Abstract and Keywords

The study of the relationship between populism and religion has for a long time remained a neglected area of social-scientific research. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of religious populism. A subtype of populism, religious populism, is analyzed in its two dimensions: as an openly religious manifestation, in the form of the politicization of religion; and as a subtler religious manifestation, tied to the sacralization of politics in modern-day societies. The chapter ends with a discussion on the nexus between politics and religion and on the need to focus on the repeated intersections between the two fields.

Keywords: religious populism, religion, sacralization, charisma, symbolism, ritual, myth, eschatology

“THE relationship between populism and religion hits you in the eye,” declared a scholar of populism (Zanatta, 2014). Even though that is indeed the case, the study of the specific relationship between the phenomenon of populism and religion has not made significant inroads but remains a neglected area of research (Mudde, 2015: 446). In terms of an ideological definition of populism, which is followed in this chapter, there is almost unanimity about the core elements of the phenomenon, or its minimal conceptual center. In short, populism identifies politics with the will of the people and anchors the political world in the vertical opposition between two homogeneous, fundamentally antagonistic groups that are judged differently: the people, who are exalted, and the elite, who are condemned (Woods, 2014: 3–5). This struggle is gauged on a good-evil spectrum, and it is common practice of populism scholars to resort to the religious-originated word “Manichaeism”—in reference to the ancient religious movement whose radical worldview divided the world into the diametrically conflicting principles of Light and Darkness (Hutter, 2006: 1142–4)—to describe the centrality of such dualism in the populist worldview (Hermet, 2007: 81; Hawkins, 2010: 5; de la Torre, 2015: 9).
With this “populist minimum” (Abromeit et al., 2016: xiii) in mind, the connection between populism and religion must be viewed as part of a subtype of populism (de la Torre and Arnson, 2013b: 375; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015: 216). Operationalized by religious or political actors and related constituencies, religious populism is a form of populism that shares its conceptual center but reproduces it in a specific religious key or fashion (Apahideanu, 2014: 77). Religious populism is two-dimensional, and only by looking at both sides of this subtype of populism will it be possible to achieve a comprehensive view of its role in contemporary societies. One of its dimensions is overtly religious, in the sense that it is shaped by religion understood in a narrow sense of a relationship with a divine sphere. Often, but not necessarily, tied with traditional organized religions, this manifestation of religious populism proclaims to be following, or fulfilling, the will and plans of the Almighty—with whom the groups feel, and believe, that they have a privileged relationship. In sum, these populists are doing God's work here on earth against its Godless enemies. The other dimension of religious populism is covertly religious, speaking to the sacralization of politics in modern-day societies. It is shaped by religion in a broader sense, centered above all on the experience of the sacred and the function that it fulfills by setting the group, with its this-worldly secular mission, apart as an absolute and transcendent force that will fundamentally change mundane everyday evil politics. Although they should be kept distinct, these two sides of religious populism intertwine and cross-pollinate. What is more, in some radical cases (exceptions) the special relationship with a higher divine power emerges also in proclamations from the covertly religious side of religious populism.

The following sections explore the dual dimension of religious populism—in terms of both the politicization of religion and the sacralization of politics—and then, in tune with the importance given to an empirical-deductive model in the study of populism (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 390; Woods, 2014: 7–9), the last part of the text gives a more detailed empirical account of early twenty-first-century examples of religious populisms, in Europe, with the French Front National under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, and in Latin America, with the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez.

Religious Populism (I)—Populism and the Politicization of Religion
For the most part, studies on religious populist groups or movements that openly profess a transcendent interpretation of human reality (which may involve a relationship with the supernatural) have interpreted them through the lens of the concept of the “politicization of religion,” which refers to the ways in which, in old and present times—both in moderate and extreme forms (Linz, 2004: 111-12)—traditional religion serves to legitimize a social order, a particular regime, or a political community against destructive forces. In the case of religious populism, it means that a revealed and scriptural religion is used to sanctify a cause. These populists’ worldview obeys the dictates of holy books or teachings—which they believe are divinely inspired—and, in their conflict against the putative enemies of the people, they often refer to these sacred texts and words (assuming a position of interpreters), in order to justify their role, actions, and wider goals. The way that this kind of religious populism manifests itself is not exclusive to any religious tradition, and crosses doctrinal differences and denominational divides.
Christianity

The first historical example of religious populism corresponds to what is usually pointed to in the literature as the first populist movement: the US-based People’s Party of the 1890s. Protestant evangelicalism was the master-frame though which this grassroots populist wave of mostly farmers and workers from the Deep South and Western states saw the main economic and political questions of its time. Their work was to reignite the lost connection with America’s God-given inalienable rights, freedoms, and values that were under assault by the elites (mostly plutocrats, the political establishment, and basically every holder of power, including traditional clergy) who had iniquitously built an unjust, oppressive, and unmoral society. In this manner, “as their religious ideals shaped the way Populists understood themselves and their movement, they wove their political and economic reforms into a grand cosmic narrative pitting the forces of God and democracy against those of Satan and tyranny.” Further, “[a]s they did so these patterns of thought energized the movement with a sacred, even apocalyptic sense of urgency” (Creech, 2006: xviii–xix). This is why the Populist writers and orators aligned themselves with prophetic tradition and “again and again … call down the judgment of God—and the Almighty’s designs for the American nation—against worldly transgressors who made their fortunes unjustly and used their power to keep the plain people enslaved” (Wiliams and Alexander, 1994: 7). Through political action Populists—addressing a constituency that understood religious language—vowed to restore the country toward the course bestowed upon America by God. As the twentieth century approached, the American populist orator and former Civil War hero James B. Weaver wondered, “[M]ay we not reverently believe that the struggle of the oppressed people of our day, to reinvest themselves of their lands, their money and their highways, is from heaven also?” (Wiliams and Alexander, 1994: 8).

Plainly, the politicization of religious discourse follows a wide geography, and its scope has not diminished in the purportedly secular contemporary world. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, in Europe, Greece witnessed the articulation of a populist discourse by the patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church. This politicization of religious discourse was tied to the defense of Greece’s national identity—rooted in Hellenism and Orthodoxy—against evil forces, and the enemies of the “blessed people of God.” In typical populist fashion, the Archbishop Christodoulos (1998–2008) split society in two conflicting camps and distinguished “between ‘us’, the forces of Go(o)d (the people as represented by the Church under God) and ‘them’ (an atheist, modernizing, intellectualist and repressive government)”; in a speech to those who wanted to undermine the traditional foundations of Greece, he warned, “You are losing your time … the People of God are not following you … you do not express the people” (Stavrakakis, 2005: 242–3, 241). Religious populism also seems to have taken root in post-Cold War Poland, through the activities of the Roman Catholic priest Father Tadeusz Rydzyk and his media network. In particular, Rydzyk’s radio station Radio Maryja (Mary, as in Virgin Mary)—whose main audience consists of elderly, rural Poles—promotes, and is the epitome of, a certain version of Polish Catholicism as an “ideology of struggle” (Porter-Szucs, 2011: 271). Its worldview
divides the world between the faithful (the good but excluded, thwarted people) and their diabolical enemies—the enemies of both God and Man, and true forces of Satan—sometimes perceived and articulated in a conspiratorial manner, with traces of anti-Semitism and anti-masonry. Hell-bent on destroying the nation and its Church, these satanic forces have infiltrated and taken control of the country’s (and the Church’s) institutions. The Vatican and the Polish Episcopate have repeatedly reproached this politicized religious discourse (Buzalka, 2005; Stępińska, Lipiński, Hess, and Piontek, 2016).

Another variation of religious populisms is that they can also emerge from within a larger secular populist movement. Such is the case with Teavangelicalism (Brody, 2012), which arose from the first US right-wing populist movement of the twenty-first century, the Tea Party (which from the beginning had enjoyed the strong support of evangelical Protestants). In the Teavangelicals’ rationale for involvement in political action, social issues are part of the mobilization, but a “biblical” defense of small government and fiscal conservatism—grounded in a “moral” interpretation of the economy—is also a significant part of this newfound political engagement. The ever-expanding government, which is being transformed into an oppressive super state, is viewed by Teavangelicals as a fundamental contradiction to the moral outlook of the biblical scriptures and as a threat to all Americans. Big government facilitates the rule of the few over the many, gives unlimited power to a power-grabbing minority, and eventually leads to the oppression that is widely condemned in the Bible. The case for a constitutionally limited government is framed within this defense of freedom (which is a God-given principle) against despotism and, ultimately, enslavement. As argued by Jonathan Wakefield, the author of Saving America: A Christian Perspective of the Tea Party Movement, even government’s spending, which is spiraling out of control, is part of this process of enslavement of Americans and future generations to a preordained life of slavery to pay taxes in order to pay down uncontrollable debt. The New Testament teaching, from the Gospel of Matthew, that “No man can serve two masters”—which Teavangelicalism sees as a choice between the government under an earthly king vs the government under the one and only True God—is a driving force behind much evangelical activism within the Tea Party movement. As a consequence, the Teavangelical political horizons are large: internal narratives often claim that the goal is restoring America to its Judeo-Christian roots, which makes its political activism oriented toward a wider reformation of society, rather than tiny, cosmetic changes incapable of reversing America’s decline. It is not surprising that references to an “awakening,” as a revitalized approximation between the people and God (against the nefarious political, economic, and cultural elites) are also present in Teavangelical circles. This of course also means that, in the Teavangelical viewpoint, tea partiers must also engage, decisively, at the level of culture—which is the arena in which ideas circulate and spirituality is formed—pushing back the left-wing control of popular culture and of the entertainment industry (Wakefield, 2013).
Finally, and also within secular political formations, dynamics of politicization of religion may also emerge in which Christianity (or more precisely Christendom) is used essentially as a marker of identity and not necessarily as a matter of faith, or religious observance. This happened, for instance, in the first quarter of the twenty-first century when many European right-wing populist movements invoked their attachment to a “Christian Identity of Europe” as a way of distinguishing the good, native people and its age-old culture from a dangerous and threatening Other (the specter of the “Islamization” of the continent). In this case cultural belonging, rather than belief, is the defining factor in the invocation of religion (Marzouki et al., 2016).

Islam

The struggle of the “oppressed people”—even if interpreted differently in diverse religious contexts and informed by different goals—is unvaryingly invoked by other religious populists to justify their actions as an accomplishment of, and in line with, what they recognize as the divine. A case in point is the rise of Islamism—as an “extreme politicization of traditional religion” (Payne, 2008: 31). A major starting point for Islamic religious populism was the politicization of Shi’ism following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni, as an interpreter of the religious tradition, proclaimed that the revolutionary cause was for the “dispossessed” against the traditional elites (Halliday, 1982–3; Alamdari, 1999: 32). The religious interpretation of events—coupled with messianism and the belief in the return of the hidden Imam—is also present in the subsequent presidency of Mahmood Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). As a “man of the people,” Ahmadinejad vowed a “return to the ideals” of the Islamic revolution, often in opposition to the ruling clergy, and certainly merits inclusion under the subtype of religious populism (Dorraj, 2014: 134–40).

Still within the vast realm of political Islam, Global Jihad has also been analyzed as a “contemporary form of religious populism.” It has constructed a narrative in which the Umma, the Islamic supernation, has been defiled by jahiliyyah society. The term jahiliyyah referred originally to the paganism of pre-Islamic Arabia but is “attributed to modern secular nation-states, Western-dominated global culture, and the elites who run both.” It is “the duty of the faithful to rise up and wage jihad to repel the ‘great kufr’ (literally, unbelief) and restore the holy geography of believers” (Yates, 2007: 129–30). Even if more work is needed to distill the populist frames that emerge, in all different contexts, from Islamism (so that they are not lost in the religious magma), in the landscape of religious populism this has been certainly the most extreme, and violent, expression of the need, felt by religious populists of all times, to harmonize the secular and the transcendental worlds.

Lastly, it should be added that in contemporary Muslim-majority societies, such populist mobilization of the umma, as a sort of proxy for “the people,” against the malignant elites, can be confined to the borders of the nation-state, and may or may not involve—at least openly—the call for the establishment of a state based on Islamic law. This twenty-first-
century “new Islamic populism”—in places such as Egypt, Turkey, and to a less extent in Indonesia—coalesces under an homogeneous and marginalized umma a wide range of socio-economic and cultural dispossessed groups against a political/social order deemed unjust and immoral, and may wage its combat, with success or not, within democratic politics (Hadiz, 2016).

Judaism

Within the tradition of Judaism, the ultra-orthodox Israeli political party Shas (or Guards of the Torah) may also be included under the scope of religious populism, which calls into question—or at least is an exception to—the assertion that religious parties are not usually considered populists (Hawkins, 2010: 40). Advocate of the Sephardic population of Israel and of a state run by Jewish religious law, Shas is simultaneously viewed as a “complete populist party” because of its anti-elitism (especially against the Ashkenazis), and its appeals to the oppressed social classes, as well as the rejection of a myriad of Others, such as African immigrants, Palestinians, and Israelis of Russian origin (Weiss and Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2016).

It is important that scholarship look beyond the three Abrahamic religions and determine the development or not of religious populisms in other cultural and religious environments. Hindutva in India (Frykenberg, 2008) or Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka (Berkwitz, 2008), for example, may provide rich avenues for research, owing to the fact that, as indicated, a tell-tale indicator of a possible presence of religious populism is the politicization of a religious discourse and mindset.
Religious Populism (II)—Populism and the Sacralization of Politics

If these religious populisms described above are rooted in a phenomenological, narrow definition that is couched in terms of a relationship with a transcendent being, force, or spirits, the second manifestation of religious populisms in the modern world is tied with a functional, expansive understanding that is expressed through a relationship with the sacred, and the holy, which in this case involves a process of sacralization of politics, that happens when politics acquires a transcendent nature. It is no longer a mundane, limited affair, but is viewed and experienced as a tool for total change, anchored in myths, rites, and symbols that galvanize group solidarity and give ultimate meaning to the life and destiny of communities.

The sacralization of politics is a modern Western phenomenon, and cannot be detached from the inexorable forward march of the rationalization of human life, the replacement of mystery by calculation, the advent of a demystified society, and the overall independence of politics from traditional, established, religion. This gradual secularization was powerfully explained by Max Weber in his early twentieth-century philosophy of history. In the world of politics, however, and almost since the beginning of the secularization process, this “spiritual vacuum” has been periodically filled with movements that aimed to create heaven on earth and confer spiritual guidance and meaning on the human condition. Many authors—from the French Revolution onward—have described what the historian Jacob Talmon called the “political messianism” of such movements. Raymond Aron, as a perceptive observer of twentieth-century politics, saw these “millenarian politics”—which could have had a positive role in “calm and happy eras” but not in times of crisis—as a type of politics that “endow an objective … with absolute value, or again that confuse a society in history, actual or to be created, with the ideal society that would fulfill human politics” (1978: 239). The attention, especially by historians and sociologists, given to the politico-religious dimensions of the mass ideologies of the twentieth century—mostly fascism, communism, and Nazism—led to their conceptualization as political religions (Gentile, 2006). They featured a strong level of member commitment that was akin to religious faith, a community dimension, and an ultimate goal of attaining salvation not outside but within the world, representing, as a consequence, the transfer of the sacred from the religious sphere into the political realm. Exemplified in these total ideologies, the sacralization of the political constituted thus a “metamorphosis of the sacred in modern times” (Sironneau, 1982: 576). This transference of the sacred was not just a feature of totalitarian regimes. Robert Bellah in particular noted how such a “religious” dimension operated within a twentieth-century representative democracy. Nevertheless, the concept of political religion, with some exceptions (Zúquete, 2007; Augusteijn, Dassen, and Janse, 2013), has been detached from
the age of democracy and viewed essentially as a “companion” to totalitarianism, such as Marxism-Leninism, National Socialism, and Italian Fascism (Gregor, 2012: 281–2).

The metamorphosis of the sacred—and its manifestations in politics—should, however, be seen in a more expansive way, because, as argued by sociologist of religion Peter L. Berger, modernity does not necessarily secularize but pluralizes: “Modern man may have lost the one enchanted garden in which his ancestors dwelled, but instead he confronts a veritable emporium of such gardens, among which he must make a choice” (2011: 136). It is in this sense that this second dimension of religious populism offers one of such “enchanted gardens” available to modern man. It constitutes, and provides, an intimate relationship with the sacred: the people is transfigured and consecrated, its enemies combated as the embodiment of evil on earth, and politics is interpreted, experienced, and felt like a transcendental cause. It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that in contemporary times “we should not ignore the possibility of another sense of transcendence, that of reaching beyond the limits of what actually exists, beyond the now and the identification of the real with the actual” (Calhoun, 2012: 359). The sacralized politics of religious re-enchants, therefore, the political landscape.

No wonder that, and to a greater extent than in relation to other parties and movements, scholars on populism, or at least a fair number of them, have noted populism’s affinity with religion not in terms of essence but in terms of resemblance. This second dimension of religious populism is, therefore, acknowledged, almost as self-evident, through analogical thinking, in terms of “looking like” religion (Paul, 2013: 26). In his debunking of American populism, Richard Hofstadter noticed the “tendency of our politics” to “secularize a religiously derived view of the world, to deal with political issues in Christian imagery, and to color them with the dark symbology of a certain side of Christian tradition” (1996: xi). Because in the framework of populisms politics is an all-consuming cause, grounded in the vital opposition between the elites and the people—which tends to be elevated as an absolute force for good in society against the corrupt and the polluted embodied in the others—the political world is viewed, felt, and experienced as a binary opposition between the sacred (the cause, the leadership, the people) and the profane (those who are opposed to it). This bifurcation lends such righteousness to the political combat, infused by a good-vs-evil imagery and rhetoric, that politics detaches itself from the “normal” and holds instead the promise of the extraordinary. It should be no surprise that populists “still believe in the univocal opposition between the truth and the false” (Godin, 2012: 17)—the sacred is, after all, also understood as what is “unquestionable” (Moore and Myerhoff, 1977: 20).

References to the “quasi-religious imagery,” “semi-religious overtones,” or “almost religious significance” of populist politics—in which “the political becomes moral, even religious”—are recurrent in the description of populist movements (de la Torre, 2000: 15; Taggart, 2002: 78; Canovan, 2002: 29). Similarly, allusions to their salvationist character permeate the literature. Scholars state that populism constitutes a “political journey of redemption” (Panizza, 2013: 114), or a “redemptive crusade” (de la Torre and Arnson, 2013b: 353), and while populists “preach impending doom, they also offer
salvation” (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008: 5), because an “appeal to a purifying or salvationist rupture” (Taguieff, 2007: 48) with the status quo is one of the defining features of populist mobilization. Similarly, the use of religious language, at least in a fair number of empirical cases, has not gone unnoticed in the analysis of populisms.

Populist appeals are also sometimes presented through religious arguments, images, metaphors, and parables (de la Torre, 2015: 10). This characteristic could be included in the categorization of populism as a “low” way of politics: by using a popular, common—and culturally specific—religious vocabulary, populist actors distinguish themselves from the polished, rationalist—and cosmopolitan—politically correct way of doing politics of politicians located on the “high” end of politics (Ostiguy, this volume). In this way, the invocation of the religious is not only a way of distinction from but also of transgression against the established ways of mainstream political behavior. This, of course, is connected with the importance of “markers of identity”—adding to the populist actor a perceived authenticity—in the populist mode of identification (Panizza, 2013: 91–4).

Ultimately, and to compound the analogical approach to the study of populism and religion, scholarship focuses on the need—grounded on empirical cases—to add symbolic depth to the study of populism. Therefore, “[i]f populism offers more than economic rewards, we need to know more about the symbolic dimensions of populist interactions” (de la Torre and Arnson, 2013b: 374). In this case, this means to enrich the understanding of the role played in it by the “experiencing of the sacred,” or the cultural dimensions of religion.

Furthermore, the “promise of the extraordinary” entailed by populism—a popular empowerment that may lead, at a minimum, to a substitution/renovation of the political elites, or, more broadly, to a refoundation of the political system (Roberts, 2015: 142)—is centered on an expansive view of political action as a holistic tool. Such “popular foundings,” although infrequent, are not “strange” to democracy, but are part of its history (Kalyvas, 2008: 7). Moreover, political theorists have paid attention to this place of the redemptive in modern politics. The political philosopher Michael Oakeshott saw it as the unfolding of a totalizing “politics of faith,” in which “perfection, or salvation, is something to be achieved in this world: man is redeemable in history,” against which stood the “politics of skepticism” that offers a piecemeal approach to politics, where governing is detached from the pursuit of human perfection (1996: 23, 31).

Drawing from Oakeshott’s analysis, Margaret Canovan offers an interpretation of the phenomenon that has become prevalent in the theory of populism. Canovan specifically connected populist politics—the promise of a better world through action by the transcendent sovereign people—with a specific face of democracy that is less rational and more emotional, and boasts a strong component of faith, that operates along the horizons of redemption rather than the boundaries of pragmatism, or democracy’s other face. Within this tension between the mundane (routine politics) and the extraordinary (redemptive politics), populism dwells (1999: 11; 2005: 89–90).
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Claims that the sacred has entered into the political realm, albeit in a secularized disguise—and that religious populisms are a manifestation of it—are contested and ignite skepticism. The religious flavor, and visions of change and hope, the argument goes, is not unique to populism. Accordingly, this argument continues, “populist movements are not the only ones that adopt a political style based on the idea of redemption. Every political party in campaign makes promises of redemption. Does this automatically transform them into populist parties? I doubt it.” Therefore, “there must be something more” than a seeming religious commitment to such a redemptive promise (Prud’Homme, 2001: 54–5). The fact that the relationship between populism and religion has, for the most part, been lightly approached—focusing mostly on remarks on religious vocabulary, or imagery—probably contributes to the skepticism and demands for details on the “something more” that supposedly makes such a relationship distinct from other non-populist actors.

In order to overcome the resistance and tighten the analytical grip on religious populism—and with the exception of political philosophy, political science has for the most part downplayed sacralized frameworks prioritizing instrumental and materialistic explanations—scholarship must deal with this issue in a non-fragmentary manner. Instead, by focusing on empirical reality, it must deduce, isolate, and highlight the essential features of the sacralization of politics in these modern political movements. This ideological/discursive approach—aiming at capturing the self-understanding of these groups (how they see themselves and perceive their role, looking at their internal dynamics rather than imposing an external view)—must then systematically reveal the different manifestations of religious dynamics and how they interact, thereby showing a sacred and coherent discourse that is intrinsic to those movements and illuminating the salvation discourse that unites and supports a populist discourse. In short, this empirical/deductive approach should reveal religious populisms as political religions that are characterized by a dynamic interaction between charismatic leadership, a narrative of salvation, ritual, and the creation of a moral community that sees itself with the collective mission of fighting conspiratorial enemies, redeeming the nation from its alleged crisis. These features together constitute an ideal type that has been categorized as missionary politics (Zúquete, 2013). This analytical investigation helps to reevaluate the belief that political religions, because of the coming of age of a society that was now “in the clutches of modernity,” were so obviously frail that they were on their way out of the world (Burrin, 1997: 342); untethered from the past (and in this way no longer viewed as relics from the totalitarian behemoth ideologies of the twentieth century), political religions are viewed as still relevant in twenty-first-century democratic politics.

Even though all populisms share a conceptual center, they are not all alike; nor do they develop with the same intensity, display the same fervor, or share the same overriding claims. This realization of different degrees of populism is at the basis of divisions of populism, between those that are “hard” or “polarized,” and a “soft,” “serial,” and less radical version (de la Torre and Arnson, 2013a; Roberts, 2013). Some scholars have phrased this division as that between “complete” and “empty” populism (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). This means that in regard to religious populism, there should be no
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sweeping generalizations. Not all religious populisms exhibit the full scale of characteristics that bring them close to the ideal type; it is the empirical analysis that will show the intensity and the extent to which such a nonmaterial dimension (the frame of the sacralization) is carried by each group, and, which is more unusual, if such an accomplishment is complete (and therefore quasi-replicates the ideal type). At the same time, as the literature repeatedly points out, the emergence and development of populism is conditioned by a number of cultural, political, and social factors. Different contexts generate different possibilities for populism’s success and, consequently, also affect the development of full-fledged religious populisms. While strong institutional settings (consolidated party systems able to channel social claims, inclusive political representation) may be constraining, weak institutions (an ineffective State, a disarrayed party-system, low political representation) seem to facilitate the path for a populist challenge to the status quo. The same reasoning applies to the impact of political culture (its meaning systems and cultural variables), on populist mobilization (or de-mobilization) across different geographies (Pasquino, 2008: 21–7; Roberts, 2015).

The Elements of Sacralized Politics and Politicized Religion
Populism and Religion

With this in mind, attention now turns to two contemporary seminal demonstrations of religious populism—political religions in their own right—which have emerged and developed in regions where, certainly in recent decades, populism has been the strongest, and that have already been the focus of cross-regional comparison: Latin America and Europe (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). These examples show that, in radical cases of populism, there may be present elements both of a sacralized politics and of a politicized religion, in the sense of a worldview based on an ecclesiastical or scriptural tradition. This means that the separation between the sacralization of politics and the politicization of religion, in the case of some populist actors, may not be clear-cut, but involves a syncretic dimension.

Leaving aside institutional contexts, it can be argued that, particularly in relation to religious populism, the cultural/religious ground plays a crucial part in these movements’ mobilizing potency—this cultural resonance facilitates both the articulation of the religious populist message and its reception. The role of religion in Latin America has always been palpable, and one of the main factors why populism has there a tierra electa is attributed to the permanence and vigor of a “holistic imaginary” that is deeply rooted in the “spiritual and normative structures of Christianity” (Zanatta, 2008: 40–1). Conversely, Europe, at least Western Europe, which is viewed as “the odd man out” (Clark, 2012: 193), or the only example where the secularization thesis still holds, has also witnessed the development of a prototypical example of religious populism. In this case, the cultural/religious breeding ground is connected to what has been dubbed the “second disenchantment of the world,” or the crumbling of the total ideologies and their great epic identity-giving narratives, creating an emptiness (a crisis of meaning) which has been filled by promises of security (a framework of meaning) and of moral and spiritual renaissance (Lecoeur, 2003: 173–92). Therefore, these empirical illustrations—the French radical right party Front National (FN), under the leadership of its founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen (1972–2011), and Hugo Chávez’s left-wing Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela (1999–2013)—although diverging in their geography, ideology, and level of political power (political opposition, in the case of Le Pen, statecraft, in the case of Chávez), constitute nevertheless quintessential examples of missionary politics by displaying a sacred framework—a discursive/ideological construction—that upholds, and contributes to, the formation and mobilization of their collective identities. In summary, these political religions are built on three major sacred pillars: charismatic leadership, a moral community, and a mission of salvation.

Charismatic Leadership

Although charismatic leadership is not usually viewed as belonging to the definition of populism—but is instead viewed as an important facilitator (Hawkins, 2010: 42; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015: 193)—it is certainly a prominent attribute of ideal typical examples of religious populisms. These movements have internal narratives that give the leader a messianic status and invest him with a sacred authority. There is what is called an
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“industry,” made up of the words and actions of the leader and the work of close collaborators (a coterie), as well as of the follower’s beliefs, that constructs the image of the leader as a missionizing figure of historical proportions.

There are six key images attached to the leader:

1. The first is the leader as the Prophet. The leaders are men ahead of their times. In the story that each of these movements tell, different events are constantly interpreted as evidence of the leader’s clairvoyance. Above all, the leader-as-prophet receives praise both for stating the hard truths and for a tireless commitment, by the use of the “word,” to exposing and shattering the lies of the dominant official paradigm that is promoted by the elites, who are the enemies of the people. To use James C. Scott’s terminology, prophecy gives voice to the “hidden transcript” about the “real” problems that affect societies, while defiling the “public transcript” (1990: 221–2). The prophetic nature of the leaders is enhanced by the manner in which, in the eyes of militants, they shatter the false vision put forth by the dominant groups and embody the voices currently under domination, or that have been under such domination.

2. The second image is that of the leader as the Moral Archetype. The narratives of these movements have portrayed their respective leaders as exemplary figures. This, of course, has long been seen as part of the arsenal of true leadership. In the nineteenth century, the Victorian social theorist Walter Bagehot expressed his belief that “men are guided by type, not by argument.” It was a matter of “commonplace” that “it is the life of teachers which is catching, not their tenets” (1874: 59). In these contemporary cases, the power of the leader’s example emanates both from his personal qualities and from his life achievements.

3. The leader is also the Martyr. The internal scripts of these movements share the dominant theme of the leader’s self-sacrifice for the cause. Each forfeited self-interest, well-being, and even health for the sake of the mission. Their biographies serve as evidence of their martyrdom. Furthermore, these leaders alluded to the possibility of being assassinated. Personal affliction enhances the missionizing image of the leader as a heroic and stoic figure who goes through pain and tribulation for the fulfillment of the mission.

4. The leader is the People. The movements portray the leaders as personifications of the “common man,” with everyday qualities, attitudes, and lifestyles. They embody the radical anti-elitism of the movements they lead. Their character and behavior is at the opposite end of the self-serving and aloof elites that the rank-and-file despises. The leaders, because they are from the people, have a direct, spontaneous, intuitive, unmediated link to what the people really think, no matter how deceitful the propaganda from the establishment and the media of the powerful. This demotic dimension is crucial for their strategy of self-legitimation as saviors of the community.
5. In a similar vein, the leader is also the Party. The political parties have served to preserve the primacy of the leader as well as the personal attachment between the followers and the leader. The fact that each leader was present at the time of creation of the parties (they are the founders) is one more factor that explained the highly personalized nature of each organization. They are seen as the products of the leader’s commitment and vision: the leader has a natural sense of entitlement to decide about its structure and decision-making process.

6. This entails that, above all, the leader is the Missionary. The central narrative produced by the Le Pen and Chávez industries consisted in the sacralization of their respective leaders as savior-like figures driven by a sense of mission to save the community. This overriding theme confirms the principle that, as stated by Robert C. Tucker, in the vein of Max Weber, “charismatic leadership is specifically salvationist or messianic in nature ... and herein lies its distinctiveness” (1968: 743). However, the missionizing dynamic is not merely connected with a simple proclamation of the leader’s mission. “Formulas for salvation” (1968: 751) are necessary but not sufficient. The mission must gain strength from the leader’s capacity to embody the mission and to transmit the urgency of the times (the turning point) to the followers. At a deeper level it deals with the issue of authenticity. The sense of a personal mission is common in the biographies of these leaders. Le Pen never failed to mention his youth adoption as a “pupil of the nation” by the French State: “I felt that I had a particular role in life, of being more French than the others” (Zúquete, 2007: 81). In jail, after the failed coup to overthrow the Venezuelan government, Chávez wrote a letter to a friend, in which he said, “I don’t want nothing more to myself than to be with the dreams and hopes of my people and the immense compromise that I now feel on my shoulders. I feel, dear friend, that a force stronger than me is dragging me as in a hurricane. I don’t feel that I belong to myself, I feel that all this exceeds me. I don’t have personal aspirations” (Garrido, 2002: 91). Dynamics of “before” and “after” abound in the description of the impact of the leadership in people’s lives. For example: “We were like those little animals, caged, who receive in their mouth the daily food; we had lost the capacity of being, of defending ourselves and of fighting for what was ours ... Until Chávez came” (Roz, 2003: 52). Le Pen was one of such men of destiny. In times of decadence and turbulence, “everytime Le Pen speaks about France, about its past, about its future, he emerges as the one who holds the baton of French civilization, as the holder of the flame, that French flame that comes from faraway and which we do not have the right to let fade. His first ambition, regardless of his own personal destiny, is to remain faithful to this duty” (Daoudal, 2002: 21).

The leaders are the personification of the cause. Howard Gardner’s conclusion that a crucial aspect of leadership as a narrative is a set of “stories of identity” is confirmed. These leaders, both by themselves, and through their respective disciples, in their interaction with followers, constantly generate such stories: “about themselves and their groups, about where they were coming from and where they were headed, about what was to be feared, struggled against, and dreamed about” (1995: 14). But the extent to
which each leader personifies the narrative (the story) is crucial, otherwise the efficacy is undermined and, ultimately, fades. The manner that the leader carries out the mission is therefore of great importance in the development of charismatic dynamics (Willner, 1984: 58–9). The leader’s incarnation of the spirit and substance of the mission boosts the trustworthiness from, and within, the community: followers are more likely to accept shifts in strategy or policy because they trust that the leader, who knows what is best for the community, would never do anything to harm the community. This echoes the break with the rational order characteristic of Weber’s definition of charismatic domination: “It is written ... But I say unto you” (1958: 250).

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At the same time, the ingrained narrative of “chosenness” and “election” attributed to the people (who are the heroic, true patriots), in addition to making it the embodiment of Good in the struggle against Evil (those “others” who oppose the people, constitute its nemesis, and are often involved in conspiracies against it), transforms its activists into a moral community. Elevated into a sacred entity, this community is separated from the surrounding, profane corruption through the dynamics of a political theology composed of myths, rites, and symbols. Historical figures are the avatars of the essence of the respective communities. In the case of the FN, the figures of Clovis and, especially, Joan of Arc are sacred national references, eternal symbols of France’s greatness, independence, and sovereignty. The Bolivarian revolution took to new heights the worship of Simón Bolívar. He is a living spirit and the guide for revolutionary activism. There is a permanent analogy between the times of the liberator and the time of Chávez: it is the same continuous struggle to liberate Venezuela from the clutch of oligarchy. In each case, the association between the holiness of past figures and the messianic leaders of the present is further reinforced by a comprehensive ritualism, in the form of processions and rallies in the sacred places, or sanctuaries, of the movements. These moments of worship serve also to objectify the communal nature of charismatic leadership, which is rooted in group ecstasy and effervescence (Lindholm, 1990; Tiryakian, 1995). Ritualism gives visibility to the nonmaterial values that are at the core of the charismatic bond and that transform the community of followers into a moral community, united by feelings of love, brotherhood, idealism, and righteousness. Through ritualization this moral community is experienced; it helps to foster a sense of collectivity as a chosen people and plays a crucial role in legitimizing its soteriological dimensions. Importantly, cultural sociology has undoubtedly advanced the understanding of the role of symbolism and ritualism—in terms of fused performances between leaders and crowds—in the struggle for political power (Alexander, 2011).

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All of this is connected with the view of politics as salvation that runs throughout the discursive frames (both verbal and symbolic) of these political religions. The twin notions of a sacred history and sacred place are complemented by a third, equally important, notion: sacred time. There is an eschatological myth at the root of their worldview (Tudor, 1972: 92). Not only must the rejection of the present lead to its abolishment; their political activity culminates in a “society to come” that is visualized as a new age of plenty. There is a “fullness of time” (Talmon, 1962: 130) that, nevertheless, is not religious in the sense of being miraculous or dependent on a supernatural entity. The millenarianism of these movements was political: this complete reversal of affairs and the coming into being of the new order happens within the world. The evil present will give way to a redemptive future.

At the same time the internal dynamics of these movements confirm to an extent the assertion that, in extreme cases, the secular dimension of religious populism also postulates a “special relationship” with the divine. In the fulfilling of this mission, Le Pen often gave the impression that his group basked in God’s favor: “As stated in the holy gospel,” he said, “‘Unless the Lord watches over the city, the watchmen stand guard in vain.’” Sometimes ambiguously, other times openly, Le Pen stressed his belief that a supernatural agency would help the group in their quest for the salvation of France. As noted by Le Pen, “History, in its intimacy, is not a simple succession of causes and effects but an abrupt apparition of founding events,” of what he calls “hours of destiny … those manifestations of Providence.” Using an expression made famous by John Paul II, the Front National founder invited his countrymen to “cross the threshold of hope,” adding, “we are not alone. The people of France have begun their liberation and Providence supports us in its invincible arm.” But “having God on their side” is not an invitation to passivity. “Providence may act no matter how weak is the spirit of resistance. But [Providence], as we know it, only helps those who help themselves,” he proclaimed to his followers (Zúquete, 2007: 88–91). In the case of the FN, it was the community, integrated and revitalized by the party, which sooner or later would lead to the renewal of values and to a moral rebirth, putting an end to the materialism and individualism—the forces of disintegration—that have corrupted eternal France. “The enemy is in you,” claimed Le Pen in a speech. “It was within the souls of the French that deformation occurred. It is in the bottom of your hearts, families, divorces, churches, schools, newspapers, courts, books … in all the false ideas and negative thoughts … it is within ourselves that the evil that weakens France, the Nation, the State, lies, and it is within ourselves that their survival can be found” (2001). And since evil is everywhere, the success of the FN will inevitably bring with it cleansing, and, from an ontological viewpoint, the purging of evil, conquered by good. Such is the fate of the political millenarianism of the party.

This dynamic is even clearer in the case of the Bolivarian revolution. The “Socialism for the twenty-first century,” in its final version, corresponded to the myth of the Final Kingdom. It is the leader who in fact announced it: The Bolivarian revolution would continue until “the kingdom announced by Christ becomes a reality: the kingdom of equality, the kingdom of justice. This is our struggle.” This kingdom would encompass the entire world: “[W]e cannot allow the world to come to an end … if we sacrifice for the
country, only then we will save ourselves and next save the world” (2005: 721–2). Although the intensity of the millennial visions varies in each group, the overall picture is that of a community that is in between ages—at the threshold of both worlds, warning about evil’s imminent victory, while provoking the totalistic reaction that will vanquish it, and open the luminous door of a redeemed future.

The politics of salvation of these movements is a reflection of the eschatological myth that integrates reality in a coherent whole, that does not separate the past from the future, and that explains the role and the meaning of the community in history. For that reason, politics must seek a total transformation, expunging evil (injustice, inequality, exclusion, oppression, decadence, and so forth), and giving an answer to the problem of existence itself (Garcia-Pelayo, 1964: 192–3; Sironneau, 2000: 63–4). “It is rare that in its very newness, the messianic reign does not appeal from the present to a distant, unknown, forgotten or unconscious past, in order to found its plan for the future,” wrote Henri Desroche in his Sociology of Hope (1979: 91–2). The centrality that the times of Joan of Arc, or Bolívar, have in the expectations, and ritual celebrations, of the “world to come” within these prophetic-soteriological populist movements indeed confirm this rarity. These political religions, however, are always contingent and provisional; they are not a once-and-for-always entity but are in fact necessarily limited in time. They are also dependent upon factors that range from changes in leadership (old age, death), to an abatement of the sense of crisis that fueled their dynamics, making the political religion wither in time, narrowing to only a small circle of true believers.

Conclusion—The Search for Reenchantment in Politics

The work on the religious subtype of populism must extend beyond its main focus of Western Christendom, as well as beyond the parameters of liberal democracies, and into other hybrid regimes. The focus is still overwhelmingly Western-centric. And in regard to that, the rise of religious populism (in its first, explicit, religious dimension) is a counterforce to the vision of Western modernity as ruled by formal rationality, and conceptualized as a place of disenchantment. Religious populist movements serve to re-enchant the world and display the belief that human and divine agency are interrelated. Similarly, the proliferation of religious populism (in its second, implicit, dimension) provides an alternative to the widespread “disenchantment of politics” in modern democratic societies at the time of ebbing of mass-based parties, which are declining in party membership, as well as the growth in political disaffection and the domination of governments by bureaucratic and technocratic classes. After the “gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation” rooted in big projects and visions of a better world (Van Kersbergen, 2010: 41), religious populisms tend (to varying degrees) to
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suffuse the political sphere with a religious zest as well as zeal, prophesying a vision of politics as a tool for the foundation of a new society.

Certainly, the admonition against the consequences of a “mechanical age” has been made before in history. “Only the material, the immediately practical, not the divine and spiritual, is important to us,” observed Thomas Carlyle (1869: 333). But even acknowledging that political activism can manifest itself through other venues (such as in social movements), the fact is that apathy toward traditional politics and traditional means of representation seems to have become a modern condition. This “discrediting” of conventional politics and downgrading of political parties has also been blamed for the rise of populisms rooted in enchanted frameworks of redemption (Mastropaolo, 2008: 40). If politics as usual is synonymous with a bureaucratic and technocratic affair, populism is not “normal politics” (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 393). Populism—and this comes to the fore exemplarily in religious populisms—connects with a dimension of imagination, wonder, and mythology that extends way above the cold view of politics as management and administration (Oudenampsen, 2010: 20; Augusteijn, Dassen, and Janse, 2013: 258). In order to capture the success of populist appeals in democratic politics, it is also necessary to account what has been called “the central role played by passions” (Mouffe, 2005: 69) in the formation and mobilization of collective political identities. Hence, the call to reinvigorate democratic life by “giving democracy a new lease on life, a new force, and a new passion”—it is needed because “the word ‘democracy’ has turned soft” (Touraine, 1997: 190). This is the case even if there is a recurrent warning about going too far into the “faith and redemption” direction in modern politics, and the inherent dangers posed by “political theologies” (Arato, 2015: 50), as well as the need to find a necessary equilibrium between instrumental politics and politics as enthusiasm (Ezrahi, 2002: 181).

Altogether, the most important observation to emerge from this overview of the articulation of populist appeals in modern politics is that it is necessary to focus on populist constituencies—not only on their material demands, but, and this is crucial in capturing the mobilizing power of religious populisms of all sorts, on the non-material, cultural-religious, and symbolic matrix and its popular expectations, desires, and transcendent hopes for a more fulfilling existence. Such an approach contributes directly to the twenty-first-century study of politics and religion and their nexus: there is a repeat encounter, with many intersections, between the two fields, instead of a clash.

References


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