

Book Reviews

Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arnson, eds., *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*. Washington, DC/Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center/ Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. Figures, tables, index, 416 pp.; paperback \$30.

While sitting at a coffee shop in downtown Rio de Janeiro, I showed my friend a copy of *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*. Immediately on seeing the title, he could not contain his contempt for the term *populism* as a demeaning way of characterizing the political reality—and, by extension, the citizenry—of an entire continent. This anecdote, trivial as it may be, nevertheless shows the reluctance that many in academia and beyond feel about invoking “populism” as an analytical tool. One main reason for the reluctance is the term’s ability to serve both as a patronizing way of looking at “the people” (as being “passive” and beholden to “messianic” leaders) and as a way of discrediting challengers to a stagnant or unresponsive status quo.

The editors of the volume are seasoned researchers and, as the introduction shows, well aware of this dilemma. They are decidedly on the side of those who use the term and see its usefulness, but also concede that the term is “contested” and “elusive” (6–7). This elusiveness, moreover, is acknowledged by almost all the contributors, as if such acknowledgment is a necessary *a priori* before any sort of analysis of the populist dynamics of the region. Although populism may be studied as a form of governance or a political strategy, the editors note a widening consensus—which is found throughout the book—that its basic characteristic is a discourse anchored in a dramatic showdown between the (always venal) elites and the (always virtuous) people.

At the same time, the “resurgence” of populism is widely acknowledged in the book. The rise to power of Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian revolution (as well as, subsequently, the regimes of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador) is seen as a moment that, after the “classical” and “neoliberal” waves of populism, inaugurated the new wave of “radical populism” in Latin America. This radical populism is geared toward refounding the nations, turning society upside down, and eventually restructuring continental geopolitics. In the process, liberal democracy is challenged by a supposedly superior (i.e., more “direct,” “real,” and “participatory”) type of democracy. It is populism in its “hard” or “polarized” form, different in character from a “soft” or “less radical” version. The introduction, by touching on all these points, sets the stage for the entire volume.

The first four chapters are general in scope. In different ways, the chapters by Kenneth M. Roberts, Enrique Peruzzotti, and Francisco Panizza deal with the relationship between populism and political representation. Roberts reflects on the

“eternal” challenge populism poses to party systems, arguing that the new “polarized” populism (as opposed to “serial” populism) has led to a reconfiguration of party systems, and the jury is still out on its consequences for the pluralism and political competitiveness in each regime. Addressing the populist call for direct democracy, Peruzzotti argues that in the light of real problems with liberal democracy, the solution is not to discard representation but instead to find ways to deepen representative democracy with new mechanisms that increase its accountability and responsiveness.

Following that, Panizza notes that the less-studied “redemptive” dimension of populism—and its promise of economic and political inclusion—is a crucial element of its appeal, giving authenticity (and therefore mobilizing power) to populism’s own argument that it truly “represents” the long-oppressed people. In chapter 5, Kurt Weyland shows that such a “redemptive,” salvationist side of populism is the reason that populist social programs, even though they are often grandiose in words and deeds, are, in practice, of poorer quality and less sustainable in the long run compared to those of nonpopulist governments.

The remaining chapters are based on case studies. Centering his analysis on the Argentine case, Héctor Schamis argues—and in this he stands alone in the book—that for the most part, in today’s Argentina and beyond, populism is a dead concept, because the material bases that have mobilized it in the past have vanished. Its goals, however, such as inclusion and equality, are still relevant. Leslie Bethell directs the analytical lens to Brazil and finds that Lula da Silva, even though he cannot be considered a populist *tout court* (especially in the radical form), has occasionally, and increasingly, veered into populist territory, particularly in discourse. Such is one of the features of *Lulismo*.

Cynthia McClintock’s chapter on Peru shows that the country has undergone the passage through all types of populism. Particularly illuminating is the trajectory of current president Ollanta Humala, who went from a radical populist, antisystem, and ultimately unsuccessful platform to a moderate, pro-liberal democracy posture, which, in the end, opened the doors to political power. Here is the lesson: radical populism is not necessarily a once and forever deal.

The chapter by Margarita López Maya and Alexandra Panzarelli on the crucial rise of the Bolivarian revolution reveals how the combination of a structural crisis, the political genius of Chávez, the creation of a “communicator state,” and a wide political and social network, all fueled by income from oil, have led to a project of deep transformation of Venezuelan society. The outcome, the authors argue, has been a regime that is less liberal-democratic and more authoritarian—tendencies that may deepen further in the post-Chávez era.

John Crabtree, in the next chapter, focuses on the peculiar case of Bolivia, in which political mobilization is essentially bottom-up, owing to the vitality of social movements that put pressure on the Bolivian state, thereby constraining Evo Morales’s populist government. Conversely, in Ecuador, writes César Montúfar, the “radical populism” of Rafael Correa manifests itself as a top-down (and for the most part successful) attempt to refound the country, thus creating a state on new eco-

nomic, social, and cultural foundations. In the context of this wave of left-wing populism, Colombia's Alvaro Uribe and his conservative-securitarian political project are the odd case. In her chapter, Ana María Bejarano notes this peculiarity, even though she classifies the Colombian leader as a populist, too, especially in style and discourse.

This is a solid book, well organized and with consistently high quality throughout the chapters. In the concluding section, the editors advance new pertinent avenues of research for the study of populism in Latin America. Perhaps one issue that may gain further traction in the future, especially in the face of widespread popular street protests in places such as Chile, Mexico, and, of course, Brazil, is whether the study of populism should decrease its focus on institutions and increase its focus on the wider and admittedly more fluid reality of social movements. This focus appears especially vital if one keeps in mind that many of those movements show characteristics of populism (the polarizing discourse, calls for unmediated politics, redemptive solutions) but nevertheless act beyond traditional institutions and are essentially leaderless. "Power to the people" comes indeed in many forms, and research on populism must reflect its variety.

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Todd A. Eisenstadt, Michael S. Danielson, Moisés Jaime Bailón Corres, and Carlos Sorroza Polo, eds., *Latin America's Multicultural Movements: The Struggle Between Communitarianism, Autonomy, and Human Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Maps, tables, figures, index, 288 pp.; hardcover \$99, paperback \$29.95.

Should collective rights trump individual rights in the struggle for indigenous autonomy in Latin America? Are communitarianism, autonomy, and human rights even compatible? These pressing questions are at the core of this book. Recent scholarship on multiculturalism and indigenous movements has been preoccupied with the tension between group and individual rights recognition. On the one hand, the recognition of the collective indigenous right to autonomy is suggested to serve as an important corrective to assimilationist and integrationist policies of the past. On the other hand, it is argued that local autonomous spaces may come at the expense of the community members' constitutionally recognized individual rights, especially women's rights.

In an attempt to bridge the divide, this edited volume brings together an impressive group of scholars to address multicultural theory and practice in Latin America. The collection is based on an innovative, cross-regional research design that pairs the subnational cases of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Yucatán, Mexico with the central Andean countries of Ecuador and Bolivia.

Indigenous rights agendas have made substantial progress in Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In Ecuador and Bolivia, broadly mobilized indigenous actors have been

at the forefront of a massive tide of resistance against neoliberal economic reforms that toppled successive national governments in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In these two countries, indigenous movements have followed a two-pronged strategy based on opposition in the streets and in Parliament. Through the formation of their own electoral vehicles, indigenous peoples in Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador managed to capture state power in an attempt to institute an alternative political and economic order for their respective nation-states.

In Chiapas, the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in the early 1990s played a key role in advancing indigenous demands in that country. Beginning in 1995, the neighboring state of Oaxaca embarked on an important experiment in indigenous customary law that recognized traditional *usos y costumbres* (UC) to elect municipal governing authorities. As the introductory essay by the volume's lead editor, Todd Eisenstadt, reveals, the roots of the book are located in this subnational rights recognition initiative. It is clear that the Andean cases are intended to shed light on what the volume's editors perceive to be a highly instructive Mexican experiment in indigenous autonomy. Yet on closer inspection, the reverse is equally true.

The volume is organized into four sections. The first section addresses the normative debates in the literature on multiculturalism. Chapter 1, by José Antonio Lucero, provides an insightful overview of multicultural policies and practices in Latin America. He challenges a number of key assumptions in the literature, particularly the notion that multiculturalism is "bad for women" (33). In chapter 2, Araceli Burguete Cal y Mayor provides a sobering analysis of the limits of constitutional multiculturalism in Chiapas. She suggests that three decades of multicultural policies in Mexico have produced very little in the way of concrete improvements for the nation's indigenous peoples and have instead marginalized and depoliticized indigenous autonomy demands in the state of Chiapas.

The second section of the book is dedicated to the empirical chapters on the central Andes. Chapter 3, by Erik Cooke, examines multicultural discourse and subnational dynamics in the case of Bolivia. His focus is on Bolivian elites in the eastern lowlands, who are agitating for departmental autonomy as part of a regional backlash against President Evo Morales's pro-poor, pro-indigenous policies. Chapter 4, by Miguel Centellas, analyzes Bolivia's 2009 Constitution from a comparative historical perspective. He suggests that while the new constitution represents a departure from liberal multiculturalism, there are numerous and possibly insurmountable obstacles to the implementation of its proposed collective rights autonomy regime.

Chapter 5 is devoted to the case of Ecuador. In this chapter, Carmen Martínez Novo details the trajectory of Ecuador's indigenous movement from a strong, grassroots-oriented movement to one that became co-opted from above by the left-turn government of President Rafael Correa. She argues that collective rights and autonomy demands in Ecuador have been progressively hollowed out by the president's recourse to a conditional form of multiculturalism that privileges individual rights. According to her analysis, in the absence of continued pressure from below, it is unlikely that even individual rights will be supported.

Section 3 of the volume contains the empirical chapters on Oaxaca. In chapter 6, Victor Leonel Juan Martínez analyzes the different configurations of indigenous customary law practiced in 418 of the state's 570 municipalities. He finds that the adaptability of the various UC communities to new challenges, contexts, and conditions allows them to reconcile collective and individual rights in ways that might influence future research agendas. Based on original survey data, chapter 7, by Carlos Sorroza Polo and Michael S. Danielson, traces the different paths that mayors in UC communities take to arrive in local office. They suggest that the community service requirements for holding office may indicate that traditional communal forms are being maintained. Chapter 8, also by Danielson, examines the rights and responsibilities of both transnational and return migrants in Oaxaca's UC communities. He argues that seemingly punitive and illiberal sanctions against migrants who fail to uphold service obligations serve to reinforce communal unity that is often lost in high-migration locations.

The final section of the book focuses on the role of the state in defining and implementing multicultural autonomy regimes. Chapter 9, by Shannan Mattiace, examines the countercase of Yucatán, where no autonomous indigenous movement emerged to press for reforms. In the absence of societal pressure, the state government pursued shallow multicultural reforms that largely equated decentralization with self-determination.

The volume's concluding essay, by Willibald Sonnleitner and Eisenstadt, rounds out the collection by revisiting the tensions between collective and individual rights on the ground. In a pessimistic turn, the authors argue that "in practice, state authorities have done little more than allow weak rural municipalities to autonomously decide who governs, passively tolerating Darwinian electoral conflicts and sometimes replacing whoever survives with governor-dispatched municipal administrators" (262). From their perspective, indigenous customary law represses individual rights. To strike a proper balance, the authors call for a weakened form of communitarianism, what the book terms "conditional multiculturalism," that would allow individual community members to "opt out" without fear of sanctions.

There is much to commend in this volume. It significantly advances our understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by indigenous autonomy struggles in Latin America. However, it lacks an integrative framework that would provide more definitive answers to how communitarianism, autonomy, and human rights can be made functionally compatible. The cases of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Yucatán, Bolivia, and Ecuador are treated in isolation. Inexplicably, instead of drawing on the rich empirical evidence contained in the volume's chapters on Ecuador and Bolivia, the introduction to the volume focuses more on the countercase of Peru, while the conclusion highlights the practices of Colombian courts. This amounts to a lost opportunity.

Recent developments in Ecuador and Bolivia, specifically the constitutional recognition of plurinationality, may point the way forward. State-sponsored multiculturalism, for the most part, has sought to reshape society along the lines desired

by governing elites. In contrast, plurinationality recognizes the plurality of cultural, legal, and political systems that exist in a nation-state and places them on an equal footing.

Despite its continued shortcomings on the ground, plurinationality has the potential to develop a bilateral or government-to-government relationship between the state and indigenous groups. This is surely a more tasteful and productive outcome than what multiculturalism has to offer.

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Stephen B. Kaplan, *Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Figures, bibliography, index, 331 pp.; hardcover \$90, paperback \$29.99, ebook \$24.

In this book, Stephen Kaplan offers a two-level explanation for the rise of laissez-faire economic policies in Latin American countries. He argues that economies' reliance on international bond markets and the memory of severe inflationary crises combine to explain the adoption of austerity policies in the region.

In the international part of his argument, developed in chapter 2, Kaplan contends that creditors' capacity to constrain economic policymaking is conditional on governments' foreign debt structure. In this sense, it is the nature of creditor-debtor relations, and not the amount of financial integration, that reduces governments' autonomy. The core of the argument is that in contrast to private banks, sovereign debt international bondholders are incapable of collectively organizing to provide additional financing when countries experience hard economic times. This lack of organization, which is a consequence of their large number and small individual stake in each country's debt, explains why, when economic performance is considered poor, bondholders massively sell sovereign bonds, with deleterious consequences for domestic economies. In an attempt to escape these consequences, governments are forced to adopt policies more austere than they would otherwise advance.

In the second part of his "political austerity theory," Kaplan focuses on the domestic arena to argue that an experience of past inflationary crises fosters a conservative macroeconomic consensus among technocratic elites and citizens. In countries that have experienced such crises, governments advance orthodox macroeconomic policies irrespective of their prevailing ideology, and even in the absence of financial market constraints. Building on the psychology literature, Kaplan contends that traumatic experiences have a disproportionate influence on decisionmaking and that "severe economic instability breeds greater risk aversion that often persists even during periods of economic stability" (14).

According to Kaplan, these two factors—reliance on international bond markets and past inflationary crises—not only explain macroeconomic orthodoxy in Latin America, but also account for the occurrence of what he denominates "political austerity cycles," which are the main focus of the book's empirical chapters.

During these cycles, instead of expanding the economy before elections, governments tighten macroeconomic policies in an effort to contain inflation, even at the cost of slow economic growth.

Kaplan contends that politicians use macroeconomic policy to expand the economy when they have both the means and the motivation to create a political business cycle. When either is lacking (i.e., when voters do not reward economic expansion or when creditor behavior is constraining), we should observe inflation-averse political austerity cycles and market-induced political austerity cycles, respectively. In extreme cases when both means and motivation are absent, Kaplan hypothesizes that strong contraction is the result.

Chapter 3 tests these hypotheses in a cross-national sample of presidential elections in Latin America. The case studies that follow in chapters 4 through 7 explore the occurrence of political business cycles along with the other three types of political austerity cycles, and the mechanisms that connect market discipline and past inflationary crises, as well as both factors and the lack thereof, to different cycles. Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of the prospects for austerity policies, considering the seemingly reasonable possibility that the domestic orthodox consensus fades over time, and that governments find alternative sources of finance that make them less dependent on international bond markets.

Kaplan's book makes an important contribution to the study of economic policymaking in Latin America by pointing to the key role of international factors—in this case, market discipline—in determining governments' economic agendas in the region. As Barbara Stallings has noted, after dependency theory lost its favor in the political economy literature, most of the work on structural reforms and the emergence of neoliberalism has centered the analyses on institutional and domestic factors. Kaplan deserves praise for reminding us that international factors do matter; this is even more important considering that the economic boom the region experienced after a decade of high export prices and abundant capital inflows is starting to wane, and with it the trade surpluses that reduced countries' dependence on international finance in that period. This book should also be praised for the richness of qualitative evidence on top of its careful data analysis, based on extensive interviews conducted with economists and leading policymakers.

Yet even though Kaplan is quite successful in convincing the reader that market discipline is key to understanding economic policymaking in Latin America, several questions arise over the course of the exposition.

First, whereas the claim that few creditors with large stakes should be more capable of coordinating during a debt renegotiation seems compelling, it is by no means clear that this coordination necessarily widens governments' autonomy in policymaking. A comparison between the widespread sovereign defaults that followed the 1930s crisis in Latin America, a period in which most international financing occurred through bond markets, and the few such defaults observed during the 1980s, when bank loans predominated, actually suggests the opposite.

Moreover, the assertion that "to the extent that countries borrow from centralized bank creditors, they can avoid market discipline" (12) is not an accurate

description of the situation of Latin American governments in the decade that followed the debt crisis.

The 1980s were dubbed the lost decade for a reason; even if authors might diverge about the extent to which governments met IMF conditionalities, evidence is clear that the adjustment that occurred throughout the region was extremely harsh. Countries devalued their currencies and adopted a variety of sharply orthodox policies, seeking to cut demand in an effort to cut imports and free up resources to pay large external transfers, all with extreme short- and long-term costs.

Rosemary Thorp, for example, notes that per capita social spending fell 10 percent in real terms between 1982 and 1986 and that the proportion of households below the poverty line increased from 35 percent to 41 percent in the decade that followed the crisis (*“Progress, Poverty, and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin America in the Twentieth Century.”* Washington, DC: IADB, 1998). In addition, income distribution worsened dramatically, and formal labor markets were largely dismantled. All of that occurred at the same time that “dividends declared by the large U.S. money-center banks in 1984, just two years into the crisis, were double those of 1980,” which suggests that coordination was successful in making sure that countries adjusted enough to meet their financial obligations.

Even the most skeptical studies of Latin American compliance with IMF conditionalities do not depict governments as free from market discipline. For those not acquainted with the Latin American experience, the more recent European debt crisis provides clear evidence that coordination among creditors does not necessarily imply a wider policy space to governments of financially distressed countries.

Yet assuming that Kaplan is correct that relying on bank loans frees governments from market discipline, his theory begs the question of why governments ever chose to borrow from any other source. Given the centrality of the structure of countries’ foreign debt to governments’ autonomy, it is somewhat surprising that very little is said about the factors that determine it. Is this a choice governments make? Is it exogenously determined? If so, what are the determinants?

Kaplan’s narrative partly answers this question when it points to the securitization of foreign debt under the Brady Plan as a key turning point in the structure of the creditors’ market for Latin American sovereign debt. After the mid-1990s, there was wide variation in levels of countries’ reliance on foreign finance in the region, as well as their reliance on the share of funds that come from private or multilateral sources. Yet among countries that rely on private creditors, there is very little variation with respect to the nature of these creditors; with few exceptions, the share of bank loans is irrelevant after the mid-1990s in the region.

It follows that when Kaplan concludes that market discipline is stronger when sovereign debt is held by bondholders rather than banks, he is not comparing variation in governments’ choices made during the same period of time; he is comparing two very distinct periods, one from 1970 until the mid-1990s and one post-mid-1990s, in which either type of financing was dominant. Data problems aside—availability of economic data for the pre-1980s period is restricted, missing data are widespread, quality is very poor, particularly in periods of very high inflation—it is

not clear whether the market discipline is being caused by the different forms of finance or by any of the many other differences between the two periods.

This happens because many other relevant factors varied along with the structure of creditor markets over the period studied, in both the international and the domestic arenas. For example, very few countries were democracies before 1980, which matters if part of the argument is about governments' responding to citizens' preferences. Furthermore, in the first half of the period studied, which was marked by international oil crises, inflation was also a problem in the United States, a scenario that departs dramatically from the one observed in the second period. International liquidity—arguably a key determinant of markets' capacity to discipline governments—also varied tremendously after 1961, the year when the sample begins.

For all these reasons, Kaplan's claim that bondholders are more constraining than private banks would be more convincing if he were able to show that governments resorting to one or the other under the same international conditions achieved different levels of autonomy. Unfortunately, this is hardly possible in an analysis restricted to Latin American countries.

I am less convinced about the domestic part of Kaplan's theory than about his argument about market discipline. In light of cases like Germany, it seems quite reasonable to think that a past of hyperinflation should create a consensus around the importance of price stability. Yet Argentina is one out of only two Latin American countries that have had relatively high inflation of late, and yet it is one that has experienced hyperinflation in the past. At the other extreme, in countries like Colombia and most of Central America, inflation was never a major problem, and it remains as such. In addition, most Central American countries never had access to international bond markets, which eliminates the international mechanism as an explanatory factor. This suggests that other factors at least as important as past inflationary crises—somewhat arbitrarily established as annual inflation over 100 percent—might be at work, and are not accounted for.

When all is said, I believe that *Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin America* does a good job of raising the issue of the relative power of governments and creditors as a key explanatory factor of economic policymaking in the region. I am not convinced that the mechanisms through which this power is asserted have been fleshed out, but the book offers an unquestionable contribution to the debate.

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Jorge Lanzaro, ed., *Presidencialismo y parlamentarismo América Latina y Europa Meridional: Argentina, Brasil, Chile, España, Italia, México, Portugal y Uruguay*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2013. Tables, notes, bibliography, index, 383 pp.; paperback €21.15.

Conceived as a tribute to Juan Linz, this book emerged from a conference conducted at the Giménez Abad Foundation in Zaragoza, Spain. The volume brings together an extraordinary team of scholars to compare the experiences of presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary systems in Latin America and Southern Europe. It provides an up-to-date view of constitutional provisions in eight countries, mapping formal as well as informal political arrangements.

The first article, by Jorge Lanzaro, sets the tone for subsequent chapters dealing with presidential regimes. Lanzaro elaborates on his prior distinction between majoritarian and pluralist presidentialism. Majoritarian presidentialism emerges in extreme party systems with very weak parties or hegemonic ruling parties, which in either case empower the executive to control the policymaking process. Pluralist presidentialism, by contrast, emerges in contexts of moderate multipartism, where cabinet coalitions and legislative compromise become common political practices. Lanzaro projects this contrast against the distinction between populist and social-democratic leftist governments in Latin America since 2000. Populist administrations, illustrated by the cases of Venezuela and Bolivia, are led by inexperienced organizations, marked by weak party institutionalization, and tainted by declining electoral competition. Social-democratic administrations, epitomized by Chile and Uruguay, are led by seasoned leftist parties, structured by institutionalized party systems, and driven by vibrant electoral contests.

The cases of Argentina and Mexico illustrate the origins and the limits of majoritarian presidentialism. Using an impressive array of data sources, Alejandro Bonvecchi and Javier Zelaznik identify the three foundations of presidential power in Argentina: formal institutions, budgetary control, and party politics. The chapter, however, shows that the effect of formal institutions and fiscal authority is always mediated by partisan dynamics. For example, the ability of presidents to rule by decree requires passive support in Congress—especially after 2006, since presidential decrees can be challenged by congressional resolutions, which are not subject to the presidential veto. Similarly, Argentine presidents control the budget with almost no oversight and transfer discretionary funds to provincial governors in order to cobble territorial coalitions. Yet the denationalization of the ruling party has forced an increasing devolution of fiscal authority to Congress and the provincial governments in recent years.

In his discussion of the Mexican case, Diego Valadés challenges what he describes as “a culture of submission” of the legislature to the president. Valadés traces the origins of this problem in Mexico’s constitutional history, particularly in the period of hegemonic rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party. The executive branch emerged from this era in a dominant position, reinforced by the constitutional ban on legislative re-election and by the broad appointment powers of the

president. Since 2000, however, this dominant position has become a burden because Congress is divided and public opinion finds the president responsible for all government actions. Valadés outlines a proposal for constitutional reform, perhaps overlooking the lessons of other chapters, which show the importance of informal political arrangements alongside formal institutional designs.

The dynamics of pluralist presidentialism are explored in the chapters about Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Octavio Amorim Neto provides a comprehensive review of the literature on the Brazilian case, comparing the operation of the presidential regimes of 1946–64 and 1988–2010. The extreme fragmentation of the Brazilian party system was overcome in the contemporary period through several institutional mechanisms that incorporate the president's constitutional decree powers, legislative rules that empower party leaders in Congress, the use of cabinet positions as a currency to form coalitions, and the selective deployment of pork to co-opt individual legislators. Amorim reminds us that cabinet coalitions do not always deliver the expected legislative support, and Brazil thus alternates between two government formulas: majority multiparty governments, which operate as legislative cartels, and minority multiparty governments, which are rolled over in Congress.

Peter Siavelis, in turn, focuses his analysis of Chile on the allocation of cabinet positions and the role of presidential advisers. In his excellent study, Siavelis shows that the Concertación, the center-left coalition that ruled Chile between 1990 and 2010, relied on an intricate system of party quotas to assure a proportional distribution of executive posts among coalition members. Patricio Aylwin, the first president in the democratic era, employed this design to generate a fluid system of consultation across ministries and parties. But later presidents superimposed age and gender criteria to select members of the administration, and staffing the executive branch became like casting a gigantic version of the Swiss Federal Council. The quota system also limited the president's ability to appoint close confidants in the cabinet, displacing them to parallel decisionmaking units in the administration. These advisers concocted major policies outside the line ministries, leading to the delegitimation of party quotas, which were ultimately perceived by the public as a patronage arrangement.

Uruguay's case, analyzed by Lanzaro, shows how pluralist practices are subject to historical mutation. Before the 1973 coup, pluralism was anchored in Uruguay's two-party system by electoral rules that granted proportional representation to partisan factions in Congress, by a tradition of coparticipation that incorporated opposition leaders in local governments and public enterprises, and by legislative compromises that facilitated governance even in the absence of formal coalitions. With the emergence of the Frente Amplio (FA), a bloc of leftist organizations that challenged the electoral dominance of traditional parties, these arrangements were converted to perform new functions. After democracy was reestablished in the mid-1980s, the traditional parties formed explicit coalitions to allocate cabinet positions and administrative jobs, excluding the FA from coparticipation arrangements between 1990 and 2005. When the FA ultimately won the presidency and secured a congressional majority in 2005, it returned the favor by crafting a single-party cab-

inet and by removing representatives of traditional parties from coparticipation posts. Lanzaro calls this government “majoritarian,” but he makes clear that President Tabaré Vázquez formed his cabinet with leaders of all FA factions, in proportion to their numerical contribution to the legislative majority. This was majoritarianism Uruguay-style, meant to reproduce the logic of coalitions even under single-party rule.

The chapters dealing with European cases provide sharp comparative lessons for Latin Americanists. Marina Costa Lobo offers a concise and informative introduction to constitutional models in the European Union, noting that Southern Europe has shown a tendency toward majoritarian politics. Juan Luis Paniagua and José Tudela Aranda document this phenomenon in the Spanish context. Paniagua describes a parliamentarism “of presidential nature,” in which the executive appoints and removes ministers, controls the legislative agenda, exercises constitutional and delegated decree powers, and relies on cohesive parliamentary blocs that constrain individual legislators. Tudela extends this analysis by focusing on the quasi-federal structure of the Spanish state. In the absence of legislative majorities, the ruling party has never formed cabinet coalitions, instead signing policy agreements with regional forces in parliament. (By contrast, coalition governments are common at the regional level.) Political decentralization has also eroded the national structure of political parties, allowing for the rising power of regional “barons.”

Gianfranco Pasquino reports on the evolution of Italian parliamentarism, contrasting its pluralist nature in 1948–94 with its majoritarian propensities in 1994–2010. Although some majoritarian aspects of the electoral system adopted in 1994 were relaxed in 2005, the current electoral law offers a majority premium for the most-voted coalition, and majoritarian tendencies are reinforced by constitutional decree powers and by personalist campaigns. Given the fragility of governments during the previous period and the glacial pace of parliamentary decisions, Pasquino does not necessarily see this trend as an evil, but he concludes that judicious leaders and voters are necessary for any institutional design to work.

In her study of Portugal, Costa Lobo similarly describes three mechanisms leading to greater concentration of power in the prime minister’s office after 1982: a progressive reduction in the number of parties that facilitated the formation of single-party governments, a bureaucratic process by which party leaders in office gained control over their party organizations, and an administrative reorganization to empower government advisers, political operatives, and the chief of staff (*ministro da presidência*) in regard to the cabinet. However, Lobo reminds the reader that the party system has become more volatile in recent years and that the Portuguese president retains important powers as a head of state that are activated in periods of crisis.

This book not only offers fresh perspectives on Juan Linz’s classic contrast between presidential and parliamentary regimes, it also inspires a broader reflection on Arend Lijphart’s distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracies. Together, the case studies suggest that pluralist systems accommodate fragmented representation, create collegial governments that allocate executive positions fairly among coalition members, and offer political concessions to the opposition above

and beyond its electoral strength. By contrast, majoritarian systems promote the formation of tight parliamentary blocs, provide a dominant role for the president or prime minister, and rely on the use of decree powers—constitutional or delegated—to preempt deadlock. But in a rather Polybian way, many examples in the book illustrate that successful cases involve a mixed constitution. And it is easy to imagine noble and debased versions of both forms of government. A major lesson of this volume is that formal rules become operative only when immersed in the context of sound political arrangements; political leaders are ultimately responsible for making all institutions work.

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William Michael Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy Toward Argentina*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. Notes, bibliography, index, 272 pp.; hardcover \$39.95.

That a stark contradiction exists between the theory of universal human rights and the everyday practice of human wrongs is out of debate. Yet this contradiction becomes more apparent when human wrongs take place in distant places and hurt distant humans. As a result, foreign policy has been a site of contestation for those claiming a moral imagination going beyond the moral boundaries of the realist mindset.

Nowhere has this conundrum been more hotly debated than in the United States. In *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, William Schmidli has crafted a well-written, succinct, and engaging overview of U.S.-Argentine relations during the period of military dictatorship in Argentina (1976–83). In particular, Schmidli offers a new and well-rounded dimension to our understanding of the Carter administration's efforts to curtail state-sanctioned human rights violations in Argentina.

Working with personal interviews, recently declassified sources, and a rich gamut of secondary literature, Schmidli opens up the state to investigation and examines the competing agencies that offer alternative visions of how to deal with state-sanctioned human rights violations by Argentina's military junta. Schmidli depicts these alternatives as a recurrent struggle between Cold War realists and human rights advocates. Cold War realists consistently downplayed human rights as a viable U.S. foreign policy goal, and therefore were ready to tolerate human rights abuses in the hands of repressive, anticommunist regimes. Realists therefore preferred a more "quiet diplomacy" and a case-by-case approach. In contrast, human rights advocates aimed for a louder policy against state-sanctioned human rights violations and preferred a more institutionalized human rights policy.

In six colorful chapters, the author examines the many ways the Carter administration embraced human rights as a key dimension of foreign policy. Already during his campaign, Jimmy Carter had put forward the need to develop a principled foreign policy and a stronger commitment to promote and protect human rights abroad. Once in the White House, Carter's rhetoric translated into practical initiatives. Cyrus Vance, Carter's secretary of state, was instrumental in implement-

ing a human rights policy. Yet Carter's key move was the nomination of Patricia Derian, a committed human rights activist, who served as assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs for the entire Carter administration.

On February 18, 1978, Carter issued a presidential directive (NSC-30) mandating human rights as a "major objective of U.S. foreign policy" (106). Then, on June 1, Carter signed the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and subsequently signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. In the coming months, Carter's nascent human rights policy sought to redefine U.S. relations with Latin America according to normative ideals, and Argentina, as Schmidli convincingly argues, would become the defining test case. Derian would therefore visit Argentina three times to persuade the military junta to curtail extralegal violence. The landmark of this policy would be the pressure exercised on the military junta to accept a fact-finding visit from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in September 1979.

Yet as the Carter administration progressed, foreign policy proved to be a difficult terrain on which to lay down normative visions amid security challenges. Schmidli explores this terrain and provides a cogent analysis of how human rights have been long considered at odds with the moral dilemmas of U.S. foreign policy. With a nuanced narrative, the author brings to the surface the interplay of competing values, tradeoffs, and consistency problems in the making of foreign policy toward Latin America in general and Argentina in particular. Schmidli demonstrates convincingly how foreign policy involves concessions and how, therefore, a human rights foreign policy may at times be compromised. The case of Argentina in particular provides ample evidence of how trade interests, convergent anticommunist ideologies, and geopolitical location can all trump a principled foreign policy. As a result, U.S. commitments to human rights waxed and waned with the changing ideological landscapes in foreign policy circles. Human rights was already losing visibility in the latter half of the Carter administration, yet the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House meant a hard setback to a principled foreign policy. This was made clear when, two months after taking office, Reagan announced plans to lift the ban on military sales to Argentina.

Schmidli's account, however, goes beyond diplomatic history, which is often restricted to Beltway politicians and diplomatic circles, and explores the roles of the U.S. Congress, civil rights activists, and individuals working on the political terrain far from top-level decisionmakers and thus with more margin to maneuver. This is the case of "Tex" Harris, a junior officer at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires. Harris's human rights reporting formed the evidentiary base for Patricia Derian's efforts to hold back cooperation with Argentina on human rights grounds. In addition, Schmidli examines the role of transnational civil society in holding state leaders and political groups accountable for their positions on human rights. As a result, the book offers an ample perspective from state and nonstate actors and shows how traditional boundaries between state policies and nonstate political activism can sometimes dissolve into more complex interactions.

Three critical observations are in order. First, as already observed, Schmidli does an excellent job of explaining Carter's back-and-forths in the implementation of a principled foreign policy, yet his analysis of the Argentine side is less fully developed. Most of the literature cited and the primary sources examined come from the United States. A closer look at how the Argentine military perceived U.S. inroads into domestic affairs would have added a more nuanced picture of the working dynamics in the domestic context.

Second, although firmly placed in the historical discipline, Schmidli's book aims to establish a dialogue with both area studies and IR scholars. For scholars doing foreign policy analysis, for instance, Schmidli's distinction between Cold Warriors and human rights advocates is crucial. Yet a more conceptual examination of these two postures would have illuminated the many complexities surrounding U.S. foreign policymaking. Schmidli omits, for instance, a rich and evolved literature surrounding foreign policymaking and the social construction of national interest. In particular, Schmidli does not mention Kathryn Sikkink's influential works on human rights in Latin America (*Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America*, 2004; Margaret Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, 1998). One of the central findings in Sikkink's research is precisely that for decades the United States has sent "mixed signals" (2004) to Latin America regarding its definitions and implementations of human rights policies. An open engagement with Sikkink's works, for instance, could have enriched Schmidli's conceptualization of U.S. foreign policy.

Third, the division between Cold Warriors and human rights advocates goes beyond the confines of the Cold War period. That is, the recurrent tension between normative standpoints and geopolitical reasoning has been and continues to be a fundamental dimension of the U.S. international identity. The crux of the debate here is not whether national interest trumps human rights but whether national interest can be redefined to include human rights in its grammar. The end of the Cold War seemed to bring up a new opportunity to inscribe human rights in the logic of national interests, yet the global war on terrorism means that Washington is now under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones.

In sum, Schmidli's book illuminates the limitations of a principled foreign policy as a force for change. While his book will appeal principally to students of history and specifically to students of U.S.-Latin American relations, its attention to domestic ideological struggles over the evolution of the moral dimension in foreign affairs also offers an excellent case study of how foreign policy is rooted in the very contours of the U.S. polity.

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Aaron Schneider, *State-Building and Tax Regimes in Central America*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2012. Figures, tables, acronyms, appendix, bibliography, index, 243 pp.; hardcover \$91, e-book \$73.

This book is an excellent contribution to a field of research that lacks persuasive answers to a critical question: the ability of Central American governments to raise revenues in order to fund states. The author develops a theory of state building and taxation systems in the region and uses it to describe the different outcomes in several countries. This work is a welcome input that largely explains the failure of several of these countries to develop strong state capacities that will enable them to launch serious development projects.

The book attempts to respond to an important question: how differences in state building affect types of tax regimes. The author's theory of state building follows in the tradition of macrosociologists such as Barrington Moore, Tilly, Rueschemeyer et al., and many others, in which state building results from the interactions of groups and classes within a defined set of institutions, producing different types of outcomes, including political regimes. The focus of this work is how this framework produces different types of tax regimes in countries that are perceived as similar and that are the core of the book: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

Following standard principles of fiscal sociology, this work also assumes that taxation is the cornerstone of states. The type of tax regime tells us much about the state's capacities, the degree of citizen consent, and the levels of social solidarity. Weak revenues from taxes, such as those in Central America, indicate that states are incapable of launching inclusive development projects. But also—and this is central in the argument of the book—they result from a clear strategy of several actors, particularly the internationally oriented elites.

Schneider's point of departure is that patterns of state building result from the elites' ability to dominate the political arena, the level of inner cohesion of these emerging elites, and the type of institutions that channel groups into the policymaking process. The higher the cohesion and dominance of these elites, the higher the state capacities, and therefore the stronger the likelihood that states will be able to legislate taxes that benefit their economic agenda. The relationship among key social groups will dictate the type of state building. Key actors, for the author, are the groups that are globally integrated with capital and markets, the transnational elites: "tax regimes are the outcome of the state-building project advanced by leading capitalist sectors as they interact among themselves and with other actors while moving through and shaping policymaking institutions" (17).

According to the author, after War World II, new rising elites sought to insert themselves into global capitalism with the help of the active states. How they pursued and accomplished these goals has been critical to the type of tax regimes that emerged in the region. In some cases, elites reached out to popular sectors to build institutions to help the development of dynamic sectors, along with welfare (Costa Rica), while in others, emerging elites remained linked to declining elites and

excluded popular sectors (such as in El Salvador and Guatemala), producing tax regimes that lacked both progressivity and universality.

The author argues that the significant differences in tax regimes in rather similar exclusionary political systems, such as those of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, derive from the strategic decisions of actors in each country, given the institutional structure in which these actions were taken. The transnational elites in Honduras remained divided among several conglomerates and family networks, and they were able to agree only on a state-building project that attracted foreign firms and in which these elites played a subordinate role as partners to those enterprises by facilitating access. Thus this model produced an "outside-in" type of state-building project. In contrast, during the critical 20-year period following World War II, El Salvador's transnational elites were cohesive within business and financial associations, and advanced an "inside-out" project through a business-oriented political party. In the last two decades, this model has been tested, and it remains to be seen whether it can hold. Meanwhile, the fragmented Guatemalan transnational elites lacked dominance. Rivalries between transnational and traditional groups, urban and rural elites yielded a no-dominant-group project, and therefore a recurrent crisis in their state-building project that consequently produced a very weak tax regime.

To prove these bold assertions, the author engages in comparative strategies. He first studies country cases, examining two tax reform initiatives in each country: one that either enhanced revenues or promoted progressivity or universality, and another that attempted to achieve the opposite. The author seeks to keep country-specific conditions constant in order to isolate possible determinants of tax regimes and to analyze the micro-level dynamics of political actors and their strategic decisions. This is a very useful approach because it allows him to analyze success and failure in taxation policymaking, or in his words, "what gets done in tax reform and what does not."

The second strategy is to compare across nations, attempting to grasp the macro-level dimension as it analyzes the role of organizations and institutions, the historical legacies, and the political arenas in these countries. Despite region-specific conditions, these seemingly similar nations produced, as mentioned, very different outcomes. By examining across cases, Schneider sheds light on the impact such variation has on the state-building projects in the region.

The main approach in this study is qualitative and is based largely on lengthy field research and personal work in the region, which has allowed the author access to key informants and data (and which has probably biased the unit of analysis for this study). The evidence is drawn from a long list of interviews, analysis of documents, description of events and facts, and the author's personal observations. There is also some basic descriptive quantitative data, particularly in chapters 3 and 4, that persuasively survey general trends and the scope of tax capacities in these countries, although no further statistical analysis is performed.

This book succeeds in presenting a compelling argument regarding the low taxing capacities of several states in Central America. However, a reader might still wonder why the more interesting comparison with countries that have achieved

stronger tax capacities has not been fully examined. While Schneider persuasively distinguishes the different roles played by elites in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and the type of tax outcome they produced, this book does not analyze with similar depth the case of Costa Rica, where precisely a different tax capacity developed. Throughout the book there are hints and statements on this topic, but the hypotheses that were fully examined for the abovementioned three low-tax-capacity cases might have been better tested if similar analysis could have done with a case that produced a very different outcome. This might be a standing topic for an upcoming research agenda.

Despite the book's significant contributions to understanding the nature of taxation in these countries, several relevant topics remain understudied. For instance, the role played by lending international agencies, primarily the IMF, in pushing for the Value Added Tax. The author does not test whether countries adopted higher domestic consumption taxes and lower trade taxes as a result of "tax advice" and external pressure or because of the interplay of domestic elites in search of a specific model of state building. Another topic underexamined is tax evasion, which transcends the problem of state capacities because it constitutes an option of resistance used by elites and individuals. Given that the countries under study have the highest tax evasion rates on the continent, a further analysis of the strategic behavior of elites that used tax evasion as a recourse could have enhanced the understanding of these tax regimes.

Schneider's book is nonetheless a must-read for any scholar who looks to grasp the inner functioning of political actors and institutional makeup in Central American nations. Schneider goes through the painstaking process of making sense of different political outcomes and presents vivid examples of the difficulties of constructing effective states and institutions. This work is a very good comparative effort that examines how weak governments adapt to the international markets. By focusing on tax regimes, Schneider illuminates the cumbersome process whereby elites sometimes construct state capacities and at other times erode them, as the author says, "like termites dismantling a home, reducing it to dust."

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Dag Mossige, *Mexico's Left: The Paradox of the PRD*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013. Tables, figures, bibliography, index, 325 pp.; hardcover \$75.

Founded in 1989, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) has established itself as the leading left party in Mexico, one of three major national parties, and a perennial contender for national and subnational power. Despite this, the PRD lacks a clear self-definition and remains conflict-ridden and weakly routinized. Since the PRD's inception, party factions, called *corrientes*, have engaged in bitter and near-constant struggles over ideology, program, electoral strategy, and coveted party leadership positions and candidacies. National leaders have reached little agreement on the party's ideological or programmatic identity. The PRD still has not devel-

oped stable formal rules and procedures for selecting candidates, selecting the party president, or distributing party posts. Top party leaders have flouted basic electoral rules, such as the ban on running for party president twice in a row. Procedures intended for long-term use have rarely endured more than a few years. Crucially, the PRD elites who compete against each other in primaries for top internal leadership positions or major candidacies have frequently alleged fraud (e.g., the 1997 internal election for the mayoral candidacy in Mexico City) or even refused to recognize the results (e.g., the 1999 and 2008 internal contests for party president).

The PRD's internal dysfunction, often publicized in the mass media, has damaged the party's image among the broader electorate. Both internal and external critics have argued that the PRD, by modeling democracy so poorly internally, disqualifies itself as a governing alternative and force for democracy in Mexico.

Why does the PRD remain conflict-ridden? Why does it still lack a clear self-definition? Why, still, do major groups within the party not accept the outcomes of internal contests? These questions lie at the heart of Dag Mossige's book. Mossige argues that all of the PRD's internal woes stem from a single factor: the longstanding and still-unresolved internal fissure between "movement advocates" and "party builders." For Mossige, the PRD remains internally dysfunctional because it still has not decided whether it is a movement or a party.

Mossige locates the origins of the party-movement divide in Mexico's 1988 presidential election. In that election, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, left-leaning ex-governor of Michoacán State and one of the top elite in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), defected from the right-tacking PRI and ran for the presidency on an antineoliberal platform. Although PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari officially prevailed, most Mexicans and virtually all Cárdenas supporters believed that the PRI had won by fraud. In May 1989, the left-wing PRD was born, with Cárdenas at the helm.

Party *corrientes* immediately split into "rupturist" and reformist camps. Rupturists envisioned the PRD as a hybrid party movement and preferred tactics of mass mobilization to achieve party goals. They advocated a clean break with the fraudulent, repressive PRI regime and promoted a strategy of "intransigence": uncompromising opposition and confrontation. In contrast, reformists envisioned the PRD as a traditional institutional party. They believed that the PRD should seek to reform the Mexican political system gradually by working within it. The reformists also put a premium on internal routinization, or the consolidation of internal decisionmaking rules in key areas like candidate selection.

Although the terms *reformist* and *rupturist* fell out of use after a few years, the underlying cleavage between party builders (reformists) and movement advocates (rupturists) did not go away with time, according to Mossige. From the 1990s to the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, tensions between the two sides remained unresolved and simmered beneath the surface (chapter 3). Then, tensions dramatically resurfaced and, in Mossige's account, have since threatened to tear the PRD apart on multiple occasions (chapters 2, 4–8).

The catalyzing events for the revival of party-movement tensions center on the 2006 presidential election. In 2005, the Vicente Fox administration, his conservative

National Action Party (PAN), and the PRI used dubious legal means to attempt to block the 2006 presidential candidacy of PRD leader Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). The PRD and its allies mobilized in response, and the federal government backed off. These events, according to Mossige, energized PRD movement advocates, confirming their suspicions of Mexico's new democratic regime and vindicating their mobilizational tactics. After AMLO lost the 2006 election narrowly to the PAN's Felipe Calderón, he alleged fraud, publicly rejected the legitimacy of Mexico's political system and institutions, called on his supporters to do the same, and set up a parallel government called the Legitimate Government of Mexico (GL). Movement advocates rallied around AMLO and the GL, arguing that in 2006, as in 1988, the political system had committed fraud against the left, and that a stance of rejectionism, confrontation, and mobilization must follow. Reformist party builders, such as Jesús Ortega, drew the opposite lesson, citing public disapproval of AMLO's postelectoral behavior as evidence that the PRD, in order to avoid marginality, had to adapt to new realities by embracing institutional politics and pursuing gradual reform.

Mossige observes that the revived party-movement divide has generated numerous internal crises for the PRD in recent years, perhaps most prominently in the 2008 election for PRD president, which pitted Jesús Ortega against movement advocate and AMLO favorite Alejandro Encinas. Due to fraud allegations from Encinas, the PRD leadership could not reach agreement on who had prevailed. It took eight months and the intervention of Mexico's highest electoral court, the TEPJF, for Ortega to assume the party presidency.

Despite his increasingly toxic relations with the PRD, thoroughly documented in chapters 5 through 8, AMLO secured the party's 2012 presidential nomination. After losing, however, AMLO formally exited the PRD to lead the personalistic, ambiguously defined National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). Few of the PRD's movement advocates defected with AMLO, so that the PRD national leadership at present remains highly divided between movement advocates and party builders. Mossige therefore concludes with the question, to what extent will the PRD's movement advocates "bow to the majority will" of the PRD's moderate, social-democratic *corrientes* "or remain an intransigent internal opposition hindering the PRD's institutionalization" (307)?

Mexico's Left is a welcome, needed addition to PRD scholarship. Most existing studies of the party's internal dynamics concern the pre-2006 era, which makes Mossige's thorough examination of the 2006 election and its aftermath particularly valuable. The empirical chapters (2–8) succeed in demonstrating that the PRD's party-movement fissure remains a serious impediment to internal stability and routinization. The book is factually rich, based on one hundred interviews with national party leaders, research in PRD archives, and participant observation in national-level party and faction meetings. Mossige's quotations from archives and in-depth elite interviews shed fascinating light on present-day PRD elites' competing visions for the party.

One might contest the book's central theoretical premise, that the PRD's internal woes are puzzling and require explanation (chapter 1). Citing the party's

ambiguous self-definition, internal strife, and weak routinization, the author suggests that “the PRD, from the point of view of the political science literature, simply did not behave in ways consistent with those of other political parties” (5). Yet it is quite common for long-lasting, electorally successful parties to possess ambiguous self-definitions; to suffer intense, perpetual internal conflict; and to lack stable formal procedures for adjudicating internal conflicts. Latin American examples include the Peronists in Argentina, ARENA and the FMLN in El Salvador, the Socialists in Chile, and entrenched clientelistic machines in Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras (e.g., Brazil’s PMDB). Arguably, mass-based Latin American parties that do become highly routinized (e.g., Brazil’s Workers’ Party) are the ones that should puzzle us.

Mossige also might overstate the risk of a “complete breakup of the PRD” (21). Since the 1990s, the PRD has dominated Mexico’s left partisan spectrum and, in election after election, has received a sizable hardcore vote (*voto duro*). This hardcore vote, combined with the financial spoils that now accompany office in Mexico, creates a powerful electoral and material incentive for PRD members not to defect. For reasons like these, it is generally rare for major established parties to suffer fatal schisms, even if they are characterized by high levels of internal conflict and low levels of routinization (e.g., the Argentine Peronists, the main Salvadoran parties).

The foregoing comments notwithstanding, Mossige’s book is a thought-provoking, thoroughly researched study of the PRD’s internal life, which will interest and benefit scholars of the PRD, of Mexican politics, and of political parties in Latin America and beyond.

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Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, eds., *Mexico and the United States: The Politics of Partnership*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013. Tables, figures, bibliography, index, 243 pp.; hardcover \$55, paperback \$22.

The bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States has changed dramatically since the Cold War dominated U.S. foreign policymaking and the PRI dominated Mexican politics. Whereas the two countries appeared to keep each other at arm’s length in the past, Mexico and the United States now “interact with arguably the broadest and densest set of bilateral relationships of any pair of nations” (John Bailey and Tonatiuh Guillén-López, 61). Though the ties that bind the two countries are more numerous and complex than ever, the relationship is still characterized by huge power asymmetries. The result is an uneven partnership in which collaboration and conflict, persuasion and compulsion occur simultaneously. This book is an impressive effort to analyze U.S.-Mexico relations in a radically changed global context.

Mexico and the United States is divided into two parts. The first section consists of three chapters that outline a loose analytical framework designed to make sense of the cooperation, or lack thereof, between the two countries. The second section

consists of four chapters that examine in great detail the issues that dominate the current bilateral agenda: NAFTA and economic integration, migration policy, environmental protection, and the fight against organized crime. The final chapter makes policy recommendations.

The book has two main arguments. The first, introduced by Peter Smith in chapter 2 and elaborated more fully in chapters 3 and 4, is that the diplomatic agenda between the United States and Mexico is driven primarily by domestic considerations in each country. It is telling that except for a few short passages, references to the State Department and Mexico's Foreign Ministry (SRE) are almost absent from the book. Much more prominent are analyses of the actions of other executive agencies, legislatures, and state and local governments. Why is the bilateral agenda dominated by domestic rather than foreign policy concerns? According to Smith, in the current global context characterized by the end of the Cold War, the rise of China, and the emergence of terrorism as the main national security threat, the United States assigns a relatively low priority to Mexico. In turn, because of democratization, political competition, and domestic crises, Mexico lacks a strong political consensus to guide its policy toward the United States. The result is that neither the United States nor Mexico has a grand strategy to guide its foreign policy for the relationship.

The second central claim, articulated by Andrew Selee and Alberto Díaz-Cayeros in the third chapter, is that the bilateral relationship is more interdependent, complex, and asymmetrical than ever before. The interdependence goes beyond shared national interests tied to economic growth and border issues and extends to shared interests between subnational actors, such as border states, businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and even citizens of the two countries. This multilevel interdependence can produce close working relationships between organizations on both sides of the border. However, without coordination across levels or issue areas, the resulting policies are often fragmented, contradictory (e.g., increasing economic integration without a policy to integrate labor markets), and full of missed opportunities. Yet there is a silver lining: because the multiple points of engagement between the two countries are largely independent of each other, policy progress can occur in one arena even if it stalls on other issues.

For the most part, the empirical chapters make good use of this framework to shed light on policymaking around four key issues. Robert Blecker and Gerardo Esquivel's chapter is an excellent analysis of how NAFTA failed to close the development gap between the two countries despite its obvious success in increasing trade and economic ties. The reason, they argue, is that NAFTA did not foster a deeper regional integration process that could have produced complementary industrial and education policies, set aside funds for necessary infrastructure projects, or allowed Mexico more macroeconomic policy flexibility. Although Blecker and Esquivel acknowledge that the rise of global free trade, particularly U.S. trade with China, limited the gains from trade that Mexico could achieve, they place much of the blame for slow growth on domestic factors in Mexico: bungled privatization of banks and telecommunications, failure to provide an adequate safety net for workers displaced

by economic restructuring, and excessively restrictive macroeconomic policies. This critique is fair, but the chapter's narrow focus on Mexico feels unbalanced for a book that aims to examine the relationship from both sides of the border.

David FitzGerald and Rafael Alarcón provide a balanced analysis of how immigration policy has evolved in each country during the past 50 years. Perhaps no other set of bilateral issues illustrates as clearly how, in the absence of a grand strategy toward Mexico, immigration policy in the United States depends almost exclusively on domestic political factors, or how the power asymmetry limits Mexico's ability to influence bilateral policymaking on this issue. FitzGerald and Alarcón convincingly argue that public opinion and congressional politics in the United States drive policymaking, with precious little recognition of how closely integrated the labor markets of the two countries have become. As much as Mexico would like to deal with both economic and labor market integration together, the United States treats them as separate policy baskets. Ad hoc, fragmented, and contradictory immigration policies are the result.

Though the implementation of NAFTA in 1994 is responsible for much of the growth in bilateral cooperation, Roberto Sánchez-Rodríguez and Stephen Mumme show that collaboration on environmental issues dates back at least to the 1940s and is supported by a well-developed collection of binational institutions and agreements. Perhaps because environmental issues rarely rise to the level of national politics, actors in both countries have had room to construct and coordinate mutually beneficial policies without the counterproductive influence that Congress and public opinion have had on immigration policy. Power asymmetries also appear less important, allowing stakeholder communities and established binational agencies to interact more or less as political equals. Nevertheless, the chapter makes a strong case that environmental problems and the management of key natural resources will be a core challenge for Mexico and the United States over the next half-century because of rapid population growth and urbanization on both sides of the border.

Luis Astorga and David Shirk analyze the rise of drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) and drug-related violence in Mexico. They provide a useful history of DTOs in Mexico that emphasizes how an earlier policy of protection and collusion, which yielded relative peace among the drug cartels, gave way to fractionalization, violence, and conflict. Although Astorga and Shirk analyze ways that the United States and Mexico have collaborated on this issue over time, including most recently the Mérida Initiative, this chapter focuses much of its attention on the failure of efforts by the Mexican government to prosecute criminals, weaken DTOs, and reduce the violence. We learn relatively little about how domestic political constraints in the United States help or hinder bilateral efforts to fight drug-trafficking organizations.

In addition to analyzing bilateral relations, the empirical chapters also make policy recommendations designed to yield more productive cooperation on the four issues. The final chapter then distills these recommendations, with the explicit goal of provoking debate and action that will strengthen the U.S.-Mexico partnership. This attention to policy issues will appeal to many readers, and instructors can use the policy recommendations to stimulate classroom debate.

All the contributors are well-regarded experts on Mexican politics based in the United States or Mexico. Though this is a clear strength of the book, it is also a limitation, since the contributors tend to pay more attention to how the dynamics of bilateral policymaking play out on the Mexican side of the border. The chapters on migration and environmental protection are more balanced, and chapters 3 and 4 rightfully emphasize the growing importance of bilateral cooperation between governors of border states in the two countries. But overall, the book appears to be written with a U.S. audience in mind, an audience that knows relatively less about Mexico than about the United States.

Mexico and the United States is impressive in its scope and rich in empirical detail. The conceptual lens spans multiple levels from the global to the local, and reminds us that analyses of bilateral and international relations should not assume unitary state interests or national-level decisionmaking. By taking domestic factors and actors seriously, the contributors not only illustrate how complex and interdependent the bilateral relationship has become, they succeed in making comprehensible what otherwise may seem like chaotic and contradictory policies.

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