Political consequences of socio-territorial conflicts. Conceptualizing changing paths of citizenship and democratic governance in the Andean Region of Latin America

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INTRODUCTION

Social conflict impinges on political systems and their dynamics in different ways. It has been studied by the theory of social movements, but only recently has it received more attention from researchers, previously more focused on its origins and dynamics. This chapter analyses socio-territorial conflicts — a type of conflict that is on the rise in countries in the Andean Region of Latin America. We suggest that socio-territorial conflicts have generated a different type of political outcome that has enabled citizen sectors formerly excluded from political expression to become increasingly visible. Until now, political outcomes have been considered to derive mainly from urban conflicts and have not normally been associated with socio-territorial conflicts. In turn, political expression had been the exclusive province of political parties and national organizations. However, things have changed in the new scenario of democratic governance, loss of State power and capacity, and neoliberal internationalization of the Latin American economies. The frontiers of “extractivism” in the Andean Region have expanded; socio territorial conflicts have spread all over the region; and the nature of the relation between social actors, politics, and the State is changing. In ways that are different from the past, local affairs now have political consequences, expanding the frontiers of citizenship and incorporating new social actors.

The relation between the crisis of the political and economic models and citizenship has acquired specific features in Latin America. In Europe, the adjustment policies applied to counter the economic crisis of 2009 resulted in the further dismantling of the Welfare State. In turn, this called into question European integration and the “globalizing consensus”, which had been hegemonic concepts in European politics in recent decades. In Latin America we must start from a different assumption, given the frequency of (economic) crises in this part of the world. The exhaustion of the developmentalist State economic model prompted deep neoliberal reforms that increased foreign dependence and transformed the political and social panorama. Although the Andean countries were able to outgrow military rule, the emerging democracies did not have the full capacity to install an effective regime of citizen participation, and thus lost legitimacy and support (Pinto and Flisfisch 2011). This was the triggering context for the emergence of different non-traditional actors that have modified their relationship with politics as they seek to conquer citizenship spaces and rights. How can we
interpret the political impact of these new forms of collective action? Do they have the actual ability to promote reforms and facilitate the inclusion of hitherto excluded sectors in new political deals?

This chapter analyses some of the political consequences of the socio-territorial conflicts, in relation to institutional changes and the implementation of public policies. It also focuses on the emergence of new political actors in the very same conflict territories. Its aim is to conceptualize this kind of phenomenon to improve our understanding of the current relationship between crisis and citizenship. It presents empirical evidence from four countries in the region (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Peru) and a general overview, to be dealt with in greater depth in future articles. The hypothesis of the chapter is that there have been important changes in the historical patterns of politicization prevailing in the region. They involve new political actors as well as new forms of political influence and new conflict venues (non-urban, peripheral); they keep their distance from political parties and formal organizations and have adopted diverse and heterogeneous processes of organization and mobilization (networks of articulation that do not constitute social movements and have different orientations in their midst). New ways of citizenship have emerged (as is the case of indigenous people, for example). Often invisible as these changes are, it is urgent to investigate them to improve our understanding of politics in a globalized world.

The chapter reflects on the way in which citizenship has evolved in the context of the crisis, with the specific characteristics of this in a part of Latin America. The crisis in its various dimensions creates large challenges to the way in which citizenship can be exercised. It involves new forms of relationship between political or social dimensions. Our approach is a comparative one, and intends to include a regional dimension -four countries- in the debate of the evolution of crises and changes in citizenship.

The chapter starts with a reflection on the historical and conceptual debate on social movements and politics in Latin America, seeking to show the particular nature and novelty of socio-territorial conflicts. The second section explores these conflicts in connection with the debate on “extractivism” and its intensification in the region, and identifies different approaches. This is followed by the conceptualization of the political consequences of these conflicts, a discussion on the methodological problems involved in their research, and finally some conclusions.
THE DEBATE ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

In the region, socio-economic changes and action by the State have prompted profound changes in the dynamics of collective action and its link to political changes. The dynamics of collective action and its connection with political changes have undergone numerous profound transformations in keeping with socio-economic changes and action by the State in the region. After the intense mobilizations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, several countries of the region experienced authoritarian regression and periods of violent repression. In Chile, in its early days, the military dictatorship imposed a new economic model characterized by an open economy, market deregulation, and the expansion of direct foreign investment in natural resources (French-Davis 2014). But in most of the other countries in the region economic transformation, to a greater or lesser extent, was to arrive via economic adjustment, the privatization of public companies, and the imposition of economic rules by international organizations. These changes were to have a significant effect on the exercise of citizenship and collective action (Pinto and Flisfisch 2011).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During the national-developmentalism stage, which started in the late 1920s in Latin America, the state expanded because of the imports-substitution economic model and the development of the national industry. Populist leaders encouraged the political mobilization of large hitherto excluded social sectors, especially, trade union movements. An actual welfare state was never established and productive development and social equity varied from country to country. It was during this period that the processes that called for the inclusion of formerly excluded social groups took place. Collier and Collier (2002, 17), analysed eight countries and classified these mobilizations into four types: by the State, by the electoral mobilization of traditional parties, labour populism, and radical populism.

During the 1960s and early 1970s there were different processes of political radicalization, which were interrupted by military coups (in Brazil and the Southern Cone), civil wars and violent armed conflicts (Central America, Colombia). Social movements became weaker, as did the national-populist movements that provided access to politics.
In the 1980s the neoliberal model implemented in Chile, profusely recommended by international organizations and systematized by the so-called Washington Consensus, began to spread through the region. The 1980s were also a decade of impoverishment of the population and scant economic growth (the “lost decade”) due to this structural adjustment. The democratic transition and the decline of authoritarian rule coincided with the implementation of this new model of state action and prevalence of direct foreign investment in natural resources. It is worth noting that the new wave of political democracy was not accompanied by more inclusion and that the traditional pattern of inequality in the region remained unchanged.

By the end of the 20th century and the early 21st, the socio-economic and political evolution of the region gave rise to various national processes. A first group of countries (Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Chile) continued opening their economies based on neoliberal underpinnings, and implemented some compensatory social programmes. By contrast, a second group of countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) began a process of anti-neoliberal political re-foundation. Yet a third group underwent a somewhat milder and varied “left turn” process (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador) that has already come to an end. This period overlapped with a commodities boom, during which the price of raw materials increased, and the Latin American economies turned to exporting natural resources, exploited by foreign companies, mainly in the mining, oil, and power sectors.

The global crisis of 2009 did not hit Latin America quite as hard as other regions. In general, “in the South, the 2009 economic decline was not too steep, and recovery was more rapid. Growth projections by 2017 more than double those for the North” (ECLAC 2012, 6). The subsequent slowdown of the Chinese economy toned down the optimistic forecasts for 2012 because of its impact

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1. The cases are different: old dictatorial and authoritarian political systems were modified (Paraguay, Mexico), but in general there is no returning to the usual military coups of the past, although authoritarianism increased in Peru, during the Fujimori administration, and in Paraguay and Guatemala. Many countries experienced the dismantling of the traditional political system, leading to periods of great instability (Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina). Colombia kept its traditional political system, but the state lost control over a large part of the territory due to confrontations with several guerrilla groups, which continued well into the 21st century.

2. Chile can also be classified within this third group because since 1990, it has been governed mostly by a centre-left coalition that tries to strengthen social reforms, alternating with right-wing governments that try to undo them (Barómetro de Política y Equidad 2017).
on the prices of commodities, particularly, oil and copper, while food prices continued to increase. But even so, this had a milder effect on employment compared to other regions such as southern Europe. Also, growth recovered much faster than in the United States and some European countries.

Thus, Latin America’s longstanding dependence, which has weakened its development prospects, underwent a transformation in the last ten or fifteen years, which provided its countries with more resources to finance social policies and reduce poverty. However, these countries gradually lost control and sovereignty over non-renewable natural resources as the extractive frontier expanded. Common goods such as water, and biodiversity and the environment in general were affected. All of this triggered new social conflicts, arising not from institutional struggles between political projects or from the great national-popular movements, but from the new sectors that were affected by these changes. These shifts in the struggle to expand citizenship require a conceptual effort of understanding, since they are part of global change trends.

THE STUDY OF CONFLICTS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES

The weakening of the great social movements of the past, particularly trade union and peasant movements, has given rise to other forms of collective action and the “territorialization” or “localization” of social conflicts (Pleyers 2011b, 26). Therefore, it is important how these new dynamics are conceptualized. The unilateral emphasis on the disarticulation of national movements and the diversity of local spaces led some authors to see in this dynamic mainly the effect of neoliberal policies, the atomization of society, and the ineffectiveness of collective action (Gómez 2010). Others rather simply consider these events as nimby conflicts (Báez 2013, 101). The lack of fit of empirical dynamics with previous theoretical models originating in structuralist Marxism or in the

3 In 2016, ECLAC itself was forced to admit that since 2011 there had been a marked drop in international prices of raw materials (agricultural produce, metals, and oil), which had particularly affected South America, an exporter of this type of commodity. On the contrary, Central America had not been affected given that it is a net importer. There has been a slow expansion of global commerce and increased international financial uncertainty since the United Kingdom voted in favour of the Brexit option to withdraw from the European Union.

4 Bolivia is a particular case, as the State has regained control over mining and hydrocarbon exploitation. This has produced a significant increase in social spending, which, however, also operates to the detriment of common goods affected by this type of production.
formalism of analytic sociology prevents the easy definition of the new trends in collective action.

We suggest that these dynamics can also be analyzed from the viewpoint of collective action and social movements theories (Tarrow 2011). This approach distinguishes between structure and actor, awarding relative autonomy to action, without considering it a mere effect of structural dynamics. As Chantal Mouffe put it, these are “decentered and detotalized” actors, originating in multiple individual standpoints not necessarily related, but which nevertheless, open the “possibility that this multiplicity may turn out to be the breeding place for antagonisms and thus become politicized” (Mouffe 1994, 86). According to such an approach, it is possible and necessary to determine the characteristics of these “localized” movements.

Thus, in the first place, the local dynamics of mobilizations respond to transformations in the economy and in the countries of the region. The reorientation of social policies from labour to local issues, the decentralization processes and the pluralization of actors, which involve non-governmental organizations, the outsourcing of services, the targeting of social programmes to specific groups, and other issues, play important roles (Pleyers 2011b; Delamaza 2014).

In the second place, it has to do with not only the pluralization of motives that originate social movement. This pluralization gave place to human rights, ecologist, feminist, and “new social movements” (Jelin 2003). This extension of the classic canons of sociology, such as Alain Touraine’s and Alberto Melucci’s, refers to the retraction of the state, and the greater political value that citizens assign to aspects of daily life, shared cultural experience, and other conflictive cleavages—all of which are further away from the previous mobilizing tradition or are simply invisible in the prevailing accounts and interpretations. However, the emergence and spread of what we call socio-territorial conflicts also confirm the politicization potential of collective action, given the particularity and fragmentation of the territories.

Thus, we do not look at socio-environmental territorial conflicts from a postmaterialist perspective that considers new sensitivities and concerns—new subjectivities—unrelated to the classic referents of the world of work and survival (Castells 2006). In the Latin American context, conflicts do not primarily originate in response to these subjectivities, but to actual pressures on the territory resources, which limit or destroy the economies and life quality of the local communities—the so-called “environmentalism of the poor” (Martínez Allier 2010; Folchi 2001). They are also classified as “cultural conflicts, arising
from problems derived from the use of natural resources and the deterioration in quality of the environment produced by specific actions by public, private, or both kinds of institutions” (Calderón 2012, 23). This conceptualization, however, places socio-environmental territorial conflicts in the same category as citizen security conflicts, and politico-ideological and human rights disputes (Calderón 2012). Such diversity forces cultural conflicts into a residual category and prevents them from being considered among the “big ones”, that is, social reproduction and institutional efficacy and efficiency conflicts.

Social movements theorists address an ample set of motivations, framings, repertoires, and steps into the political sphere. For the last ten years or so, attention has focused on “alterglobalizing” movements (Pleysers 2011a; Della Porta 2015), which go beyond national borders, disseminate via non-traditional means, and engage in confrontation with the global power centres. In addition, there are conflicts and mobilizations that have a local origin. These correspond to a different type of organization and mobilization and have different consequences in the political field.

The above setup has generated enthusiastic reactions, which see in the emerging social movements and the new sorts of territorial governance a way to overcome the many existing limitations. For this reason these movements have been regarded as open, flexible, pluralistic, and diversified networks (Abramovay 2006). However, in this assessment there is less empirical evidence than normative approaches to democratic territorial governance (Gomà and Blanco 2002; Cruz 2008). Above all, the underlying fact is that these movements confirm the loss of legitimacy and representational capability of the traditional institutions of the democratic system (Subirats 2006; Della Porta and Diani 2004). Empirical evidence in Latin America appears to indicate that these mobilizations not only respond to pressures on the territory and represent new forms of collective action, but also to the inability of the institutional systems to meet current demands for participation in decision-making about issues that affect them and the general orientation of society (Varas 2006).

**APPROACHES TO SOCIO-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE EXTRACTIVIST BOOM**

Most of the studies of socio-territorial conflicts are in one way or another related to the boom period of ore extraction as the pillar of economic growth.
in the region. This phenomenon has been termed “extractivism” because it includes several productive sectors. Maristella Svampa speaks of the “commodities consensus” to refer to its scale and scope. She says that this development style is “sustained by the international prices of raw materials and the continually increasing demand for consumer goods in central and emerging economies” (Svampa 2013, 31). This development style “generates comparative advantages—visible in economic growth—at the same time that it produces new asymmetries and social, economico-environmental and politico-cultural conflicts” (Svampa 2013, 31). In turn, José de Echave, says that, at least in the case of mining, the expansion of the exploitation frontier precedes the boom in prices and will probably outlive it. This is explained by the technological changes in the industry, which cut production costs but do not always reduce the environmental externalities (De Echave 2009). The political institutions and administrative regulations underwent adaptation to favour of this expansion (Bebbington and Bury 2013).

In turn, the notion of “neoextractivism” (Gudynas 2009; Humphreys and Bebbington 2012), shows that the intensification of the pressure on the territories is not exclusive to the neoliberal economy and its spinoffs. Rather, it is a development style that has become generalized in the countries of the region and has received a boost from left-wing governments. This includes governments such as Bolivia’s, which promotes an ideology of respect for nature rooted in the indigenous tradition and might thus have adopted a different approach. In practice, the difference is that these governments have adopted policies for the public control of natural resources and have increased the State’s share of the benefits of their exploitation. These resources continue to be the main source of income for the country and thus, their exploitation keeps expanding. In Ecuador, it led to direct confrontation between the Rafael Correa Administration and the indigenous movement that had supported him in his accession to power. In Bolivia, it led to straightforward criticism of neoextractivism by the Vice-President of the country, the sociologist Alvaro García Liñera (García Liñera 2013, 97 and ff.). From the viewpoint of our analysis, this begs the question of politization forms, as they are not structured according to the classic options of Latin American politics.

5 “Thus, the central debate for the revolutionary transformation of society is not whether we are extractivists or not, but to what extent are we outgrowing capitalism—either in its extractive or non-extractive variant—as a mode of production” (García Liñera 2013, 103).
However, exploring socio-territorial conflicts in the light of the intensification of extractivism—relevant as it may be—does not fully account for the diversity of conflicts for various reasons. In the first place, not all the situations in which there is an extractive intensification lead to conflict. Neither do conflicts develop in the same way nor do they have the same consequences. In the case of conflicts related to disputes over natural resources, some of them represent upfront opposition to the introduction of mining or extractive activities. On the contrary, others relate to the negotiation of the conditions established by the extractive industries, and yet others to disputes over the income that these industries generate (particularly, when there is a fee or royalty favouring specific territories) (Monge et al. 2008, 127). We might say that the intensification of extractivism provides a backdrop for action, but that it is by looking into the social and political dynamics, as well as the technological, geographic, and economico-productive conditions, that we may come to understand the dynamics and consequences of conflicts.

Humphreys and Bebbington (2012, 33) draw attention to the diversity of motivations and objectives that underlie movements and conflicts. This does not solve the problem either, because movements may not initially have a clearly defined position. It is generally throughout the development of the mobilization itself, its specific dynamics, and the actors involved that different degrees of confrontation will be adopted in each conflict. For this reason, we prefer to speak of “conflict” rather than “movement”, since the result of the action depends on the conflict dynamics.

Another conflict dimension that has been gaining relevance in the territory has to do with public policy management (response to demands for provision and quality of services) and criticism of the institutional organization of the State (demands for autonomy and participation). Here the role of the State is crucial, since “the State is a central player in the power and conflict games but has a limited capacity to manage and sort them out” (Calderón 2012, 15). Despite the local nature of conflicts, the local problems that originated them, and their distance from the central authority, conflicts are managed by the State and, in this sense, many of them become politicized. Some of

6 There are also large differences depending on the type of technology used, degree of concatenation with other industries in the territory, size of the works, and productive sector involved. Even within one specific sector, there are differences: gold mining, for example, generates the greatest negative externalities of all mining exploitations.
them are conflicts demanding greater decision-taking autonomy through political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. Even in Chile, where the State’s institutional capacity is greater, the excessive privatization of services and insufficient decentralization weaken its capacity for action. This gives rise to demands for a modification of the rules of the distribution of power and decision-taking game. At times, conflicts originating in the provision of services converge with socio-environmental ones; at others, on the contrary, the dynamics co-exist without necessarily overlapping. Our hypothesis in this respect is that these conflicts become politicized because the existing institutional structures do not permit the local actors involved to discuss and negotiate terms on an equal footing with non-local actors, or simply, because there are no conflict management regulations.

Another way of classifying conflicts is by their conceptualization approach. There are conflicts that originate in disputes over the revenue produced by the activities carried out in the territory, especially when that revenue originates in the extractive industry. These conflicts involve a problem of distribution and do not necessarily question the type of exploitation or its modalities, but the unequal share of the spoils of the local groups. This line of analysis, in addition to the idea of “the curse of natural resources” accounts for many of the conflicts but does not explain all of them (Paredes and Delgado, forthcoming). A second approach emphasizes the concept of “environmental justice” (Boelens, Cremers, and Zwarteveen 2011), in cases in which pressure from the extractive industry —especially mining and hydrocarbons— damages access to ecosystemic resources and services (air, water, crops) that are relevant for the territory and its inhabitants. This produces serious injustice in the distribution of costs and benefits. A third approach addresses conflicts as part of the defence of threatened alternative development styles and ways of life, or of the right to self-determination of use of the territory (Paredes and Delgado forthcoming). This type of conflict motivation and framing is usual in indigenous communities but is not exclusive to them.

In our opinion, these approaches are helpful, but none of them account for the whole of socio-territorial conflictivity, given its great diversity and the fact that there is no unique pattern. There is still not enough empirical evidence to characterize all these conflicts in a suitable way. Besides, it is perfectly possible that one same conflict may involve the co-existence of dimensions of disputes over revenue, over inequality in the distribution of environmental costs, as well as disputes over longer-projection “development projects” for the
territories. In addition, claims for autonomy and participation appear to cut across socio-territorial conflicts.

This diversity, which must be studied further, also indicates that these phenomena are different from NIMBYs, which are also local conflicts. The defense of the immediate environment of the groups affected and the preservation from contamination of local resources are relevant aspects for significant population groups. Claims for the right to participate in the taking of decisions are not the exclusivity of NIMBY conflicts, because there is an evident democratic element in them. The same goes for conflicts that transcend more ample disputes over the orientations of public policy or development style, which show a clear politization component (Pleyers 2011b, 33-34). We shall suggest an operational scheme to deal with this issue.

Summing up, socio-territorial conflicts have not normally been associated with political consequences or with ways to expand citizenship. However, things have changed in the new scenario of democratic governance, with the loss of power by the State and the neoliberal internationalization of Latin American economies. The frontiers of extractivism have expanded, socio-territorial conflicts have increased, and the nature of the relationship between social actors, politics, and the State has changed. Some of the local conflicts have installed issues in the public debate, which governments had normally ignored because they might encumber their commitment to extraction-based economic growth. Other conflicts have applied pressure to modify relevant public policies. Ultimately, the citizens themselves have constructed new forms of political articulation and expression from these conflicts, which until now, had just been local and specific. In a context of lack of coherent political response and scope, these movements are pressing to extend citizenship to groups hitherto excluded.

STUDY OF POLITICAL OUTCOMES

What have been the political outcomes of these conflicts that, apparently, had little chance of transcending into the public arena? We suggest that these conflicts have had significant impacts on the different dimensions of the political world and institutions. Thus, their outcomes appear to be a good starting point to approach the exploration of the relationship between social and political issues. We have characterized impacts as cumulative
and combined. That is, a specific conflict is not always intended to generate a relevant political change, although this may happen at times. In general, the impact of conflicts depends on how they add up and dovetail with one another and on how they act in a combined way. On the one hand, effects may depend on contextual political factors, which justifies the comparative approach between different contexts. On the other, “grassroots” consequences directly produced by the actors of the conflicts of the territories may combine with extra-territorial factors and generate multiple relationships between the different transformation spheres and levels.

OUTCOME SPHERES

The literature on the outcomes of collective action is not very extensive, despite some recent additions. Most of it originates in studies on social movements and refers to political consequences (external outcomes), consequences on the movements themselves (internal outcomes), and consequences related to the activists of the movements and their track records (biographical outcomes) (Amenta 2014; Giugni, Bosi and Uba 2013). Among the strictly political outcomes, the literature refers to those that have had a direct influence on certain public policies and others that point more specifically to the interests of the mobilized groups (Amenta 2014).

It is possible to apply these categories to socio-territorial conflicts, provided that we bear in mind that they are not quite as structured as the social movements. In fact, in general, they have a very low level of institutionalization. Also, these conflicts do not exclusively involve the civil society and the citizens: it is usual to find local authorities and other “institutional activists” in these territorial coalitions (Von Bülow et al., 2017). Thus, the differences between “external” or “internal” outcomes are somewhat blurred. Lastly, the study of political outcomes has so far focused on the regulatory and legal changes at national level. In the case of socio-territorial conflicts, the political consequences in the selfsame territory where they take place— not usual in other types of social movements— are of equal interest.

SOCIO-TERITORIAL CONFLICTS: BETWEEN PROTEST AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Conceptually, a socio-territorial conflict, as the object of analysis, is a combination of protest event and social movement. Although it is theoretically
possible that socio-territorial conflicts may become social movements, apparently their territorial fragmentation and the local character of their struggles would suggest partially different constitution modes. Socio-territorial conflicts have different organization patterns, with different modalities of “coalitions of agents” (Diani 2015, 11). At least in Chile and Peru there is no evidence that local conflicts evolve into national forms of coordination or organization. In the case of Peru, Paredes (2015) points out that these conflicts may become “glocalized”, that is, they raise combined global/local interest but do not constitute conflicts at national level. Another recent analysis suggests that this is strongly influenced by the changing political context in Peru (Panfichi and Coronel 2011). In Chile, there has been no structuring of significant national organizations or coherent strategies for conflictive action. Paredes and Delgado (forthcoming) point out that the particular characteristic of a socio-territorial conflict is the defence of a territory, not as a jurisdictional enclave, but for the protection of a space that contains specific “ways of life”. The conceptualization of socio-territorial conflicts has been of use to describe contentious processes characterized by a heightened awareness of the place and claims related to regional or territorial diversity. In addition, it has been used to describe conflicts from a constructivist or “framing” approach, in which geographical discourses, narrations, and maps are reconstructed as strategico-political representations. In many cases they represent forms of grassroots citizenship because of their claims for the right to territorial self-determination (Dietz 2017).

In our study of this emerging phenomenon, we have conceptualized conflicts in their dual condition of “local” and “political”. In other words, we are interested in processes triggered by a local event, which may transcend the original motivation but do not abandon it, as they simultaneously link up with other dynamics and other actors. In our view, three copulative conditions must obtain to consider a conflict as local, whereas the political dimension may depend on alternative factors, as has been conceptualized in the case of Chile (Delamaza, Maillet and Martínez 2017). According to this formulation, a conflict is local when it arises from problems that affect the inhabitants of the territory directly; it includes contentious actions that take place in the territory itself or that are carried out by actors from the territory. In addition, their claims involve specific territories or issues that impinge directly on the territory. This can involve specific issues such as the environmental monitoring of a mine or perks such as the distribution of corporate profits.
Politicization is produced by the involvement of other actors, who are not among those that originally promoted and generated the conflict, or when claims are not only addressed to those directly responsible for the original problem but also to the State (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Also, politicization is expressed in the framing of a conflict by its own actors, that is, when public policy orientations become the subject of debate, as has happened with decentralization, the environment, foreign investment regulations, rights over territory resources, etc. Obviously, some conflicts do not develop beyond the private sphere, but many others take an interesting turn into the political arena. Politicization is prompted by the duration and evolution of the conflicts and the diversity of actors involved in, or arising from them, whose scope exceeds that of those directly involved at the beginning. These new actors resort to their own repertoires of organized action to elicit public attention and political responses.

A conflict is much more than mere protest. Protest is a specific contentious component of conflict, which usually also involves negotiations, discussions, legal actions, political alliances, etc. It is an element of the repertoire: not all conflict is protest and protest on its own does not constitute conflict. This is important from an empirical point of view because the available information on protests is more itemized and has been used as the basis for the analysis of conflicts in Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia (Arce 2015; Quiroga 2014; Somma and Bargsted 2015). Information on conflicts, understood as a complex set of different actions, is frequently found in case studies, which are not always representative of all conflicts. Case studies tend to have a bias toward cases of greater public connotation or issues that are politically relevant for governments or international cooperation agencies. Heterogeneous and asymmetrical groups of actors participate in territorial conflicts due either to their motivation or to their social conformation. The mobilization of actors and the conformation of coalitions is the result of arduous processes of negotiation, competition, and the search for hegemony.

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7 The term **framing** refers to the network of interpretative frameworks and political justifications that are essential as effective forms of communication with the agents inside and outside the mobilization process.

8 In the case of Chile, we can mention the conflict over polymetal waste in Arica, which resulted in changes in the national standard for lead (Arriagada 2012). In Perú, after the Tambobrande conflict, community referenda to decide the fate of large investment projects throughout Latin America (Arce 2015; De Echave et al., 2009) became far more common. In these and other cases, the conflict dynamics is very different from that of NIMBY conflicts.
(Melucci 1999). Indigenous and non-indigenous actors take part in a significant percentage of conflicts, in some cases in exclusive organizations and, in others in wider multi-ethnic coalitions (Rice 2012). However, as observed in Chile, coalitions in which there is indigenous participation acquire configurations that are different from those without, which points to new profiles in the civil society (Bidegain 2016).

The hypothesis of this chapter is that there have been important changes in the historical patterns of politicization prevailing in the region. They involve new political actors as well as new forms of political influence in new places (non-urban, peripheral) mostly some distance away from political parties or formal organizations, which operate through diverse and heterogeneous processes of organization and mobilization (networks of articulation that do not constitute social movements and may have different orientations). As is the case of indigenous people, new forms of citizenship have emerged.

**HOW ARE POLITICAL OUTCOMES PRODUCED?**

**THE SPHERE OF OUTCOMES, ACCUMULATION, AND COMBINATION**

Conflict analysis should go beyond such notions as “success versus failure” or “strengths and weaknesses”. This has inspired some relatively recent academic literature under the umbrella term of “political outcomes of social movements”, although there are fewer studies than those exploring the reasons for the emergence, dynamics, actors, framing, and action repertories of social movements (Amenta 2014; Amenta et al. 2010; Bosi, Giugni and Uba 2016; Kolb 2005; Silva 2015). Some of the categories defined in these works are also applicable to socio-territorial conflicts.

In the first place, conflicts can have direct, indirect, or mixed outcomes and impacts (Giugni 2004). This implies the study of mediation agencies and operations as a crucial aspect of the process leading to the materialization of political outcomes. In addition, not all outcomes are positive or negative. In fact, they can be progressive, in extending politics into new sectors by incorporating them or in increasing the weight of the participation of the actors mobilized in the territory. However, there can also be a regressive effect if the impact runs contrary to the claims, as happens with repression. Conflicts can also have no effect if there are no noticeable changes.

The spheres of outcomes may vary since they may take place in the territory itself —new actors, changes in regulations or in the local institutional
framework, new political dynamics, etc.— or they may take place on a larger scale at country level —national or sectoral policies, changes in the law and regulations, etc. It is also relevant to consider the time scale of outcomes, which may be immediate, short-term, or long-term. Lastly, outcomes have been conceptualized according to how they are influenced by the actors’ strategies and competencies as well as according to political opportunities (political process theory). It seems reasonable to include both dimensions in a combined effects model, in which the outcomes of collective action combine with elements of the context.

Although rare, political change arising from territorial conflicts can reach the sphere of national politics. In these cases, there is a complex connection. In Bolivia, for instance, different territorial mobilizations —such as the “water war” in Cochabamba— combined with the “gas war” (Perreault 2006). Although both involved natural or subsoil resources, their dynamics were very different, as was their impact at national level. Both took place during the rise and electoral victory of Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Subsequently, during the Morales administrations, the links and political control of the MAS over the social movements influenced their dynamics, obstructing their emergence and consolidation. In Colombia it is also possible to see links between the government’s decision to expand the mining sector, the emergence of local protests, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court to preserve some rights of the local communities to decide over their territories (González 2017).

Outcomes have a greater impact on the sectoral sphere of public policies, on both distributive and procedural participation aspects, as happened with the ratification and implementation of ILO Convention 169 and the right of indigenous people to prior consultation in their territories. Chile has also undergone significant changes in energy policy in both aspects. The former focus on mega-projects has been replaced by projects that favour renewable energies and smaller-scale projects. In addition, there is now a stronger and more inclusive participation policy (Maillet 2017).

It is difficult to attribute political outcomes to one conflict in particular: they should be understood as the “cumulative effect” of many (Silva 2016). This can be seen in the dynamics existing in one same territory, for instance, when hydrographic basins become saturated or diverse conflicts overlap in the same geographic area. There is also a cumulative effect when a given motivation gets repeated in several conflicts, as happens with water resources.
In this case, the motive that cuts across conflicts becomes a political issue because of the accumulation of territorial conflictivity.

Another process that has been observed is the combination of mobilized resources and political opportunities (Tatagiba and Teixeira 2016). The literature provides several useful distinctions to understand cumulative and combined effects, among them, the phases of public policy, the role of networks with participation of institutional agents and/or political actors, and the intervention of the international variable in the decisions. A simple model of combined effects somewhat schematically suggests two hypotheses that influence the impact on public policies, the first one, related to the presence of powerful allies and the other, to the nature of the claims (Giugni 1998, cited by Tatagiba and Teixeira 2016). The larger the number and variety of powerful allies in public opinion or the political system, the greater the chance to exert influence. Also, the smaller the scope or extent of the proposed reforms, the greater the chance to exert influence. Without denying the relevance of these two hypotheses, the current empirical evidence allows expanding and diversifying the field of combined effects.

Conflicts may produce changes in the territories themselves. These changes may affect the structure of social and political agents and their capacity for action, or the local regulations. Last, but not least, other important changes are those due to the framing of a situation in the territories. By this we mean the evolution of the way a movement is understood and the ensuing modification of public opinion in the territories under conflict. This has happened in several conflicts over water (Yacob, Duarte and Boelens 2015), as well as in territories considered not suitable for intervention by productive dynamics, because of their religious, landscape, and eco-diversity value or other aspects considered relevant by the local communities. It has been observed in Chile in some of the cases studied, which have involved the coalition of environmentalists and indigenous groups (Delamaza, Maillet and Martínez 2017). In this regard, our hypothesis is that territorial consequences depend to a large extent on the institutional conditions of the country (degree of decentralization) and on the relative presence of political actors in the territory, that is, the greater the lack of political articulation and the more decentralized the country, the more favourable the environment for changes in the different territories.

Actors are not always able to anticipate outcomes because they do not emerge from ideological platforms or structured political projects, but from very diverse and reciprocally disconnected territories. For this reason, it is
crucial to observe the diversity of consequences and try to link them with the characteristics of the conflicts. Post-conflict dynamics can be quite different from what the actors initially expected, either within the territory or in other territories that become “contaminated” and “learn” from previous experiences. The feedback between the conflict dynamics generates different scenarios, which depend on the institutional response, the dynamics of coalitions, etc. This underscores the importance of studying the evolution of conflicts to identify possible patterns in them.

WHERE CAN WE OBSERVE CUMULATIVE AND COMBINED POLITICAL OUTCOMES?

From what we have said so far, it is possible to derive a research strategy suitable for conceptualization from two main entry points. One is the study of local conflicts, to observe their outcomes in different spheres and at different levels. The other is to start from observable outcomes in representative politics, the organized civil society, sectoral public policy, and entrepreneurship strategies and explore their possible relationship with socio-territorial conflicts in the light of cumulative and combined effects. Table 13.1 establishes the different analysis levels and spheres of the study.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS ENVISAGED

The methodological design of the strategy described above encounters three difficulties inherent to this type of research: attributability of outcomes; comparability between national and subnational cases; and the multidimensional nature of the object of research, which also results in great internal variability. Only by safeguarding methodological rigour will it be possible to draw conclusions about an increase in participatory citizenship from the local social dynamics of these types of conflicts and their outcomes.

In connection with attributability of political changes, how far is it possible to assert that a given reform, or a political change, has been the result of one or more conflicts? It is difficult to determine causality and for this reason the research strategy should focus on finding out significant connections, and

9 We have not included the international level because it is not the main object of analysis. This level should be considered in case studies in which the dynamics operate at “glocal” level (Paredes 2015).
attempt to isolate recurring elements in different situations. Complexity increases at the national level, given the difference in scale between socio-territorial conflicts and the policies and institutions concerned. Therefore, rather than attributing single causality to a conflict, our option is to determine the specific role that one or more conflicts may have on certain political decisions (their “cumulative effect”), as well as their connection with elements of political opportunity (their “combined effect”). The methodological design must also consider resorting to mixed methods that reinforce the explanations, that is, it should use aggregate quantitative data to establish correlations and compare national cases, as well as case studies, including perception surveys, to identify the main cumulative and combined effects.

A comparative design should include two levels. At the level of country, it should consider the history and economic importance of the extractive industry in the respective country, its recent evolution, and the variation in number of socio-territorial conflicts. However, cases may also differ significantly in the strength of their political institutions and the structure of their party-political system (Cameron and Luna 2010). At subnational level, it is necessary to select territories whose main characteristics are similar, to allow for “systematic

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Maillet (2017) analyses the change in the energy production policy in Chile from this angle.
and contextualized comparisons” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 10). In other words, the design must consider the interaction of the subnational territories with the politico-institutional variables in the countries, as this may account for the differences in the respective spheres of analysis. It is advisable to opt for a multilevel research design (Luna 2014, 14-15) and apply the “subnational comparative method” (Snyder 2001), that is, the qualitative comparison of cases in subnational territories in different countries.

Mixed methods allow for comparison in different spheres and levels: trends and configuration of conflicts (in an aggregate way, but also in specific territories including, for example, perception surveys) and changes in participatory representation policy; creation of institutions; elaboration of local platforms; coalitions of actors; corporate political strategy, etc. Territorial case studies should permit integrating qualitative information with perception surveys and the data on the evolution of electoral results in the territory. The suitable selection of territories will also permit the comparison between subnational territories and between countries.

The multidimensional nature and internal variability of socio-territorial conflicts make it advisable to analyse them by economic sector, or to select the sector with the highest concentration of cases. In addition, the selection of four spheres of outcomes, each of which is analysed at the national and local level, makes it possible to deal with the main dimensions of the conflict in a suitable way, without assuming that they behave in a homogeneous way.

CONCLUSIONS

The expansion of the neoliberal economy and free markets has produced social and political changes in a large part of the world in recent decades. In the case of several Latin American countries this has resulted in important degrees of disarticulation of the social actors combined with very serious political crises, especially in the early years of the 21st century. These processes have been accompanied by the emergence of new social actors and the redefinition of their relations with political institutions. The limited access of many sectors to political participation typical of the developmentalist economic model prevailing in the 20th century is being challenged by the neoliberal transformation.
In this study we have undertaken the conceptual exploration of a particular type of social conflictivity, which has become more frequent in different contexts, namely, socio-territorial conflicts. These conflicts have a local origin but may have national consequences in countries in which the “extractivist” or “neoextractivist” economic model prevails. Do these new social conflicts contribute to a growth in participatory citizenship in the sectors in which they take place? Do they modify the structure of opportunities of the subordinated sectors in dependent societies? Do they generate forms of political participation that differ from those of the past? How do they compare to the social movements and outcomes already dealt with in the literature?

The main conclusion of this chapter is that socio-territorial conflicts are not the same as NIMBY conflicts, which are circumscribed local conflicts that have no impact on the public sphere. Contrary to the belief that such impacts favour only certain corporate interests, socio-territorial conflicts affect the public sphere to varying degrees, including the increase of participatory citizenship. Over and above the examples from the Andean Region that we have mentioned, the conceptualization that we suggest shows the different sectors in which these conflicts have produced political outcomes, which range in size from single territories to larger areas. There is evidence that there are several areas in which the conflict dynamics opens up spaces to new actors, new territories, and new forms of social and political action.

In addition, the examination of possible outcomes draws attention to their diversity and suggests ways in which they can be compared to establish common patterns. In countries of the Andean Region the extractivist foundations of the economy and the crises that this entails provide the contextual backdrop to which these conflicts respond. In this sense the local dynamics are linked to the dynamics of globalization (evolution of the demand for commodities, changes in prices, global institutional deals influencing terms for the Andean countries, etc.). This is particularly valid to explain the origin of conflicts. However, their dynamics and, above all, their outcomes, also depend on the political and institutional variables that are specific to each country, as well as on the accumulation of conflicts and their combination with environmental factors.

Finally, we have suggested some recommendations for the comparative analysis of the immense diversity of conflicts. This conceptual and methodological reflection is crucial to assess conflicts in relation to the political changes being produced. In other words, it is a suggestion for the
specific treatment of this new type of conflict, which a) considers them as longer-term phenomena than protest episodes; b) incorporates the mediation strategies that any political change process entails; c) permits distinguishing between the different types of outcomes, including those that expand participatory citizenship and processes that restrict it or consolidate the status of exclusion; and d) accounts for the feedback existing between a contentious social dynamics and the evolution of institutional framework, in an attempt to respond to it.

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