when Salazar began to replace up to one-third of his ministers every three to four years.

The centralization of power and the increasing number of organizations that were directly dependent from Salazar led to the creation in 1938 of an institution designed specifically to support the Prime Minister: the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 'Rather than being just the inevitable consequence of an expansion of the State, this concentration of power was a guiding principle of the regime, controlling the departmental bureaucracy' (Lobo 2001: 71). It was not until 1950 that Salazar created a Minister of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, to whom he began to delegate some responsibility for the co-ordination of the government. The least important ministers practically ceased to have any direct contact with the dictator from this point. The initial Ministers of the Presidency included some of the regime's most notable figures, including Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, who used this office to create important networks of influence. In 1961, Salazar began cautiously to reduce the status of this portfolio, and chose less 'political' personalities to occupy the office – a practice that was continued by his successor.

The 'technical' legitimacy of the ministerial function was a constant theme of the dictator's discourse: the true political areas of the regime were not initially elevated to ministerial rank, remaining dependent from the Prime Minister. This was the case with the National Propaganda Secretariat (*Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional* – SPN), for example, which was promoted to ministerial status as the Ministry of Information and Tourism only after it had been de-politicized. Salazar's official discourse was that despite 'politics, as a human art [being] forever necessary as long as mankind exists; government ... will increasingly be a scientific and technical function' (Nogueira 1978: 290).

It is not surprising that the New State has been characterized by the long time ministers served in office: one-quarter remained in government for more than eight years, while another one-quarter retained their positions for between four and eight years (see Table 4). The lack of mobility through ministerial portfolios is also remarkable (see Table 5), suggesting the progressive nomination of specialists for those portfolios. Salazar loosened his hitherto iron grip on government, largely as a consequence of the outbreak of the Colonial Wars in 1961, and increased

the independence granted to the more technical ministries, which allowed him to concentrate his efforts in defence and foreign policy matters.

Reflecting the expansion of the administration, and its extended control, there was a concomitant increase in the size of the government that was shown through the creation of an ever greater number of Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State. These positions were to become a fast track to ministerial careers, as we shall see below. Centralization of the public administration was accentuated during Salazar's regime, and the stability of appointments to the bureaucratic elite was a characteristic of his rule. Signs of change only began to appear towards the end of the 1960s with Caetano's attempts at technocratic modernization.

Salazar's substitution by Marcello Caetano in 1968 heralded a significant renewal of the dictatorship's political elite. Caetano replaced a large number of Salazar's ministers, reorganized the single party by introducing younger blood, and outlined his proposals for administrative modernization that included increases in the technocratic component within government. The increased degree of 'limited pluralism' within some of the regime's institutions was apparent, particularly within the National Assembly which was opened to a small 'liberal' sector.

Portugal's transition to democracy began with a military coup on 25 April 1974. Occurring at the height of the cold war, when there were no great international pro-democracy pressures, the rupture provoked by the Portuguese 'Captains' led to an accentuated crisis of the state that was driven simultaneous by the movement towards metropolitan democracy and the decolonization of Europe's last empire.

The most complex phase of the democratization process took place between 1974 and 1976, the year in which the new Constitution was approved, and in which the first legislative and presidential elections took place. The divisions that arose as a result of decolonization – the initial cause of the conflict between the captains who led the coup and the conservative generals – stressed the political role played by the Armed Forces Movement (*Movimento das Forças Armadas* – MFA), whilst clearing a space for the political and social mobilization that produced the crisis of the state: 'at that moment, Portugal experienced the most intense and sweeping mobilizations of all the new democracies' (Schmitter 1999: 360). As one analyst of the Portuguese transition has noted, the crisis of the State was a 'window of opportunity' for the radicalization of the social movements, one that should not be ignored in

any analyses of this period (Muñoz, 1997). It was in this context of powerful social and political mobilization (with nationalizations, agrarian reform of the large southern *latifundia*, the occupation of urban buildings, and a strong military presence in political life and in the regulation of the social conflict) that the moderate political parties, in alliance with members of the military, defeated the radical left and their military allies.

Alone out of the four principal founding parties of Portuguese democracy, the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Português* – PCP) had a long history of clandestine organization within the country. The Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista* – PS), which was founded by Mário Soares in West Germany in 1973, was heir to the republican and socialist elements of the electoral opposition to Salazarism. The remaining two centre-right parties were only formed in 1974: the Popular Democratic Party (*Partido Popular Democrático* – PPD) – since October 1976, the Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democrata* – PSD) – founded by the 'liberal wing' that emerged during the last phase of the authoritarian regime; and the Social Democratic Centre (*Centro Democrático e Social* – CDS), a Christian liberal conservative party that was on the verge of being proscribed in 1975 (Bruneau 1997; Frain 1998). In an atmosphere of political purges and measures introduced to punish the authoritarian regime's political and administrative elites, the parties of the right were pressurized not to accept leaders from the previous regime as their political programmes shifted considerably to the centre and the left (Pinto 2001).

The MFA's decision to respect the electoral calendar was the key element in the establishment of the democratic regime's founding legitimacy. Elections to the Constituent Assembly on 25 April 1975 gave the moderate parties powerful leverage. The PS won with a working majority, followed by the PSD; the PCP, however, only obtained 12 per cent of the vote. The d'Hondt system of proportional representation was adopted as a means to ensure that the diverse range of political forces contesting Portugal's first democratic elections obtained representation without also leading to an excessive fragmentation of the party system.

There were six Provisional Governments between 1974 and 1976, each with representatives of the three main parties (PCP, PS and PPD). These Cabinets proved to be extremely unstable, as can be seen in their average duration of 4.3 months (see Table 2). As would be expected given the nature of the transition, there were no 'carry over' ministers, and military officers held several civilian ministerial portfolios; besides, two

of the three Prime Ministers and the two Presidents of this period were also military. Nevertheless, the various pacts that were celebrated between the MFA and the political parties ensured the establishment of a democratic regime – even if it was to be supervised by the armed forces (Graham 1992).

The moderate party elites who supervised the consolidation of Portuguese democracy had to cope with a complex heritage. The 1976 Constitution had a long ideological preamble that consecrated the revolutionary nationalizations and agrarian reforms, as well as the military's tutelary political presence with the institutionalization of the Council of the Revolution (*Conselho da Revolução* – CR), which retained important powers over the armed forces and functioned as a constitutional court. In an arrangement that was imposed by the MFA on the political parties, the CR was to be placed under the direct control of the President, who was also a military officer: in this case, the leader of the coup that had contained the radical left.

The 1976 Constitution created a semi-presidential regime. Directly elected by universal suffrage, the President became both commander of the armed forces and the person to whom the government was politically responsible. He had the authority to dismiss parliament if the government did not have a stable majority, giving him the power to 'engineer a majority himself'. He also retained a pocket veto with which he could prevent any law from passing.

The period between 1976 and 1982, when the Constitution was revised to abolish the CR and reduce the President's powers, was one of heightened tension between the President and the political parties at a time when the PCP remained out of the government. The first years of democratic consolidation were dominated by unstable coalitions and three Presidential Cabinets. Those years were of economic austerity during which agreements were reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the 1982 revision of the Constitution, the PS, PSD and CDS managed to secure governmental control over the armed forces, enhancing the role of parliament and removing un-elected military officers from important power positions. The political parties became increasingly dominant within the political arena. By 1985, all candidates contesting the Presidential elections were civilians, with Mário Soares, then leader of the PS, becoming the first democratically elected civilian President. While some analysts continue to believe that the President retains significant powers, the reality is that Portugal has become closer and closer to the model of a parliamentary democracy (Sartori, 1994).

Curiously enough, the emergence of a centrist party sponsored by President Ramalho Eanes during his second mandate, and which had been spectacularly (and ephemerally) successful at the 1985 election – winning 18.4 per cent of the vote – did not lead to a major fragmentation of the party system. Rather, it produced a shift towards a bipolar competition between the PS and the PSD, at the expense of both the PCP and the right-wing CDS. From 1987, when the centre-right PSD led by Cavaco Silva formed a single-party government, the previous pattern of coalition governments came to an end, replaced by a series of single-party majority PSD (1987–95) and PS (1995–2002) governments, 'with a remarkable increase in cabinet durability not preceded by any change in electoral law' (Bruneau *et al.* 2001: 28).

Democratic consolidation, accession to the European Union (EU), economic development, and a new impulse for social change coincided during the 1980s in a 'virtuous circle' that linked the economy and politics (Maravall 1997: 82). Accession to the EU was a policy shared by all parliamentary parties, with the exception of the PCP, and represented a new framework for both democratic consolidation and economic development. It was in this context that a second revision of the constitution in 1989 removed constitutional obstacles preventing the privatization of the substantial nationalized sector.

As mentioned above, Portugal has a long tradition of political and administrative centralization. If we exclude the grant of autonomy to the island regions of Madeira and the Azores through the creation of regional parliaments and governments in accordance with the 1976 Constitution, the new regime may be characterized as being a 'high unitarian democracy' (Diamandouros and Gunther 2001: 20). Although regional identities are very feeble in metropolitan Portugal, proposals for the creation of semi-autonomous regions were included in the manifestos of the political parties as a decentralized device that would lead to administrative modernization and rationalization, and as a means of creating a greater opening towards civil society: however, it was a policy that neither governments of the left nor of the right were to implement. Accession to the EU in 1986 was to introduce a supplementary external spill-over, particularly with the influx of Regional Development Funds. However, the persistence of complaints against regionalization from a part of the electorate led to the rejection of the proposal in a poorly attended referendum in 1998. Portugal thus continues to be one of the most centralized of all Europe's democracies. This is naturally reflected in the way in which public administration has developed. With

democratization, state expenditure has risen substantially, largely as a result of its increased participation in the provision of health and education services and in the extension of social security – those services having been neglected by the previous regime (Maravall, 1997: 54–7). The growth of the central civil service has outstripped that of the local administration to the extent that around 83 per cent of all public employees during the democratic period are employed by central government (Barreto, 1996).

WHO GETS TO POWER? THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF MINISTERS

Our study looks at all members of the Portuguese ministerial elite from May 1851 to October 1999. During this 148-year period, Portugal was governed by 118 Cabinets that incorporated a total number of 769 ministers (including 72 prime ministers). The background information on the ministers was drawn from several printed sources (biographical dictionaries, official directories, newspapers, etc.) as well as from some primary source material that is available in historical archives, and was entered into a specially designed database. As regards the ministers of the democratic regime, a few personal interviews were also conducted in order to collect more detailed biographical data. Unfortunately, only a very small number of ministers have published autobiographies or memoirs, and there is a shortage of academic monographs on the lives of both past and present politicians – even the most prominent ones. The aggregate analysis of biographical data presented here is the first comprehensive empirical study on the composition and recruitment of the Portuguese ministerial elite, since the few quantitative works published on the subject are focused on specific chronological periods and use a limited set of background variables.

Age

During the last century and a half, and regardless of the political regime, the majority of first-time ministers fell into the 40–49 age group, and their average age was either 46 or 47. The only exception to this pattern occurred during the Military Dictatorship, when the 'standard' age for entering the Cabinet was between 50 and 59, and the average age rose to 49. This rise was caused by the fact that a substantial proportion of ministers were drawn from the senior hierarchy of the armed forces.

In terms of the age of first-time ministers, the Constitutional Monarchy occupies second position in the ranking, with 41.3 per cent of

TABLE 6

AGE DISTRIBUTION (%) AND AVERAGE AGE OF MINISTERS*

Period	Age groups**						Average
	<30	30–39	40–49	50–59	>60	Total	age
Constitutional Monarchy[1] (N=150)	2.0	18.0	38.7	29.3	12.0	100	47
First Republic (N=235)	2.3	27.2	41.0	22.6	6.9	100	46
Military Dictatorship (N=64)	1.6	20.3	23.4	42.2	12.5	100	49
New State (N=103)	0.0	21.3	39.8	32.0	6.8	100	47
Democracy (N=189)	0.0	26.4	41.3	24.9	7.4	100	46
1974–76 (N=52)	*0.0*	*32.7*	*36.5*	*21.1*	*9.6*	*100*	*46*
1976–99 (N=149)[2]	*0.0*	*22.8*	*44.3*	*26.8*	*6.0*	*100*	*46*

[1] Includes only ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851.
[2] Includes only ministers first appointed after 21 July 1976.
N=Number of known cases.
* Age at time of first appointment.
** Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

first-time ministers being appointed after they had reached 50 years of age. The reasons accounting for this high proportion of ministers recruited in the oldest age groups are the significant presence of high-ranking military officers, and the long parliamentary careers that many ministers enjoyed prior to their elevation to the Cabinet. The authoritarian New State was another regime in which seniority was valued, with almost 39 per cent of all first-time ministers being appointed after their fiftieth birthday. It should be noted, however, that contrary to a popular belief, which is founded on the longevity of the Salazarist regime, Salazar's regular Cabinet reshuffles effectively prevented the formation of a gerontocratic authoritarian ministerial elite (Lewis 1978).

In contrast, the First Republic and post-authoritarian Democracy account for the largest proportion of younger first-time ministers. As far as the latter regime is concerned, almost one-third of all first-time ministers during the transitional period (1974–76) were less than 40 years of age when they were appointed. The youth of the new regime's 'formative elite' is also evident in the age distribution of the deputies elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1975, where 50 per cent had not reached their fortieth birthday (Freire 2001). This 'trend' was reversed during the period of consolidation, when the proportion of Cabinet

beginners aged between 30 and 39 declined to 23 per cent. Nevertheless, the median age (46 years) of Portuguese ministers during the democratic period is lower than the average for all Western European democracies between 1945 and the mid-1980s, which Jean-Louis Thiébault refers as being 48 years (Blondel and Thiébault 1991: 21, 71).

Geographical Origins

Unlike in other southern European countries, regional identities in continental Portugal are weak and diffuse. They have neither been an important factor in Portuguese political life, nor have they led to demands for territorial autonomy. Consequently, in terms of geographical analysis, the contrast between urban and rural areas, and the specific role played by the largest cities is a more appropriate indicator than regional differentiation.

Taking information on places of birth into account, the most important observed trend throughout the period being studied is the predominance of Lisbon, and its over-representation despite some rather significant variations in magnitude between regimes. The proportion of ministers born in the capital city has varied between one-fifth and one-third of all ministers, while the city's population only raised to a maximum of about ten per cent of the total population of the country. Most likely, metropolitanism – that is, 'the tendency for one or a few large cities to dominate the politics of a nation' (Frey 1965: 131) – would be more accentuated when data on the previous place of residence of ministers become available. This seem to suggest the persistence of high levels of centralization in elite recruitment.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, and in contrast with the country's dominant demographic profile – in 1991, only 39.4 per cent of the population were living in towns with more than five thousand inhabitants (Rodrigues and Pinto 1997: 11) – the largest proportion of Portuguese ministers have been born in the major urban areas. This trend was reversed briefly during the First Republic, when a slight majority of ministers (52.1 per cent) came from small towns and villages. A similar phenomenon had occurred with the establishment of the French Third Republic (Estèbe 1982), and in both countries it seems to be closely connected with the lower social status of the new ruling elite. In the present democratic regime the urban background of ministers has been clearly reinforced: nearly two-thirds of them were born in the major cities. The transition to democracy also brought a novelty: a sizeable minority of ministers (ten per cent) of the provisional governments were

TABLE 7

PLACE OF BIRTH OF MINISTERS (%)*

	Lisbon[1]	Oporto[1]	Major provincial cities	Rest of country	Overseas territories	Abroad
Constitutional Monarchy						
Ministers (N=168)	29.8	7.1	19.6	40.5	1.2	1.8
Population (1878)	5.3	2.4				
First Republic						
Ministers (N=234)	19.7	8.5	14.1	52.1	3.8	1.7
Population (1911)	7.8	3.5				
Military Dictatorship						
Ministers (N=59)	27.1	5.1	28.8	37.3	1.7	0.0
Population (1930)	9.3	3.7				
New State						
Ministers (N=97)	26.8	6.2	18.5	47.4	1.0	0.0
Population (1950)	9.9	3.6				
Democracy						
Ministers (N=173)	32.9	8.7	15.0	37.6	5.8	0.0
Population (1981)	8.7	4.5				

[1] And surrounding areas.
N=Number of known cases.
* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

born in the former African colonies, which by that time achieved independence.

Educational Credentials

Data on the educational background of ministers show a striking and persistent feature across regimes: almost all of them had either a university degree or had graduated in the military academies. In other words, ministers without higher education training were atypical.

The lowest proportion of those with higher education may be found during the Constitutional Monarchy (93.5 per cent), and the highest during the authoritarian period (100 per cent). This did not alter with democratization (see Table 8). Even within the left-wing parties, academic credentials have been an indispensable prerequisite for access to the most senior political positions. When we consider that in 1981 only 1.6 per cent of the Portuguese population had a university degree (Barreto 1996), it is undeniable that educational qualifications have acted as a powerful social mechanism restricting the range of elite recruitment. We should note that from 1945 to the mid-1980s, the overall proportion of university educated ministers in the older Western European democracies was 77 per cent (Blondel and Thiébault 1991: 21).

TABLE 8

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MINISTERS (%)*

	Civilian non-university educated	Military non-graduate	Civilian university educated	Military graduate	Total %	Total N
Constitutional Monarchy	4.7	1.8	59.6	33.9	100	171
First Republic	2.1	0.0	55.4[1]	42.5	100	240
Military Dictatorship	0.0	0.0	44.6	55.4	100	65
New State	0.0	0.0	73.8	26.2	100	103
Democracy	1.5	0.0	87.2	11.3	100	204
1974–76	*1.8*	*0.0*	*63.6*	*34.5*	*100*	*55*
1976–99	*1.2*	*0.0*	*95.1*	*3.7*	*100*	*163*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.
N=Number of known cases.
[1] Includes six ministers who were military doctors.

TABLE 8a

UNIVERSITY DEGREE OF CIVILIAN MINISTERS (%)*

	Incomplete	Graduate	Post-graduate	Doctorate	Total %	Total N
Constitutional Monarchy	1.9	76.5	0.0	21.6	100	102
First Republic	2.3	84.4	0.0	13.3	100	128
Military Dictatorship	0.0	75.8	0.0	24.1	100	29
New State	0.0	52.6	3.9	43.4	100	76
Democracy	0.0	66.3	11.8	21.9	100	178
1974–76	*0.0*	*71.4*	*5.7*	*22.8*	*100*	*35*
1976–99	*0.0*	*71.0*	*9.7*	*19.3*	*100*	*155*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.
N=Number of all university educated civilian ministers.

TABLE 8b

FIELDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF MINISTERS (%)*

Field of education	Constitutional Monarchy	First Republic	Military Dictatorship	New State	Democracy 74–76	Democracy 76–99
Agronomy and Veterinary	0.6	3.0	1.6	1.0	3.7	4.4
Economics and Management	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.8	7.4	20.6
Engineering	6.3	3.0	14.1	17.5	16.7	29.3
Humanities	3.8	3.0	4.7	1.9	5.5	4.4
Law	47.5	30.0	23.4	47.6	29.6	35.6
Mathematics and Natural Sciences	10.8	4.8	0.0	6.8	1.8	2.5
Medicine	3.2	13.0	7.8	3.9	0.0	1.2
Military	36.7	44.3	56.2	26.2	35.2	3.7
Social Science	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	5.0
Other	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
N	158	230	64	103	54	160

* Multiple coding has been applied as some ministers held degrees in two or more academic fields. Percentages do not, therefore, total 100.
N=Number of ministers who completed their higher education studies.

The proportion of civilian ministers with a doctorate is also impressive, and reached its peak during the authoritarian regime (43.4 per cent). As we shall see below, this accounts for the importance of university professors as a reservoir for ministerial recruitment.

Several aspects of the ministers' fields of higher education should also be mentioned. Training in the Military Academies was the dominant credential during the First Republic and, rather obviously, the Military Dictatorship, and the second largest academic background in both the Constitutional Monarchy and the New State. It was also prevalent amongst ministers during the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s. A decisive consequence of the consolidation of democracy was a break with this long tradition of military participation in political office.

Among civilian ministers, those holding degrees in law maintained the highest share throughout the entire period. Graduates in Medicine had some relevance during the First Republic, but afterwards became increasingly marginal. Engineering emerged as the second largest discipline in the authoritarian period, and since 1976 it has seriously challenged the traditional hegemony of legal training.

In the Democratic regime there has been a clear diversification of expertize amongst members of Cabinet. Accompanying the rise in engineering graduates there has also been a rapid expansion in the number of ministers with degrees in economics and in management. This picture is congruent with the demographic trends in the professions: between 1970 and 1990, there was a steady growth in the number of engineers, and a remarkable increase in the number of economists (Carapinheira and Rodrigues 2000: 132). Another distinctive trait of ministers' educational profile during democracy has been the increased

TABLE 8c

PLACE OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION STUDIES OF MINISTERS (%)*

	Coimbra	Lisbon	Oporto	Abroad	(N)
Constitutional Monarchy	54.9	42.7	1.2	3.6	160
First Republic	45.9	54.5	6.4	3.0	235
Military Dictatorship	27.9	68.8	6.5	n.d.	61
New State	35.7	66.3	6.1	2.0	98
Democracy	12.6	78.6	7.7	24.2	182
1974–76	10.4	87.5	0.0	14.6	48
1976–99	14.2	70.2	9.5	27.0	148

* Multiple coding has been applied as some ministers made their studies in different places.
N=Number of known cases.

cosmopolitanism, with those taking their undergraduate or postgraduate degrees at foreign universities accounting for almost one-quarter of all ministers appointed since 1974. During the transition to democracy, the majority of those who had studied or taken degrees abroad had gone to France. Since 1976, however, the United Kingdom comes clearly ahead, and the predominant postgraduate qualifications taken there are in the academic fields of Economics and Engineering.

Two institutions dominated Portuguese higher education until the early decades of the twentieth century, and played a crucial role in the socialization and recruitment of future political leaders: the University of Coimbra, with its Faculty of Law; and Lisbon's Military School (*Escola do Exército*). The creation of faculties of Engineering and of Law in Lisbon during the First Republic contributed decisively towards reinforcing the capital city's status as a privileged location for university-level education. If the number of students of higher education in Lisbon represented less than 36 per cent of the national total in 1900, by 1930, this proportion had risen to 51.7 per cent, while the proportion studying at Coimbra fell from 44 to 28 per cent over the same period (Marques 1991: 560). Data on the places of the higher education studies of ministers confirm Coimbra's decline and Lisbon's rise, a trend that has been reinforced during the Democratic period. Whereas 55 per cent of Constitutional Monarchy ministers received their higher education at Coimbra, only 13 per cent of Democracy's ministers were graduates of that university, while an impressive 78.6 per cent studied in Lisbon.

Occupational Profile

Recruited from a highly educated middle class, the majority of Portuguese ministers have also been drawn from a narrow professional range. Prior to the consolidation of contemporary democracy, the two most important occupational categories were the military and university professors. On the whole, the contingent of public employees has predominated, a characteristic that in part reflects the central role that the state has performed in the structuring of the occupational market, where it is the major employer in some professions. The ministerial elite's dependence on state employment (as it is the case for other political office-holders), may be considered an indicator of weak elite autonomy (Etzione-Halevy 1993).

The strong presence of the armed forces at the ministerial level is principally a result of their direct involvement in regime transitions and crises. During earlier periods, however, the military's involvement was

TABLE 9

MINISTERS' OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND (%)*

Occupational categories	Constitutional Monarchy	First Republic	Military Dictatorship	New State	Democracy 74–76	Democracy 76–99
Military	35.5	44.8	55.4	26.2	35.2	3.8
Army	*31.4*	*31.8*	*38.5*	*17.5*	*20.4*	*3.2*
Navy	*4.1*	*13.0*	*16.9*	*7.8*	*11.1*	*0.6*
Air Force	–	*0.0*	*0.0*	*0.9*	*3.7*	*0.0*
Judge or Public Prosecutor	16.9	7.9	1.5	4.8	3.7	1.9
Diplomat	2.3	1.2	4.6	2.9	0.0	2.5
Senior civil servant	10.5	6.3	0.0	6.8	5.5	13.2
Middle civil servant	1.7	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
Officer of state corporatist agencies	–	–	–	7.8	0.0	0.0
Officer of Central Bank	–	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.4
Officer of international organisation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.3
University professor	19.2	10.9	21.5	33.0	22.2	32.1
Teacher	1.7	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Employee	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.6
Writer or Journalist	7.6	6.7	0.0	0.0	1.8	2.5
Lawyer	9.9	15.5	9.2	6.8	18.5	19.5
Medical doctor	2.3	12.1	4.6	2.9	0.0	1.3
Engineer	5.3	3.3	7.7	7.7	11.1	15.1
Manager	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	9.3	24.5
Businessman, industrialist or banker	3.5	2.1	1.5	2.9	0.0	1.9
Landowner or farmer	5.3	3.8	3.1	1.9	0.0	0.0
Full-time politician	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	3.1
Other	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
N	172	239	65	103	54	159

* Occupation immediately before first ministerial appointment. Multiple coding has been applied.
N=Number of known cases.

TABLE 9a

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTERS ACCORDING TO EMPLOYMENT STATUS (%)

Occupational categories	Constitutional Monarchy	First Republic	Military Dictatorship	New State	Democracy 74–76	Democracy 76–99
Public	78.5	66.9	79.7	86.4	60.4	54.7
Private	15.1	21.2	12.5	5.8	33.9	25.2
Mixed	6.4	11.9	7.8	7.8	5.7	20.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	172	236	64	103	53	159

N=Number of known cases.

also connected with their monopoly of technical expertise (in engineering, topography, and mining, for example), which gave them an influential role in critical areas of state-building. It was not uncommon, for example, for ministers of Public Works to be recruited from the military during the Constitutional Monarchy. After the Great War the military's presence in government was exacerbated by their direct political interventions, which culminated in Military Dictatorship in 1926. With the consolidation of the New State, however, military ministers' numbers not only declined, but those who remained were appointed on the basis of more 'technical' criteria. If during the 1930s they could still secure such positions as the Interior Ministry, at a time when the state's repressive apparatus remained marked by its previous connection to the Military Dictatorship, from the early 1940s they were almost exclusively restricted to those ministries associated with defence and the colonies. The democratic transition of the mid-1970s saw the brief emergence of middle-ranking officers who had been politicized during the Colonial War. From 1976 on, the proportion of military officials within government declined dramatically, representing only 3.8 per cent (see Table 9): by 1980 even the defence portfolio came to be occupied exclusively by civilians.

The importance of university professors (in particular, professors of law) is not in itself surprising, but it was during Salazar's regime that this numerically small body was to become the single major source of ministerial recruitment, and one that, at 33 per cent (see Table 10), was significantly higher than the European average. Even when we limit our comparison to authoritarian regimes alone – and with Franco's Spain in particular – the difference is noticeable. Enjoying great social prestige, they were transformed into a 'super-elite', sharing the leading positions within the state apparatus, government and the public economic sector between themselves. By the 1960s, for example, professors of law enjoyed greater prestige than leading industrialists (Makler 1968). Another significant group of professors represented within Cabinet from the 1950s were those coming from the Faculty of Engineering who were associated with economic development and infrastructural modernization projects, and who occupied the Ministries of Economics, Commerce and Public Works.

University professors were to remain the largest single category of ministers in contemporary Portuguese democracy (32.1 per cent), albeit with two significant differences from the authoritarian regime: (i) not all of them came from the highest ranks of the university profession, and (ii)

law professors ceased to dominate. Many of the university elite that had been associated with Marcello Caetano (who was himself a law professor) were to play an important role during the first years of the democratic regime. Nevertheless, since 1976 engineers and, especially, economists were favoured in the ministerial selection processes, provoking a relative decline in the number of law professors. This tendency was stimulated by the economic crises and the 1978 and 1982 IMF negotiations, and later by the demands of European integration.

The consolidation of democracy is associated with some important changes in the ministerial elite's occupational background, particularly with the re-emergence of the liberal professions and of a large proportion of professional managers (24.5 per cent). Lawyers were the dominant civilian element of the republican elite, followed by medical doctors (12.1 per cent). If the former continued to be an important source of recruitment of the political elite, the latter – a professional group that had typically been associated with political notables – have been eclipsed as a result of increasing technical and state demands placed on the profession. Lawyers, given their protected position within civil society, constituted an important reserve of pro-democratic counter-elites during the authoritarian regime, and their return to the political elite was a natural consequence of the transition to democracy. In the democratic regime, lawyers have become one of the dominant professional groups within both the parliamentary and party elites. Their lesser importance within the ministerial elite, particularly when compared with the professional managers, can perhaps be attributed to the increasingly technical nature of ministerial functions since the 1980s, and the consequent need to recruit trained specialists.

If we look at the occupational distribution of ministers, we see that public employment is a structural characteristic of the Portuguese ministerial elite, peaking at 86.4 per cent during the New State (see Table 9a). This trait, however, should not be confused with the presence of those with a purely bureaucratic background. The significant proportion of senior public servants in the democratic regime (13.2 per cent) includes managers of the state's regional development commissions – almost all of them being engineers and economists.

Even under Salazarism, it was the military and the university professors who constituted the majority of ministerial office-holders, with very few of the members of the bureaucratic elite actually attaining ministerial rank. Whilst simultaneously strengthening the government's political control over the judiciary – therefore reducing its formal

autonomy – the New State also sought to prevent members of the judiciary from joining the regime's political institutions.

Both the First Republic and the present democracy were and are political regimes in which the occupational background of ministers has demonstrated the least dependence upon the State. In the former, this was due to the importance of liberal professionals, whilst in the latter, it is a result of the supplementary growth of both managers and economists within the private and mixed sectors of the economy.

The left–right cleavage – which in the Democratic period has been represented through the two main parties of government, the PS and the PSD – has not been translated into substantive differences with respect to the occupational background of their respective ministers.

Gender

It is only recently that Portuguese women have obtained political rights. Despite feminism having been a component in the republican movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, the First Republic denied women the right to vote. It was only in 1933, in Salazar's New State, that some women were enfranchised, albeit under conditions that were more restrictive than those that applied to men. Equal political rights, in the context of a reduced franchise, were only granted in 1969, with Marcello Caetano's arrival to power, on the basis of a report that stressed the usefulness of obtaining some more 'conservative' votes for the governmental party (Lucena 1976). The first three women deputies entered parliament in 1934, having stood on the single party's list. The representation of women in parliament was to remain poor until the end of the authoritarian regime, and it was only during the 1960s that the first woman was to enter the government: as an Under-Secretary of State, however, not as a minister.

The demands for women's political and civil rights were only met with the transition to democracy, and the question of the lack of women in the parties' leaderships, within parliament, and within the government only entered the political debate during the 1980s. With Portugal having one of the largest rates of female employment in Western Europe since the 1960s, the contrast of this with the presence of women within the legislature and the executive is particularly noticeable (Barreto 2000: 119).

While the number of women parliamentarians increased dramatically – from five per cent in 1976 to 17 per cent in 1999 – this increase has been driven more by the parties of the left than by those of the right, with the PCP having the highest percentage of women deputies since 1976,

followed 15 years later by the PS, which has established an internal system that is designed specifically to increase the number of women candidates. The Portuguese case also seems to demonstrate that the closed party list system of proportional representation increases women's chances of entering parliament (Siaroff 2000). During the 1990s, 12 per cent of Portuguese deputies were female – a figure that is only slightly below the EU average (Viegas and Faria 2001) – although the indicators showed that 'civic and political demobilization' of women remained high (Cabral *et al.* 1993). A moderate proposal advanced by the PS, which sought to establish gender quotas for candidates to Parliament, was rejected in 1999 as a result of opposition from both the parties of the right and the PCP, thereby demonstrating elite resistance towards a culture of 'parity' through positive action.

The number of women (seven) in the Portuguese ministerial elite is very small, accounting for less than four per cent of the total number of ministers between 1974 and 1999. The first woman to become a member of the executive was Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, an independent who was appointed Minister for Social Affairs in July 1974, and who later led one of the governments appointed by President Eanes in 1978.

The more significant increase in the number of female Secretaries of State improved the overall average to eight per cent at the beginning of the 1990s if we consider all members of government and not only ministers. The rate of increase has been irregular, however, as no political party has a specific policy aimed at increasing women's participation in government. It only really became noticeable when in 1995 the PS, after ten years of centre-right governments, nominated a government in which 15.8 per cent of the members were women – although this proportion was to decrease following the first government reshuffle (Viegas and Faria 2001: 27). The creation of a Ministry for Equality in 1999 was also a PS initiative, albeit a short-lived one, as the ministry was soon dissolved.

If the left-right division may be a reasonable explanation for the variation in the number of women in Parliament, the same cannot be said for the ministerial elite. Moreover, and as in other European democracies, 'specialist recruitment patterns' appear to have been the most important factors enabling women to enter government (Davis 1997).

POLITICAL PATHWAYS TO THE CABINET: THE MAIN CAREER PATTERNS

The main career path leading to the Cabinet during the Constitutional Monarchy was through Parliament, with the overwhelming majority of

ministers having had previous legislative experience (87.1 per cent), either as deputies (82.6 per cent) or as peers (21.3 per cent) (see Table 10). Former deputies with long parliamentary careers were more common within ministerial ranks: more than two-thirds of ministers had served three or more terms in the legislature (see Table 10a). The fact that a successful political *cursus honorum* required many years of parliamentary service is clearly stated in the memoirs of many liberal politicians of the time (Cayolla 1928; Cabral 1930). The small number of ministers who were not recruited from Parliament were mostly military officers.

For the majority of ministers, serving in Parliament was the starting point of their route to Cabinet. Most likely as a consequence of traditional administrative centralization, positions in local administration were not perceived as promising routes for the progression of political careers. The figures confirm this belief, with only approximately ten per cent of Cabinet members having served as mayors at an earlier stage in their career. The empirical evidence that is available on parliamentary deputies during the late nineteenth century reveals how few of them had previously served as either mayors or as local councillors (Almeida, 1995). As for the position of Prefect – a position that was crucial in the intermediation process between national and local politics – this was an important springboard to Cabinet office, which one-fifth of ministers utilized, although it should be noted that most of these men had also served as Parliamentary deputies or as Peers.

Although poorly organized and riven with personisms and factions, the two major parties played an increasingly important role in the electoral and parliamentary arenas from the late 1870s, and controlled the major routes to power. The chances for aspiring politicians to obtain Cabinet rank were therefore greatly enhanced if they associated themselves with one or other of these parties: the proportion of ministers with political affiliations was very high. However, it is difficult to know with certainty how many ministers had been party leaders, particularly given the low level of formalization of party structures (see Table 11). Leadership experience gained in one of the organized interest groups was confined to a small number of ministers (7.8 per cent).

We should also note that the impact of secret organizations and of informal relationships in the selection and reproduction of the elite is difficult to assess, although it is an aspect that should not be neglected. Thirty ministers (17.2 per cent) were Freemasons, while family and kinship relationships also played a part in both parliamentary and

TABLE 10

POLITICAL OFFICES HELD BY MINISTERS (%)*

Previous political office	Constitutional Monarchy	First Republic	Military Dictatorship	New State	Democracy 74–76	Democracy 76–99
None	6.4	20.2	66.5	28.1	65.4	23.3
Mayor or local councillor	9.7	13.2	4.6	7.7	0.0	4.9
Prefect (Civil governor)	20.6	14.4	13.8	8.7	0.0	2.4
Colonial governor	9.7	9.0	7.7	6.8	0.0	0.0
Parliamentarian	87.1	67.5	10.8	30.1	7.3	51.5
Deputy	*82.6*	*60.1*	*10.8*	*30.1*	*7.3*	*51.5*
Peer or Senator	*21.3*	*16.0*	*0.0*	*0.0*	–	–
Member of Corporatist Chamber	–	–	–	25.2	5.4	3.7
Secretary or Under-Secretary of State[1]	–	0.8	3.1	34.0	12.7	46.0
Member of *cabinets ministériels*	n.d.	6.6	3.1	4.8	3.6	9.8
Ministerial director	5.2	4.9	0.0	n.d.	1.8	5.5
Minister[2]	–	0.4	9.2	11.6	0.0	9.2[3]
Member of 'Council of the Revolution'	–	–	–	–	1.8	0.0
N	155	243	65	103	55	163

N= Number of all ministers, except during the Constitutional Monarchy. For this period only those ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851 have been included.

* Before their first appointment to Cabinet. Multiple coding has been applied when minister have held different political office, therefore percentages do not total 100.

1 The post of Secretary of State, a provisional creation of the First Republic (1916–17), became a permanent office dating from the early years of the New State.

2 Individuals who had been ministers during the previous period.

3 Includes 14 individuals who were ministers during the transition to democracy (1974–76), and one who was a minister in the last Cabinet of the New State.

TABLE 10a

MINISTERS' PREVIOUS PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE (%)*

Number of times elected to parliament	Constitutional Monarchy	First Republic	Military Dictatorship	New State	Democracy 74–76	Democracy 76–99
1	13.3	53.7	42.8	61.3	100.0	38.0
2	18.0	26.5	42.8	22.6	0.0	40.5
3	19.5	10.5	14.3	9.7	0.0	10.7
>3	49.2	9.3	0.0	6.4	0.0	10.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	128[1]	162	7	31	4[2]	84

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

N=Number of all ministers who were elected to parliament prior to first ministerial appointment.

1 Includes only ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851.

2 Sá Carneiro and Magalhães Mota were elected deputies to the New State's 1969 National Assembly as members of a small reformist and pro-democratic parliamentary group (the Liberal Wing); Jorge Campinos and Lopes Cardoso were elected deputies in the first democratic elections, held on 25 April 1975.

TABLE 11

PREVIOUS PARTY AND INTEREST GROUP LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE OF MINISTERS (%)

	Constitutional Monarchy	First Republic	Military Dictatorship	New State	Democracy 74–76	Democracy 76–99
Party leader	n.d.	20.6	n.d.	31.1[1]	23.6	49.1
Interest group leader	7.8	6.7	7.7	n.d.	10.9	n.d.
Employers' assoc.	*2.6*	*2.5*	*4.6*	*n.d.*	*3.6*	*n.d.*
Trade Union	*0.0*	*0.0*	*0.0*	*0.0*	*1.8*	*3.7*
Professional assoc.	*5.2*	*3.7*	*3.1*	*n.d.*	*5.4*	*7.4*
N	155	243	65	103	55	163

N=Number of all ministers, except during the Constitutional Monarchy. For this period only those ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851 have been included.

[1] Refers only to the regime's single party (National Union, which was founded in 1930 and renamed National Popular Action in 1969), and thus excludes any party leadership positions held prior to the authoritarian period.

ministerial recruitment: relatives were often elected in the same constituency and appointed to the same ministerial portfolios (Almeida 1991; 1995).

The change of regime from the Constitutional Monarchy to the First Republic had two main effects on the pattern of ministerial recruitment. On the one hand, the proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience dropped sharply, from 87.1 per cent to 67.5 per cent (see Table 10). Moreover, while during the Monarchy there was a high proportion of ministers with long parliamentary careers, in the First Republic the proportion of ministers who had been elected to parliament only once increased dramatically to 53.7 per cent (see Table 10a). This suggests that there was a high turnover of both parliamentarians and ministers: an intense elite circulation that provided more opportunities for those aspiring to political office. On the other hand, the proportion of Cabinet members appointed without previously holding political office increased from 6.4 per cent to 20.2 per cent, a trend that was largely the result of the consolidation of an alternative route to power: the armed forces. It is also worth noting that it is in the First Republic that we find the highest proportion of ministers with prior service as mayors and councillors (13.2 per cent).

The political parties of the First Republic, and the dominant Democratic Party in particular, played an active role as the gatekeepers of elite recruitment. With the exception of some military officers and a few civilians, ministers were usually affiliated to a political party, and at least

20 per cent of them had previous party leadership experience. Freemasonry, which had close links with the Democratic Party, was a major source of recruitment to the ministerial elite, providing a total of 89, or 36.6 per cent, of all Cabinet members. In contrast with the Monarchy, political endogamy was rare within the Republic.

Salazarism, as an authoritarian regime with a weak single party, adopted a much more 'bureaucratic' channel of elite recruitment. Only 31.1 per cent of Salazar's ministers were either national or regional UN leaders (see Table 11), and around one half were not even members of the party (Cruz, 1988). Compared to the other dictatorships of the 1930s – Italian Fascism or Francoism, for example – we see that the Portuguese regime's party was much weaker and did not monopolize the selection of the ministerial elite. As Clement Moore noted: 'The party cannot establish its legitimacy, it would seem, unless it acquires some autonomy as an instrument for recruiting top political leaders. Thus dictators who attain power through other bases of support often have difficulties creating a party to legitimate their regimes' (Moore 1970: 51).

Salazar created the UN, but gave it only a limited role. Promotion to governmental positions via the leadership cadres of either the militia or the paramilitary youth organization, the *Legião* and the *Mocidade* respectively, was even less likely. The UN played a significant role in the selection of deputies to the National Assembly, and it was within this institution that the greatest equilibrium between the regime's informal 'political families' – the Catholics, monarchists, and republicans – was to be found (Carvalho 2002).

There was a great stability in the New State's ministerial elite recruitment methods. A large proportion of the regime's civilian Cabinet ministers had initially served as Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State (34 per cent), had been deputies to the National Assembly (30.1 per cent), or had served as procurators in the Corporatist Chamber (25.2 per cent). An increasing number of ministers emerged with no previous history of involvement in any of the regime's institutions (28.1 per cent: see Table 10). This proportion was not to change much over time, and remained significant even within Marcello Caetano's two ministries (Castilho 2001; Carvalho and Fernandes 2002).

During the New State, the most important ministerial portfolios were clearly controlled by a small group of dignitaries, or 'notables', who belonged to the leadership of the single party, and also occupied senior positions in the public administration and the universities. Several of those UN ministers had also been deputies to the National Assembly.

Participation in the single party was, therefore, 'quite helpful [when] combined with other qualifications ... [such as] a brilliant academic or civil service career, and identification with other groups' (Linz 1976: 184). The Portuguese case seems thus to confirm Linz's thesis that when the single party is weak, the chances of ascending to the governing elite are slight 'without [first] belonging to a senior administrative body' – in such cases the party is only a supplementary guarantee (Linz 1976; cf. Pi-Suner 1978: 184).

During its first phase, the New State strengthened the role of the prefects to such an extent that they became the single party's main organizers during the 1930s. In association with the UN, they controlled all mayoral nominations, and were important instruments for controlling local politics – especially in the organization of 'elections'. The majority of prefects were members of the armed forces until the end of the 1930s: afterwards civilians came to dominate, as the Prefecture was perceived to be a good launch-pad for obtaining a position in the National Assembly, although it rarely led to a ministerial appointment.

Nominations to the Corporatist Chamber (*Câmara Corporativa*), representing the nation's 'organized interests', was the responsibility of a state council, which the Dictator presided over until the 1950s – although the creation of the various corporations thereafter made very little change to the proceedings. Being the more 'technical' chamber of the New State's bicameral legislature, a 'limited pluralism' of interest group representation was permitted. Given the nature of the 'reports' that the Chamber had to produce, the presence of university professors and senior members of the administration was common in some of its commissions. Unsurprisingly, one-quarter of the ministers were then drawn from the Corporatist Chamber. Progression through the offices of Secretary and Under-Secretary of State was also to become a privileged route towards membership of the ministerial elite: one that a significant proportion, around one-third, of ministers had followed.

Following the 1974 coup, a large group of military officers, lacking any real political experience, controlled important ministerial portfolios in the Provisional Governments. The first civilian ministers were well-known members of the democratic and communist opposition, however, and most of them had served long political apprenticeships in the regime's prisons or in forced exile. Some of the leaders of the right-wing parties had also been actively involved in politics, particularly during the final years of the regime, when they were members of the 'reformist' group that had initially supported Caetano.

Since 1976, a parliamentary career has become once more the single most important path to ministerial office. Another significant political experience of ministers, which often goes together with a representative background, has been holding a position as Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. Whilst still corresponding to a minority of cases, membership of a *cabinet ministériel* (that is, the staff who directly assists a minister) has been a promising springboard for those aspiring to ministerial office (see Table 10). Almost one-half of all ministers have had partisan leadership experience, either at the national or regional level (see Table 11). Local political careers are still not favoured routes to reach ministerial office, which is in contrast with the situation in most West European democracies, where the average proportion of ministers who have been involved in local and regional politics is around 50 per cent (Thiébault 1991: 34). With democratization, prefects have become increasingly irrelevant as they have progressively been dominated by local branches of the national governing party. Also, between 1974 and 1999 only a few ministers (4.9 per cent) had previously served as local councillors (but none of them as mayors). Nevertheless, the importance of elected local officials is increasing in the selection of the national political elite. The reinforcement of local autonomy and the increased financial muscle of many of the larger local authorities that has come about as a consequence of EU membership, is changing the image of local government. The symbolic prestige of the mayor's office in both Lisbon and Oporto has been enhanced during the late 1990s, mainly as a result of the 1996 election of the former mayor of Lisbon, Jorge Sampaio, as President of the Republic. A growing number of parliamentary deputies also have been elected after having served an 'apprenticeship' in local government (Magone 2000; Freire 2001).

It should be stressed that the number of ministers with a parliamentary background, accounting for approximately 51 per cent, is much lower than the Western European average of around 75 per cent (Winter 1991: 48). With respect to the length of parliamentary service, we note that a large proportion of those who were deputies (38 per cent) were elected only once, some of them having never actually served in Parliament due to their receiving promotion to the Cabinet within a matter of weeks after their election. Even the assumption that 'prime ministers and deputy prime ministers are more likely to be parliamentarians' (Winter 1991: 62), must be treated with caution in Portugal's case.

Two factors may have contributed to the reduced number of ministers with parliamentary experience in the Democratic period. On the one

hand, the party leaders who have been appointed to the position of Prime Minister have always enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in the selection of their ministers (Silva 2002). On the other, the parliamentary groups have tended to occupy a subordinate position within the party's internal power structures. Additionally, it is significant that once the parties obtain power, it is normal for them to effect a 'governmentalization' of their leaderships through the control exercised over them by ministers who also hold key positions within the party leaderships (Lobo 2002).

The relative devaluation of a parliamentary background in ministerial careers is undoubtedly related to the elevated number of technocrats and independents having little political experience, who have served in the governments of the Democratic period – particularly in the more technical portfolios. In fact, almost one-quarter (23.3 per cent) of ministers have not held any political office prior to their appointment. During the early period of Portugal's democratic consolidation, the semi-presidential nature of the political system (which was later reformed) favoured the formation of presidential ministries peopled by independent personalities. However, the recruitment of the latter has also been promoted by the parties, with a view to increasing their political legitimacy and the technical efficiency of their governments. This is, in part, symptomatic of a structural fragility of parties in democratic Portugal: despite their protagonism on the political stage, parties' roots are shallow, and their penetration of civil society is weak.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Regime changes in modern Portugal were generally violent processes with an abrupt rupture, both from the previous political institutions and from its underlying values. The military were key actors in most regime changes and political crises, and therefore an important source of recruitment of the governing elite.

Except for the transition from the Military Dictatorship to Salazar's New State, every regime transformation also brought about a radical alteration in the membership of the governing elite. As Mattei Dogan and John Higley have noted, 'in many regime changes the entire group of uppermost political rulers is replaced, while the turnover of political elites at middle levels is more limited' (Dogan and Higley 1998: 21). In Portugal, however, regime changes have propelled an extensive replacement of the political personnel at different levels – from ministers and parlamentarians, to prefects and other middle-ranking officials. In

some cases other institutions and elite groups were affected, and not solely those occupying formal leadership positions in the previous regime. In this respect, the greatest rupture with the past undoubtedly occurred during the mid-1970s' transition to democracy, when the nature of change also affected several members of the social and economic elites.

None the less, as regards the configuration of the ministerial elite, we find significant continuities over the whole period studied here. Overwhelmingly recruited among middle-aged men from a highly educated middle class, Portuguese ministers prove to have formed an 'elitist' group drawn from a very narrow professional spectrum. Moreover, this image remains constant across party lines. The two single most important occupational categories, until the consolidation of contemporary democracy, were military officers and university professors. Lawyers and other liberal professionals – medical doctors, etc. – only gained some importance during the First Republic. On the whole, professionals working in the public sector have been the majority. The consolidation of democracy during the 1970s is associated with two important changes in the occupational background of the ministerial elite: the re-emergence of liberal professionals, and the appearance of a large number of managers.

As far as the political *cursus honorum* of Portuguese ministers is concerned, two characteristics are worth noting: the persistence of the relative unimportance of local politics; and, as a secular trend, the declining role of parliamentary experience. In Portugal, unlike in many of the other western European countries, there is a long tradition of separation between politics at the national and the local levels. Consequently, local politics has never been a promising route to ministerial office. Prior to the authoritarian period, parliamentary experience was regarded as an essential prerequisite for a ministerial career – at least for civilians. The contemporary democratic regime, however, has not clearly resumed this tradition of the liberal past, while it has favoured the enhancement of more technical credentials and technocratic backgrounds in ministerial recruitment. As the comparison with other European democracies reveals, this tendency does not arise only from the growing complexity and technical character of policy-making; among other factors, it is also connected with the weak penetration of parties in civil society.

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