Research Note:

**Exposure to Polls, Cognitive Mobilization, and Voting Behavior:
the 2002 General Elections in Portugal**

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Two assumptions are commonly made about the effects of exposure to opinion polls on voting behavior. The first is that those effects are likely to be found either among the public in general or, at least, among those who are less politically involved, informed or sophisticated. This stems from the notion that, if poll effects are at all to be stronger among particular subgroups, these should be composed precisely by those voters who have little political information of other sorts and have no incentives to seek out more of it, and are thus more likely to allow themselves to be guided by their perception of where the majority of their fellow citizens stand on terms of issues, candidate and party preferences.

The second major assumption that is commonly made is that the kind of polling information that might make a difference on voting choices concerns the static distribution of preferences between "leading" and "trailing" candidates or parties. In fact, the very concept of a "bandwagon effect" — through which "persons are more likely to vote for a candidate when they expect him to win than when they expect him to lose" (Simon 1954, p.246) — relies mainly on the notion that, for voters, what counts as relevant and potentially influential information is the basic distinction between who is ahead and who is behind in the polls.

In this research note, a somewhat different set of arguments as to why and how should opinion polls influence voters is advanced and tested. First, it will be suggested that, rather than being homogeneous across the electorate or greater among unsophisticated and disengaged publics, the effect of exposure to opinion polls on voting choices should be stronger among the *most* politically involved and sophisticated voters, i.e., those who have higher levels of cognitive

mobilization. Second, that among these publics, the impact of polls might stem not so much from the static perception of "leading" and "trailing" candidates or parties, but rather from the dynamic perception of trends throughout the campaign and what they tell the voters about the adequacy, viability, or utility of particular options. These hypotheses are tested here using data from the 2002 Portuguese Electoral Study, a national face-to-face survey of 1.303 registered voters conducted in the two weeks after the March 12th 2002 general legislative elections in Portugal, part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems international project (see appendix for details).

**Exposure to polls: what effects, and on whom?**

Two main arguments, derived from the social psychology literature on social influence and conformity, are commonly advanced as to why we could expect citizens' exposure to opinion poll results to produce a "bandwagon effect". The first consists in assuming that polls may exert a *normative* influence over voters. When individuals perceive the existence of a social norm — defined, in this case, by a majoritarian preference expressed in opinion polls — they may feel compelled to abandon their views and comply with such norm (Asch 1951; Crutchfield 1955). The second consists in assuming that individuals may be influenced by polls because they use majority preferences as *information* about the correct option to take (Sherif 1936; Deutsch and Gerard 1955). The credibility of the second argument has been enhanced by an abundant literature on citizens' overall levels of political sophistication and electoral behavior. In fact, most citizens do seem to lack information about the electoral process, policy platforms, or the connections between their choices and policy outcomes. Considering they have strong incentives to minimize the costs of acquiring the information necessary to make choices (Downs 1957),

they are also likely to rely on "informational shortcuts", such as group references, ideology, party identification, and the like (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991; Lupia 1992). From this point of view, knowledge about where other voters stand on issues, candidates and parties may also constitute a "informational shortcut" usable in order to make voting decisions, with opinion polls playing a role that is presumably stronger either in electoral contexts where other sources of information are less available or among voters that are themselves less informed about politics (Fleitas 1971; Lavrakas, Holley, and Miller 1991; West 1991).

More than a decade ago, McAllister and Studlar suggested that "with the loosening of the bonds between parties and the electorate, more people are potentially available for influence by campaign effects, such as opinion polls, than ever before" (1991, p. 736). Since then, the observed decline of social class, religiosity, unionization or partisan loyalties as bases of electoral choice all over Western industrialized nations (Clark and Lipset 2001; Dalton 1996; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) would lead us to expect a decline in the use of such voting cues and an increased role of opinion polls as a short-term factor in voting choices. However, evidence for this remains somewhat mixed, particularly when research about "first-order" elections — legislative or presidential, rather than referenda or primary elections — is concerned. In fact, findings range from "bandwagon effects" (McAllister and Studlar 1991; Mehrabian 1998; Skalaban 1988) to "underdog effects" (Ceci and Kain 1982; Fleitas 1971; Lavrakas, Holley, and Miller 1991; McBride 1991) to no effects as all (West 1991), leading observers to conclude that "bandwagon and underdog effects can and do occur, but their magnitude is small and probably inconsequential" (Asher 1992, p. 120).

It may also be the case, however, that poll effects have not always been looked for exactly in the right places or the right way. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that voters' mere *exposure* to poll results should not make much of a difference in their voting decisions. As Henshel and Johnston (1987) argue, all voters in general — regardless of their exposure to polls — may be indirectly affected by poll forecasts, by responding to factors that those forecasts themselves are likely to affect, such as financial contributions, mobilization efforts and public endorsements to candidates or parties. Moreover, information about who seems more likely to win the election can be generated by and circulate through other means besides actual exposure to poll results, such as political discourse and commentary in the media, interpersonal discussion and other political intermediaries. Thus, although it may be the case that attention to the polls does account for more *accurate* predictions of electoral outcomes (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2002), the fact is that the electorate in general seems to be particularly good at simply predicting election winners, at least when the margin of victory is not extremely slim (Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1989). In other words, although we cannot exclude that poll forecasts about likely winners and losers affect expectations about who's ahead (and foster support for them), such impact is likely to occur in many other ways besides individuals' reported attention to polls.

Second, in most advanced industrial democracies, polls have become a permanent fixture of campaign coverage. And more than telling voters who is likely to win or lose, the information generated by the sequence of polls that typically precedes an election may also tell voters who is losing and gaining support throughout the campaign, i.e., information about poll trends and dynamics. This information is likely to matter for the choices of at least some voters. Marsh (1984), for example, dealing with the impact of polls from the perspective of normative effects, finds that trend information is actually far more powerful an explanation of attitude change than

information about static public opinion. And information about trends might also be relevant from an "informational effects" point of view. For example, if strategic voters perceive that the advantage enjoyed by a leading party is becoming increasingly solid in the polls — turning election outcomes into a foregone conclusion — they will be less concerned with the possibility of "wasting" their votes and can more easily desert to a third party, either because that party is simply closest to their preferences or because they can take the opportunity to make a protest vote with major consequences. However, if the margin of victory of the leading party is perceived as narrowing, incentives for deserting third parties in order to avoid waste of votes become higher, and undecided voters may begin to see the option for the trailing (but gaining) party or candidate as an increasingly politically accurate and viable one.

Finally, if those sorts of effects are to be found at all, I suggest that they should be looked for among the most cognitively mobilized segments of the electorate. Although the use of informational shortcuts in order to make decisions is usually portrayed as making up for the general lack of information of citizens about politics (Popkin 1991), it is also likely that certain cues are only relevant to those voters who are able to bring more and more complex information to bear when making decisions, i.e., those that have greater levels of political skills and resources (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). The perception of poll dynamics, by demanding consistent attention to media messages and the cognitive skills necessary to detect trends in support for parties or candidates, seems to qualify as one of such pieces of complex information. Furthermore, higher levels of cognitive mobilization also seem to be associated with a tendency to rely less on social class, group membership, and, particularly, partisanship as a voting cue (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Dalton 1984, 1996), opening up voting decisions to influence by short-term factors, such as campaign effects in general and perception of polling trends in particular.

Therefore, while it may be true that "it is very difficult for short-term campaign forces, such as media coverage and polls, to break through partisan barriers and influence voter assessments" (West 1991, p. 159), it may also be the case that more sophisticated, skilled and attentive publics are more willing and able to use heuristics such as poll forecasts and, particularly, poll trends, in their voting decisions.

**Electoral behavior and exposure to polls in the Portuguese 2002 elections**

In its three decades of democratic politics, Portugal has displayed several characteristics suggesting that the influence of polls in electoral decisions should be relevant. On the one hand, in spite of significant social and religious cleavages, long-term socio-structural determinants of voting behavior — such as class, religion, trade-union membership and even ideology — have systematically emerged as rather weak explanations of the vote (Gunther and Montero 2001), turning Portugal into one of the post-industrial nations where long-term determinants of the vote are less relevant (Norris 2004).

On the other hand, particularly since the early 1990s, legislative election campaigns in Portugal have become a relatively poll-rich environment, at least in European terms. For example, in the three months preceding the most recent legislative elections of March 17th 2002, fifteen nation-wide polls were conducted by seven different polling organizations, including seven different polls published just three days before the election.[1] Besides, reported exposure to those opinion polls was considerably high. The 2002 Portuguese Election Study, a post-electoral survey conducted in two weeks following the election, asked a national representative sample of registered voters whether they had "listened to, seen or heard any results of polls during the last

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[1] These polls and their results can be found in a dossier prepared by national daily newspaper *Público,* available in http://dossiers.publico.pt/shownews.asp?id=70483&idCanal=317&idSubChannel=318.

electoral campaign" ("yes" or "no" answers). About 68% of respondents reported having been exposed to poll results (with 2% "don't know" or "no answer" responses).

The 2002 elections resulted from the December 2001 resignation of the Socialist Prime-Minister António Guterres, following disappointing results in the local elections and two years of increasing dissatisfaction with government performance and, particularly, its management of the economy (Freire and Lobo 2003; Lobo and Magalhães 2003). After new elections were scheduled for March 17th, the Socialist Party (PS) managed to elect a new party leader, Ferro Rodrigues, former minister of employment and social affairs. However, in the meantime, the crisis in the Socialist Party had taken its toll in public preferences. The first two polls published in late December gave the Social Democratic Party (PSD), PS's main center-right adversary, a comfortable advantage of more than 10 points after redistribution of the undecided voters. In every single poll conducted until March 17th, the PSD always came out ahead, and ultimately did win the elections.

Nevertheless, one of the most striking facts of the campaign was that, as it progressed, PSD's projected margin of victory over the Socialists seemed to diminish noticeably. Table 1 compares the average voting intention figures presented by the different polls in two different periods: those whose fieldwork had taken place between December 2001 and February 2002, and those whose fieldwork took place in March 2002, i.e., the final polls. Two trends are clearly visible. On the one hand, a decline of voting intention for the Social Democrats, resulting in an average decrease of the gap between the PSD and the PS from 8.5% to 5%. In the end, the difference between both parties on election-day ended up being even narrower, 2.4%, turning the 2002 elections into the most competitive ever of Portuguese democratic history. At the same time, the right-wing Popular Party also seemed to be rising throughout the campaign, from 4.8%

in the earlier polls to 6.4% in the final polls, an impression confirmed by the ultimately rather

strong showing of 8.7% on election day.

**Table 1 about here**

Table 2. presents the results of a preliminary test of the "bandwagon" hypothesis. Two

alternative dichotomous dependent variables have been defined: vote for the leading party (PSD)

vs. vote for all remaining parties;[2] and vote for PSD vs. vote for the Socialist Party, the Social

Democrats' main contenders.[3] Independent variables include a range of factors that have been

commonly used in the analysis of voting behavior in Portugal and other western European

nations (Gunther and Montero 2001; Norris 2004): demographic factors (sex and age);

socioeconomic status variables (social class, educational attainment, trade union membership);

catholic church attendance; ideological self-placement; and PSD identification.[4] To these,

another independent variable — exposure to polls — was added to the logistic regression

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[2] The question was: "Could you tell me in which party did you vote?", asked after a filter question about turnout in the March 2002 elections. Answers were recoded with value 1 for voters in the PSD and 0 for all remaining parties. "Don't know/no answer" and blank and spoiled votes excluded from the analysis.

[3] Answers were recoded with value 1 for voters in the PSD and 0 for the PS. Third parties, "don't know/no answer" and blank and spoiled votes excluded from the analysis.

[4] Sex was coded 0 for male and 1 for female. Social class is a five-point scale coded 0 for "manual worker", 1 for "routine non-manual worker", 2 for "service class", 3 for "petty bourgeoisie" and 4 for "bourgeoisie", built upon answers to the questions "What is your present professional situation?", "What is your present or latest professional activity?", "In which sector of activity do/did you work?" and an additional question about number of employees, if any, for those self-employed . Education is a five-point scale, coded 0 for "none", 1 for "primary", 2 for "basic", 3 for "secondary" and 4 for "university", built upon answers to the question "What was the highest degree of schooling you have reached?". Trade union membership was coded 0 for non-members and 1 for members, based upon the question "Do you belong to a trade union?". Catholic church attendance is a seven-point scale, coded 0 for those without religious beliefs or non-Catholics, 1 for non-practicing Catholics, 2 for Catholics who attend religious services about once a year, 3 for those who attend religious services 2 to 11 times a year, 4 for those who attend religious services once a month, 5 for those who attend religious services two or three times a month and 6 for those who attend religious services at least once a week, based upon the questions "Do you consider yourself a very, somewhat, little or not at all a religious person?", "What is your religious affiliation?" and "How often do you go to church?". Ideological self-placement is an 11-point scale, based upon answers to the question "In politics, people sometimes talk about left and right. Where would you position yourself ideologically in a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means the position most to the left and 10 the position most to the right?". PSD identification was coded 1 for PSD partisans and 0 for others, based upon answers to the questions "Do you feel yourself to be close to a political party in particular?" and "Can you tell me what party is that?".

analysis.[5] If a bandwagon effect exists, we should expect exposure to polls to have a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for the leading party.

**Table 2 about here**

The results in Table 2 are not particularly surprising, judging on the already mentioned literature on voting behavior in Portugal. Explanations of voting choices based on social or religious cleavages turn out to be mostly irrelevant, not only (and understandably) when the center-right PSD vote is pitted against vote in all other parties to the right and left, but also the choice between PSD and its main center-left competitor (the PS) is analyzed. Ideological self-placement in the left-right scale and party identification turn out to be the strongest explanations of the vote. And although exposure to polls has a positive sign in both cases, the variable is far from reaching statistical significance. In fact, this multivariate analysis confirms what bivariate analysis already suggested: the tau-b correlations between exposure to polls and vote for the PSD, measured in the two ways advanced here, are both below .05 and quite short of statistical significance. It seems, therefore, that voters who were exposed to the 2002 Portuguese polls — all of them presenting the PSD as the winning party — were not significantly more likely to vote for the Social-Democrats.

However, recall that our working hypotheses were somewhat different to begin with. It was suggested that voters exposed to the polls might be sensitive not so much to the perception of who is the front-runner or the underdog in the polls, but rather to the dynamic of public opinion expressed by the succession of polls. Since that dynamic was of a diminishing margin of

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[5] Exposure to polls was coded 1 if respondent was exposed to polls during the campaign and 0 for others, based upon the question "During the campaign, did you read, listened to watched any poll results in newspapers, radio or television?".

victory for the PSD, two expectations result. The first is one of third-party defection to the largest parties as the election became increasingly competitive, while the second is that, when the option between one of the two largest parties is concerned, there should be an increased likelihood of vote for the "underdog", which was revealed by the poll trends as a increasingly viable and accurate choice of governing party. Furthermore, we had suggested that such effects, rather than homogeneous across the electorate, were more likely to be present among voters with higher levels of cognitive mobilization.

Tables 3 and 4 display the results of multivariate analyses that test these hypotheses. Cognitive mobilization was measured as an additive index of scores obtained from three items in the questionnaire: level of interest in politics, knowledge of candidates running in the voter's electoral district and level of exposure to TV news about politics.[6] In this way, the variable combines three dimensions typically included in the theoretical construct of cognitive mobilization: political awareness, political knowledge and access to political information (Dalton 1996, p. 19). We then tested whether exposure to polls had a differential impact on voting choices depending on levels of cognitive mobilization. Thus, each model was tested on split samples, breaking respondents into medium/low (the lower and middle terciles) and high levels (the upper tercile) of cognitive mobilization. Three different dependent variables were used: vote for the leading party (PSD) vs. vote for PS[7]; vote for PS vs. vote for PCP, BE and the other

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[6] Cognitive mobilization is an additive index summing respondents' scores on three items: level of interest in politics (0 for "not interested" or "little interested", 1 for "somewhat interested" and 2 for "very interested", based upon answers to the question "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be very interested, somewhat interested, little interested or not interested at all in politics"); correct knowledge of candidates running for elections in respondents' electoral districts (0 for none, 1 for one, 2 for at least two candidates, based upon answer to the questions "Do you remember the name of any of candidates running for the electoral district of [respondent's] in the last legislative elections?" and "What are their names?"); and level of exposure to television news (0 for "never" or "less than once a week", 1 for "once a week" or "several times a week" and 2 for "everyday", based upon answers to the question "How frequently do you watch news or shows about political issues on television?").
[7] Answers were recoded with value 1 for voters in the PSD and 0 for the PS. Third parties, "don't know/no answer" and blank and spoiled votes excluded from the analysis.

remaining smaller leftist parties[8]; and vote for PSD vs. vote for CDS-PP (the "third-party" to PSD's right).[9]

**Table 3 about here**

In Table 3, although the sub-samples end up being small, generalized statistical insignificance for socio-demographic variables matches what we had already found when the model was estimated for the larger sample of PSD and PS voters in Table 2. Ideological self-placement and party identification remain the only significant independent variables common to both sub-samples. There is, however, one very noticeable difference on the impact of exposure to polls. As expected, having been exposed to polls had a significant impact on the choice between the PSD and PS in the Portuguese 2002 elections *only* among voters with higher levels of cognitive mobilization. And that impact is *negative*, i.e., exposure to polls decreased the likelihood of voting for the party that had been *leading* but *declining* in the polls. Column 4 provides estimates of the impact of each variable, by presenting the enhanced probability (in percentage) that a change from the minimum to the maximum value of each variable would have on voting for the PSD while holding all other independent variables at their high cognitive mobilization sub-sample means. In this way, we can see that, among those with high levels of cognitive mobilization, exposure to polls emerges as the third most powerful predictor of the vote, after ideological self-placement and party identification.

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[8] Answers were recoded with value 1 for voters in the PS and 0 for the PCP, BE and other leftist parties. Other parties, "don't know/no answer" and blank and spoiled votes excluded from the analysis.
[9] Answers were recoded with value 1 for voters in the PSD and 0 for the CDS-PP. Other parties, "don't know/no answer" and blank and spoiled votes excluded from the analysis.

It was also suggested that, among voters with high levels of cognitive mobilization, exposure to polls showing the election was becoming increasingly competitive should increase the likelihood of third party defection. That hypothesis is tested in the two different ideological blocs of the Portuguese party system, and the results are presented in table 4. Among voters with low and middle levels of cognitive mobilization, exposure to polls had no impact on the likelihood of voting for the Socialist Party instead of the remaining third-parties to its left. However, in what concerns voters with high levels of cognitive mobilization, exposure to the polls has a decisive effect in *increasing* the likelihood of voting for the Socialists, and emerges as the single most powerful predictor of their vote.

**Table 4 about here**

The same cannot be said, however, for intrabloc voting choices in the right of the party system. Here, exposure to the polls has no significant impact on the choice between the PSD and the smaller CDS-PP to its right, either in the high or middle/low cognitive mobilization sub-samples. Besides, the sign of the coefficient among those with higher levels of cognitive mobilization is negative, i.e., contrary to what could be predicted if the perception of an increasingly close race created pressures to avoid "wasting votes" in the smaller party. However, although this finding is open to several different interpretations, there is at least one that is not entirely incongruent with the overall theoretical framework presented here. Recall that *two* major trends resulted from the analysis of earlier and final polls in the 2002 campaign: while the first was a narrowing gap between Social-Democrats and Socialists, the second was a noticeable *rise* of the CDS-PP. It this therefore possible that incentives towards third-party defection on the right

were counteracted by the perception of a trend of growing support for the Popular Party, which emerged as an increasingly viable choice in order to impose a post-electoral coalition on the largest rightist party. In fact, much of the CDS-PP campaign discourse was directed precisely at this possibility, presenting the party as a much-needed "right arm" of an inevitably victorious PSD, whose absolute majority should be prevented (Freire and Lobo 2003). As it happened, this was precisely the political outcome that emerged out of the 2002 elections. Absent an absolute majority for the Social-Democrats, who were unable to match in 2002 their 1987 and 1991 electoral landslides, the formation of a PSD/CDS-PP coalition cabinet followed.

**Conclusion**

This research note sought to examine two alternative mechanisms for the influence of polls on electoral behavior. One is the "bandwagon effect", through which those exposed to poll information become more likely to support candidates and parties that are expected to win in the polls. We found, however, that in the Portuguese 2002 elections such bandwagon effects were simply absent when other determinants of the vote are controlled for.

 In contrast, we proposed an alternative mechanism through which poll effects may be felt. In information-rich environments should as those provided by first-order elections, and also considering the indirect effects produced by poll forecasts, mere exposure to polls displaying likely "winners" and "losers" is unlikely to produce bandwagon effects. Instead, the effects of polls should result from the perception of poll dynamics and trends which, on the eyes of the most cognitively mobilized voters, should make some electoral choices more viable and desirable, while reducing the utility of others.

We found, indeed, that while the least cognitively mobilized members of the electorate were generally insensitive to their exposure to poll forecasts, those with higher levels of cognitive mobilization were not. On the face of polls that consistently showed a declining gap between the major leading center-right party and the trailing center-left party — revealing the elections as far more competitive that what had seemed in earlier polls — voters with higher levels of cognitive mobilization tended to vote for the trailing (but gaining) party and to strategically defect third-parties in the left.

**Appendix: survey and sample**

The Portuguese Election Study 2002 was conducted as part of a research project of the Social Sciences Institute of the University of Lisbon, entitled "Portuguese Electoral Behavior and Political Attitudes in Comparative Perspective". The project is integrated in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) program, and the survey applied in Portugal contained CSES's modules 1 and 2, as well as a set of country-specific questions. It was a post-election, face-to-face household survey, taking place between March 23$^{rd}$ and April 8$^{th}$ 2002, based on a multi-staged probability sample of the inhabitants of mainland Portugal aged 18 or more (N=1303).. Localities were chosen with probability proportional to size among strata defined by region (five regions) and size of locality (11 strata), based on the 1991 Portuguese census, with no more than 10 interviews being conducted in each locality. Households were selected by random route and individuals by the use of a Kish table. Maximum response rate was 81.4%. This study was sponsored by Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, the Portuguese Technical Secretariat for Electoral Process Issues, the National Election Committee, the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Administration and the Portuguese

Ministry of Finance. The complete dataset and its design report can be downloaded from the

CSES website (http://www.umich.edu/~cses/download/module2/module2mirror.htm).

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Table 1. Campaign Polls in the Portuguese 2002 elections: Voting Intention After Redistribution of Undecided Voters

| | N. of polls | Voting Intention (in average percentages) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | PSD (Social Democratic Party) | PS (Socialist Party) | CDS-PP (Popular Party) | PCP (Communist Party) | BE (Leftist Bloc) |
| All polls | 15 | 44.8 | 37.9 | 5.6 | 6.9 | 2.7 |
| December-February polls | 8 | 46.5 | 38 | 4.8 | 6.6 | 2.3 |
| March polls | 7 | 42.9 | 37.9 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 3.2 |
| Election results | | 40.2 | 37.8 | 8.7 | 6.9 | 2.7 |

Source: see note 1

Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis of Voting Behavior in the Portuguese 2002 Elections: Testing the Effects of Exposure to Opinion Polls

| Independent Variables | Dependent variable: 1=Vote for PSD; 0 = Vote for other parties | Dependent variable: 1 = Vote for PSD; 0 = Vote for PS |
|---|---|---|
| | $B$ | $B$ |
| Sex | -.01 (.24) | .00 (.27) |
| Age | -.00 (.01) | -.00 (.01) |
| Class | -.04 (.13) | -.05 (.14) |
| Education | -.01 (.04) | -.01 (.16) |
| Trade union membership | -.58 (.41) | -.51 (.44) |
| Catholic church attendance | -.03 (.07) | -.03 (.08) |
| Ideological self-placement | .37*** (.06) | .53*** (.08) |
| PSD identification | 3.36*** (.38) | 3.15*** (.45) |
| Exposure to polls | .27 (.30) | .22 (.33) |
| Constant | -3.08 | -3.57 |
| Cox and Snell $R^2$ | .42 | .44 |
| Number of cases | 601 | 484 |

Values are logistic regression coefficients (and their standard errors); *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis of Voting Behavior in the Portuguese 2002 elections: vote for PSD vs. PS broken by level of cognitive mobilization

| Independent Variables | Dependent variable: 1= PSD Vote;  0 = PS Vote. | | |
| | Medium/low cognitive mobilization | High cognitive mobilization | |
| | *B* | *B* | First difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sex | .40 (.37) | -.44 (.46) | -7.4 |
| Age | -.01 (.01) | .02 (.02) | 19.5 |
| Class | -.26 (.18) | .32 (.24) | 16.3 |
| Education | -.02 (.06) | -.01 (.04) | -0.7 |
| Trade union membership | -.68 (.71) | -.58 (.59) | -10.6 |
| Catholic church attendance | -.05 (.11) | .05 (.13) | 5.0 |
| Ideological self-placement | .55*** (.10) | .53*** (.13) | 83.2 |
| PSD identification | 3.06*** (.53) | 3.62** (1.06) | 45.2 |
| Exposure to polls | .54 (.40) | -2.54* (1.23) | -22.0 |
| Constant | -3.93 | -1.72 | |
| Cox and Snell $R^2$ | .46 | .47 | |
| Number of cases | 289 | 186 | |

Values are logistic regression coefficients (and their standard errors). Column 4 presents the enhanced probability (in percentage) that a change from the minimum to the maximum  value in each particular variable would have on voting for the PSD instead of the PS while holding all remaining independent variables at their high cognitive mobilization sub-sample means. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 4. Logistic Regression Analysis of Voting Behavior in the Portuguese 2002 elections: exposure to polls and third-party defection

| Independent Variables | Dependent variable: 1= PS Vote; 0 = other leftist parties. | | | Dependent variable 1= PSD Vote; 0= CDS-PP vote. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Medium/low cognitive mobilization | High cognitive mobilization | | Medium/low cognitive mobilization | High cognitive mobilization |
| | *B* | *B* | First Difference | *B* | *B* |
| Sex | -.30 | 1.21 | 9.8 | -.57 | .10 |
| | (.55) | (.76) | | (.70) | (.62) |
| Age | -.01 | -.06 | -40.0 | -.00 | .01 |
| | (.02) | (.03) | | (.02) | (.02) |
| Class | .37 | -.61 | -37.5 | -.33 | -.12 |
| | (.36) | (.43) | | (.32) | (.34) |
| Education | -.01 | -.02 | -0.7 | .12 | -.04 |
| | (.08) | (.08) | | (.37) | (.29) |
| Trade union membership | -.45 | -.93 | -9.2 | [b] | .18 |
| | (.76) | (.84) | | | (1.00) |
| Catholic church attendance | .02 | .90** | 54.1 | -.22 | -.34* |
| | (.15) | (.30) | | (.20) | (.17) |
| Ideological self-placement | .76*** | .71** | 61.9 | -.28 | -.27 |
| | (.17) | (.25) | | (.14) | (.15) |
| Party identification[a] | 5.02*** | 4.44*** | 51.0 | 2.90*** | 3.81*** |
| | (1.16) | (1.04) | | (.80) | (1.09) |
| Exposure to polls | -.01 | 6.66** | 91.6 | .63 | -.18 |
| | (.62) | (2.18) | | (.61) | (.97) |
| Constant | -2.05 | -8.87 | | -4.08 | 3.86 |
| Cox and Snell $R^2$ | ..41 | .53 | | .18 | .25 |
| Number of cases | 192 | 117 | | 158 | 124 |

Values are logistic regression coefficients (and their standard errors); *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Column 4 presents the enhanced probability (in percentage) that a change from the minimum to the maximum value in each particular variable would have on voting for the PS instead of the remaining parties in the left while holding all remaining independent variables at their high cognitive mobilization sub-sample means.

[a] PS identification was used for analysis of PS vs. leftist vote, while PSD identification was used for analysis of PSD vs. CDS-PP vote.

[b] Only one responded belonged to a trade union in the sub-sample.