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## Abstract

Presidential cabinets include on average more nonparty ministers than governments in any other form of democracy, and critics of presidentialism have argued that this compromises representativeness, accountability, and governability. Yet cabinet partisanship in presidential democracies remains poorly understood. Existing studies argue that the partisan composition of cabinets reflects the degree to which presidents prioritize building legislative support. We demonstrate that a better understanding of government formation requires attention to a second dimension of choice: agency risks. Focusing on the relationship between presidents and their own parties, which is at the core of every presidential government, we show that party-affiliated ministers are not always reliable agents for presidents and that presidents appoint nonpartisan ministers to limit agency loss. We test this argument using original data on the partisanship of single-party cabinets in 12 Latin American countries and find support for the key claims.

## Keywords

cabinets, presidents and executive politics, bureaucracies, Latin American politics

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One of the most striking aspects of presidential democracies is the remarkable share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010).<sup>1</sup> In Latin America, for example, where presidentialism is the rule, on average every fourth government minister has no party affiliation. Moreover, the partisan composition of governments varies significantly across countries and over time.<sup>2</sup> Given the extensive influence of cabinet ministers on policy, these patterns matter. Indeed, they are central to the classic critique of presidential democracy, which argues that the frequent suppression of links between the cabinet and the assembly by presidents weakens the representativeness of governments, focuses accountability for cabinet actions on the president alone, and can even compromise the quality of presidential democracy (e.g., Linz, 1994; Valenzuela, 1994).

Despite the potential consequences of cabinet partisanship, however, there is a puzzling lack of comparative work on the topic. The handful of studies that do exist typically describe cabinet partisanship as shaped by the legislative strategies of presidents (e.g., Neto, 2006; Neto & Samuels, 2010). In this view, nonpartisan cabinets are appointed mainly by presidents who are able and willing to rule by decree, whereas presidents who aim to enact policy through the legislative process must build support for their policy agenda by including parties in the cabinet. This standard approach assumes implicitly that once in the cabinet, party-affiliated ministers are always reliable and faithful agents for presidents. We agree that there is a legislative dimension to cabinet choices, but disagree that partisan ministers can be assumed to be uniformly faithful agents for a president. The regular occurrence of high-profile conflicts between presidents and ministers—including those from their own party—powerfully contradicts that assumption (Conaghan, 1994; Corrales, 2002; Romero, 2007).

In this article, we argue that existing work has overlooked a central concern of presidents in cabinet choice—the risk of agency loss. Presidents are guided by more than the need to build support for their agenda in congress—they must also delegate significant authority over policy formulation, enactment, and implementation to ministers. Agency loss arises when ministers have political incentives that diverge from the president's and employ this authority to pursue goals that conflict with the president's aims (Strøm, 2000). Presidents are acutely aware of this risk and manage it by appointing nonpartisan ministers when divergent incentives and goals make partisans poor agents. Our analysis thus makes clear that a better and more accurate understanding of cabinet partisanship requires a conceptualization of a president's cabinet choices as two-dimensional, shaped by his or her legislative strategy as well as the need to manage the risk of agency loss.

Agency problems have been found to be pervasive in the relationship between government ministers and their principals in parliamentary and semipresidential systems (Huber & Martínez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridason & Kam, 2008; Martin & Vanberg, 2011; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2008) but have been largely ignored in studies of presidential cabinets (see Samuels & Shugart, 2010, for a rare exception). Yet presidential democracies can enhance the scope for agency risks through the separate election of executives and legislatures, which can drive a wedge between the preferences and priorities of presidents and parties in the legislature, including their own party.

Consider the following example. In 2000, Vicente Fox of the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) won the Mexican presidential election despite opposition from significant sections of his own party who feared his candidacy would “compromise the party’s ideological profile over the long term” (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 208). Upon winning, Fox declared that the PAN had to “respect the president’s decision to appoint his own cabinet.”<sup>3</sup> The distance between the new president and his party was reflected in the composition of his cabinet, which included few party members and instead drew heavily from his own inner circle (Shirk, 2005).

Fox’s choice to limit cabinet partisanship was no accident. When the aims and incentives of presidents and parties diverge, presidents are exposed to the risk that partisan ministers will use their authority to prioritize the party’s goals rather than the president’s. Two features of nonpartisan appointments can help presidents limit that risk. First, by naming nonpartisans, presidents are free to prioritize incentive compatibility in ministerial selection. Unlike party-affiliated ministers, nonpartisans do not typically pursue political careers (Blondel, 1991a, 1991b) or have previous electoral experience (Camp, 2010). They are therefore less likely to have their own electoral objectives or links to party constituencies, and are more likely to return to their original profession when they leave the government (Blondel, 1991a, 1991b; Claveria & Verge, 2014). Second, presidents are less constrained in sanctioning and dismissing nonpartisan ministers when they depart from the president’s aims because the cabinet’s legislative support is not predicated on their representation in cabinet. Recognizing the risk of agency loss as a dimension of cabinet choice orthogonal to legislative strategy, we argue, is crucial to understanding cabinet partisanship in presidential democracies.

In demonstrating the centrality of agency risks to choices about cabinet partisanship we focus on the relationship between presidents and their own party for two reasons. First, this relationship is central to understanding presidential cabinets more broadly. In presidential systems presidents always have the initiative in forming their government. Consequently, unless the president

is an independent, the presidential party is included in every cabinet irrespective of its legislative seat share. Thus, agency risks in *all* presidential governments derive at least in part from the relationship between presidents and their own parties. Second, this focus allows us to clarify the parameters that shape the scope for agency loss in the simplest case in which presidents negotiate just with their own party. Coalitions are significantly more complex because factors such as party centralization, that help presidents to control their own party and its ministers, often hinder their ability to control the ministers of coalition partners. The article thereby provides a baseline model of the effect of agency risks on cabinet partisanship, which can be extended in future work to the more complex situation of coalition government. Clearly, agency risks can be expected to be as central to coalition cabinets as they are in a single-party government, but theoretically and empirically, their analysis is beyond the scope of this article.

Our work speaks to two central literatures in comparative politics. To the comparative literature on cabinet formation we contribute the first investigation of agency risks in presidential cabinet formation. So far the literature has ignored the potential costs to presidents of including parties in the cabinet. Yet, an account of cabinet formation that excludes a theory of the conditions under which presidents can fruitfully delegate authority over policy to copartisan ministers is clearly incomplete. By integrating the analysis of agency loss into a coherent conception of cabinet formation in presidential democracies, our work represents a completely new endeavor.

We also contribute new insights to the classic debate about the effects of presidentialism on the quality of democracy. As noted above, critics of presidentialism have long argued that the ability of presidents to exclude political parties from the cabinet at will weakens representation, obscures accountability, and can increase executive–legislative conflict (e.g., Linz, 1994; Valenzuela, 1994). Recent work has challenged this view, pointing out that presidents invite parties into cabinet, form coalitions, and seek to build governments with majority support in the legislature more frequently than the critics of presidentialism would anticipate (e.g., Cheibub, 2007). Our findings complement this newer literature and show that presidents who limit cabinet links with the assembly do so not at will, but under very specific conditions—namely, when the electoral and party systems amplify the risk of agency loss from naming party-affiliated ministers.

In the next two sections of the article we develop our argument about cabinet partisanship and derive a series of expectations about the conditions under which presidents manage agency risks by appointing nonparty ministers. The third section probes these expectations using original data from 12 Latin American countries and a total of 103 cabinets, including 44 single-party

governments. Because single-party governments are not a random sample of the full population of presidential cabinets, we adopt a two-stage empirical approach. In the first stage, we model the president's choice of the cabinet's majority and coalition status and then take account of the selection effect in our second stage models of cabinet partisanship. The concluding section spells out the implications of our findings.

## **Agency Loss and Party Representation in Presidential Cabinets**

There is by now broad agreement that presidents employ cabinet choices, including efforts to build majority cabinets and coalitions, as crucial strategic resources to get their policy agenda enacted (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Martínez-Gallardo, 2011; Amorim Neto, 2006; Raile, Pereira, & Power, 2011). Cabinet partisanship is typically viewed in the same way: Presidents' choices to recruit party-affiliated rather than nonpartisan ministers are thought to depend on their incentives to build legislative majorities and to govern through statutes rather than decrees. As Amorim Neto argues:

If the president opts for a statutory strategy, then a majority cabinet will be appointed. To build such a cabinet, the president will need to draft partisans to the ministries in order to solidify legislative support. Conversely, should the president decide to govern by executive prerogative, then a minority cabinet will more likely be appointed, which indicates that the chief executive is not interested in solid legislative support, thus leading to fewer partisans in the cabinet. (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 424)

Although we agree that the majority and coalition status of cabinets is linked to a president's legislative strategy, we disagree that variations in cabinet partisanship can be adequately understood based on this consideration alone. The difference results from our analysis of the risks inherent in naming partisan ministers. Implicit in legislative strategy accounts of cabinet partisanship is the assumption that party-affiliated ministers will always be reliable agents for a president. But as we demonstrate in this article, this is not always the case; partisan ministers can have political incentives that diverge substantially from the president's goals. Although presidents can secure legislative support by conceding cabinet posts to such partisans, they risk appointing poor agents who do not share their aims. We argue that presidents take these agency risks into account when choosing the level of partisanship in their cabinets.

As the literature on parliamentary and semipresidential systems shows, the risk of agency loss is widespread in the relationship between cabinets and their political principals (e.g., Huber & Martínez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridason & Kam, 2008; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010). Ministers occupy a crucial position in the democratic chain of delegation because their principals entrust them with authority to develop government policies, work toward their legislative approval, and secure their implementation. However, as in other instances of delegation, information asymmetries and conflicts between the interests of ministers and their principals can result in agency loss, that is, in outcomes that differ from the principal's preferences (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Lupia, 2003; Strøm, 2000). One key source of agency loss is moral hazard, which occurs when ministers exploit information asymmetries to pursue their own political preferences, taking actions that work against the interest of their principal.<sup>4</sup> This risk is more prevalent when the agents have *aims and incentives* that are not well aligned with the principal's, and when they are difficult to *control* once in office (Strøm, 2000). Thus, regardless of who the principal is—parliamentary backbenchers or a president—the delegation of power to ministers gives rise to the risk of moral hazard that principals will seek to control.

The scope for agency loss through moral hazard is magnified in presidential democracies by the separate electoral origin of the executive and the assembly, which affects the relationship between presidents and governing parties. Even a president's relationship with his or her own party can be powerfully affected. Because they compete in separate elections, "presidential candidates can campaign on and win election for different reasons—or even be elected by a different set of voters—than their legislative parties" (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 38; Romero, 2007). These tensions can split presidential parties internally, confronting the legislative party and the executive with "different and even conflicting incentives in the electoral arena" (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 15). When this is the case, partisan ministers find themselves subject to pressures to pursue the divergent policy aims of two competing principals, the legislative party and the president (Carey, 2007; Samuels & Shugart, 2010), which can lead to significant agency loss. This raises the question of how presidents can ensure that ministers remain faithful agents.

A classic answer to this question in principal-agent theory is that principals will seek to minimize the risk of agency loss by selecting agents with more compatible incentives, who are easier to control once in office (Müller, 2000; Strøm, 2000). The choice of nonpartisans, which we define as ministers who do not represent a party in cabinet, can offer presidents precisely that option. With respect to incentives, most *party-affiliated* ministers see themselves as serving two principals, the president who appointed them and

has the power to dismiss them, and their party in the legislature. The party typically helped these ministers build their political careers and many rely on it for positions when they leave the cabinet.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, in shaping national policy, ministers work with the legislative party to realize both the party's and the president's policy goals (Cox & Morgenstern, 2002).<sup>6</sup> The loyalties of partisan ministers can therefore be divided between their legislative party and the president. By contrast, *nonpartisan* ministers can be selected to have incentives that coincide closely with the president's goals. Indeed, they are often described as cronies or loyalists for exactly this reason (Camerlo & Pérez-Liñán, 2012). These ministers typically engage politically as members of the presidential clique because they tend to come from outside politics, are not beholden to a party, and tend to move on to positions outside the electoral arena after serving in cabinet (Camp, 2010; Centeno, 2010; Centeno & Silva, 1998; Claveria & Verge, 2014; Teichman, 2001).

Moreover, nonpartisan ministers can be easier to control than partisans. As others have noted, the scope for agency loss varies with a principal's ability to sanction or dismiss "troublesome" ministers who take actions that contradict their principal's goals (Huber & Martínez-Gallardo, 2008, p. 171; see also Samuels & Shugart, 2010).<sup>7</sup> Here, too, the choice of nonpartisans can have advantages. Dismissing nonpartisan ministers is less costly than sacking partisan ministers because the cabinet's legislative support in the assembly does not depend on their representation in the cabinet so that replacements do not need to be negotiated with the party (Dowding & Dumont, 2009).

It is important to note that we are not arguing that nonparty ministers will always be better agents for a president. Our argument is simply that under some circumstances—which we specify below—the agency risks for presidents of naming partisan ministers can be large, and in those situations, nonpartisans can be an attractive alternative. For presidents, cabinet choices present a trade-off between the legislative benefits of naming partisan ministers and the potential agency risk of appointing partisan ministers whose loyalties are divided between their principals in the executive and in the legislature. Our concern here is to conceptualize and explain how nonpartisan appointments help presidents to manage this trade-off.

In sum, we expect that presidential cabinet-building strategies will reflect both the need to appoint reliable agents and the need for assembly support. In developing this argument, we focus on the relationship between presidents and their own party, which is central to every presidential government. The next section develops testable hypotheses about the factors that shape the scope of agency risks and their effects on the partisanship of single-party cabinets. We recognize, of course, that there can also be other reasons to recruit nonparty ministers. Most notably, the case-oriented literature has

found that economic crises, in particular soaring inflation, prompt presidents to include nonparty technical ministers in the cabinet (e.g., Dominguez, 1997; Teichman, 2001). We control for this possibility in the empirical analysis below.

## Single-Party Cabinets, Agency Loss, and Cabinet Partisanship

A critical motivation for presidents in appointing copartisan ministers is to “shore up the support of their own party, [to ensure that] they will have the numbers necessary [in the legislature] to implement their programs” (Taylor, Botero, & Crisp, 2008, p. 285). In this sense, partisan ministers provide the link between the legislative and the executive branches in presidential systems. These ministers may have risen through the provincial organization of the presidential party, through elected executive positions, and other party-based career trajectories, but once they serve in the national cabinet, their central relationships are with their legislative party on one hand and the president on the other.

Presidents, we argue, loosen this cabinet link with the legislature and name nonpartisan ministers when the appointment of copartisans generates significant agency risks. The magnitude of these risks depends on presidents’ relationship with their party, including the degree to which their *incentives and aims* diverge and the *control* that presidents have over their party and its ministers. This relationship is shaped by the incentives presidents and their parties face in the electoral arena (Samuels & Shugart, 2010), and the features of the president’s party.

### *Divergent Incentives and Aims*

As national executives, elected in a single national constituency, presidents are judged on the “health of the nation” and have powerful incentives to focus on programmatic questions of national policy (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 51). Given the differentiated nature of legislative representation, however, their legislative parties will not always share this focus. Three main factors—electoral institutions, voter preferences, and the competition strategy chosen by the president’s party—powerfully affect the level of incentive divergence between presidents and their parties (Carey, 2007; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). These factors shape how likely partisan ministers are to pursue objectives that differ from the president’s.

The rules that structure the electoral process have been shown to condition the degree to which the incentives and mandates of presidents and their

parties are compatible (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Compatibility is reduced by the “non-concurrence of presidential and congressional elections; incongruence of the congressional majority’s constituency with that of the president, . . . [and] staggering of elections, such that there is not full renewal of legislative seats at each election” (Haggard, McCubbins, & Shugart, 2001, p. 321). These electoral institutions separate the mandates of presidents and their legislative parties and can focus the two branches of the party on the pursuit of distinct and incompatible policy goals (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). For presidents, this gives rise to the risk that ministers who represent the party carry these conflicting policy goals into the cabinet.

The experience of Venezuela’s President Pérez illustrates precisely this problem. Between 1989 and 1991 Pérez sought to implement a program of market-oriented reforms. But unlike the president, Venezuelan legislators “who depend heavily on votes from narrow constituencies, [were] unenthusiastic about reforms” (Corrales, 2000, p. 132). Fearing vote losses, significant parts of Pérez’s legislative party, *Acción Democrática* (AD), opposed his economic program as a “radical about-face from AD’s traditional populist policies” and were determined to block it (Mainwaring, Bejarano, & Pizarro, 2006, p. 59). Pérez responded to the divergence of his party’s electoral incentives and policy goals from his own by appointing a cabinet staffed mainly by non-AD “political friends . . . and highly trained, non-partisan market-oriented social scientists” (Corrales, 2002, p. 121). Our first expectation, then, is that

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** Divergent mandates raise the share of nonparty ministers in cabinet.

The second factor that shapes incentive compatibility between presidents and their party is the extent to which voter behavior is predominantly structured by ideological cleavages (Mainwaring et al., 2006). In Latin America, the degree to which national ideological divides shape the vote varies tremendously (Coppedge, 1998; Haggard et al., 2001; Jones, 2005; Kitschelt, Hawkins, Luna, Rosas, & Zechmeister, 2010); regional, ethnic, or religious concerns may be as, or more, salient than ideology (Jones, 2010). Given the differentiated and often subnational nature of legislative representation, legislative parties are unlikely to share the focus of the president on questions of national policy unless voter behavior is predominantly structured by ideological cleavages concerning questions of national policy. In contexts where voting is mainly structured by ideology, presidential and legislative mandates should therefore be more compatible, in principle, which reduces the agency risks for presidents in relying on ministers drawn from their own party. This leads to our second hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2 (H2):** Ideologically structured voting reduces the share of nonpartisans in cabinet.

A third factor that shapes incentive compatibility is the centrality of clientelism to the competition strategy of the president's party. Historical patterns of contestation over social welfare and distributive policies have engendered variations in the reliance of different parties on clientelistic linkage strategies. Parties choose these different strategies based on their specific voter constituencies, resources, and organizational strengths (Kitschelt et al., 2010). When presidential parties adopt linkage strategies that privilege the provision of material benefits, their ministers are more likely to be exposed to contradictory pressures to prioritize the aims of particular client networks on one hand and the national policy aims of the president on the other. For presidents, these cross-pressures cause agency problems.

The cabinet choices of Mexico's president Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 illustrate this point. When Zedillo steered economically to the right in a bid to attract international investment and promote Mexican exports, a major rift emerged between him and an important sector of his party who saw the president as part of a group of "technocrats [who] concerned themselves more with economic policy than with clientelism," which had been the dominant strategy of political competition for years (Eisenstadt, 2003, p. 29). In response to opposition from his own party, Zedillo set out to build a "governing team composed of loyalists rather than have secretaries of state imposed upon him by the [party's] old guard" (Starr, 1999, p. 42). Our expectation, then, is that presidents with more clientelistic parties face greater agency risks so that

**Hypothesis 3 (H3):** More clientelistic parties raise the share of nonpartisans in cabinet.

In sum, when divergent incentives in the electoral arena drive a wedge between presidents and their legislative parties, partisan ministers will feel pressure to pursue the competing interests of their principals in the executive and the legislature. When this divergence is significant, nonpartisan ministers can be better and more reliable agents for a president precisely because they lack links with traditional party constituencies and patronage pools (Centeno & Maxfield, 1992).<sup>8</sup>

### *Controlling Copartisan Ministers*

The capacity of principals to control agents once they are appointed is the second aspect of delegation relationships that shapes the risk of agency loss

(Indridason & Kam, 2008; Müller, 2000). The magnitude of these risks is conditioned by the resources available to presidents to compel their party, including cabinet ministers, to act in the president's interest, which derive from the central role that presidents typically have in their party's leadership. In most presidential systems, presidents are formal or de facto leaders of their party whose control of—and influence over—their party benefits from the resources available to the party leadership to reward loyalty and punish dissent (Carey, 2003; Zucco, 2009). Such resources include the president's power to affect access to electoral office through control of the party label, ballot access, and ballot rank (Carey, 2003). The capacity to exert control stems in part from incentives in the electoral arena and in part from features of the president's party itself (Carey, 2007).

Electoral systems strongly affect the incentives for the legislative party to defer to its national leadership. Systems that make legislative careers dependent on endorsement by the leadership (rather than voters) enhance the resources of leaders to control their party (Carey & Shugart, 1995; see also Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, Jones, & Taylor-Robinson, 2004; Hallerberg & Marier, 2004; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Wallack, Gaviria, & Panizza, 2003). When presidents benefit from these resources as leaders of their party, they will typically have better control over it, which limits the risk of agency loss from naming copartisan ministers. Our fourth hypothesis is therefore that

**Hypothesis 4 (H4):** Incentives to defer to the party leadership reduce the share of nonpartisans in cabinet.

In addition, the degree to which presidents can control copartisan ministers also derives from their influence on the opportunities of ministers to move on to careers in the wider party (Jones, 2005; Sáez & Freidenberg, 2001). This capacity is shaped by the structure of the party itself, specifically the degree to which decision making is concentrated in the national leadership rather than devolved to regional party actors. Centralized control over decisions that shape careers, such as who can run for public office locally, gives presidents additional means to control copartisan ministers. Our final hypothesis is therefore that

**Hypothesis 5 (H5):** The share of nonparty ministers in cabinet falls with party centralization.

In short, when presidents have extensive powers to control their copartisans, the risk of agency loss from including them in the cabinet declines. Once agency drift is discovered, the most effective response available to

presidents is to dismiss the minister concerned (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). But for presidents who have little control over their parties, such changes tend to engender costly, more general renegotiations of the cabinet bargain. In those circumstances, presidents can be expected to limit the prospect of agency loss by naming nonpartisans who do not represent the party in cabinet and depend for their survival in office solely on their relationship with the president. In the section that follows we probe our expectations empirically.

## Modeling Cabinet Partisanship: Data and Method

A major challenge in testing arguments about presidential cabinet formation strategies has been the difficulty of assembling data on the composition and partisanship of ministers in a wide cross-section of presidential countries. In Latin America, cabinet composition is often poorly documented; in many countries the party affiliation of ministers is not reported in any single national source, but has to be researched for each individual separately. As the result of a multiyear research project, we built an original data set on the composition of 103 cabinets (44 single-party and 59 coalition governments) in 12 Latin American countries. We collected information on the partisanship of ministers from news reports (Lexis Nexis and Keesing's Record of World Events), websites, as well as personal interviews and biographies. The countries included in the data set are Argentina (1983-2011), Bolivia (1983-2009), Brazil (1990-2010), Chile (1990-2010), Colombia (1982-2010), Costa Rica (1982-2010),<sup>9</sup> Ecuador (1984-2009), Mexico (1994-2012), Paraguay (1992-2008), Peru (1985-1992, 2001-2011), Uruguay (1985-2010), and Venezuela (1984-2008).<sup>10</sup> Cabinet partisanship is recorded at the time of government appointment and we count a new cabinet each time (a) a government takes office after a presidential election or (b) more than half of the positions in a cabinet change hands. Consistent with the definition outlined above, ministers who lack party affiliation and do not serve on behalf of a party in cabinet are recorded as nonparty.

Estimating how the relationship between presidents and their parties affects cabinet partisanship in single-party governments is not trivial. This is because presidents do not select single-party minority or majority cabinets at random but do so when they anticipate benefits from working with their own party in terms of policy development, enactment, and implementation, compared with working with a coalition of parties. As others have argued, presidents make these choices in light of their (unobserved) legislative strategy and coalition preferences (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Amorim Neto, 2006). We therefore adopt a two-stage empirical approach. In the first stage, we draw on a priori information about the assembly, presidential attributes, and the policy environment to estimate the effect of unobserved legislative and

coalition preferences on the choice of cabinet type: single-party majority, single-party minority, coalition majority, or coalition minority. We then correct for the selection effect by including the Stage 1 probability that a single-party (minority or majority) cabinet is selected in our second stage models of cabinet partisanship.<sup>11</sup>

### *Stage 1: The Choice of a Cabinet's Coalition and Majority Status*

As Amorim Neto (2006) has argued, a president's choice of legislative strategy can be expected to impact the cabinet's majority status. The motivation for presidents to build majority cabinets is well understood—their legislative success rate (66.36%) significantly outstrips that of cabinets with minority support (59.83%; Cheibub, 2007). However, when majority support can only be reached through coalition formation and policy compromise, presidents will weigh that option against proceeding with a single-party minority cabinet. Work on the coalition and majority status of presidential cabinets suggests that three types of factors shape how presidents balance this trade-off: the features of the assembly, the president's own attributes, and the policy context (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Cheibub, 2007; Amorim Neto, 2006).

Turning first to the assembly's features, presidents whose party holds a majority of seats in the legislature are known to form single-party majority cabinets more frequently (Cheibub, 2007; Amorim Neto, 2006). We operationalize this variable as an indicator for *presidential majority* (1, otherwise 0; more detailed information about the variables and data sources is given in the appendix). The ideological *distance* between the president's party and other parties can also be expected to affect a president's willingness to form a coalition; as this distance grows, presidents should be more likely to rely on their party alone. Our measure of ideological distance is a scale ranging from 1 to 5, which builds on Coppedge's (1997) ideological placements of parties.<sup>12</sup> Finally, assemblies that are more effective in legislating and oversight are expected to give presidents incentives to build governments with majority support even if that requires forming coalitions (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011). We employ Saiegh's (2010) 7-point survey measure of *legislative effectiveness* on which higher values indicate greater effectiveness.

Regarding the president's attributes, contradictory expectations attach to strong *decree powers* that enable a president to change the legislative status quo. On one hand, decree powers are thought to undermine incentives to build majority governments (Amorim Neto, 2006), on the other, they have been found to enable presidents to take the legislative risks of working with coalitions (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011). We remain agnostic about these

competing expectations and account for either possibility by including in the analysis a variable that records presidential decree powers (strong = 1, restricted = .5, none = 0, see appendix for details). Because both extreme ideological preferences and a fresh mandate are thought to reduce a president's willingness to form coalitions and majorities, we include indicators for *extreme* preferences based on Coppedge (1997) and for whether a cabinet was formed immediately after a presidential election (*newly elected*).

Finally we control for *inflation* because challenging policy environments, such as periods of high inflation, are expected to create pressures for presidents to prioritize speedy action and choose a legislative strategy that relies on decrees, raising the probability that they will form a minority single-party cabinet (Amorim Neto, 2006).

Our dependent variable in the first stage of the analysis is a president's choice between four cabinet types—single-party majority, single-party minority, coalition majority, and coalition minority. We define *single-party* governments as composed only of members of the president's party. Such cabinets may also include nonparty ministers and members of other parties who serve in the cabinet *without* the support of their party. *Coalitions* are in place when one or more parties other than the president's support ministers in the cabinet. To model these outcomes, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on country.<sup>13</sup> The data for this part of the analysis include all of the 103 cabinets formed in the 12 countries in the data set, including 44 single-party and 59 coalition governments.

The results are presented in Table 1 and largely confirm the expectation that factors that condition a president's legislative strategy have an impact on their cabinet choices. Compared with the baseline category of coalition majority cabinets, the probability that presidents form single-party majority cabinets is powerfully raised when the president's party controls a majority of the assembly's seats; more effective legislatures significantly reduce a president's reliance on minority and single-party cabinets compared with majority coalitions. Presidents with strong decree powers appear to be more willing to take the legislative risks of working with coalitions. In contrast, presidents with a fresh mandate feel less compelled to build governments with majority and coalition support as do presidents who govern at times of high inflation. Other variables have no statistically significant effects. The model performs well overall, correctly predicting nearly 70% of the cases.

The Stage 1 results now enable us to examine the effects of agency loss on cabinet partisanship given the president's legislative strategy and choice of cabinet type. Because single-party cabinets are not chosen at random, but when a president anticipates benefits from working with his or her party

**Table 1.** Stage 1: Determinants of Government Status (Multinomial Logistic Regression).

	SP majority	SP minority	Minority coalition
<b>Assembly features</b>			
Presidential majority	24.72*** (3.892)	-23.05*** (1.587)	-23.83*** (1.756)
Distance	1.944 (1.436)	-0.146 (0.294)	-0.166 (0.305)
Legislative effectiveness	-4.341** (2.037)	-2.063*** (0.529)	-2.197** (1.093)
<b>Presidential attributes</b>			
Decree powers	-6.219* (3.663)	0.154 (1.178)	2.471* (1.426)
Extreme president	-3.926 (3.789)	-1.986 (1.255)	0.492 (0.719)
Newly elected	-0.833 (0.610)	1.281*** (0.488)	0.488 (0.608)
<b>Policy environment</b>			
Inflation	-0.012 (0.011)	0.013** (0.006)	0.013 (0.011)
Constant	-14.82*** (4.332)	3.262** (1.619)	2.952 (1.886)
Observations	103		

Baseline category: Majority coalition. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. SP = single-party.

\* $p < .1$ . \*\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

alone, we correct for the impact of the selection process by including terms for the selection of single-party minority and majority cabinets in the analysis of cabinet partisanship below.

## Stage 2: Cabinet Partisanship and the Risk of Agency Loss

Do presidents appoint nonparty ministers to hedge against the agency risks that arise from naming copartisans who do not share the president's incentives and aims or are difficult to control? How far do these agency risks shape cabinet partisanship beyond the effect of the president's legislative strategy and the majority status of their cabinets? In this section, we address these questions focusing on the 44 single-party governments formed in 9 countries in our data set.

Table 2 gives an overview of our dependent variable—cabinet partisanship—using two alternative measures, the average count and the proportion of nonparty ministers in cabinet. The average count varies from a low of .44 nonparty ministers (a proportion of .04) per government in Argentina to nearly 13 ministers (a proportion of .8) in Ecuador.

*Explanatory variables.*<sup>14</sup> Our Hypotheses 1 to 3 suggest that three variables shape the divergence of incentives between the president and his or her party:

**Table 2.** Cabinet Partisanship: Average Number and Proportion of Nonpartisan Ministers.

Country	Single-party cabinets	
	Number	Proportion
Argentina	0.44 (1.01)	.04 (.08)
Paraguay	0.67 (1.15)	.07 (.12)
Costa Rica	2.57 (4.16)	.13 (.20)
Venezuela	4.50 (4.95)	.20 (.21)
Colombia	4.80 (4.09)	.34 (.28)
Mexico	6.00 (4.36)	.29 (.21)
Peru	6.83 (4.22)	.43 (.28)
Bolivia	11.17 (5.08)	.62 (.33)
Ecuador	12.75 (2.22)	.80 (.19)
Uruguay	No single-party cabinets	
Chile	No single-party cabinets	
Brazil	No single-party cabinets	
All countries	4.96 (5.13)	.30 (.32)

Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

divergent mandates, the degree of ideological voting, and the extent to which the president's party relies on clientelistic linkage strategies.

To construct a measure of *divergent mandates*—or the degree to which presidents and their party are supported by, and responsive to, different electoral mandates—we build on the intuition of Samuels and Shugart (2010) who use the “average difference across all constituencies between a party's executive and legislative vote in each constituency” (p. 130).<sup>15</sup> As constituency-level returns are not available for all the countries in our data, we estimate the difference between the national-level vote share of presidents and their party in the nearest legislative election, weighted by the temporal distance between these elections (the measure ranges from 0 to 2.66). As the temporal and vote share difference between elections increases, the mandates of presidents and their parties are more likely to diverge. We expect that greater mandate divergence enhances the agency risks from appointing copartisans and thus the probability that presidents will name nonpartisan ministers (H1).

We test the expectation that ideologically structured voting behavior helps align the electoral incentives of presidents and their parties and curbs agency risks (H2), by drawing on a measure developed by Mainwaring et al. (2006). The measure (which ranges from 1 to 1.72) estimates how well voters'

ideological positions predict their choice among the three largest political parties in any given country using Latinobarometro surveys. More *ideological voting* can be expected to align the electoral incentives of presidents and their parties more closely, which should reduce the risk of agency loss and the president's reliance on nonparty ministers.

To examine whether the adoption of clientelistic competition strategies by the president's party increases a president's resort to nonparty ministers (H3) by detracting from the party's focus on national policy we draw on expert survey data assembled by Kitschelt and Freeze (2011). The question we use asks how far a party mobilizes voters by promising them material benefits and answers range from "not at all" (1) to "to a great degree" (4) (*clientelism*).

Our last two hypotheses concern the effects on cabinet partisanship of the electoral and organizational resources that presidents have to control their parties, including copartisan ministers. Hypothesis 4 suggests that presidents whose leadership of their party benefits from electoral rules that enhance their control over their legislative party face reduced agency risks from appointing copartisan ministers (H4). To probe this expectation, we draw on Carey and Shugart (1995) and score four features of the electoral system—ballot control, vote pooling, types of votes, and district magnitude (DM)—that shape the relative value of party (rather than personal) reputation to politicians in advancing their careers.<sup>16</sup> We use Hallerberg and Marier's (2004) approach to aggregate these electoral system features into a single index, which we then reverse, so that higher values indicate greater incentives to defer to the national party leadership (*party-centered incentives*).<sup>17</sup> The index ranges from  $-.80$  to  $-.04$  and we expect higher values to reduce a president's reliance on nonpartisans.

Finally, we anticipate that presidents will be less likely to name nonparty ministers when the structure of their party concentrates control over careers at the national level so that presidents have greater influence over the career options of copartisans after they have served in cabinet. To measure party *centralization* we use another expert survey question from Kitschelt and Freeze (2011), which asks whether the selection of candidates for public office in the party is dominated by national party leaders (1), local actors (3), or is the result of shared-control and/or negotiations among both types of party actors (2). Our expectation is that presidents are less likely to rely on nonpartisans when they have stronger control over their party.

*Control variables.* We control for two variables that are likely to have an impact on ministerial selection: an indicator for cabinets formed immediately after the presidential election and inflation. First, the timing of cabinet formation can be expected to affect cabinet partisanship because governments

appointed immediately after a president's election—when the talent-pool of their party is still plentiful—may be more party based than those made later on in the presidential term, when successive reshuffles have exhausted the party's pool of potential ministers (Dewan & Myatt, 2010). We therefore include a dichotomous indicator that records whether a cabinet was appointed immediately after a president's election (*newly elected*). Second, it has been argued that economic crises cause presidents to place increased value on the technical expertise of their ministers, which may lead to the appointment of a greater number of nonpartisans to the cabinet. To account for this possibility we control for *inflation* using the quarterly change in the consumer price index, which varies from 0% to 124.5%. All count models also include a control for *cabinet size*.

**Model choice.** To measure cabinet partisanship we use the count of nonparty ministers in the cabinet. As there is evidence of overdispersion in the counts, we employ a negative binomial regression approach (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). We estimate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors to account for the possibility that the error terms may be correlated across cabinets in the same country. Alternative ways to model unobserved country-level heterogeneity are presented in the section on robustness checks below. To adjust for the fact that single-party (minority and majority) cabinets are not selected at random but reflect a president's legislative strategy and coalition preferences, we include the estimated probability that a single-party minority or majority cabinet is selected, obtained from the Stage 1 regression (*probability single-party minority*, *probability single-party majority*).<sup>18</sup> Finally, two of our variables (*clientelism* and *centralization*) are based on expert survey data that present missing data challenges because they do not include information on four presidential parties: AD in Venezuela, *Cambio90* in Peru, and *Democracia Popular* (DP) and *Alianza País* (PAIS) in Ecuador. We use two strategies to address missingness: substituting the country average and estimating the missing values by multiple imputation (Models 1 and 2 in Table 3).<sup>19</sup>

**Findings.** Table 3 presents the results of the analysis, which suggest that the risk of agency loss powerfully influences presidential decisions about cabinet partisanship.<sup>20</sup> The results are very similar, whether we address missingness using country averages (Model 1) or multiple imputation (Model 2). Mandate divergence (H1) and the adoption of clientelistic competition strategies by the president's party (H3) significantly raise the number of nonparty ministers that presidents name to the cabinet, whereas more ideologically structured voting (H2), more party centralization (H5), and greater incentives of the party to defer to its national leadership (H4) reduce the reliance on nonpartisans as we anticipated.


**Table 3.** Stage 2: Cabinet Partisanship in Single-Party Cabinets (Negative Binomial Regression).

	Number of nonparty ministers	
	(1)	(2)
	Country averages	Multiple imputation
H1 divergent mandates	0.372*** (0.114)	0.489*** (0.132)
H2 ideological voting	-3.116*** (0.525)	-3.486*** (0.448)
H3 clientelism	0.886** (0.434)	1.217*** (0.300)
H4 party-centered incentives	-1.397*** (0.446)	-1.220*** (0.350)
H5 centralization	-0.940*** (0.330)	-1.115*** (0.159)
Newly elected	-0.677** (0.302)	-0.785** (0.372)
Inflation	0.013*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)
Cabinet size	0.152*** (0.047)	0.173*** (0.046)
Stage 1: Probability (SP minority)	1.859*** (0.550)	1.903*** (0.309)
Stage 1: Probability (SP majority)	0.311 (0.317)	0.299 (0.266)
Constant	1.022 (1.528)	0.657 (1.446)
Ln(alpha)	-4.050 (8.109)	-4.961 (7.454)
Observations (Countries)	44 (9)	44 (9)

Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. H = hypothesis; SP = single-party.

\* $p < .1$ . \*\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

The effects are sizable and substantively meaningful as Figure 1 illustrates. Holding all other variables constant at their means (and *newly elected* at its mode, 1), Model 1 predicts that an increase in mandate divergence from its observed minimum value to its maximum value leads on average to the inclusion of 5.2 additional nonparty ministers (34% of the average single-party cabinet's size). Thus, presidents appear significantly more likely to favor nonpartisan appointments when the electoral process generates divergent substantive mandates for themselves and their parties (H1). Ideologically structured voting (H2) has even more powerful effects on cabinet partisanship: Increasing ideological voting from its minimum to its maximum value aligns the incentives of presidents and their parties and reduces the average number of portfolios controlled by nonpartisans by fully 9.1 ministers (more than 59% of the average cabinet size). Take Peruvian president Fujimori, for instance, who won office in 1990 as a "self-professed political outsider" and named a cabinet dominated by nonparty ministers (M. Cameron, 1997, p. 38). Changing the measure of ideological voting from the observed value



**Figure 1.** Predicted number of nonparty ministers in the cabinet (given a change in variables from their minimum to the mean and maximum values).

for Peru (the minimum score of 1) to the sample maximum (1.72), our model predicts that Fujimori would have appointed only 1.6 nonparty ministers instead of the 12 that he in fact appointed.

Similarly, a change in the level of clientelism employed by the president's party from the observed minimum to its maximum value powerfully increases the agency risks for presidents in recruiting partisan ministers into cabinet and raises the average number of nonparty ministers by 6 (39% of the average cabinet size).

Turning to our expectation that the agency costs of naming partisan ministers decrease when presidents have more resources to control copartisans once in office, we find that incentives for a legislative party to defer to its national leadership (H4) are a significant determinant of the president's appointment strategy. Going from a context in which incentives to defer to the national party leadership are at their minimum to one in which they are at their maximum translates into a decrease of three nonparty appointments (19% of the average cabinet's size). Finally, we also find evidence that when control over careers in the president's party is concentrated at the national—rather than local—level, presidents are less likely to name nonparty ministers (H5). An increase from the minimum level of party centralization to its maximum leads to a reduction in the average number of nonpartisan ministers of 3 (19% of the average cabinet's size).

The control variables have the anticipated effects: Newly elected presidents are more likely to form party-based cabinets, and as other scholars have observed, presidents appear to recruit more technical experts (who are frequently nonpartisans) into the cabinet during periods of high inflation. Finally, the count of nonpartisan ministers rises with the size of the cabinet.

Table 3 also indicates that the number of nonpartisan ministers increases significantly in contexts that raise the predicted probability of selecting a single-party minority cabinet—as we would expect from a legislative strategy perspective (the probability of selecting a single-party majority cabinet is not significant). Crucially, though, our findings demonstrate that the effects of legislative strategy and cabinet type are not sufficient to understand cabinet partisanship, but need to be considered alongside the risk of agency loss. As anticipated, a likelihood ratio test suggests that Model 1 is a significant improvement over a model that excludes measures of agency risks.

In sum, the results indicate that presidents are clearly mindful of the risk of agency loss when shaping the level of partisanship in their cabinets. The selection of nonpartisans to cabinet positions offers presidents a way to limit agency risks when divergence between the aims and incentives of presidents and their party is high, or when the president lacks resources to control his or her party and its ministers once they are in office. Agency risks and the number of nonpartisans in cabinet, our analysis suggests, are powerfully reduced when electoral institutions encourage mandate convergence, when ideologically structured voting aligns the incentives of presidents and their parties in the electoral arena, when clientelism does not detract from the party's focus on supporting its president's national policy goals and when presidents are better able to control copartisans.

## Robustness

Building on Model 1 (Table 3), we probe the robustness of our analysis in several ways and report the results in Table 4. First, in column 1 we employ a different specification of the dependent variable and substitute the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet for the count. All the results are confirmed with one exception: Although the coefficient for party-centered incentives has the anticipated sign, it falls just short of conventional levels of statistical significance ( $p = .12$ ). Second, we choose an alternative way of addressing unobserved country-level heteroscedasticity and estimate Model 1 (Table 3) as a multilevel Poisson regression with random, country-level intercepts (column 2). Third, we adjust our sample in two different ways. In the third column, we change the definition of single-party government. Above (in Table 3), we consider single-party cabinets to be in place when

**Table 4. Robustness Tests.**

	Dependent Variable: Proportion nonpartisan <sup>a</sup>	Multilevel random intercept Poisson <sup>b</sup>	Alternate definition of SP government	Only core portfolios	Electoral democracy	Excluding outsider presidents <sup>c</sup>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
H1 Divergent mandates	0.856*** (0.270)	0.553*** (0.133)	0.436** (0.179)	0.424*** (0.131)	0.501*** (0.156)	0.561*** (0.113)
H2 Ideological voting	-6.020*** (0.612)	-3.471*** (0.536)	-3.686*** (0.325)	-3.318*** (0.482)	-3.570*** (0.454)	-3.563*** (0.403)
H3 Clientelism	1.345*** (0.264)	1.348*** (0.347)	1.164*** (0.361)	1.004*** (0.313)	1.312*** (0.347)	1.579*** (0.389)
H4 Party-centered incentives	-1.619 (1.030)	-1.319*** (0.444)	-1.173*** (0.357)	-1.550*** (0.379)	-1.260*** (0.361)	-0.952** (0.415)
H5 Centralization	-1.106* (0.583)	-0.942** (0.446)	-1.107*** (0.141)	-0.886*** (0.225)	-1.172*** (0.199)	-1.137*** (0.120)
Newly elected	-0.975*** (0.310)	-0.555*** (0.206)	-0.755* (0.440)	-0.617 (0.428)	-0.779** (0.368)	-1.434*** (0.445)
Cabinet size		0.187*** (0.037)	0.176*** (0.050)	0.230*** (0.072)	0.184*** (0.054)	0.227*** (0.042)
Inflation	0.021*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.004)
Stage 1: Probability (SP minority)	4.179*** (0.618)	2.113*** (0.526)	1.982*** (0.317)	1.396*** (0.444)	1.946*** (0.492)	2.027*** (0.539)
Stage 1: Probability (SP majority)	0.841* (0.447)	0.770 (1.083)	0.275 (0.318)	0.238 (0.340)	0.404 (0.360)	0.470 (0.388)
Electoral democracy					-0.380* (0.199)	
Constant	2.756* (1.665)	-0.539 (1.534)	1.017 (1.923)	-0.303 (1.599)	0.352 (1.421)	-1.075 (1.831)
SD (random intercepts)		0.000 (0.072)				
Observations (Countries)	44 (9)	44 (9)	40 (9)	43 (9)	44 (9)	38 (9)

Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Country averages used for missing cases on Clientelism and Centralization. These results are based on appropriately adjusted first-stage regressions predicting the choice of single-party government. SP = single-party.

a. General linear model with a binomial distribution and logistic link function.

b. Poisson regression with random, country-level intercepts.

c. Presidents who were not popularly elected and/or had weak party ties were coded as outsiders.

\* $p < .1$ . \*\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

only members of the president's party are represented in the cabinet and when a member of a party different from the president's is appointed to a cabinet position *without* the support of his or her party. In column 3 we reestimate Model 1 on the 40 single-party governments in which *no* member of a party other than the president's party holds a position in the cabinet. In the fourth column, we focus on a different set of portfolios, restricting the analysis to the core group of cabinet posts that are central to the work of a government at all times and are therefore continuously filled. In column 5 we include an additional control to identify the poorer quality electoral democracies in our sample, with scores of 4 or 5 on the Polity index, which might differ from democracies in ways that affect patterns of cabinet recruitment (Ecuador 2007, Mexico 1994, Peru 2000, and Venezuela 2006). As Table 4 shows, our results are robust across all of these alternative specifications of the model.

A last potential cause for concern is that unobserved factors may affect both the strength of partisanship in the electorate and the probability that a president will appoint nonparty minister, which would question the causal relationship between agency risks and cabinet partisanship. This is a particular concern in those cases in which we observe "outsider" presidents who may be more likely to appoint nonpartisans and are also more likely to be elected in countries with weak party systems.<sup>21</sup> In column 6 we show that our results are robust to the exclusion of "outsiders," defined as presidents who were not elected by popular vote and/or had weak party ties.<sup>22</sup> In the longer run, of course, it is likely that parameters such as electoral cleavages, social heterogeneity, and education condition the strength of parties, the scope for agency risks, and the partisanship of presidential cabinets. However, these parameters evolve as the product of secular, long-term processes (Huber, Kernell, & Leoni, 2005). In the time frame that is relevant for cabinet formation and ministerial choice in any particular presidential administration, they can reasonably be treated as exogenous and mediated by the party features that we measure.

## Conclusions and Implications

The findings presented in this article suggest that agency risks are fundamental to a better and more accurate explanation of cabinet partisanship in presidential democracies. Party-affiliated ministers can have preferences that diverge significantly from the president's and because ministers have extensive influence on the development and implementation of policy, presidents are acutely attuned to this problem. Applying a principal-agent approach, we examine how a president's relationship with his or her own party affects the magnitude of these agency risks. We find that presidents are more likely to limit the risk of agency loss by appointing nonpartisan ministers when they

have poor institutional resources to control their party and when their incentives and aims diverge from their party's—because their mandates diverge, voting is not sufficiently ideologically structured to align their incentives, or because clientelism detracts from the party's focus on supporting the president's national policy goals.

These results have implications for two central areas of comparative politics. First, our work contributes to the comparative literature on government formation. Although we agree with the view that legislative considerations shape presidents' choices, we show here that this approach to government formation is incomplete. Instead, we offer a view of a president's cabinet choices as two-dimensional: shaped not only by presidents' search for legislative support but also by presidents' need to manage the risk of agency loss inherent in delegating significant authority over policy to cabinet ministers. Our work is the first to recognize the importance of agency problems in the relationship between presidents and cabinet ministers in presidential democracies, and to estimate the influence of these problems on cabinet partisanship.

More work, though, remains to be done. We focus on the relationship between presidents and their own party, which is central to every presidential government. However, we leave for the future the extension of our arguments to capture the complexities of coalition governments—such as the aggregation of agency problems across different parties in the coalition and the effect of the relative bargaining power of coalition partners on the impact that agency risks have on cabinet partisanship.

Second, our findings cast doubt on a central criticism of presidential democracy in the comparative literature. The traditional view of presidentialism argues that the tendency of presidents to exclude parties from the cabinet at will decreases the pool of experienced politicians in government, undermines the representativeness of policy, and weakens accountability (e.g., Linz, 1994). However, as more recent work has shown, presidents invite parties into cabinet much more frequently than the classical perspective suggests and reap benefits from doing so, particularly in terms of the success of enacting legislation (Cheibub, 2007). Our findings complement this work and show that presidents who limit cabinet links with the assembly do not typically do so at will, but under very specific conditions—namely, when the risk of agency loss from naming party-affiliated ministers is high. Although more work remains to be done to clarify how nonparty appointments affect policy, representation, and accountability, these insights open the door to a better informed debate about the causes of nonparty appointments in presidential cabinets and contribute to an ongoing effort by comparativists to better understand how presidential motivations shape cabinet composition, representation, and accountability in presidential democracies.

## Appendix

### Variable Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
Stage I: Cabinet status	Records single-party majority, single-party minority, coalition minority, coalition majority cabinet. A single-party cabinet is defined as including only members of the president's party or members of a party different than the president's but who take the position without the support of their party. Cabinets are majority if the legislative seat share of all parties in government is > 50%.	Coded by authors. Sources: Observatorio-electoral.org, Political Database of the Americas, Encyclopedia Electoral Latino-americana y del Caribe (Dieter Nohlen, Coord.), country electoral commissions.
Presidential majority	= 1 if the president's party controls > 50% of the seats in the lower/ only house of the legislature, otherwise 0.	Coded by authors. Sources: See <i>Cabinet status</i> .
Extreme president	= 1 if the president's party's ideology is coded as 5 (right), or 1 (left), otherwise 0.	Coding based on ideological placements from Coppedge (1997). The ideology of parties that were created after 1997, that changed their ideological placement after that date, or that were not coded by Coppedge were determined by the authors based on party programs, secondary literature, and communications with country experts.
Ideological distance	Mean distance between the ideology of the president's party (measured on a 1-5 scale) and the ideology of parties in the opposition (measured on a 1-5 scale and weighted by each party's share of legislative seats).	Sources: See <i>Extreme president</i> .
Decree powers	We use the following scores: Argentina after 1994 and Brazil receive a 1; Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are coded as .5; the rest of the country-years are coded as 0.	Coded by authors from different sources: Amorim Neto (2006); Carey and Shugart (1998); Negretto (2013).
Legislative effectiveness	Based on a World Economic Forum survey asking business executives "How effective is your national parliament as a lawmaking and oversight institution?" Scale varies from 1 ( <i>very ineffective</i> ) to 7 ( <i>very effective</i> ).	Saiegh (2010).

(continued)

## Appendix (continued)

Variable	Description	Source
Newly elected	=1 if the cabinet was formed after a presidential election, otherwise 0.	Coded by authors from <a href="http://idea.int">idea.int</a> , <a href="http://electionguide.org">electionguide.org</a> . Dates of ministerial appointment: See <i>Cabinet partisanship</i> .
Inflation	Percentage change in the quarterly consumer price index.	World Development Indicators: <a href="http://databank.worldbank.org/">http://databank.worldbank.org/</a>
Stage 2: Number of nonpartisan ministers in cabinet	Partisanship was coded on the basis of individual appointments. Nonpartisan =1 if there is no evidence that the individual appointed to the cabinet was affiliated to a political party, otherwise 0.	Coded by authors. Sources: Lexis Nexis, Keesing's Record of World Events, ministers' websites, personal communications, news.
Divergent mandates	Difference between the vote share obtained by the president and his or her party in the nearest legislative election, weighted by the temporal distance between the elections.	Calculated by authors. Source: See <i>Cabinet status</i> .
Ideological voting	Extent to which ideologically structured voter positions predict their party choice. Based on a multinomial regression analysis using Latinobarómetro data.	Source: Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro (2006, p. 26).
Clientelism	Based on expert survey question, "Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the capacity of the party to deliver targeted material benefits to its electoral supporters." Answer categories: (1) Not at all, (2) To a small extent, (3) To a moderate extent, and (4) To a great extent.	Sources: "Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competition and Economic Governance," see Kitschelt and Freeze (2011) and <a href="https://web.duke.edu/democracy/">https://web.duke.edu/democracy/</a>
Party-centered incentives	Records incentives for legislators to prioritize party interests based on four features of the electoral system: ballot control, vote pooling, types of votes, and district magnitude (DM). To create the index we take the log of DM. Then we add ballot, vote, and pool together; for systems with closed list that are not plurality we divide this number by the log of DM, for the rest of the systems we add the log of DM to this number. The resulting index is reversed so that higher values indicate greater incentives to defer to the national party leadership.	Sources: Carey and Shugart (1995), Hallerberg and Marier (2004), Johnson and Wallack (2007), as well as author's own research, based on electoral laws and secondary literature.

(continued)

## Appendix (continued)

Variable	Description	Source
Centralization	Based on expert survey question, "In general terms, the authority to select candidates for public office is always divided between local/district/municipal party actors, party organizations in the states or regions, and national party leaders. Frequently, a particular level of party organization dominates the process, while other times it is the result of negotiations between different levels." Answer categories: (1) National leaders dominate the process, (2) Local leaders dominate process, (3) Control over candidate selection is shared, and (4) Candidate selection results from negotiations between different levels. In the analysis, we collapse answers (3) and (4).	Source: See <i>Clientelism</i> .
Cabinet size	Total number of positions in the cabinet	Martínez-Gallardo (2011)
Robustness tests		
Proportion nonpartisan ministers	Proportion of nonpartisan ministers. See <i>Number of Nonpartisan Ministers in Cabinet</i> for details on how partisanship was coded.	Source: See <i>Number of nonpartisan ministers in Cabinet</i> .
Alternative definition of single-party government	A single-party cabinet is defined as including members of the president's party exclusively.	Source: See <i>Cabinet status</i> .
Electoral democracy	= 1 if a country has a Polity score of 4 or 5 in a given year, 0 otherwise.	Polity IV index downloaded from <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html">http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html</a>
Outsider president	= 1 if a president was not elected through popular vote and/or had weak party ties. Single-party presidents coded as "outsiders" are Fujimori (Peru), Mesa (Bolivia), Noboa (Ecuador), and Palacio (Ecuador).	Coded by authors.

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## Notes

1. Throughout the article we use “nonparty” or “nonpartisan” to refer to ministers who have no formal party affiliation and do not represent a party in the cabinet. Ministers who fall into the latter category may be party members, but serve in cabinet in a personal capacity and are therefore, like nonparty ministers, independent of party control.
2. The average share of nonpartisan ministers varies from a low of 3% in Uruguay to a high of 67% in Ecuador. Averages based on the data used in this article. See below for details.
3. Interview with *La Jornada* on July 6, 2000, <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2000/07/06/yo.html>
4. The principal–agent literature also examines the role of adverse selection (which arises from uncertainty about prospective agent’s skills and goals) as a source of agency risks (Huber & Martínez-Gallardo, 2008; Kam, Bianco, Sened, & Smyth, 2010). We see the efforts of principals to limit agency loss from adverse selection and moral hazard as complementary. For tractability we concentrate on the latter source of agency risks in this article.
5. Ministers who hold positions in a party or an elective post before becoming ministers are likely to “keep active in politics at other elective, appointed or partisan positions” after leaving the cabinet (Claveria & Verge, 2014, p. 3). Blondel (1991a) reports data on the share of ministers who are drawn from the legislature and the share that return to it. These groups are very closely correlated ( $r = .89$ ,  $p = .001$ ; calculated by authors based on Table 1, p. 193).
6. Although the degree of executive integration in the legislative process varies across countries, on average it is high in Latin America where ministers “can often sit in the assembly (practically speaking) . . . and are often appointed with an eye to solidifying assembly support; [and where] ministers and the president wield important powers in setting the assembly’s internal agenda” (Cox & Morgenstern, 2002, p. 464).
7. Presidents can typically appoint and dismiss members of the cabinet unconstrained. Only in rare cases is legislative approval required for select positions.
8. Note, that we do not argue that presidents will cease to appoint any copartisan whose aims and incentives diverge from their own. Clearly presidents will often draft copartisans who represent different party factions into cabinet to build legislative coalitions. We anticipate that presidents weigh such appointments in

light of their legislative strategy and model this choice process explicitly below. However, once the differences in aims and incentives become large, the agency problems that arise from such appointments can outweigh the legislative gains. In those situations, we expect presidents to name nonpartisan ministers.

9. We exclude other Central American countries due to poor data availability.
10. We exclude periods of autocratic rule in which political competition was suppressed and constraints on executive authority absent. Included are cases with a Polity score of 4 or above in a given year, which allows us to capture periods of liberal democracy as well as higher quality episodes of electoral democracy. The only exception to this rule is Peru under Alberto Fujimori after his election in 2000 and before his impeachment that same year (Polity score 5), which we exclude given the broad consensus about the authoritarian nature of this regime.
11. Traditional Heckman selection models cannot be applied in this context because they cannot accommodate the combination of an outcome variable with multiple categories (cabinet type) at Stage 1 with a proportion or count model at Stage 2 (proportion/number of nonpartisan ministers).
12. The ideology of parties that were created after 1997, that changed their ideological placement after that date, or that were not coded in Coppedge (1997) was determined by the authors based on party programs, secondary literature, and personal communications with country experts.
13. We ran the same analysis using a country-level random intercepts model in conjunction with a random intercept Stage 2 model and obtain near identical results at Stage 2 (see Table 4).
14. More detailed information on variable definitions and sources is included in the appendix.
15. We are aware of only two measures of presidents' policy preferences that are independent of the positions of their parties; however, neither covers the time period and range of countries we require (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009).
16. An alternative approach would be to gauge party discipline via the voting behavior of a party's legislators; however, legislative voting data are not available for all the countries in our data set.
17. We rely on Carey and Shugart (1995), Hallerberg and Marier (2004), and Johnson and Wallack (2007), as well as our own research, to code electoral institutions for every country-year. See details of how we calculated the index in the appendix.
18. We control for both probabilities because they result from the choice between four alternatives so that one is not simply the inverse of the other. The literature (e.g., Cheibub, 2007) suggests that these outcomes respond to very different political processes. Our first-stage results confirm this.
19. We use the `mi impute` and `mi estimate` commands in Stata 12.
20. As the results are highly consistent, our discussion in the following paragraphs is based on Model 1 unless otherwise noted.
21. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment.
22. The following single-party presidents are defined as "outsiders": Fujimori (Peru), Mesa (Bolivia), Noboa (Ecuador), and Palacio (Ecuador).

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