CHANGING SOCIETIES: LEGACIES AND CHALLENGES
Citizenship in crisis

Marina Costa Lobo
Filipe Carreira da Silva
José Pedro Zúquete
EDITORS

ICS
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Marina Costa Lobo
Filipe Carreir da Silva
José Pedro Zúquete
EDITORS

José Luís Cardoso
António Costa Pinto
Jorge Vala
EDITORIAL BOARD
Instituto de Ciências Sociais
da Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9
1600-189 Lisboa – Portugal
Telef. 21 780 47 00 – Fax 21 794 02 74
www.ics.ulisboa.pt/imprensa
E-mail: imprensa@ics.ul.pt

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In 2016, the Scientific Board of the Institute of Social Sciences (University of Lisbon) decided to prepare a three volume publication in English based on its 2015/2020 Strategic Programme: Changing Societies: Legacies and Challenges. Each volume focuses on one of the programme’s main research areas: Inclusion, Citizenship and Sustainability (I-C-S). The aim was to foreground the science carried out at ICS, make its researchers’ innovative contributions to the advancement of knowledge in social sciences more widely known, and leave a significant mark on the national and international scientific agenda. A further aim was to encourage and foster interdisciplinary collaboration between researchers belonging to different Research Groups - as strongly encouraged a few months earlier by the External Advisory Committee during its visit to the Institute.

Once the rules of the game had been thought out, two calls were made to the Institute’s scientific community. The first, for the selection of interdisciplinary editorial teams for each volume, was based on the presentation of an editorial project. Candidates explained how their project would explore the theme (Inclusion, Citizenship or Sustainability), as well as their conceptual and possible empirical approaches. The second invited proposals for texts for each of the volumes. Their provisional versions would be presented, discussed and commented on publicly at the ICS Conference, in November 2017, in addition to being subject to the usual peer review processes organised by the volume editors.

The response to this challenge went far beyond our expectations. The numbers do not speak for themselves, but
they do give some indication of the ICS community’s remarkable collaborative vitality. They also show the amount of work involved in the initiative: three editorial teams, benefiting from the support of three editorial boards; 21 chapters, 39 authors in the Inclusion Book (vol. I); 13 chapters, 30 authors in the Citizenship Book (vol. II); 14 chapters, 37 authors in the Sustainability Book (vol. III).

However, I would particularly like to emphasise the quality of the editorial lines defined, as well as the texts that have been collected and are now accessible to the reading and scrutiny of a vast international audience. As well as highlighting the virtues of interdisciplinarity in science practice, one of the structuring marks of ICS-ULisboa is that its work is illustrated through different prisms.

On behalf of the ICS-ULisboa Scientific Board, I would like to thank all the authors for their contributions, which invite us into areas of scientific thought and innovation, from issues and concepts to the empirical contexts, through the strategies and methodological instruments used. I also wish to express my gratitude to the editors of the three volumes, for having decided to advance with the original, inspiring proposals for their volumes, as well as for their perseverance and determination over many months of work: Sofia Aboim, Paulo Granjo and Alice Ramos; Marina Costa Lobo, Filipe Carreira da Silva and José Pedro Zúquete; Ana Delicado, Nuno Domingos and Luís de Sousa. My sincere thanks also go to the editorial boards that worked so closely with them: Rui Costa-Lopes, Pedro Magalhães and Ângela Barreto Xavier; José Luís Cardoso, António Costa Pinto and Jorge Vala; João Ferrão, Dulce Freire and Susana Matos Viegas. The Director of the Imprensa de Ciências Sociais (the Social Sciences Press), José Machado Pais, who from the first moment enthusiastically welcomed this publication, disseminated in open access, also deserves our warmest thanks. My final expressions of gratitude are to Carla Araújo, who served as secretary and Marta Castelo Branco, editorial assistant to the project.

Ana Nunes de Almeida
President of the Scientific Board
ICS, University of Lisbon
INTRODUCTION

Marina Costa Lobo
Filipe Carreira da Silva
José Pedro Zúquete
EDITORS
This volume offers an interdisciplinary perspective on citizenship in a time of crisis. Crisis has been a word recurrently used to describe political and social processes in Portugal, Europe and elsewhere, but one that deserves further analysis. Even though it is common for all generations to believe that they are living through critical junctures, at the risk of losing sight of what actually constitutes a crisis situation and how exactly this differs from a period of non-crisis (i.e. decay, recovery, instability, etc.), it does seem safe to apply “crisis” to the 2008 financial situation. With its origins in the USA’s financial system, it quickly spread to other parts of the world, hitting the Eurozone in particular where, especially in smaller peripheral economies, it often led to dramatic economic problems. The duration and severity of the negative economic consequences of the crisis has had a profound impact on the political and social realm. Political consequences include the strengthening of the radical right, as well as populist leaders, the relative decline of centrist parties, in particular the electoral decline of social-democrat/socialist parties, together with an increase in the radical left, especially in Southern Europe. Not only have there been repercussions at the national level, but the EU has been called into question due to difficulties in reaching a consensus on how best to respond to a crisis that has often led to great tensions between governments of debtor nations and creditor nations. Moreover, Brexit means that for the first time a member state will leave the EU, potentially signalling the beginning of the end of the decades-old process of European integration. The crisis, of course, is not only a European phenomenon. As mentioned above, it quickly spread around the world. Despite the apparent protection that relatively insulated banking systems of countries such as Brazil provided in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Latin American countries eventually proved unable to escape the political and economic ripple effects. Some have seen signs of a political backlash against economic globalisation and its dramatic social implications in this, calling the existing global order into question. The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States, in November 2016, only reinforced this association of a global crisis in the financial and economic realms with the questioning of democratic institutions and the meaning and exercise of citizenship itself.

The word “crisis” therefore, conveys a multiplicity of meanings and deserves further attention. As researchers in the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, we want to bring together a number of different disciplinary and epistemological approaches that have been employed in the study of this issue in the last decade or so.
This volume focuses on the causes, characteristics and consequences of the crisis for citizenship. Following T. H. Marshall, we take citizenship to entail three dimensions: civic, political and social. The civic element includes the rights necessary for individual freedom – freedom of the person, right of expression, thought and faith, right to property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The political dimension of citizenship includes the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of an institution with political authority or as a voter of such institutions. Social rights of citizenship include the right to health care, the right to social security, the right to work, and the right to education. So-called fourth-generation rights, associated with recent developments in areas such as biotechnology or the Internet, although absent from Marshall’s original analysis, are also considered here.

Portugal is an especially relevant case when analysing the causes and multiple consequences of the crisis. The 2008 international financial crisis, which led to the country’s bailout in 2011, had a strong sense of déjá vu for those who remember the two previous bailouts that had to be negotiated in 1978 and 1983. In fact, Portugal’s democratic experience since 1974 has been punctuated by recurrent economic crisis. Its frequency does not detract from the dire situation which has marked Portugal in recent years. In 2011, the country was unable to finance itself, having lost access to international capital markets. This forced the Portuguese authorities to request a bailout loan of 78 billion Euros. In mid-2011, the Portuguese government and the Troika of lenders signed a Memorandum of Understanding detailing the conditions under which this loan was to be granted. The bailout’s conditionality, following the so-called “Washington consensus” on privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalization, focused on reducing public deficit, reducing the segmentation of labour markets and reforming welfare provision. This resulted in a long period of economic recession, record-high unemployment rates and significant levels of immigration. Portugal found itself among the most gravely hit countries in the Eurozone, close to Greece, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and Italy. At the same time, starting in the summer of 2013, a wave of hundreds of thousands of Syrian and North African refugees began reaching European shores, putting immense pressure on European governments to integrate them. European public opinion, already anxious about the first wave of terror attacks on European soil since the 1970s, received the news of this sudden inflow of refugees with mixed feelings. Partly given to its geographical location on the Atlantic shore, partly to the lack of economic opportunities, Portugal has
received only a residual number of these immigrants. This may partly help explain why, unlike in other Southern and Eastern European countries, there has been no rise of populist movements or leaders in Portugal. If anything, the crisis seems to have reinforced, rather than questioned, the commitment of the Portuguese to the citizenship rights won on 25th April, 1974.

The main goal of this volume is to discuss the ways in which citizenship, its exercise and our understanding of what it means to be a citizen, has evolved in the context of these events. The assumption is that the crisis, in its various dimensions, has created significant challenges to the way in which citizenship has been exercised. A second goal is, whenever relevant and possible, to take a longer-term and comparative approach. This includes *prima facie* the European context, which has gained additional relevance given the role of the Euro and the EU in the origins and management of the crisis, as well as the Latin American context, whose Iberian roots afford important points of transatlantic comparison. A third and related goal is to question whether 21st century economic globalisation and its financial dimension can be effectively regulated by elected forms of government, and whether the EU and other multilateral and regional organisations are supplying useful citizenship and governance to the national dimension. Due consideration will also be given to a potential trend towards a political reversal of globalisation, a closing of borders, and its implications for the concept of citizenship.

The disciplinary backgrounds of the three editors of this volume are, respectively, in political sciences, sociology, history and international relations. Together, we represent two research groups in the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS-UL), namely the SPARC and the Research Group on Regimes and Institutions. Our aim has been to bring together contributions where the concept of crisis figures as either a dependent or an independent variable; sociological and political science studies delving into the consequences of crisis for citizenship; studies in international relations and history that provide a more long-term perspective; as well as cross-country comparisons adding depth to the research on the way in which citizenship has been challenged in times of crisis. The thirteen chapters making up this volume, and which we summarise below, fall into three sections: (1) Questioning the crisis; (2) Actors in crisis; (3) Consequences of the crisis.
QUESTIONING THE CRISIS

The first chapter in this section is “The crisis of political representation: the Portuguese case (2002-2015)” by Manuel Villaverde Cabral and Susana Salgado. Making use of a longitudinal analysis of post electoral surveys, as well as other quantitative data, the text sets out to discuss how Portuguese citizens evaluate political parties and politicians. This, in turn, enables the authors to address the broader question of whether the idea of a “crisis of political representation” is indeed the most appropriate in accounting for this situation. Confirming Bernard Manin’s hypothesis that the deepening of such a crisis of political representation may occur simultaneously with a scenario of consolidated democracy and high levels of formal education, the authors conclude that this has indeed been the case in Portugal, namely if one takes into account the combination of low levels of turnout in elections and citizens’ responses to the post electoral surveys.

The second chapter is “Revisiting the politicisation of the EU. A three-dimensional approach” by Marina Costa Lobo and Jan Karremans. This text proposes to increase our understanding of the ways in which Europe has emerged in national political debates (both at the media and parliamentary level), and with what consequences for national democracy, in terms of citizen attitudes and political behaviour. One of the major consequences of the financial crisis has been to bring the nature and consequences of European integration to the heart of national politics. Are we witnessing a period of increasing lack of choice among EU member-states democracy or, in contrast, are we on the path to the formation of a European democracy and European public space? The authors’ overview of the literature frames the terms of an important debate on the state of democracy in Europe.

The third chapter is by Pedro C. Magalhães and Tiago Abril, and is entitled “Favourable outcomes, procedural fairness, and political support: results from a survey experiment” It begins with the observation that it is often the case that, in their relationship with authorities, people care not only about getting their preferred outcomes but also about the way those outcomes are generated, particularly about the extent to which decision-making procedures are fair. The text focuses on the case of political authorities, which is particularly relevant to the exercise of citizens’ rights in hard times. Making use of a survey experiment, the authors reach three different conclusions. First, from a procedural point of view, fair rules have a significant larger total
effect on political support for authorities, an effect that is largely mediated by perceptions of fairness but can also, in some cases, be a direct effect. Second, they show that this finding holds regardless of the dimension of procedural fairness – Voice, Neutrality/Impartiality and Accessibility/Transparency. This suggests that, overall, fairness matters more than outcome favourability. Third, they show that in high transparency events/situations, receiving a favourable outcome is of little importance, but in low transparency events/situations, receiving a favourable outcome or not counts more.

The last chapter in this section is “Economic crisis and political decision: words and meaning” by Virgínia Henriques Calado and Luís Cunha. Their argument is built on the assumption that the “crisis”, either as a phenomenon or concept, does not exist independently of the social agents’ meaning-making practices. A crisis is, therefore, a fundamentally discursive formation. Narratives, as practices of production of discourse, are thus hypothesised to have a significant impact on how crisis, their origins and consequences, are perceived by the public and managed politically. The text’s main contribution is its original analysis of the speeches by Portuguese prime ministers in State of the Nation debates over ten years (2008-17). It shows how the notions of crisis and reform but also of adjustment, ideology and reality were mobilised to produce decisive effects, and that the ideological tenor of political speeches increases when one is in the opposition and diminishes when one is in office.

ACTORS IN CRISIS

The second section starts with a chapter on “Children, citizenship and crises: towards a participatory agenda” by Ana Nunes de Almeida, Ana Sofia Ribeiro and Jussara Rowland. The text discusses the relation between children, citizenship and crises. Drawing upon the findings of two research projects, it advocates the importance of including children’s perspectives in crisis narratives (the right to be heard), as well as a participatory agenda recognising children’s agency and competencies to be active participants in policy processes that concern not only their present, but also their future.

The sixth chapter in the volume is “Youth and generations in times of crisis: Portugal in the global situation” by Vítor Sérgio Ferreira. The author posits that the flexibility established in the labour conditions and its potential extension throughout the life course focuses on inequalities in the discussion
on generations, detaching it from the mere cultural values and ethics of life differences. It is hypothesised that “precariousness”, although experienced in very distinct ways due to young people’s unequal social support, can be part of the core of a new generational conscience as a structural condition considered during a lifetime. It can have deep and extended effects going beyond the sphere of the working life, reifying a context that is favourable to the ontological insecurity of the younger citizens.

Moving from a sociological perspective to a political one, the next two chapters in this section deal with social partners and parties. The seventh chapter is “The crisis impact on the political discourse of Portuguese social partners” by Raquel Rego, Miguel Won, Bruno Martins, Amália Mendes, Iria del Río, Pierre Lejeune. Like Calado and Henriques’ chapter above, this contribution also focuses on discourse. It offers an analysis of the evolution of the political discourse by trade unions and employer associations between 2011 and 2014, the period in which the country was under the financial tutelage of the Troika. It is hypothesised that the social partners would assume asymmetric positions given their opposing ideological perceptions regarding the neo-liberal policies imposed by the Memorandum of Understanding. Their findings give credence to this hypothesis. In fact, this original analysis of social partners’ discourses shows that the belligerent tone of the discourse is not only a feature of trade union discourse, but also of employer discourse. Both organisations have clear enemies, abstract, and polarised: the “capital” for CGTP, and the “state” for CIP.

The eighth chapter is “Party-citizen online challenges: Portuguese parties’ Facebook usage and audience engagement” by Sofia Serra-Silva, Diana Dias Carvalho and Júlio Fazendeiro. It addresses the contemporary challenges to citizenship by looking at the current relationship between parties and citizens in the digital context, a space where political action and active citizenship is increasingly undertaken. Focussing on how political parties use ICT and social media, namely Facebook, the authors conclude that since 2010 all major political parties have increased their investment in Facebook content. In recent years, most parties have been moving towards a strategy to increasingly include more multimedia content so as to diminish their dependence upon Facebook. The main finding refers to PAN – Pessoas-Animais-Natureza (People-Animals-Nature). Despite being a small and recent party, when taking into consideration the relative number of “likers”/friends, it showed the second highest level of user engagement. This result highlights how the
use of new technologies can favour new parties and help them overcome their limitations. PAN’s successful Facebook communication might be explained because it emerged in a more recent technological context when compared to parties, such as the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democrat Party (PSD), which developed at a time when the printed mass media was the dominant communication channel between leaders and citizens.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS

The final section, on the “Consequences of the crisis”, begins with a socio-psychological approach to citizen attitudes with the chapter “Racisms and normative pressures: a new outbreak of biological racism?” by Jorge Vala and Cícero Roberto Pereira. The authors present different strands of research – both old and new – which they have undertaken on racism in contemporary European societies, namely on its impact on social relations in different societies. The research is framed by the concept of social representation and social norms and uses the metaphor of racism as an “evolving virus” to understand the mutations of racism in contemporary societies. The authors propose that racism has undergone adaptive transformations, making it possible to maintain the fundamental aspects of traditional racial beliefs, without jeopardising democratic institutions and a non-racist, non-prejudiced self-representation. It is the mutation that racism has undergone, the subtle shift from the biological to the cultural sphere, which allows its overt widespread and socially effective persistence. Their results illustrate how expressions of racism vary across countries depending on the dynamic of social relations framing the motivations underlying social identities, and the content of social representations about human groups.

The tenth chapter is “Why no populism in Portugal? ” by Filipe Carreira da Silva and Susana Salgado. This text offers a blueprint of a possible answer to the question why there is no populism in Portugal. Populism has been a common consequence of the economic crisis, both in Europe and elsewhere. Yet despite the deep economic recession Portugal suffered between 2011 and 2013, the fact remains that there was no “populist revolt” in the country, either in the form of a social movement like the Indignados movement (and the subsequent Podemos party) in neighbouring Spain, or in the form of a
changed discourse by an established political force. This text proposes a novel research design in order to answer this question: methodologically, the negative case presented by Portugal is to be studied in contrast with a positive case, Spain. Theoretically, populism is understood to function according to the logic not of enmity, but resentment. The logic of resentment includes both socio-political indignation, which refers to democratic norms and has the potential to reinforce democracy, and radical envy, which can slide into racism and political violence. The seeming absence of populism in the country would be explained, from this perspective, by the performative failure of political agents in using either of these sub-logics of resentment to promote a populist response to the crisis.

The eleventh chapter is “In welfare we trust? Political trust in Portugal and Spain, 2008-2014” by Edalina Rodrigues Sanches, José Santana Pereira and Isabella Razzuoli. The authors seek to identify the sources of political (dis)trust in two countries that were profoundly affected by the Eurozone crisis: Portugal and Spain. They assess the relationship between welfare perceptions and political trust in the two Iberian countries, hypothesising different impacts of those perceptions on the two countries according to the timing of the sovereign debt crisis. Their findings show that perceptions of welfare performance are a strong predictor of political trust, and that its impact is stronger on Spain than Portugal. However, the impact of welfare performance perceptions was weaker in 2012, at the peak of the crisis, than in 2008 or 2014. Cognitive mobilisation also led to these perceptions having a stronger impact, but only on Spain and in 2014.

The twelfth chapter in this section is Roberto Falanga’s “Critical trends of citizen participation in policymaking. Insights from Portugal”. The text discusses three critical trends pinpointed by the international literature with regards to the institutional design of participatory processes, namely participatory budgets: the detachment of local participatory practices from global issues; the shift towards technocratic approaches in detriment to political-oriented practices; and the scarcity of evaluation in contrast to the mushrooming of pilots. Findings show that with the first trend, although the implementation of the national participatory budget challenges international preference for local scale, the weak institutional articulation with the massive presence of local processes may impair state reform goals. As to the second trend, models of deliberation focused on the capacity of the individuals to network and campaign without either intermediation or inclusion of
organised groups may have favoured the emergence of self-organised lobbies. Regarding the third trend, the absence of evaluation from both local and national institutional designs further limits this reflection, given the lack of data about who is actually participating in these processes.

We end the volume with an international perspective on the consequences of the crisis. Gonzalo Delamaza’s “Political consequences of socio-territorial conflicts. Conceptualizing changing paths of citizenship and democratic governance in the Andean Region of Latin America” takes this critical evaluation of the civil implications of the economic crisis beyond Portugal and Europe to Latin America, expanding the frontiers of what we mean by citizenship and which groups are involved. This text studies socio-territorial conflicts, i.e. conflicts that involve contentious actions taking place and that are carried out by social agents from a given geographical territory, and whose claims involve issues that impinge directly on that territory. It is further suggested that this type of conflict is on the rise in countries in the Andean Region of Latin America, and that they have generated a different type of political outcome. This has enabled citizen groups formerly excluded from political expression to become increasingly visible. There is evidence, the author concludes, that there are several areas in which the conflict dynamics open up spaces to new actors, new territories and new forms of social and political action.

Taken together, these chapters provide a snapshot of the ongoing research on citizenship in crisis at the ICS-UL in the last decade. We hope that this volume will contribute to the advancement of scientific knowledge on the contemporary challenges to citizenship. It is an issue of great public interest, insofar as it deals with the open-ended debate about the quality and nature of democracy in the 21st century.
MARINA COSTA LOBO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
marina.costalobo@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-7329-0972

FILIPÉ CARREIRA DA SILVA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
fcs23@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-2459-0802

JOSÉ PEDRO ZÚQUETE
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
jose.zuquete@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-6209-6931

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PART 1

Questioning the crisis

Manuel Villaverde Cabral
Susana Salgado
INTRODUCTION

Most political science research is concerned with the supply side of politics, i.e. the ability of political actors to attract supporters; instead, citizenship research is frequently interested in politics’ demand side, i.e. what citizens ask from politicians and to what extent are they satisfied with party supply. The present study addresses the evaluation of political parties and politicians by the Portuguese citizenry on the basis of a longitudinal analysis of post-electoral surveys as well as other quantitative data allowing us to measure to which extent such evaluation fits the features of the “crisis of political representation” described in extant literature (Porras Nadales 1996). Indeed, in a very recent article on the concept of Democracy, the Greek political philosopher and politician Georges Contogeorgis brings the issue of the crisis of political representation into focus, by reminding us that “the initial political regime of classic Athens ceased to be fully democratic when it stopped being “the citizens’ assembly” to become increasingly a matter of representation, which is by its composition if not by definition an oligarchic institution distinct from direct participation in the polity. And that was why democracy left Athens in the early 4th century BC” (Contogeorgis 2017).

Representation is therefore at the heart of the full exercise of citizenship in current democracies both when citizens associate and mobilise themselves in order to express their needs and their political will, as well as when they elect their representative parties and leaders to the nation’s constitutional bodies. This chapter intends to show how the main rights of political citizenship have been exercised since the beginning of democracy in Portugal in 1974-75, providing at the same time some comparative European data. Its main focus remains, however, the relationship between the citizenry and its political representatives – parties as well as party leaders – in order to show the possible extent of the crisis of political representation in Portugal as one of the most decisive domains of the exercise of citizenship.

Today, voting is a political right internalised in most countries as the main legitimating feature of democracies. Although voting is a citizens’ right, it is not compulsory in Portugal and electoral turnout is noticed to have been steadily decreasing since the beginning of democracy in 1974 down to a very significant number of Portuguese electors, near 50% who currently abstain from voting. Abstention is therefore the first sign of some kind of “crisis” concerning the representational process: a gap between the...
electorate’s interests and convictions and the political parties’ actions and proposals voiced by political leaders increasingly concerned with their own image in media-centred political communication environments saturated by information as well as misinformation. New communication technologies, such as social media, make these communication environments even more complex and challenging for democracy (for an analysis of the challenges of the new political communication environments to democracy, see for example Aelst et al. 2017; and for details on the direct links between news media and politics in Portugal, see Salgado 2018a).

The empirical “anomaly” that triggered our research was observed in the first academic post-electoral survey carried out in Portugal soon after the 2002 parliamentary election (Freire, Lobo and Magalhães 2007). The first item of the questionnaire asked the respondents whether they had voted in that election: only 23.7% said “no”; however, we know from official statistics that 38.52% had in fact abstained (Viegas and Faria 2007, 152). Therefore, almost 15% of respondents were not truthful in the survey about their actual voting behaviour: given the internalisation of voting as a democratic rule confirmed by several surveys in Portugal, one presumes that those who abstained acted out of the knowledge that they had failed to comply with their political duty.

Even more puzzling, the second question asked the respondents who had declared to have voted for which party they had done so. Amazingly or not, those declaring to have voted for the Socialist Party (PS) were in greater numbers than those who actually voted for the winning party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD). \(^1\) One interpretation might be that PS supporters who were led to believe by the opinion polls and the media that their party was going to lose the election decided not to turn out at the polls, fulfilling as it were the prophecy of opinion polls, somehow along the lines of Noelle-Neuman’s “spiral of silence” (1974).

In addition to the increasing rate of abstention in Portugal (as in several other countries), pointing to some kind of “crisis of political representation”, the aforementioned post-electoral study contained two significant batteries of fourteen plus eight items aimed at measuring not just generic relationships between the Portuguese electorate and political parties and leaders, such as social trust, but specific relationships that we categorised into four evaluative

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1 The official results are available at: http://eleicoes.cne.pt/raster/detalhe.cfm?eleicao=ar&dia=17&m es=03&ano=2002&codreg=0&local=0.
dimensions: normative, affective, performance, and relational. The quantitative analysis of those two batteries, together with the similar items measured in the post electoral surveys that followed until 2015, allowed us to conclude that, if anything, the gap between demand and supply of political goods in Portugal, to use Jon Elster’s (1986) metaphor of “the market and the forum”, has not ceased to exist and, depending on different political junctures, it has been increasing instead.

This chapter contains three sections, plus this Introduction and a Conclusion. In the first section, we discuss the contents of the “crisis of political representation” and clarify the origins of the concept. In the second section, we explain our empirical approach to the crisis of political representation, detailing our model and presenting the results of the analysis of the Portuguese case, based on the results of the 2002 post electoral survey. The third section is dedicated to the analysis of the Portuguese case over time until 2015 and to the discussion of the potential consequences of such a gap between representatives and represented on Portuguese politics.

CRISIS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: THE CONCEPT

Long before Contogeorgis, Bernard Manin (1995) had already acknowledged, in his study *Principles of Representative Government*, that “what is today referred to as a crisis of political representation appears in a different light if we remember that representative government was conceived in explicit opposition to government by the people, and that its central institutions have remained unchanged”. Moreover, “the relationship between representatives and those they represent is today perceived as democratic, whereas it was originally seen as undemocratic” (Manin 2010, 232-236). The French author seems to have been, indeed, among the first to realise the existence of a permanent risk of a “crisis of representation” due to the gap existing between the demand and the supply of political participation, in other words, an enduring gap between citizens and political parties as well as their leaders.

Such systemic crisis manifests itself with more or less frequency and relevance according to the specific characteristics of different polities and political systems, as well as specific societal conditions and their local evolution. Having said that, the so-called crisis of representation has somehow changed its nature and weight as the representative function performed in different electoral/
political systems has evolved first from “notables” to “hommes d’appareil” and, more recently, from the latter to the “élites politico-médiatiques” as Manin calls them in French. According to him, “plus que la substitution d’un type d’élite à un autre, c’est le maintien, voire l’accroissement de l’écart entre les gouvernés et l’élite gouvernante qui provoque un sentiment de crise”; and he concludes that: “les évolutions présentes apportent un démenti à la croyance que le lien représentatif était destiné à avancer toujours vers plus d’identité ou d’identification entre gouvernés et gouvernants” (Manin 1995, 300).

From a descriptive point of view, one of the most comprehensive studies on the crisis of political representation was published in Spain under the editing of Porras Nadales (1996), virtually at the same time as Manin’s essay. Historically, the current notion of such a crisis can be factually linked to the beginnings of the contemporary globalisation spread from 1971 onwards (Cabral 2016, 152 note 1) and to the rise of the “democratic third wave” in the mid-1970s (Huntington 1991), from then up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet empire in the 1990s, when the crisis spread worldwide and deepened in several new liberal democratic countries (Cabral 2004; 2016, 151-162).

The cultural critical turn which occurred in the aftermath of the “events of May’ 68” in Paris seems to have provided the “rationale” for the increasingly militant anti-authoritarian movement that followed and which questioned the alleged authority of traditional political parties, namely left-wing ones. In turn, such parties witnessed the gradual blurring of several of their previous social class and ideological differences as they moved from mass-parties to catch-all parties at the same time that they became increasingly dependent on the mass media. The so-called “legitimation crisis” argued then by Jürgen Habermas (1973) as a manifestation of demotivation towards the standard political life in “late capitalism”, may have been the first critical theory of what we are now referring to as “the crisis of representation”.

Crises of political representation are not something entirely new in democratic systems. Indeed, according to several authors (Manin 1995; Porras Nadales 1996; Taggart 2004; Mair 2013; just to provide a few examples), the gap is permanent. Such gap undergoes changes in the nature of its manifestations and in intensity, but it remains an inherent part of the double nature of representative democracy, i. e. democratic as far as universal free vote

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2 The English translation does not include this exact paragraph; so, we used the French edition (1996).
decides who rules each time it is called to, and oligarchic in so far as there is an unbridgeable social and power distance between the elected representatives and those they are supposed to represent (Manin 1995; Hofstede 1980; for Portugal, Cabral 2016).

There are also references to similar crises in the classical theories of democracy (see for example, Vieira and Runciman 2008; Aurélio 2009). However, our focus is on the framing and the features of the crises of political representation that emerged as a response to the increasingly important role of mass and catch-all parties, as well as to the wide spreading expansion of the “welfare state” and its growing economic weight. Party programmes became more vague and similar to each other, which has led to some ideological and sociological homogeneity and to an increasing lack of political identity. The loss of centrality of most nation-states in the political decision-making processes in a growingly globalised economy is also directly related to this blurring of political alternatives.

Today, due to globalisation, global crises, and the growing complexity of most issues (e.g. environmental changes, security, terrorism, health, population ageing, etc.), the national political elites also seem to have lost much of their autonomy and are now accountable not only to those who elected them, but also to other political actors, such as foreign governments and international institutions (IMF, WTO, EU, ECB, etc.). Many political decisions that affect citizens directly are now in the hands of supranational organisations, and often national elites wash their hands from unpopular policies, explaining them as the only possible outcome of international pressures, the so-called “TINA” (There is no alternative). This blurs responsiveness and contributes to discredit the representational nature of current democratic polities (Powell and Whitten 1993; Buhlmann and Fivaz 2016).

The transformations that occurred in professional structures and the erosion of the class system (the alleged middle class effect) in which party democracies were underpinned are also related to these crises. In turn, socio-cultural transformations, including mass education, the increasing amount of information available and the fast development of technology have led to cultural shifts such as the alleged shift from “materialism” to “post-materialism” studied by Inglehart (1989). In this context, notions like “cognitive mobilisation” as a leading factor of political awareness and mobilisation tended to overcome the role of parties and of the political class (Dalton 1984). Those developments have also contributed to what Norris’s names as the rise
of the “critical citizen” (Norris 1999), which impacts on the citizen’s political attitudes, and increases the citizens’ reluctance to accept uncritically mass parties’ platforms and the catch-all parties’ blurred ideological proposals, often leading to party disaffection and electoral abstention.

On the other hand, the growing influence of the media in politics (process of mediatisation and different types of media effects) is frequently described as being responsible for framing citizens as spectators, rather than as part of the democratic decision-making process, and for portraying politics as a “spectacle” (see for example Debord’s *La Société du spectacle*, published in 1967; and several others after this “seminal pamphlet”, as Postman 1985; and more recently Hedges 2009). These specific features of the media logic in politics have also been related in extant literature to low turnouts, political apathy, and overall disinterest in politics leading to a “spiral of cynicism” (Bartels 1996; Cappella and Jamieson 1997).

Against this background, the role of the media and the increasing dependency of politics on the media are of the outmost importance, as news media can contribute to further explain the representative political processes of decision making to citizens, or do exactly the opposite, i.e. contribute to further disengagement, for example, when journalists report politics through superficial and biased approaches. Increasingly, politicians have been developing political communication and media strategies to get media exposure and to control both the media agenda-setting process and the news framing of issues. In fact, today any political success is at least in part media-driven. Moreover, this concern with publicity and propaganda also leads to a redefinition of what is perceived by the public as a skilled politician or a suited public policy, for example.

Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) name the problem as “the crisis of public communication”. These authors are concerned with the way politics is communicated to the public, which they see as increasingly disaffected and with a growingly confounded and frustrated ability to make sense of civic problems and political issues. However, in their view, neither politicians nor journalists are to blame for this crisis. The crisis is caused by a complex combination of factors that have made government more difficult, popular support more contingent, and effective communication more vital in these processes. Overall, citizens have now access to more information and are better prepared to understand the political processes than ever, but at the same time – or because of that – they also feel more disengaged and underrepresented.
than ever. Over time, democracy seems to have broadened its representation, but it has not deepened it, precisely as Bernard Manin had put it several decades ago.

The process of representation requires a link between the opinions of citizens and the actions of their representatives. In an ideal representative democracy, representatives would be fully responsive to the citizens’ opinions and preferences, which would guide the definition of policy (Powell 2004). It is often assumed that political parties should compete on the basis of distinct policy platforms, which, in turn, should respond to the socio-economic interests and ideological beliefs of their supporters (Dalton 2002). But real-life democracies do not usually meet this ideal and there are often differences between the preferences of citizens and the views and actions of politicians. This is what Stephen Whitefield names a representational gap: more or less wide differences between the views and acts of representatives and the preferences of those they claim to represent. The representational system fails when this gap is too large (Whitefield 2006, 733).

Citizens have thus grown more distrustful of politicians and parties, and became more sceptical about allegedly representative institutions as well as about the overall functioning of the democratic process (Dalton 2007; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). In turn, growing political abstention and apathy do affect representative democracies negatively, in the sense that less citizen participation could lead to a discredit of the representative system. In many situations, politicians are being elected with less and less votes, and become therefore less representative of a large portion of the population, which can also lead to the emergence (or growth) of different forms of populism, or even, in extreme circumstances, to overt anti-democratic political behaviour.

In fact, both the concept of political representation and some kind of crisis of representation lay at the heart of most forms of populism. Similarly to Canovan’s (1999) interpretation of populism as a reflection of the limitations of representative political systems, Roberts (2015) sees populism as a response to the discredit of representative institutions, from which a large proportion of citizens feel alienated due to socio-economic and/or cultural alleged exclusion. The representative system presupposes that political elites compete among each other to govern and represent the citizens. Populists are often against the representative system as well as against the mediating structures of the representative model of democracy which they consider not only ineffective, but also inadequate to deal with the citizens’ concerns.
AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

In addition to examining the theoretical and analytical debates that are focused on the concept of political representation and its crises, we are also concerned with analysing how a flawed political representation, or indeed an underlying crisis of political representation, can be captured by post electoral surveys in Portugal.

As noted in the Introduction, electoral turnout in Portugal has been decreasing sharply and consistently since the first elections in 1975, after the 1974 democratic revolution which started the beginning of the “third wave of democratisation” (Huntington, 1991). Turnout at general elections was

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<tr>
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<td>2016</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>61.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>63.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>66.16</td>
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around 90% and 80% in the 1970s, but in the last elections, in 2015, turnout had declined to 55%; to that one can add a regular percentage of 3% to 5% null votes. Turnout tends to be even lower in second order elections, especially in European elections, which always had very low voting participation like in many other member countries of the European Union.

Despite of the deteriorating situation over time, there have not been many comprehensive research attempts to understand and explain the precise nature, the characteristics, and the causes of this disillusion with democratic representative politics in Portugal. Is it mainly due to the inability of political leaders to mobilise citizens? Is it caused by the poor link between party programmes and the citizens’ main concerns? Or is it more related to the inefficiency of the institutions of representative democracy (what they are and how they work)? It could be related to all of these elements. Our present approach does not provide answers to all these questions, but it intends to draw scholarly attention to this issue and it is an attempt to examine the specific characteristics of the Portuguese citizens’ disillusion with representative democratic politics in Portugal.

There are some studies focused specifically on attitudes towards political parties in Portugal, such as Teixeira and Pereira (2011) who investigated the so-called crisis of parties in Portugal and concluded that parties have been criticised for what they do and supported for what they were supposed to do; Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior (2016) also focused on the same issue, but were mainly concerned with understanding how the 2011 bailout had affected the support for political parties in Portugal. Other studies have tried to relate the state of the economy and economic crises in particular, to overall support for democracy (Sousa, Magalhães and Amaral 2014). The issue of abstention has also been a concern of other approaches, such as Magalhães (2001), and Freire and Magalhães (2002), who have analysed the extension and the reasons behind the phenomenon.

Our proposed exploratory approach examines the general feeling of trust/distrust in the representative democratic model, but it is not limited to this aspect. It also aims to better understand the match/mismatch between supply and demand in Portuguese politics (parties, party leaders, policy preferences and priorities). In a previous study, Cabral concluded that, in Portugal, usually “the more involved people are in the political process, the more they feel represented by the system” (Cabral 2007b, 206), but it is difficult to ascertain precisely in which way the order of causality works.
In any case, a European comparative study (Cabral 2007a) allowed the measurement of the class effect on political participation and the satisfaction with the political system, concluding that the higher the respondents’ position on the social class ladder, the more involved and satisfied they were. Indeed, involvement and assessment of the representative system effectiveness, as well as the feelings of belonging and of being accurately represented, refer to different aspects of the citizens’ social background and to their relation with the democratic system.

We now propose to measure and categorise the citizens’ views on whether they feel that they are (or not) adequately represented by parties and other institutions of representative democracy, as well as by politicians in general, thus investigating the different dimensions of the citizens’ attitudes towards representative politics. These dimensions concern the different aspects of the citizens’ evaluation of democratic politics, namely: (1) the “normative” dimension refers to the formal agreement or disagreement of citizens with the representative democratic system in a broad sense and with its institutions, in particular political parties; (2) the “affective” dimension denotes the degree of support and identification with a given political party or political leader; (3) the “performance” dimension is related to the assessment that citizens make of their actual political system, and in particular of the political parties’ and the political leaders’ actions and proposals; (4) and finally the “relational” dimension, which refers to the concrete mutual connections between representatives and citizens being represented, allows for the evaluation of the representative system as it is directly experienced by citizens.

The 2002 post electoral survey was our starting point as it included several relevant questions to investigate this topic in its different dimensions. For example, concerning the “normative dimension”: “Are political parties necessary in democracy?”; the “affective dimension”: “Closeness of citizens to a political party”; the “performance dimension”: “Political parties care about what citizens think?”; and finally the “relational dimension”: “Have you been contacted by any political party?”.

In total, the 2002 post electoral survey included fourteen questions specifically related to representation by political parties and eight questions focused on representation by the political elite in general. If fully replicated in the following elections these survey questions could have been used in a longitudinal comparative approach; however, due to budget restrictions, the post-electoral surveys that were carried out in the elections that followed...
(2005, 2009, 2011, 2015) changed their set of queries and several of the 2002 questions were not replicated. In any case, the 2002 post electoral survey functioned as our basis to develop an analytical model, which allowed the further empirical de-construction of several different dimensions of political representation and some specific characteristics of its alleged crisis in Portugal.

MODEL AND ANALYSIS

The data that resulted from the post-electoral survey was organised into the four dimensions mentioned above: (1) normative; (2) affective; (3) performance; (4) relational. We have attributed equal value/weight to each survey question related with the issue of political representation. This means that the final value might vary according to the number of questions that were actually considered and included in the analysis. In this way, and considering the 2002 post electoral survey, a total of 1,400 positive points (14 items 100 points each) were considered in the case of political parties, and a total of 800 in the case of the role of political elites in general.

With this quite straightforward approach we noted that, in 2002, political parties received a total of 523 positive points out of 1400, just over 37%. However, when we de-construct the scores considering the different dimensions, the score is even less favourable.

Responses have been valued as positive or negative taking into account the manner in which the survey questions were posed and according to whether they were favourable or unfavourable to political parties and to politicians. We can therefore observe that the highest positive scores were found precisely when the normative dimension (1) was considered (three items: 204 points). In other words, it is neither the political parties’ performance nor the level of sympathy that citizens’ may have for political parties that is being assessed. What is actually being measured in the normative dimension is the respondents’ formal agreement with the supposed role of political parties in the representative system: “There is no democracy without parties”, “Political parties are essential for citizen participation”, and “Political parties are a requisite for democracy”. A majority of 69% of citizens thus seem to have internalised the norm according to which the existence and the role of political parties in the representational system are crucial to the legitimation of democracy.

Together, political parties only scored 319 positive points (29%) in the remaining three dimensions. Examining the affective dimension (2), which
refers to the level of identification with the supply side (the existing political parties) and to the feeling of being adequately represented by a given political party, the survey respondents only attributed 176 positive points (44%) in a total of 400, which is similar to the percentage of citizens who declared their sympathy to a given political party in the early 1990s (Cabral 2000). The respondents’ evaluation of the political parties’ performance (3) was much less favourable: only 106 positive points (26.5%) in a total score of 400. And finally, the relational dimension (4) that refers to actual relationships between parties and the electorate, i.e. behaviours that indicate proactivity and actions in favour of a given political party, or party actions towards the citizens, the positive score was even lower: 33 in a maximum of 300 points (only 11% of favourable responses).

With this simple measurement exercise and assessment of the various types of relationships between citizens and political parties, it is possible to observe that, although respondents seem to have internalised the necessity of having political parties in a representative system for the functioning of democracy,
the actual link between citizens and political parties in Portugal is extremely weak. In other words, the citizens’ opinions and patterns of behaviour clearly show their detachment from the existing supply of political parties. In sum, respondents have displayed an average level of identification with the existing political parties (44%), but have showed considerable reluctance in expressing their specific party preferences. In addition, respondents have displayed very low levels of trust in political parties and have evaluated their performance mostly in a negative way (only 26.5% of favourable opinions). Finally, there are not many active and reciprocal relationships between citizens and parties, as respondents only provided 11% of positive responses.

Regarding political elites, the span of issues dealt with is smaller (eight items) and there are only two queries related with the normative dimension and none measuring the affective dimension. Altogether, the battery resulted in 215 points of positive evaluations out of 800; thus, 457 points of negative evaluations and 128 points of no responses, i.e. a much larger share of no answers: a total of 16% against 7% concerning political parties, which might indicate that respondents felt a greater uneasiness to evaluate leaders than parties.

The normative dimension (1) with two items produced an average of 40% of positive answers, 41.5% negative and 18.5% of no responses. The remaining six items can be divided in two groups: four items assessing the parties’ performance (3) with 23% positive responses on average, 62.5% negative, and 29.5% no answers; and finally, two relational (4) items with on average 26.5% positive, 62% negative, and 16% no answers. Altogether and not accounting

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<th>POSITIVE</th>
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<td>Citizens are interested in politicians’ views (2)</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Politicians’ opinions reflect voters’ opinions (3)</td>
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<td>Politicians are not interested in what common citizens think (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contacts with politicians (4)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
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for no answers, the citizens’ evaluation of political leaders only included 27% positive opinions (please see Table 1.3, for further details). In other words, in terms of political evaluation, political leaders do not seem to make a positive difference in the citizens’ feeling of being well represented by in the representative system.

THE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OVER TIME

Although the exact same items were not available in the post electoral surveys that followed, the ones that were incorporated in the subsequent surveys allow a general overview of how the crisis has evolved over time, from 2002 to 2015. So, how has this crisis of political representation evolved over time in Portugal?

It is important to note that during the period from 2002 to 2015, both the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party won parliamentary elections. In 2002, the PSD led by José Manuel Durão Barroso (and later by Pedro Santana Lopes) won the election, but in the next two elections (2005 and 2009) it was

Table 1.6

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<tr>
<td>Identification of the party to which the citizen feels closest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feels close to a party or just sympathiser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have you been contacted by any party?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties only serve to divide the people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without political parties there cannot be democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political parties are all alike</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
the PS led by José Sócrates that won, first with a full majority and later with a relative majority. The next election, in 2011, followed the bailout request and was won by the PSD led by Pedro Passos Coelho who made an alliance with CDS-PP in order to command a parliamentary majority. In coalition with CDS-PP, PSD came first again in the 2015 election, but without a majority in parliament. So, those two parties did not manage to form a stable government and the left-wing parties (CDU: the Communist Party – PCP – together with the Green Party – PEV – and the Left Block – BE) negotiated an agreement of parliamentary support to enable a minority PS government led by António Costa, who became prime minister.

There are some indicators that point to a deterioration of the crisis of political representation in Portugal. However, it is interesting to note that the normative dimension does improve over time, which shows that even though citizens have become less satisfied with the existing supply of political parties, they seem to increasingly believe that political parties should have a central role in a representative system. Indeed, this view became stronger, from 2002 to 2009, from 69% to near 80% (there is no data for 2011 and 2015). These results also suggest that the crisis of political representation might not be fully undermining the legitimacy of the democratic system in itself, which adds to explain the recent levels of voting support for mainstream parties in the 2015 election (nearly 70%) and the little success of populist (including anti-system and anti-establishment) political actors in Portugal (for a development on this issue, see Salgado 2018b).

Conversely, it is possible that the continuation of virtually the same party system since the first election in 1975, with the same alternation of the two leading parties on top of the vote (PS and PSD) and with no basic change of the parties alternating in office alone or in coalition before the latest election in 2015, has led in about forty years to the electorate’s discouragement in the face of such electoral predictability, which the “spiral of silence” behind any electoral surveys rightly replicates (Noelle-Neumann 1983).

In the meantime, Portuguese society has greatly changed from the times of authoritarian rule and colonial war, but this change was not accompanied by relevant constitutional changes after the Constitution adopted in 1976, with the exception of the “demilitarisation” of the presidency and the reduction of the president’s powers in 1982 and, above all, the economic liberalisation in 1989 in order to accelerate the process of European integration. Otherwise, the 1976 Constitution and its changes over time were never put to a popular
vote, including the membership of the EU and its successive treaties. Instead, none of the three referenda carried out about issues (regionalisation and voluntary termination of pregnancy) with more of a cultural content rather than a political one, reached 50% of voting participation.

Along those 40 years, the educational and professional structure of Portugal’s social composition changed very significantly while the population became much older. These profound societal changes, alongside the electoral register’s lack of systematic updating which has led to the inexistence for several years of accurate numbers of registered voters, might also account for an increasingly low turnout among both the elderly (2 million over 65 years old) and younger people born after 1974. The electoral system itself, despite several public debates occasionally carried out by the ruling parties, has not changed and the districts’ demography has not been updated as frequently as it should; the virtual absence of change applies also to the very few political parties that have been seating in parliament ever since.

The d’Hondt system that converts district votes into seats in parliament is not entirely proportional, but has made it all the same quite difficult for parties to reach full majorities (only three times in fifteen elections, which have resulted in twelve years of majoritarian government; only one of the other twenty governments finished its mandate). Among other consequences, this absence of long-term stability has hampered parliamentary agreements for relevant constitutional changes with the necessary two-thirds of seats. Such features of the Portuguese electoral and party systems, together with international dramatic political changes, like the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-8, may have been contributing to enlarge the gap between political parties and citizens.

Looking at the quantitative outcome of our research, it is indeed striking that contacts between the citizenry and parties occur so infrequently in a western European country: only ten percent of voters said that they have been in contact with politicians and politicians with them. We have found a similar mechanism in an earlier research (Cabral 2007b) which showed that there was then – and probably there is still today – a very high correlation between a citizens’ decision to take action in order to obtain a given political gain and the previous expectation of success: the lower the latter, the lower the former; unless it is the other way around. Manin (1995) also concludes that social distance between voters and representatives prevents them to keep mutual, frequent and successful contacts.
In turn, the EU has been repeatedly blamed for increasing voting abstention, notably at the European Parliamentary elections, due to an increase of the “power distance” already felt in each country. A survey specifically conducted on citizenship in 2004 did indeed confirm that different social classes, such as the elites and the working class, accounting together for more than half of the population of each country, evaluate their national political systems quite differently: the elites are more satisfied with democracy in every country and evaluate the performance of their parties and politicians more positively than the working class; elite members also have a greater interest and understanding of politics than manual workers, as well as possessing higher indicators of the exercise of citizenship, including association membership and self-mobilization. It is as if national elites have co-opted their political systems, hence the EU. The same study also shows that Portugal has lower indicators when compared with the European average. Besides the class effect, there is also a societal effect in operation affecting political attitudes and behaviour, which can be measured by the fact that the Portuguese elites possess a lower “social capital” than, for example, the Swedish working class. Such combination

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<td>Interpersonal Trust</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>4.52</td>
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<td>Trust in Institutions</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in Politicians</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Understanding</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.71</td>
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<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Democracy</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>5.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left-Right Orientation</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>4.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association Membership</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilisation</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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Note: EL = Elite; WC = Working Class; MN = National Average; MEU-18 = European Union average-18.
of class and societal effects operating in Portugal may account for a larger gap between citizens and their political representatives than in most European countries (Cabral 2007b).

CONCLUSION

Most democratic nations face similar problems today: decreasing political participation, loss of citizens’ confidence in political parties and politicians in general, loosening of party ties and affiliations. Depending on electoral systems, there seems to be a growing mismatch between political supply and demand. This is all the more important that the deeper the crisis of political representation, the more it translates into further alienation as well as an increasing distance between the purely legal aspects of constitutional democracies and the actual legitimacy of the system.

Our approach to the crisis of political representation in Portugal was focused on both the theoretical and analytical discussion of the concept together with an empirical approach to examine the nature and some of the specific characteristics of such crises. We investigated Portugal through post electoral surveys and our proposal can be replicated in other countries, provided that relevant and comparable surveys are available. We analysed the Portuguese crisis through the citizens’ behaviours and opinions about the representative system. Thus, low levels of turnout in elections and citizens’ responses to the post electoral surveys combined to support of the idea that such a crisis is profound and has not diminished over time; rather the opposite.

Bernard Manin seems therefore to be right when he concludes that the deepening of such crisis of political representation may occur at the same time that the franchise has been democratised and the population is more educated than ever. Precisely because of that, citizens are today more aware of the gap between what they demand and what parties are able or willing to supply. By contrast, Peter Mair (2003) tends to confine parties to the procedural roles of staff recruitment and of policy formulation, instead of focusing mainly on the role of actual representatives of the citizenry. Along with other authors quoted by Mair, from Schumpeter to Sartori, they all find “naïf” to believe that politicians are the citizen’s advocates, as established philosophical theories of representation do (Pitkin 1967).
According to Mair’s synthesis, parties’ decline affects affiliation and mobilisation, as well as identification, and we have noted how low Portuguese citizens do score in those dimensions. Parties tend to become increasingly distant from society and closer to the government and become “almost official parts” of the State; they are synonyms of the parties in parliament and in government. In such a context, party identity tends to evaporate and parties are reduced to the leaders in office or in wait. Public policies become less politicised and politicians increasingly dependent on specialists. Eventually, representative political functions decline and/or are taken up by other organisations and corporations. Party identities have thus become blurred. The end result of the different authors’ views is not that different: actual political representation is indeed a philosophical fiction. However, it needs to be preserved and nourished and no professional politician will deny this fact. Otherwise, the box of successful populism will not remain closed in Portugal.

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MANUEL VILLAVORDE CABRAL
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
mvcabral@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-4679-5569

SUSANA SALGADO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
susana.salgado@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-7967-3763
§ REFERENCES


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Revisiting the politicization of the EU. A three-dimensional approach

Marina Costa Lobo
Johannes Karremans
INTRODUCTION

Fifty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, fifteen years after the entry in circulation of the Euro, and after the recent Eurozone crisis – it has become common wisdom that “something like politicization” has been occurring with regard to the EU (Schmitter 2009). The phenomenon has been measured in its essence, its magnitude, in the factors driving it, and in the contexts that facilitate its emergence (Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde 2011; de Wilde and Zürn 2012). At the same time, however, the literature is far from having reached an agreement on how and at what pace politicization has occurred, or on the consequences it may have had on citizens’ vote calculus in national elections. With the current chapter we aim to step into the debate on precisely these two points, with a particular focus on the latter.

From the literature on EU-politicization, we can identify two important processes through which the issue of European integration may be changing the dynamics of national politics. The first is that of the formation of a new cleavage between the “winners” and the “losers” of the opening-up of national borders, which cuts across the traditional left-right divides (Hutter and Grande 2014; Kriesi et al. 2012). The second regards how the gradual supranational transfers of political authority are likely to be reducing the scope for economic voting, whereby citizens reward or punish incumbent parties on the basis of their economic performance (Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012). Our argument is that the extent to which these two processes will further unfold depends on (1) how the EU is being politicized and (2) on how citizens react to this politicization.

The aim of this chapter is to present a framework for creating an Index of Politicization of the EU (IPEU) that can subsequently be used for developing a survey aimed at understanding the ways in which the issue of Europe is affecting voting today. In this way, we try to build a bridge between what is currently known about EU-politicization and its impact on citizens’ political attitudes and voting behaviour. The literature has so far largely neglected citizens’ attitudes. Consequently, a number of important developments remain unaccounted for, such as how the new conflicts between the “winners” and “losers” translate into electoral behaviour and thereby tap into the process of European integration. We aim to fill this gap by first exploring the frames by which the EU has been politicized in different countries and then by grasping how these different frames are linked to different political attitudes and electoral behaviour.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first sketch an overview of the state of the art of the research on EU-politicization, highlighting the unexplored questions that we propose to investigate. Secondly, we illustrate how the recent Eurozone crisis has opened an important chapter in the 60-year long history of European integration, thereby affecting politicization as well. Thirdly, we make the case that in order to understand how contestation over EU-matters will play out further, it is crucial to understand how it affects citizens’ political attitudes and voting behaviour. Finally, we will set out a research agenda for a multidimensional study that will significantly advance our knowledge regarding how different frames of the EU may generate different outcomes in terms of political attitudes and voting behaviour.

EU POLITICIZATION: WHAT IS IT, WHAT DO WE KNOW, AND WHAT DO WE NOT KNOW ABOUT IT?

Politicization refers to a process whereby a collective decision generates disputes, and wherein the audiences of those disputes gradually expand (Schmitter 1969). To speak in more technical terms, politicization refers to “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation” (de Wilde, 2011, 559). When studying the politicization of the EU, scholars have focused on how contestation over regional integration connects to domestic conflict, and on how this contestation influences the speed and direction of regional integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Within the broader field of EU studies, thus, the analysis of politicization has always had the purpose to understand the way it relates to – and helps to shape – the speed and direction of European integration.

THE THEORETICAL STARTING POINT

The most important contribution in this regard – by Hooghe and Marks (2009) – proposes a post-functionalist theory, according to which the final outcome of the process of European integration will not be defined solely by jurisdictional design (as argued by neo-functionalist theorists) but also – and largely – by the increased contestation at the party and mass level. According to this view, since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 the politicization
of the EU has not only increased, but has also become inevitable. The gradual transfers of authority to the supranational level increasingly pushed Europe into political discussions, making European issues more salient and raising awareness amongst citizens about the implications of decisions taken at the supranational level. Consequently, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that from the Maastricht Treaty on citizens’ relationship to Europe has increasingly shifted from a “permissive consensus to a constraining dissensus”. Hooghe and Marks (2012) combine these insights with their previous research on parties’ positions, and find that pro- and anti-EU stances do not overlap with the traditional left-right axis, but are rather orthogonal to it, with the Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) parties on one pole, and Traditional-Authority-Nationalist parties (TAN) on the opposite pole (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, 970). The Eurosceptic views, besides being more associated with the TAN pole, appear to be strongly rooted in an identitarian, “pre-material” perspective. This leads to another important proposition, namely that each country’s nature of identity – and especially “the mobilization of exclusive national identity among mass publics” (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 22) – Is an important determinant for how politicization will occur.

As a consequence, considering also that the process of European integration is traditionally based on bargaining and compromises, Hooghe and Marks take a relatively negative view of the consequences of its politicization. In countries where Europe has become politicized, it is likely that politicians’ room for manoeuvre decreases, as Euroscepticism increases, and resistance to further transfers of authority rise among citizens. In addition, as mainstream parties tend to support European integration, the salience of the issue is largely given by parties on the extremes of the party-system who – especially on the right – tend to be strongly Eurosceptic and therefore to frame the EU in a highly negative way.

These various propositions constitute the basis of an important research agenda on EU-politicization. The magnitude of politicization, in fact, has been the focus of several studies looking into whether politicization has become inevitable, whether Maastricht was a turning point, and whether integration is proceeding at an ever increasing pace following successive transfers of authority to the EU. These attempts at measuring politicization do not, however, share the same measures of the phenomenon, which naturally is problematic for comparison purposes (Kriesi et al. 2012; Hutter and Grande 2014; Statham and Trenz, 2013; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Green-Pedersen, 2012). Table 2.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Politicization</th>
<th>EU/National Focus</th>
<th>Countries Analysed</th>
<th>Years Covered</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Sample Data</th>
<th>Parliamentary Debates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hooghe and Marks (2009)</td>
<td>The extent to which the EU is a contested issue in public debates</td>
<td>Theoretical</td>
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<td>Two quality newspapers one from left and one from right</td>
<td>Keyword searches in large dataset, factiva, etc. then code every second article. Analysis of claim-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratham and Trenz (2013)</td>
<td>Claims-making and how it incorporates views from others, and non-party actors</td>
<td>European Constitution</td>
<td>France, Germany, and UK</td>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td>Two quality newspapers one from left and one from right</td>
<td>Analysis of claim-making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hutter and Grande (2014)</td>
<td>Salience, polarization, actors</td>
<td>Domestic level/ National election</td>
<td>Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland</td>
<td>1970-2010</td>
<td>One leading quality newspaper in each country</td>
<td>Selection of all articles 2 months before the national election. Core sentence analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi (2016)</td>
<td>Salience, polarization, actors</td>
<td>Domestic level</td>
<td>Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland</td>
<td>1970-2012</td>
<td>One leading quality newspaper in each country</td>
<td>Selection of articles with keywords during key periods. Analysis through relational content analysis, core sentence analysis.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rauh and De Wilde (2018)</td>
<td>Salience of EU governance in national parliaments</td>
<td>Domestic level</td>
<td>UK, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain</td>
<td>1991-2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Automated content analysis of over 2.5 million plenary speeches, text-mining and web-scraping tools</td>
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provides an overview of different attempts to study the politicization of the EU, starting from Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) theoretical discussion. In the next sub-section, in turn, we illustrate in more detail the findings that have emerged from the field.

EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS OF EU POLITICIZATION

Although they do not carry out a longitudinal study that can seriously test politicization, Statham and Trenz (2013, 169) conclude that politicization has increased greatly in recent times, as do other authors, and that it will not be reversed (de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Risse 2015). Yet, in what is perhaps the most wide-ranging study of politicization, Hutter et al., find that there is “neither a uniform process of politicisation, nor is there a clear trend over time” (Hutter, Grande and Kriesi 2016, 279), and it is not a “post-Maastricht phenomenon” (p. 281). Thus, the authors speak of “punctuated politicisation” (p. 280) which varies over time, across contexts, and countries. Even more sceptical concerning Hooghe and Marks’ theory of post-functional growth in politicization, Green-Pedersen (2012, 126) shows through an analysis of media and party programmes that in Denmark, despite the existence of a radical right party, European integration remains a lowly politicized issue due to lack of incentives for mainstream parties. Hutter, Grande and Kriesi (2016, 281), in turn, state that they are not as sceptical as Green-Pedersen concerning the importance of politicization, but they concur that seldom has Europe been important at the national electoral level. Hoeglinger (2016, 146) also provides a sobering picture of the degree of politicization: “Europe is being politicised on a regular basis, yet within clear limits […] the answer to the ongoing debate on whether the sleeping giant has awakened or whether it is fast asleep lies somewhere in between those two stances”.

Going beyond the magnitude of politicization, the second most important proposition is whether this effect is driven by identity politics, in an orthogonal way, rather than following the left-right axis. Kriesi (2007) had already gone beyond the “politics of opposition” theory espoused in most literature on Euroscepticism to add another proposition, namely that the politicization of Europe is itself embedded in a “globalization cleavage” opposing winner and losers of the growing interdependence and openness between states. He suggested that instead of Euroscepticism being simply part and parcel of the “politics of opposition”, it may constitute a new cleavage, in which “mobilization
for and against European integration is part of a new structural conflict that is fundamentally transforming West European party systems altogether”. This structural conflict is to a large extent identitarian, and therefore Kriesi reinforces Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) proposition that identity politics drives politicization.

The idea that “identity”-matters shape politicization, however, is also the cause of various controversies among scholars. Statham and Trenz (2013), for instance, argue that the separation between (bad) identity politics and (good) interest politics is overly rigid and a false dualism (p. 157). Hoeglinger (2016, 77) finds that being on the tan side of the cultural/identity axis has a strong effect on European integration orientations. Yet, he also emphasizes that elite (party) attitudes toward European integration are not orthogonal to the left-right axis. When economic issues are at stake within the European integration umbrella, the left-right position correlates well with party-positions on the EU: those parties on the right are more supportive of the EU than the left. Indeed, the author insists that this multifaceted nature leads to “multiple linkages with the political space creating opposition which is scattered across the political spectrum, rather than belonging solely to the tan positioned parties (Hoeglinger 2016, 138). Recent research on the salience of EU governance in national parliamentary debates, however, strongly suggests that the politicization of the EU is driven almost exclusively by governing parties, from both the left and the right (Rauh and De Wilde 2018). Opposition parties, and especially when elections draw near, tend to avoid discussing EU matters. From this perspective, thus, the politicization of the EU seems not to be related to left-right affiliations, but EU matters seem rather to be the prerogative of governments, toward which opposition parties structurally fail to express alternative views.

In relation to the various insights regarding how the EU can be politicized, Hoeglinger (2016, 21) subdivides the issue of European integration into four categories that get at its multidimensional nature: two economic dimensions (market making and social regulation) and two political dimensions (enlargement and deepening). Indeed, whereas all authors have to contend with the fact that the EU is multidimensional, not all incorporate this into their own research methodology. According to Hutter et al. (2016), the EU can be conceptualized in terms of constitutive issues – on the scope of policy, membership, and institutional design that Europe has been taking over the years. These constitutive issues are decided at the supranational level over time, and subsequently get translated into issues of sovereignty, identity,
and solidarity within and across member states (Hutter et al. 2016, 12-14). According to Hutter et al., issues of sovereignty, or considering the EU a political issue, have been the most common way in which the EU has been politicized, namely whenever there has been a transfer of political decision-making to Brussels. Issues of identity have increasingly been identified as the main source of political opposition to the EU amongst extreme right wing parties, and as the more important way in which Europe has become politicized (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). Third are issues of interest or solidarity resulting from problems of redistribution of financial resources between states. As the authors explain, the EU has the potential to become more politicized to the extent that it combines several of these dimensions. Also, rather than positing a duality between identity and interest, Hoeglinger (2016) argues that they work in combined ways.

Taking into account these different dimensions on the basis of which the EU can be politicized, also the third proposition by Hooghe and Marks (2009) – namely that politicization would generate a “constraining dissensus” – is far from being fully agreed upon in the literature. Stratham and Trenz, for instance, are optimistic about the consequences of politicization. Despite the fact that they focus on the period of deliberation of the “Constitutional Treaty”, which itself was a failure, they find that these episodes contribute to the emergence of a transnational community built around common frames and similarities in political communication that are conducive to European political integration. Hutter et al. (2016, 295) are relatively ambivalent: politicization does not necessarily lead to negative decisions or failure: what it does is to increase political uncertainty for elites. Yet, they argue that this uncertainty at the national level has been circumvented by political elites who have managed to avoid stalemate at the European level. With the recent Euro-crisis, the authors argue, this practice has come to the surface even more clearly, with governments having little room for manoeuvre at the domestic level shielding themselves from the constraining dissensus through depoliticization (Hutter et al. 2016, 297; see also Sanchez-Cuenca 2017). While recognizing that the negative effects of depoliticization and technocracy could fuel repoliticization and more constraining dissensus at the national level, the authors claim that this is “an open question”, which must be answered by looking at mostly Southern “debtor” countries (Hutter et al. 2016, 298). In fact, Hutter et al. believe that the effect of politicization on domestic politics has to be taken more seriously by regional integration theory, something that until now has not happened.
In sum, this review of the literature shows how far the field has matured, but also indicates a number of issues that remain unresolved. In terms of magnitude, while politicization is unequivocal, it has not increased systematically since 1990. In terms of the ways in which European integration is defined, there has been a move from a unitary to a multifaceted definition. While this has proven extremely useful, at the same time it also has made research less comparable.

Regarding the “identity” hypothesis, recent research has signalled that not only is it not necessarily the main driver, but that the left-right axis is still relevant to explain positioning. Mainstream parties, in turn, should also not be discounted in the politicization of the EU. Finally, concerning the consequences for the process of European integration, the full consequences of the Eurozone crisis have not yet unravelled to understand the effects of politicization. In addition, the major existing longitudinal studies often do not cover the whole crisis period, nor its aftermath; they often do not include the debtor countries; they do not take seriously the idea that domestic politics and citizen attitudes must be integrated into the post-functional theory of European integration.

The Eurocrisis, however, marks a milestone in the decade-long history of European integration, as the measures taken in its aftermath considerably widen the spheres of competence of European institutions (Laffan 2014), to the extent that citizens have now become more aware of how governments’ hands are now more tied than in the past (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017). This increased perception is very likely to affect the opinion that European citizens have about the process of regional integration and thereby, in turn, influence the further evolution of politicization. In the next section we discuss the Eurozone crisis and how the decisions taken at the supranational level between 2009 and 2013 may have served to change in fundamental ways the political game at the national level, as well as the process of European integration. Subsequently, we move our focus to how the developments surrounding Eurozone crises in debtor countries highlight why citizen attitudes must be incorporated into the study of politicization, namely to help to understand the concept as well as its long-term consequences.

THE EUROZONE CRISIS AND POLITICIZATION

The financial crisis, which had its origin in the US in 2008 with the rescue of Bear Stearns and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, eventually led to a
European banking crisis that was accompanied by increased differentiation of countries within the Eurozone. Between 2010 and 2012, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal needed to be rescued by sovereign bailout programmes, delivered jointly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC), and the European Central Bank (ECB). Even though Greece, Ireland, and Portugal were the three countries officially bailed out by external institutions, Spain and Italy also had to impose severe austerity measures, with governments forced to implement unpopular economic measures.

Despite the fact that not all of these countries had identical economic weaknesses, nor did they all have to face similar external constraints, the policy mix that was administered by incumbent governments was similar. The austerity measures consisted of a mix of very unpopular policies such as decreases in state salaries and state pensions, which affected an important part of the population, decreases in state social spending such as education, health, and social security, and raises in indirect and direct taxes. In all debtor countries, we can expect that these measures contributed to the politicization of the EU from a “distributional perspective”.

Yet, politicization of the EU as a constitutive issue of “transfer of authority” also seemed to become painfully evident in debtor countries at this time. In 2012 the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paulo Portas, recognized that Portugal had “transitionally lost part of its sovereignty” when it asked for a bailout.1 Perhaps the most evident sign of loss of sovereignty was witnessed in Greece though, in the summer of 2015. On 5 July a referendum was organized by the Tsipras government, which asked whether or not Greece should accept the bailout conditions that the troika was offering the country, and 61% of voters rejected the bailout agreement, which nevertheless went ahead shortly thereafter. Tsipras accepted cuts of 12 billion euros in return for a third bailout, amounting to a loan of 53.5 billion euros. In exchange, the Greeks were promised a formal restructuring of their debt, which until now has not materialized.

Writing in 2017, it could be argued that this discussion is no longer relevant, since the bailouts have all become history, with the notable exception of Greece. What was initiated as a shock to the political systems of the Southern European periphery of the Eurozone could simply be perceived as equivalent.

to country bankruptcies which occurred previously in Latin America, in which, following external intervention by the IMF, the country returns to fiscal and monetary sovereignty. In the framework of the EU, however, rules and discretion have been structurally Europeanized in a post-bailout scenario, especially with the ongoing decisions to strengthen the Eurozone – such as the introduction of the Six Pack, the Fiscal Compact, and the Two Pack. In other words: “The increased gradualism of the sanctions and the broader monitoring toolkit that the Commission has at its disposal lend support to the view that the rules’ credibility has been strengthened” (Laffan and Schlosser 2016). Therefore, there is no likely return to a fiscal and monetary ex-ante sovereignty. In addition, austerity measures continue in many of the debtor countries, despite the end of the bailouts.

The Eurozone crisis in the periphery may therefore suggest that identifying “identity” as the main driver of politicization may not be too useful, as interests/distributional and constitutive issues seem to be highly crucial. The crisis, thereby, proves to be a very important episode to analyse, not only because it is likely to generate new important findings regarding the magnitude of politicization, but because we expect it to also to provide insights on the importance of the interests vs. identity issues, as well as on the consequences of politicization for quality of democracy.

To gain these insights, however, it is highly important to move beyond the study of politicization at the media or the institutional level, and to look into how citizens actually perceive the increased relevance of the EU and how this perception affects their voting considerations. Building upon the idea of the circularity of the democratic process (Kriesi et al. 2013), we expect the politicization occurring at the parliamentary and media levels to have their repercussions on how citizens construct their electoral choices. Mapping these repercussions is fundamental for getting a more encompassing view of how – and to what extent – the issue of the EU is altering the functioning of the democratic cycle.

TAKING THE IMPACT OF EUROPE ON CITIZENS’ ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS SERIOUSLY

All too often, studies have assumed that political parties are the sole drivers of politicization. However, studies of politicization show that parties are leaders
as much as followers in this domain. Cleavages form sociologically, and need of course to be activated, but citizens are also key in this interaction for the definition of politicization, whether it has positive or negative consequences for national and European democracy.

Just as Hooghe and Marks were criticized for ignoring political communication when considering how politicization occurred, it seems that the incorporation of citizen attitudes may be key to understanding politicization – both in terms of how it is constituted and what consequences it may have. Thus, we propose to incorporate the study of politicization within both the media and parliamentary debates in order to measure the changes in party dynamics, as well as at the level of citizen attitudes and behaviours, using an analytical framework that considers salience and polarization in each arena. The measurement of the politicization of the EU in the three arenas simultaneously will give a perception of the depth of politicization across society, rather than keeping it at the level of media and political parties. Zürn (2016) has made a similar case, that politicization must be studied not only in the media realm or parliamentary one, but also at the level of citizen attitudes. One recent example is Baglioni and Hurrelman (2016). Not only will the measurement of the importance of Europe for political attitudes and behaviours be important to understand politicization as a concept, it is important to understand changes in the dynamics of voting behaviour at the domestic level.

This leads us to the question of how the impact of the EU cleavage can be conceptualized in domestic electoral behaviour. One obvious avenue is to consider it as an alternative cleavage to the left-right one, and measure its comparative strength in explaining voting in national elections. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004, 2007) find that there is no great relevance in this regard, although they do find that the potential is there for Europe to make a difference in national elections. Indeed, until recently, we also could agree that the “sleeping giant” thesis would be accurate. Research in Southern European countries, moreover, showed that attitudes toward the EU could be potentially divisive amongst the “winners and losers” of the process of integration, or between those parties that systematically voted for opposition; yet overall the EU issue barely received attention in legislative elections (Lobo and Magalhães 2011). This is in part due to the fact that mainstream parties and their electors share a largely pro-EU stance (Green and Pedersen 2012; Gramacho and Llamazares 2007). On the contrary, de Vries (2007) examines the “sleeping
giant” thesis and finds that the EU issue can have an impact on domestic politics when the extent of partisan conflict over European integration and its salience among voters are high.

A second way of investigating the importance of Europe in domestic elections is to consider it not as a proper cleavage, but as an issue, alongside others that gain salience in different contexts. In this respect it seems clear that the repercussions of EU salience in national elections have been conceived in different ways. The first is given by the approach taken by de Vries (2007), namely by measuring the impact of the EU issue vis-à-vis others. In that respect, several avenues can be pursued, namely to understand the extent to which attitudes toward the EU shape the vote for Eurosceptic parties in the countries under investigation; to what extent they shape the vote for anti-mainstream parties and in favour of populist parties; to understand whether the EU issue voting is stronger in contexts where the EU has gained media and parliamentary salience to a greater extent. In sum, to treat the European Union as an issue that has gained salience. The nature of this issue, as seen above, can be conceptualized differently, with different questions capturing different dimensions of the EU. The instruments being created by MAPLE within the online panel surveys will allow us to include such issues as well as more traditionally used factors of voting behaviour in order to analyse their relative impact in differentiated contexts.

The third way of investigating the impact of the EU in political behaviour would be to think of the EU as having an indirect effect on the vote through economic or leadership variables on the vote and more widely on political attitudes. There has been important research on the way in which globalization and the decline of the state have had an impact on economic voting (Hellwig and Samuels 2007). Hellwig has examined the role that global economic interdependence plays in constraining citizens’ responses to domestic economic performance, and shown that the economic vote is mitigated when, either objectively economic interdependence is higher, or it is perceived as being high by electors. In electors’ minds the progressive transfer of authority to the EU, which has been accelerating since Maastricht, and gained further ground in the Eurozone crisis, may be a symbol of the progressive decline of meaningful choices at the domestic level.

Following in that literature’s path, Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) used data from the 2009 European Election Survey to show that in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal) the national economic vote diminishes
to the extent the **EU** is held responsible for the economy. The more the **EU**
is perceived as dominating in the government decision-making, the likelier
it would be that short-term factors of voting behaviour may be mitigated.
Just as finding the **EU** responsible for the Eurozone crisis may decrease the
economic vote, leader effects may also be impaired during a severe economic
crisis, and namely, when a country has endured successive bailouts that may
lead to perceptions that the party leader and the Prime Minister are not such
powerful figures. But also the mere fact that electors in all Eurozone member
countries have become increasingly aware that all monetary decisions are
taken in Brussels could be changing the vote calculus at home. In terms of
the literature on leader effects, there is no research on the impact that global
economic interdependence, and perceptions of a dislocation of political power
to supranational bodies such as the **EU**, or even the troika, may have on leader
effects (Lobo and Curtice 2014).

So, in classic economic voting terms, the **EU**‘s progressive importance
at the domestic level would constitute an instance of structural “blurring
of responsibility”, which has been demonstrated to dampen the impact of
economic voting in legislative elections. Similarly, it can be linked to citizens’
dissatisfaction with national democracy, if it is equated with a decline in the
meaningfulness of elections (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017; Sanchez-Cuenca
2017).

Finally, there is also an emerging literature that looks strictly at the impact
of the Eurozone crisis on voting in member-states. Several scholars who are
investigating this topic are doing so to understand whether the economic vote
changes (considering both magnitude and clarity of responsibility) under
economic crisis or not (Lewis-Beck and Lobo 2017), while others are seeking
to understand the importance that the crisis had for party system change
(Vidal 2017). This literature has important implications for the wider debate
on the politicization of Europe, as it does for understanding how citizens may
have changed their political behaviour.

Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck (2014) use aggregate data to investigate the
question of whether macroeconomics influences overall electoral outcomes.
They measure crisis in two ways: one is to split the sample, before and after
2008. The other is to code any year in which growth is negative as a crisis
year. They use a very large dataset that includes 31 countries in Europe since
1950 or whenever the country had competitive elections. The final total of
elections considered is 359. The authors find strong support for the positive
relationship between GDP growth and incumbent support. Concerning the crisis dummy variable, it does not reach significance in any model, which leads them to the following conclusion: “while the incumbents of Europe may have been punished by the post-2008 economic crisis, that punishment has been no greater than for economic downturns occurring in other periods.” The authors also find that negative growth hurts the government support more than positive growth helps it.

Similarly, Talving (2017), analyses the European Election Studies (EES) data for 12 Western European countries in 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009, and 2014 and finds that there is very little abrupt change in economic effects over time. The statistical relationship between the economy and voting remained remarkably constant and was not subject to short-term fluctuations in the period analysed. Nor did she find that the diminished clarity of responsibility may hamper the economic vote.

This finding is relatively different from others, such as Hernandez and Kriesi (2016) who, using party electoral performance data before and after the crisis in 30 countries determined that prime ministers’ parties are routinely damaged by the crisis, besides being harmed because they are in government. Giuliani and Massari (2017) also use aggregate data, namely the electoral performances of parties competing in 89 elections held in 28 EU member-states between 2003 and 2015. They find that all incumbent parties suffer similarly in the event of an economic crisis, while the PM’s party gains comparatively more when there is economic growth. They also find that Euroscepticism has become much more important. Eurosceptic parties’ success has been proportional to the depth of the recession. This latter finding corroborates the findings of Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012).

Moving to the individual data level, Vidal (2017) analyses the change in voting behaviour in Spain before and after the Eurozone crisis. Looking at data collected in 2015 and 2016 the author finds that the change in voting behaviour, and especially the choice for the new parties that arise, is a combination of economic voting and dissatisfaction with the overall political system. Both factors in Spain reinforce the left-right cleavage. Thus, in terms of economic voting there seems to be disagreement, with investigators using different ways to measure electoral outcomes and reaching divergent conclusions on the importance of the Eurozone crisis for the economic vote.

One type of impact through the left-right cleavage may occur if the politicization of the EU is mainly about “distributional” issues. The other
type of impact – impacting on the strength of the economic or leaders’ vote – may happen if the EU is being politicized mainly as a “transfer of authority”. Whereas Zürn (2016) has recently put forward a framework within which the quality of politicization of the EU will depend on the nature of democratic national setting within which it happens. They envisage positive politicization only if the European cleavage reinforces the pre-existing national ones.

While it is reasonable to expect that these might indeed be the two main mechanisms through which EU-politicization is changing the vote calculus, the extent to which these are actually occurring is strongly dependent on how citizens react to EU-related issues. It is also necessary to distinguish between economic crisis effects and politicization of Europe effects, which are not necessarily the same. The main goal to be tested remains, however, the idea that the progressive importance of Europe for decision-making may lead to changes in the voting explanatory model.

The integration of citizen attitudes alongside the media and parliamentary debates not only helps to understand the depth of politicization that has occurred in Europe, it also makes it easier to understand the context within which these phenomena can take place.

MOVING FORWARD: A MORE ENCOMPASSING STUDY OF EU POLITICIZATION

Following the idea that contestation over EU matters plays out in different dynamics in different countries, we expect it to have different sets of consequences for citizens’ vote calculus. Our aim is to make sense of both of these different sets of consequences, as well as to map the different modalities with which the EU has been politicized in different parts of Europe. As argued above, the link between modalities of politicization, political attitudes, and electoral behaviour constitutes the most important gap in the literature on EU-politicization, as it has so far been only (marginally) theorized and not been studied empirically (with a few rare exceptions, Baglioni and Hurrelman 2016). We aim to fill this gap with a three-dimensional study that first uncovers the magnitude and modalities of EU-politicization in the aftermath of the Eurocrisis at both media and parliamentary levels, and that subsequently creates a web-panel survey with questions about citizens’ perceptions of how the EU affects their electoral choices. The three dimensions – media, parliament,
and citizens – will provide indicators of EU politicization at different stages of the democratic cycle.

The main belief that guides our research is that the Eurocrisis has given a significant boost to the saliency and polarization of the EU. In turn, we expect this increased politicization to affect how citizens vote, and more specifically how at elections citizens reward or punish national incumbents (Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012). The literature already suggests that the politicization of the EU is likely to be impacting voters’ preferences on redistributive issues as well as their perception of who is in charge of the country’s policies (Hutter and Kriesi 2016; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017). We expect that the Eurocrisis has accelerated this process particularly, as the events of the crisis may have raised citizens’ awareness of the extent to which economic policies are coordinated at the supranational level.

Considering that the crisis hit some countries harder than others, the context of the Eurozone crisis allows us to map how the politicization of the EU’s increasing involvement in national economic policy-making may affect voting behaviour. More specifically, we expect debtor and creditor countries to reveal different dynamics in this regard. Due to the different exposure to the EU-promoted austerity measures, it is for example expectable that the recent wave of political contestation over EU matters has played out in different ways in Northern and Southern Europe.

We also expect there to be country-specific factors in the ways in which the EU has been politicized. Taking these considerations into account, we focus our study on two creditor countries (Belgium and Germany) and four debtor countries (Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal). With this relatively heterogeneous set of cases, we expect to gain insights into how EU contestation generates different patterns of electoral behaviour at different levels of EU intervention in national politics, as well as into how the EU is perceived in countries featuring different EU-related narratives.

To map the different modalities and magnitudes of EU-politicization, we analyse both print-media and parliamentary debates. Covering the time range between the introduction of the Euro (2002) and today (2017), we put our focus on election campaigns by analysing the newspaper editions of the 30 days preceding the national elections, and the plenary parliamentary sessions of the last 12 months of each legislature in the given time frame. The study consists of quantitative techniques of text analysis as well as of more qualitatively crafted investigations of the narratives surrounding the EU. In
this way we obtain comparative overviews of the frequencies with which the EU has been referred to in the media and in the parliament, and of the range of actors involved and the sentiment surrounding mentions or debates of the EU. These comparative overviews will therefore be informative about the extent to which the politicization of the EU has played a role in national elections before and after the crisis, as well as the different narratives in debtor and creditor countries.

Differently from existing media-based studies on salience and polarization (Kriesi et al. 2012), our measure of EU-salience will be weighted within the following sections: national politics, economics and international politics, opinion, first and last page. At the same time, we will control for the salience of a typically highly-contested issue, namely education, in order to check the extent to which the EU-salience may in some instances grow beyond average levels. The newspaper articles, moreover, will be organized according to section, theme, and article type (e.g. editorial, front page article, etc.). In this way we will gain insight into whether the salience of the EU varies only in specific parts of the newspaper or throughout the entire edition.

Similarly, the individual interventions in the plenary sessions will be organized according to the speaker, party affiliation (including government vs. opposition), legislative instrument, and theme. In this way we will not only obtain variations over time and across countries of EU salience, but we will also gain an insight into which parties drive more or less the politicization of the EU. In turn, by controlling for legislative instruments and themes, we will also be able to obtain insights into how the EU issue taps in to the legislative activities of parliaments, thereby providing valuable information about the modalities through which national legislatures are losing political authority to supranational institutions. The combined analysis with the media, in turn, will be informative about how and to what extent these losses of authority constitute part of the election campaign.

By bringing together the findings from newspapers and parliamentary debates we will thus be able to create a unique Index of Politicization of the EU (IPEU) on the basis of which it is possible to trace the magnitude, timing, and causes of politicization. It is on the basis of this Index that we will then be able to develop a web-panel survey that will enable us to move to the next and final stage of our endeavour, namely analysing the consequences for political attitudes and voting behaviour in the avenues outlined above; namely, the EU as a cleavage, as an issue, and as a moderator of short-term economic and leader
effects. The web-panel, in fact, will be built upon the insights generated by the IPEU, as it will formulate questions about how the patterns of politicization in the different countries affect the political attitudes and voting behaviour of respondents. Understanding how Europe affects the vote calculus will provide crucial insights about the future of democracy in the EU.

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MARINA COSTA LOBO  
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa  
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal  
marina.costalobo@ics.ulisboa.pt  
orcid.org/0000-0002-7329-0972

JOHANNES KARREMAN S  
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa  
johannes.karremans@ics.ulisboa.pt  
orcid.org/0000-0002-8770-374X

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§ REFERENCES


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Favourable outcomes, procedural fairness, and political support: results from a survey experiment

Pedro C. Magalhães
Tiago Abril
INTRODUCTION

Many studies show that, in their relation with authorities, people care not only about getting their preferred outcomes but also about the way those outcomes are generated, especially about the extent to which decision-making procedures are fair. Furthermore, a growing research agenda has shown an interactive effect between outcomes and procedures (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; Gangl 2003; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2014; Van Dijke and Verboon 2010; Wilking and Zhang 2017). Through this “process-outcome interaction”, the fairer the procedures, the less people seem to care about outcomes.

Do these aspects of people’s relationship with authorities tend to generalize to the study of political authorities and the policy outcomes they generate? We believe this question is important for the broader themes of citizenship and crisis addressed by this volume. As we have seen throughout Europe in recent years, economic crises generate negative outcomes and thus endanger the public standing of political authorities. Furthermore, economic shocks may force authorities to take measures that, although potentially necessary and beneficial in the long run, produce short-term costs and further losses in support. However, this could be less politically damaging if, as Mansbridge argues, fairness in the procedures behind policy- and decision-making somehow mitigate the detrimental effect of delivering negative outcomes, giving authorities “the discretion to act in ways that, although not in the short-term interest of citizens, may benefit those citizens in the long run” (Mansbridge 1990, 175).

In this research note we address this issue and attempt to add to the literature in three ways. First, we look experimentally at how both procedural fairness and outcome favourability matter for people’s support for political authorities, in terms of both incumbent approval and (intended) voting. Second, we look at different dimensions of procedural fairness — Voice, Neutrality, and Transparency — to determine which of them appears to be most consequential for political support. Finally, we test for the existence of a process-outcome interaction in the explanation of political support using the experimental method.

Several aspects remain unclear in the literature testing theories of procedural fairness as they apply to the study of political support. The first concerns the extent to which procedural fairness and outcome favourability matter overall for people when reacting to political and policy decisions. Based on a large number of experiments, Esaiasson et al. (2016) suggest that citizens’
acceptance of policy decisions is driven much more by outcome favourability than by procedural fairness. Our work, whose experimental design is largely based on their own, asks whether that is also the case when we move from “decision acceptance” as the main dependent variable to attitudinal and behavioural support for the political authorities that issues those decisions. A second unclear aspect concerns the dimension of procedural fairness that might be most consequential for political support. While many authors have stressed the importance of “voice” and “neutrality” (Rodell, Colquitt and Baer 2016; Rosenbaum et al. 2017; Van Craen and Skogan 2016), a somewhat neglected dimension has been the notion of “transparency” or “accessibility” (but see Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2014; Migacz, Zou and Petrick 2017). Finally, it is also unclear whether a process-outcome interaction applies when political support is concerned. Positive and negative results coexist: while Kumlin (2004) and Bøggild (2016) find no significant interaction effects between outcomes and procedures in the explanation of political support, other studies obtain such an interaction (Magalhães 2016, 2017).

METHOD

Our experimental design closely follows Esaiasson et al.’s (2016) model of acceptance of policy decisions, applied to a survey experiment.

PARTICIPANTS

The survey took place during the months before the local elections in Portugal that took place on 1 October 2017. It was online for 58 days (from 27 July 2017 to 22 September 2017). Online surveys allow systematic access to the information of a given sample, and are an ecological method that takes into account: costs (faster, simpler, and cheaper) and data collection (allows access to a large number of participants in a short period of time). Online surveys are also less intrusive than many other techniques (with fewer social desirability effects) and have greater response accuracy (Bethlehem and Biffignandi 2012). We used a convenience sample; participants were contacted through social networks (including Facebook, Linkedin, e-mail, and academic portals). The survey was performed with the Qualtrics platform (which presented seven conditions, randomly selecting only one for each participant, using only a single link).
Participants were also informed about the anonymity of their answers. A valid sample of 939 respondents was obtained. Average age was 42.68 (SD = 13.166), 55.1% of the individuals were male. As a result of a preliminary screening, we selected only participants who indicated that they had the right to vote in the Portuguese municipal elections.

**MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE**

Before the survey two pre-tests were conducted with a convenience sample (the first with 40 participants, and the second with 41 participants), which led to the selection of the two outcomes, each showing similar average levels of importance and similar distributions, but being inversely proportional. Following that, the online survey with the two chosen outcomes and seven conditions was conducted (Figure 3.1).

The survey consisted of an initial set of sociodemographic questions (gender, age, level of education, social class, residence, residence council, left-right orientation, and political proximity to a party). Subsequently the survey elicited from respondents their preference about a hypothetical investment outcome. Participants were asked to imagine that the mayor of their municipality had to choose between investing funds in the rehabilitation of degraded municipal heritage or promoting accessibility of municipal buildings for handicapped people. Subjects were then probed about their preferred outcome (whether they personally supported the first or the second policy decision).

**Figure 3.1** *Survey model*
After answering this question, participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions (one control group and six fairness conditions). In the control condition, the final decision outcome was indicated (“promoting accessibility”). Under the remaining conditions, we first primed procedural considerations, by presenting subjects with a list of alternative decision-making arrangements to make the policy decision. Three variants were employed for the six remaining conditions, expressing the existence or nonexistence of fairness in the variants of Voice, Neutrality, and Transparency. They involved calling a meeting of the municipal assembly where citizens were allowed to express their opinions about the investment (High Voice), vs. making the decision immediately in closed executive meeting (Low Voice); consult with independent experts on matters of health and patrimony in the city (High Neutrality), vs. consulting only with county council presidents of the mayor’s own party (Low Neutrality); and make all documentation about the pros and cons of each investment publicly available to citizens before the decision was made (High Transparency), vs. divulging such information only after the decision was made and only upon request (Low Transparency).

Finally, under all of the six conditions, as in the control condition, the outcome was revealed (constant for all, “promoting accessibility”), but also the procedure that was adopted, with randomly assigned low or high procedural fairness in the variants of Voice, Neutrality, and Transparency. To conclude the survey, all participants answered on a 0 to 10 Likert scale about “How much do you think the decision was fair?”; “How much do you think citizens have had the opportunity to influence the decision made?”; “To what extent do you think the decision was taken in an impartial manner?”; “To what extent do you think the decision was taken in a transparent manner?”; and “On the basis of the information we have given you, how satisfied are you with the City Council?” A final question was asked “Based on the information we gave you, would you say that you would feel:” with three options: “More willing to vote for the current Mayor” (2), “More willing to vote against the current Mayor” (0), and “Neither one nor the other” (1).

RESULTS

There are no significant differences ($x^2 (6) = 3.808, p = .703$) in the distribution between the response options in the investments when crossed with the
seven conditions (Figure 3.2), which ensures the control of the outcome favourability.

Figures 3.3 to 3.5 show average levels of perceived Voice, Neutrality, and Transparency in the different conditions. Subjects in the Low Voice condition show significantly lower levels of perceived Voice in comparison with the control group, while subjects in the High Voice condition perceived significantly higher levels of Voice, ensuring validity check of voice manipulation. The same occurs with the validity check of Neutrality (F(6,885) = 17.073, \( p < .000 \)), and with the validity check of Transparency manipulation (F(6,876) = 37.824, \( p < .000 \)).

Neither the interaction/moderation between the party of the executive and the choice of response of outcome (F(2,928) = 1.640, \( p = .195 \)), nor between the seven conditions (F(12,913) = 1.200, \( p = .278 \)) show significant differences in the average perception of fairness of decision. The same occurs for the average level of satisfaction with mayor’s office (F(2,868) = 0.861, \( p = .423 \)) and (F(12,853) = 1.021, \( p = .427 \)). This suggests that proximity to the main party in the executive council of the municipality does not overlap or interact with experimental conditions of manipulation of justice or with outcomes.

However, there are individual statistical differences in the average perception of fairness of decision (F(2,931) = 3.041, \( p = .048 \)), average level of satisfaction with mayor’s office (F(2,871) = 57.039, \( p < .001 \)), and the change in the intention to vote for the incumbent mayor (\( \chi^2(4) = 54.479, \))

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**Figure 3.2**

*Distribution of preferred policy outcomes by condition*

- **Heritage rehabilitation**: 100%
- **Accessibility for handicapped**: 80%
- **Control group**: 60%
- **Low voice**: 40%
- **High voice**: 20%
- **Low neutrality**: 0%
- **High neutrality**: 20%
- **Low transparency**: 40%
- **High transparency**: 60%
- **Control group**: 80%
- **Low voice**: 60%
- **High voice**: 40%
- **Low neutrality**: 20%
- **High neutrality**: 0%
- **Low transparency**: 0%
- **High transparency**: 20%
- **Control group**: 0%
- **Low voice**: 20%
- **High voice**: 40%
- **Low neutrality**: 60%
- **High neutrality**: 80%
- **Low transparency**: 40%
- **High transparency**: 60%

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**Figure 3.3**

Average perception of voice on a scale of 1 to 10 per condition (one control group and six experimental groups)

- Control group: 4.05
- High voice: 5.60
  - Low voice: 2.86
- High neutrality: 3.90
  - Low neutrality: 3.23
- High transparency: 5.19
  - Low transparency: 2.94

**Figure 3.4**

Average perception of neutrality on a scale of 1 to 10 per condition (one control group and six experimental groups)

- Control group: 4.83
- High voice: 5.72
  - Low voice: 4.34
- High neutrality: 5.56
  - Low neutrality: 3.83
- High transparency: 5.74
  - Low transparency: 3.94

**Figure 3.5**

Average perception of transparency on a scale of 1 to 10 per condition (one control group and six experimental groups)

- Control group: 4.82
- High voice: 6.20
  - Low voice: 3.76
- High neutrality: 5.84
  - Low neutrality: 3.70
- High transparency: 6.23
  - Low transparency: 2.92
depending on proximity to the party of the mayor. This suggests that partisanship mattered in people’s responses, and that subjects resorted to their real experience even when asked about a hypothetical political context. This also implies that estimates of the effects of objective and subjective fairness conditions on political support need to be obtained while controlling for partisanship.

To understand those direct and indirect effects, we turned to several structural equation models (SEM), based on Esaiasson et al.’s (2016) model of acceptance of policy decisions. The different models employed each of the several different justice conditions (Voice, Neutrality, and Transparency) and each of the two dependent variables (1) Satisfaction with mayor’s office and (2) Intention to vote. Figure 3.6 illustrates one of the models estimated (Voice).

Several features are evident from this analysis. First, whether the decision is hypothesized to take place under an “objective” High or Low Voice condition is something that affects political support (satisfaction with the Mayor’s office), both directly and indirectly. While the indirect effect — as mediated by the perceived fairness of decision-making — is greater than the direct one, the latter is also significant. Second, obtaining a favourable outcome increases satisfaction with the Mayor’s office, but, in the Voice experiment, only directly so. There is no evidence in this experiment that outcome favourability shapes perceptions of fairness and, by so doing, affects political support. Finally, the total effect of Voice is about twice as large as the effect of Outcome Favourability.

**Figure 3.6**

Effects on satisfaction with Mayor’s office, Voice experiment. Standardized coefficients.
Table 3.1 shows the results for all structural equation models, by variant of procedural fairness and by dependent variable of political support (satisfaction with the Mayor’s office or change in intention to vote for the Mayor’s party).

Overall, we find that although outcome favourability also affects perceptions of fairness, the total effects of objective procedural fairness are always greater than the effects of outcome favourability, regardless of the objective fairness condition manipulated — Voice, Neutrality, or Transparency — and of the specific outcome variable. On the other hand, in all analyses, most of the effect exerted by objective conditions is indirect, mediated by perceptions of fairness, although in two conditions — Voice and Transparency — objective fairness also exerts a direct effect on political support, regardless of how we measure it.

An additional concern of the paper is related to whether outcome favourability’s direct effect on political support is unconditional or, instead, if it decreases as people perceived the decision-making process to be fairer. In other words, we want to test if the mediator “perception of fairness” is also a moderator of the relationship between outcomes and support. Figures 3.7 to 3.9 show the results of the experiments for each dimension of procedural fairness looking at satisfaction with the mayor as the dependent variable:

In each of the analyses, the sign for the coefficient of the interaction term (Perceived fairness*Outcome favourability) is negative, in the expected direction. However, in one of the experiments — Transparency — the magnitude of that interaction term is more than twice as large as in the other cases, and reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. Results using change in the intention to vote for the current Mayor are very similar, whether treating that variable as continuous or ordinal.

---

1 For the equation with vote as the dependent variable (0, less likely; 1, neither nor; 2, more likely to vote for Mayor), we also estimated a structural equation model with ordinal probit. Results are very similar.
### Table 3.1

Structural equation models (standardized coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETERS</th>
<th>POLITICAL SUPPORT DV: SATISFACTION WITH MAYOR</th>
<th>POLITICAL SUPPORT DV: CHANGE IN VOTE INTENTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice treatment</td>
<td>Neutrality treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective fairness (\rightarrow) Fairness perception</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome favourability (\rightarrow) Fairness perception</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls (not shown): Sex, Age, Education, Class, Closeness to Mayor’s Party

Fairness perception \(\rightarrow\) Political support | .58*** | .67*** | .61*** | .40*** | .40*** | .41*** |

Objective fairness \(\rightarrow\) Political support | .18*** | .05 | .11* | .13* | .03 | .14* |

Outcome favourability \(\rightarrow\) Political support | .14** | .10* | .09 | .17** | .08 | .06 |

Controls (not shown): Sex, Age, Education, Class, Closeness to Mayor’s Party

Indirect effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voice treatment</th>
<th>Neutrality treatment</th>
<th>Transparency treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective fairness</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome favourability</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>.12***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voice treatment</th>
<th>Neutrality treatment</th>
<th>Transparency treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective fairness</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome favourability</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
**Figure 3.7**
Effects on satisfaction with Mayor’s office, Voice experiment. Fairness-outcome interaction.

**Figure 3.8**
Effects on satisfaction with Mayor’s office, Neutrality experiment. Fairness-outcome interaction.

**Figure 3.9**
Effects on satisfaction with Mayor’s office, Transparency experiment. Fairness-outcome interaction.
CONCLUSION

This research note reports the results of a survey experiment through which we examined several phenomena; first, the extent to which individuals respond to procedural fairness and outcome favourability when evaluating political authorities responsible for policy decisions. We find that procedurally fair rules have a significantly greater total effect on political support for authorities, an effect that is largely mediated by perceptions of fairness but can also be, in some cases, a direct effect. Second, we examine whether this varies significantly when examining three different dimensions of procedural fairness: Voice, Neutrality/Impartiality, and Accessibility/Transparency. In general, we find that the previous finding holds regardless of the dimension we focus on. Thus, overall, fairness matters more than outcome favourability (when both outcomes are positive outcomes for society, but one is more favourable than the other for each individual person). Moreover, what is most important for a person is not the fairness event/situation itself, but mostly the perception that each individual person has about it (especially with Neutrality, but also detectable with Transparency and Voice).

Finally, we test whether the effects of outcome favourability on support are moderated by procedural fairness. Our findings do not yield such results in all experimental conditions (although we see the same direction, no significant values were obtained). Only when Transparency is manipulated do we find perceived procedural fairness to significantly moderate the direct effect of outcome favourability. These results suggest that in high transparency events/situations, receiving a favourable outcome is of little importance, but in low transparency events/situations, whether or not receiving a favourable outcome counts more. The overall results also highlight the importance of clarifying which dimensions of procedural fairness are used in a given study, because even with similar effects they behave in different ways, with effects that may be different in some contexts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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FAVOURABLE OUTCOMES, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT 85

PEDRO C. MAGALHÃES
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
pedro.magalhaes@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-8934-4552

TIAGO ABRIL
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
tiago.abril@ics.ulisboa.pt

§ REFERENCES


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:

Economic crisis and political decision: words and meaning

Virgínia Henriques Calado
Luís Cunha
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between crisis and citizenship is complex and ambiguous. Objectively, a crisis, as deep as the one we experienced recently almost inevitably implies a compression of citizenship rights, even of those that we considered unassailable. This is done by reducing some of the institutional responses usually provided by the State, thereby aggravating unemployment and insolvency. It is true that the idea of citizenship was summoned from positions of power, namely with the call for collective commitment in overcoming the crisis. However, it was a mobilization requirement that cannot be dissociated from the attribution of responsibilities, which are also collective, as was the generic and abusive claim that people had lived above possibilities.

Aware of the multiplicity of approaches to the relationship between crisis and citizenship, let us elucidate the purpose of this text: it is not an analysis of how specific groups of citizens have organized to provide answers to the crisis. What we are looking for is an identification of particular mechanisms – expressed in the construction of narratives and in the language used – through which a convincing world view is created and the responses to the crisis are sought to influence the exercise of citizenship. If a crisis context can be seen as leading to specific forms of exercising citizenship, it should also be emphasized that discourses and narratives about it contribute to the definition of specific forms of citizen organization. It is therefore important that we devote particular attention to them. The experience of the crisis creates favourable conditions for the affirmation of models of deconstruction and deciphering that may be relevant to a more enlightened and committed citizenship. In some ways, it is in the debate between a hegemonic narrative, which denies the ideological dimension on which it is based, and the effort to uncover the mechanisms of its construction, that our contribution is situated.

FROM CRISIS TO CRISES: SEGMENTATION AND DISSIMULATION

This chapter is definitely not a proposal to understand the crisis from the Political economy point of view, nor can we place this input in the sphere of Political philosophy or make it fit into the old or renewed debates of Economic sociology or Economic anthropology, even though its authors are trained anthropologists. The difficulty in accurately placing ourselves arises not only
from the nature of the object of inquiry but also from the intersection of two epistemological vectors: the attempt to observe it from an effort of disciplinary transversality and the heuristic value that we give to the interstitial spaces within the framework of the debate we aim to initiate.

We will not address the discussion concerning the virtues and possible inadequacies of a model of ordering and organizing knowledge with its core on the strict specialization and the inevitable fragmentation that comes with it. As a replacement for this necessarily long and inevitably displaced discussion, we emphasize that the object we propose to address, at least in the way we conceive it, is particularly dispersed by areas of knowledge which, in some cases, are not even contiguous. From our point of view, therefore, it recommends an integrated gaze inspired by what could be called a general theory of social systems. We do not, obviously, intend to propose something that resembles this, but we still seek an approach based more on dispersion than on specialization, engendered more in a(n) (un)certain cross-fertilization of knowledge than on a narrow respect for disciplinary boundaries.

It is not, of course, only a matter of trying a free exercise of heterodoxy before modestly contributing to a debate which, by its very nature and implications, needs to be as broad as possible. We understand that disciplinary boundaries are not limited to defining knowledge only in favour of a virtuous specialization, but they are also decisive in creating the hierarchy of these fields of knowledge. On the other hand, the dispute concerning legitimate fields of knowledge can operate, and does operate in the case of economics, a disguise effect, which limits and restrains the practical action of agents. To put it in another way, and trying to connect these arguments, we consider specialization not only as a consequence of an operative rationality sustained by the virtues of labour division; it is also the product of the symbolic fights that move across the fields of knowledge and, thus, creator of representations and conceptions of the world that guide social practices.

Before we even enunciate the script we intend to follow, let us begin by considering the nature of the object of search, seeking to point out the way in which it shows itself as elusive, assuming different images, reconfiguring itself, without essential changing. It is important to highlight that the crisis we are talking about, and which we will discuss here, has had different forms of expression, themselves associated with different narratives, as if they were different and disconnected phenomena (Teles 2017, 53-54). It was first named a crisis in financial systems, thus referring to a global financial crisis (2007-08)
that resulted from the implosion of the US financial market, which had grown speculatively due to the strong flow of foreign capital to that country (Varoufakis 2015). What followed, clearly from 2011 on, was the public debt crisis in the Eurozone, which was therefore given a distinct geographical scope and also a different explanation – that of the imbalance between creditor and debtor countries, with the latter suffering the most penalizing consequences.\(^1\) From 2013 on and as a result of the reversal of US monetary policy and the loss of market value of many commodities, a third side of the crisis became clear, now affecting emerging countries.\(^2\) Finally, today: “we are apparently in the fourth act of the crisis” (Teles 2017, 54). This crisis is centred in the developed countries, which have plunged into a long period of low growth, high unemployment, and have come close to deflation in a situation of apparent endless stagnation.

The opinion of economists concerning this issue is not consensual, but this is not what matters to us here. The point that seems most relevant to us is the one concerning the practical effects of this process of fragmentation of a phenomenon that in many ways is seen as indivisible. We argue that this segmentation is neither neutral nor justified by strictly technical criteria, but it depends instead on the adjustment to far-reaching political narratives. This adjustment has decisive implications from the point of view of the measures applied to the resolution of the crisis, since it signifies a change of moral judgment on its causes.\(^3\) It should also be mentioned that this segmentation of the crisis is already a simplification, as it leaves out the possibility of thinking about this mutant crisis in a longer temporality, just like other dimensions that only seem to escape it. In the long run it is possible to trace back the current

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1 A direct relationship can be established between these two acts of crisis: “the crisis has undergone a metamorphosis: what was apparently a financial crisis in 2007-2008 – the banking freeze and the credit crunch – became an explosive political crisis because states were directly involved in solving the financial crisis, with the burden being transferred to states and governments” (Thompson 2011, 38) [our translation].

2 Equally inseparable from the 2007/8 crisis, especially if we see in the slowdown in growth of these countries as a consequence of the collapse of the financial surplus recycling mechanism, as proposed by Varoufakis (2015).

3 If the “crisis of the financial systems” hardly escapes a critical evaluation of the performance of banks and the greed of financial agents, its transmutation into a “public debt crisis” places moral judgment on the reckless behaviour of ordinary citizens – “We lived beyond our means.” The “genesis amnesia”, pointed out by Bourdieu (2000, 16), has a clear illustration here.
developments to the *oil crisis* (1973) and to the profound economic, political, and social transformations promoted by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher’s governments (Judt 2010, 99). On the other hand, and concerning a different issue, the *refugee crisis* as a result of the greater migratory wave and humanitarian crisis that Europe has faced since World War II, or the resurgence of nationalist movements, both have evident connections with global processes (financial, political, and others) that explain economic crises *stricto sensu*.

In a globalized world like the one we live in – unequally globalized, we already know it, but which has precisely in the financial system one of the highest exponents of globalization (Santos 2001) – it seems inappropriate to split or circumscribe financial crises according to geographical or spatial criteria. The sovereign debts of the southern European countries and the strong decelerating or even halt in the growth rate of the emerging countries cannot be separated from a global macroeconomic framework, which includes phenomena such as the social division of labour, the direction of flows in a global economy, or the unequal power of countries. We should not, however, reduce the proposals for segmentation of the crisis to an error of evaluation or to a desire to simplify it, nor to a deliberate effort to control damages made by those who have an interest in this same control. We argue that we should see in them not a *strategy* but a condition that tends to be *structural*: “We are segmented everywhere and in all directions. Man is a segmental animal. Segmentarity belongs to all the strata that compose us” (Deleuze and Guattari 1972, 268). However, the classical opposition between the segmentary and the centralized is not relevant in this case:

> The modern political system is a global, unified and unifying whole, but [this is so] because it implies a set of juxtaposed, overlapping, orderly subsystems in such a way that the analysis of decisions reveals all sorts of separations and partial processes that are not maintained from one to the next without imbalances or displacements. (Deleuze and Guattari 1972, 269)

We can see in this description of the modern model of power a design that fits the way in which the dominant economic theory – let us call it *Theory of Rational Action* – manages its territory. Crossing the different axes in which power is centred and their branches (political, financial, legal, and even media centres) are located with an instrumental segmentation of the event, which is also language containment, a closing effect is achieved that allows to both
govern the reading of the past and to predict the future.\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Closing} means, in this case, a molecular expansion of unified signs, a meaning-producing machine, which curtails the counterpoint, preventing, in the limit, dissent. This closure can be both manifest and sometimes subtle in our everyday experience – obvious, for instance, in the recognition as \textit{truth} of the statement “There Is No Alternative” condensed into the acronym \textsc{tina}; more subtle when a neutral judgment is attributed to financial rating agencies, as if this neutrality were derived from the function they perform, and cannot be tainted by the links to actual branches of the financial system. One can see in these examples the molecular expansion of a \textit{truth} that does not allow any discussion and involves complex devices, which have a formal sedimentation – for instance in the legal sphere – but also informal, clear in the political discourse or in the media space. From this comes, thus, an enclosing of \textit{public sphere} (Habermas 1962) and the reduction of the exercise of citizenship to innocuous ritual procedures.

Returning to the idea of \textit{crisis}, we understand that we must see in it simultaneously a singular moment and also the materialization of a cyclical event that is an integral part of how \textit{economy} works in modern societies. In the first sense, the idea of \textit{crisis} (re)assumes a meaning that seems to have been lost. Understood as a “decisive moment” (Leone 2016, 11), it would signal a turning point, an end of cycle in its minimalist expression, or, in its maximalist expression, the \textit{revolutionary} end of an era.\textsuperscript{5} The second sense we proposed is not contradictory when compared to this one, it just implies another focus. Instead of seeing the crisis as a decisive moment, it is a matter of seeing it as an inevitable consequence of the dynamics of a system that needs the crisis to regenerate itself. It is not a question of declaring the existence of a definite intentionality, let alone trying any conspiracy theory (Thompson 2011, 43), but the mere replacement of the belief in the \textit{virtuous balance} generated by

\textsuperscript{4} The homogenization of a narrative brings us, of course, before the question of \textit{agency}: to which instance should be attributed the greater responsibility in the production of this narrative? Where should we put the line that separates this production from its homogenization, in order to perceive the dynamics of processes and their agents? Rehearsing an answer to these issues is outside the scope of this work, but here is its signage.

\textsuperscript{5} In this sense, Castells’ reading (2013, 10) seems to indicate the \textit{minimalist} option: “the aftermath [of the crisis] is fundamentally the aftermath of the end of a particular model of speculative capitalism.” In the \textit{maximalist} version we would, of course, be faced with the irrecoverable collapse of the capitalist model.
the market by the idea that successive imbalances are systemic and the result of structural inequalities between individual agents and collective entities, such as countries. If we put debt at the heart of the capitalist economy (Thompson 2011, 33), we can see the crisis as the extreme manifestation of the structural imbalance between debtor and creditor (Varoufakis 2015), bringing to life the market, levelling and egalitarian, as an essential fantasy for the health of the capitalist system.⁶ Seen through these lenses, the crisis, any crisis, but also this one in which we still live, acquires another expression, losing neutrality to assume a definite political sense: that of managing inequalities, naturalizing them, and emptying them of their arbitrary contents. The success of this effect depends, as we shall see later, on the effectiveness of the narratives that the model itself demands. Aspects such as persuasion, disguise, and even the use of forms of external intervention (Troika) are consistent with this narrative, sustaining and reinforcing it. Grant (2012), discussing the legitimacy of the use of incentives, such as IMF loans, argues precisely that these, like persuasion or coercion, are forms of exercising power that allow the manipulation of individuals through political games.

It is to this exercise of making sense that we should report the theoretical and practical work of segmenting the crisis. Whether considered at the level of diagnosis or therapy, this segmentation, like any other, can be reported in an apparently neutral way to the complex exercise of drawing boundaries and operating distinctions, that is, to an act of ordering that is simultaneously indispensable and arbitrary (Cunha 2007). Inevitability stems from the need to give a recognizable meaning to what would otherwise be a chaotic succession of events. Arbitrariness arises from the definition of the criteria of ordering, of the place where the frontier is placed and legitimized, that is, of the division of the world that is inherent to the act of drawing boundaries (Bourdieu 1989).

The arbitrary nature of the division is dissimulated; from the very beginning thanks to the auctoritas of who divides, which refers to the enunciation and to the acts that create meaning and govern the legitimate order of the world. If we consider specifically the economic order, which has, as we shall see, the ambition of becoming a global order, we will realize that the procedures added to this device are multiple, complex, and widespread. For our part, although without the ambition of being exhaustive, we will focus our analysis on the

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⁶ The centrality of debt is discussed by Caillé (2002, 248) in an even more fundamental sense, which is the hypothesis of debt being constitutive of the subject and guarantor of social perenniality.
mechanisms that produce a convincing narrative, summoning, as an example, the political discourse, specifically by analysing the speeches of the prime ministers in the framework of the Debates on the State of the Nation over ten years (2008-17).

The idea of narrative is understood here as a statement composed by expressive content, that is, “A method of recapitulating past experience that consists in matching a sequence of events (supposedly real) to an identical sequence of verbal propositions” (Labov 1978, 295). The discourse seems a set of statements that cannot be separated from its setting of production (Reis and Lopes 2002, 110). Thus, the meaning that derives from discourse and is expressed in words, expressions, and prepositions, is inseparable from socio-historical processes and from the ideological placement of agents.

The roadmap for what remains of this paper can now be drawn. We have argued that the process of segmentation of the crisis into sectoral crises is not able to be reduced to a possible technical justification, implying, on the contrary, the management of a narrative that not only orders temporality but also affects the meaning of past actions and the strategy for future actions. In the next steps of this work we will try to open the analysis beyond the technical and also symbolic process of crisis segmentation. We will focus on the sphere of language, summoning, at first, some of the central narratives of formalist economic theory, and then focusing on the contemporary modalities of word management through the use of an almost newspeak in the Orwellian sense of the term. Finally, we will conclude by addressing processes of enunciation recorded in political discourse, choosing, in this case, an analysis that we have taken as illustrative, since it focuses on a singular moment – Debates on the State of the Nation – and on the expression of a single voice, that of the acting Prime Minister.

We consider that political discourse does, in its own way, what science does as well: it classifies and orders, it intersects things and words in order to create rhetorical effects that can become generators of meaning and truth, giving expression to a world view according to specific knowledge and beliefs. On the perspective adopted here concerning the power of discourse, see Foucault (1971).
irrefutable. If the high technicity of Political Economy is a field to experts only, the possibility of applying far-reaching measures to the economy belongs to the State and to those who rule it. Two orders of meaning are thus articulated, into which we will look. On the one hand, one deriving from the competence recognized in the economics experts; on the other hand, another one that is based on the way in which political discourse leans upon and reinforces ideologies (Mannheim 1960) that are widespread in social space.

OLD FABLES AND NEW TALES: PERSISTENCE AND RENEWAL OF NARRATIVES

In a work whose greatest aim was dissemination, Vitor Bento summons morals to help explain economics:

Economics, as a study of reality or, more accurately, of human behaviour related to economic activity, is a positive science and, as such, a science (practically) independent of moral considerations. But economy, as a human activity, always works in moral contexts. (Bento 2011, 10)

The distinction pointed out by Vitor Bento is almost reduced to irrelevance if we believe that all human activity is economic, that is, if we reduce society to the market. The ambition to be a positive science and the inevitability of being a social science could lead Political Economy to an unmanageable field, which, as we know, does not happen. On the contrary, economists move on clearly defined, monitored, rationalized, and predictable grounds. How do you get this effect? It is often done by placing morality at the service of economics, that is, by making it the basis of positive science, by establishing a connection between human nature and economic behaviour. Fables and metaphors have served this purpose, so it is worthwhile considering here, even briefly, something that can be seen as belonging to the matrix narratives of Political Economics.

In 1714 Bernard de Mandeville published The Fable of the Bees, or: Private Vices, Public Benefits that would become famous in the core arguments developed by Political Economics. About half a century later, Adam Smith published his most famous work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), which is an expressive example to account for natural economic behaviour:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith 1776, 95)

These two narratives converge in the idea that it is private interest that leads to the proper operation of both society and economy, but in no case the dispensability of ethics and morality is affirmed. Mandeville is suspicious of virtue, seeing behind it selfishness – for instance, when carrying out charitable acts, one finds personal satisfaction in them (Brito 2014). In his case, the debate focuses not on the grounds of *morality* but on denouncing *hypocrisy*, which he does with a sharp cynicism. As for Adam Smith, it would be extremely reductive to see him as a defender of the subordination of morality and ethics to strict economic rationality. Not only for his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), but for the fact that his work could and should be seen as an attempt to build a social and moral science, far beyond the framework of nineteenth-century political economy (Swedberg 1994, 44). Contrary to this perspective, the course taken by Political Economics meant distancing itself from the uncertainty of a *moral social science*, favouring the development of a model that should be capable of replacing uncertainty. What we are interested in discussing at this point is not the relevance of these authors to economic theory, but rather perceiving the genesis of the narrative that founded and still supports economic liberalism. Basic principles, such as *rational choice, peer competition, mobilizing ambition, meritocracy*, or even *free enterprise*, are found in Mandeville and Adam Smith, but they also have other links to the world of thought and science, such as Charles Darwin and the idea of *natural selection*, or the *primitive accumulation of capital* behaviour illustrated by Robinson Crusoe in the well-known novel by Daniel Defoe, just to mention two famous and different references.

Perhaps it is more appropriate to think of narrative threads that intertwine and unlace themselves, getting lost only to be rediscovered later on, in some cases obeying to remarkable processes of resignification. For instance, between the *mobilizing ambition* of the founders and the *greed* that their heirs place on the functioning of Wall Street, the heart of the System (Varoufakis 2015, 35),

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8 “The explanation of human nature, therefore, which takes self-love from every feeling and affection (...) comes, in my opinion, from a confused and false interpretation of the empathy system” (Smith 1759, 554).
goes a step too far. On the other hand, the narrative today hegemonic has already had a subordinate expression. It will suffice to consider the consolidation of a counter-narrative following the Great Depression of the late 1920s. The Keynesian model, by focusing the initiative on the State, making it an active regulator of economic practices, proposes another line of thought, another narrative, which became prevalent in the following decades, losing its momentum only in the 1970s.

The return to a *homo economicus*, which is a matrix in many aspects, has been approached in several ways and by different authors, with distinct highlights given to this recovery. The withdrawal from the fixed exchange system defined in Breton Woods; the huge increase in the price of oil imposed by the producing countries; the growing financial difficulties in the USA following the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam; the ascent to power in the USA and UK of two strong and mobilizing liberals, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher; the growing demographic imbalances endangering the funding of the welfare state; the obviously growing weakness of planned economies in eastern Europe: these are just a few factors we could refer to here. It is difficult to determine whether these and other historical moments are triggered by crises or whether they are crises generators themselves. One of the faces of this difficulty arises from the more or less spontaneous association of the crisis with a situation of abnormality or exceptionality, instead of considering it as an intrinsic part of the economic cycle, thus replacing *dysfunction* by *systematicity*. On the other hand, it is impossible to equalize all crises, insofar as some determine real turning points. Understanding the depth of a crisis involves considering the density of the narratives that explain it and underpin the therapy that applies to it. It is in this sense that the analysis of political discourse gains importance as we shall later see and justify. Before we get there, however, it is important to return to the issue of narrative construction in order to better understand its solidity and its weaknesses.

**FROM WORDS TO MEANING: OLD AND NEW WAYS OF SAYING**

Putting aside the ambition to call on the currents and authors who over the years have been doing the history of Political Economy, we aim to argue that Political Economy has been structured around a basic narrative, which, although undergoing adjustments and reformulations, maintains an identity
and a project that stems from its umbilical relationship with the capitalist mode of production. We sought to show how the founding nucleus of the main narrative was constituted and which were its constitutive elements – discourse on *human nature* based on individualism and belief in a virtuous balance based on the idea of *competitive market* – a wide range narrative that never broke up with its founding nucleus, having, nonetheless, suffered successive readjustments. To look at this *narrative* in time implies considering the long and complex process that has brought us to the present and which also confronts us with the reasons for the success of the *Theory of Rational Action* as an explanatory discourse of *economic things* and, more broadly, of human action.\(^9\) In order to understand this success, it is important to highlight the connection of three effects: the idea of rigour and scientificity created; the restriction of access to their field of knowledge by those who are not accredited; the ability to become indispensable to political power.

The first of these effects received a contribution from the supposed predictive capacity of economic science, assuming a reliability that can only be based on the knowledge of *human nature*, as it is revealed in the foundational narrative to which we have just alluded. The reduction of human rationality to the *homo economicus*, a character marked by competitiveness, by the maximization of profit and, ultimately, by selfishness, topics seen as invigorating of economic activity, allows us to look at economics as a set of mechanical forces tending toward balance. Discovering this *mechanics* would only be a question of finding the technical instruments that are capable of responding to the ambition to forecast and anticipate the *natural* development of economics. Mathematics then emerged as a basis for the creation of these instruments, providing technical support, through increasingly complex models, to macroeconomic forecasts. The second aspect arises, at least in part, from this mathematizing. The growing technicality, at the same time as it requires peer recognition, prohibits the field to non-specialists, making Political Economy a unique case in the universe of social sciences (Swedberg 2006, 77). We find here, in some way, a successful alliance between Political Economy and Statistics, both competing for the most perfect *government in the*

\(^9\) This extension is implicit in the well-known formula that Lionel Robbins proposed in 1932: “Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Bento 2011, 25).
The last aspect is precisely this one, the strong overlap between political power and the vision of economic things proposed by Political Economy. Looking at contemporaneity, we also see a somehow unexpected effect of this strong articulation: the Prince’s Counsellor, a status that has, in fact, long been in the hands of economists, threatens to take the place of the Prince himself. The divorce between power and politics eventually translated into “statism without a State” (Bordoni and Bauman 2016, 24), which is largely a consequence of the process triggered by the projection of Political Economy as the main explanatory (and prospective) science of social activity. The market regulated by the pursuit of self-interest gives way to a voracious machine, which, in the name of effectiveness, requires the State to abdicate the possibility of regulation, both in the financial sector and in relation to social protection mechanisms; whether they are direct, such as the Basic Social Income, or indirect, such as protectionism arising from labour legislation.

These three conditions for success are not enough by themselves. They imply the existence of an enormous performativity of economic theory, which, at the same time that it shapes the practices, also guarantees that the narrative adjusts to the historical circumstances that determine the transformation of the economy. In fact, the persistence of a capitalist model of production does not prevent the significant changes that have been under way since the eighteenth century and that can be measured or traced back in various levels. Thomas Piketty (2014), for instance, shows us the transformation of the distribution of national capital, especially in France and England, pointing to the replacement of agricultural income by that generated by urban properties, as well as the abrupt reduction of income from foreign capital that followed decolonization. Other authors record and highlight different indicators of this historical transformation in the way capitalist economy works. Today we live in the era of informational capitalism (Castells 2013, 10), we anticipate, or wish, a cognitive capitalism (Abreu 2017, 229), we witness the accelerated process of funding the economy (Teles 2017, 63) and also the reconfiguration of the international division of labour as a result of the deepening of globalization (Santos 2011). The adjustment between economic theory (expert competence) and economic narrative (disseminated and consumed in the social space) implies language

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10 Considering the history of statistics, we see how it became essential for the legitimization of political action: “statistics presented itself as an essential instrument for rationalizing the conduction of human affairs” (Desrosières 2000, 122).
effects, including semantic transformations, a phenomenon that has become visible in the last decades. Without the ambition of a systematic approach, we will consider some examples that we find relevant to what we have called above newspeak.\footnote{Inspiration for this comes from Orwell, but can also refer to other sources, for example the new hitlerian language (Faye 1973, 34), or any other attempt to mobilize language in search of a determined political effect, that of totalitarianism.}

As background we can have a mutation of meaning that tends to transform into regular and constant what was considered singular and circumstantial. We talked about the crisis pointing to the segmentation of its contents and, consequently, to the difficulty in distinguishing between crisis and non-crisis. Let us note now that, taken in this sense, the crisis is inseparable from the idea of reform. In this case, too, it evolved from a strict sense, that of reform as a detachable event, marked by an improvement or renewal into an open and reasonably imprecise meaning, with some reforms appearing not as improvements but objectively as setbacks.\footnote{We do not use the notions of advancement and regression as an expression of any historical determinism. We only emphasize that if we consider social space as a place of dispute we must see the current reformism as a marker of the reversal of social achievements (for example, in labour rights).} As with the idea of crisis, the idea of reform no longer corresponds to an exceptional moment, so that it seems a permanent intervention, which regulates the adjustment of social life and economic practice to macroeconomic theorization. Seen in this light, the reformist proposals refer to the idea of metanoia, either in the (almost) religious sense of conversion or in the sense of a reform of the psyche, a change that begins by being mental and then becomes management of action. We also have to consider the idea of adjustment, one of the pivotal concepts of this newspeak learnt from economics. Stripped from the idea of adjustment and conciliation between parties, the word acquires in its new use by economics a somewhat euphemistic sense, since it fits deep transformations in the semantic memory of conciliatory adjustment.

Emphasizing, once again, that our intention is more to illustrate than to systematize, we summon the processes of transferring specialized language, born among scholars and academics, to the public space, and its transformation into everyday language. Sovereign debt, swaps, but also derivatives market, among others, have become expressions of common usage, with more or less accuracy in their use. The centrality assumed by Management explains another type of contamination and, in this case, also of vocabulary substitution,
words such as CEO, coaching, benchmarking, outsourcing, and stakeholders are examples of that kind of vocabulary. These innovations, valued in the name of modernity or the need to respond to the demands of globalization, are concomitant with a set of determining transformations, at the level of both practices and representations. An example that accounts for the effect of disguise is the transformation of the worker into a collaborator, to put it in another way, the ability to hide what one does not want to show, maintaining a minimum level of acceptability. This effect is achieved thanks to the conjunction, operated by language, of a supposed equalization of the subjects (we are all collaborators) and an update of concepts, seen as necessary for the modernization of the country and the economy. In this way, the effective devaluation of the labour factor becomes a potential valuing resulting from labour flexibility; the loss of the guarantees contained in collective labour agreements is distorted in the name of the virtues of competition and personal commitment; the inequalities inherent to the system are reconfigured as the result of both the workers’ capacity for work and differentiated effort.

We can see the foundational narrative of Political Economy and narratives derived from it through the concepts with which they operate, with the words they use, and with the recognition they imply, as points of encounter and conciliation between a dominant and tendentiously hegemonic theory and the “economic practices and ordinary forms of calculation”. The divergence between these two operational levels is solved, precisely, by language, which allows us to think economic science and the categories with which it operates as ahistorical (Bourdieu 2000). Transposed into the arena of public debate, reconfigured words help to make sense of the social processes in which agents are involved. This is also done by suggesting a simplification of economic language, which creates the illusion that it is accessible to anyone, and at the same time resorting to a complexification that prohibits access to non-specialists. These two effects, which are contradictory only in appearance,

13 On the importance of “management professionals” in the transformations since the 1970s, see Cardoso (2013, 52).

14 Faye (1973, 174), discusses the idea of acceptability in relation to those from which one cannot hide what one intends to hide. Bourdieu (1982, 75) discusses the social conditions of acceptability in the level of language.

15 We use here the title chosen by Florence Weber (2002) for an article that deals with the real way the economy works, which in many aspects stands out from the “utilitarian theory”. In his early works, Bourdieu (2000) notes and highlights these discrepancies.
should be seen as complementary: if the first effect gives rise to the idea of a unified field for all, which equalizes all players within the market, assuming that they are equally equipped for the competition generated there, the second effect is activated whenever one goes to the level of explanation and definition of economic policies, guaranteeing a control of the processes – also here disguising the performativity of the decisions (deregulation of labour, loss of state power, etc.) under the cover of newspeak, as formulated by theory.\footnote{The availability in the current banking market of complex financial products, and their acquisition without adequate knowledge of their characteristics, generated financial losses to many thousands of Portuguese citizens, who argued with their banking institutions, in favour of their part as \textit{savers} and not \textit{investors}.} Political discourse is undoubtedly a part of this complex mechanism that generates meaning, and we will address it to conclude this paper.

THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE: METAPHORS AND REFLECTIONS

The debates on the State of the Nation happen in the middle of the calendar year (July), preceding the vacation period and consequent slowing down of political activity. They constitute an opportunity for retrospective, which the Government uses to justify its action and present new measures, and which the Opposition uses to create political difficulties for the Government, denouncing failures or shortcomings. There are a lot of games, staging, and dissimulation, highlighting the positive or negative colours of political acts and statistical indicators, highlighting or devaluing external factors, etc. Although it is an important moment from the point of view of political confrontation, we opted, on this occasion, to stick to the Prime Minister’s speech. This is a debatable option, but with it we sought to highlight the political act as a combination between discourse and power to apply measures.\footnote{For an analysis that also draws on Prime Ministers’ speeches and interviews with members of the Governments in office during the Troika period, see Moury and Standring (2017).} Considered in a relatively long time, we can see these discourses as an illustration of the possibility for a differentiated reading of the \textit{crisis}, but above all of the strategies of rhetorical construction of arguments that justify real political actions, including manipulative strategies, which both announce measures of rupture as continuous and, in opposition, claim to be different, changing nothing concerning the past outcomes of contestation. Taking into account the
objectives of this work, we consider the period in which the crisis is stated, the period marked by external intervention and the current period. A ten year span (2008-2017) is thus defined, which includes three legislatures and three prime ministers – three speeches by José Sócrates (2008/2009/2010), four by Passos Coelho (2012/2013/2014/2015), and two by António Costa (2016/2017).

Corresponding to expectations, the crisis is clearly present in the nine discourses we analysed. It begins by being considered in a limited and restricted way by Sócrates who, in 2008, summons it to explain Portugal’s difficulties in the foreign market (the increase in the price of oil and rise of value of the euro), and then becomes central in his last speech as prime minister, and in all the speeches of Passos Coelho, and relatively subtle in discourses by António Costa. Leaving aside the explanation of the crisis for now, all discourses converge into the idea that “the worst is now over”, that is, they all announce turning points as a result of the policies they are using. Somehow we can see here a central aspect to the narrative strategy of discourses: the systematic recurrence to a set of simple binary oppositions, in this case between crisis and overcoming, but which has other expressions – government/opposition; active/passive; change/permanence, irresponsible investment/budget discipline, etc. These oppositions are structural in the sense that they define significations in an expressive way, signalling what must be done in opposition to what others want: doing differently or preventing what is necessary. In some cases, the rhetoric used seems to depend less on ideological factors than on the fact of being in government or in opposition. This is what happens with the accusation of being too passive in the face of the crisis or of favouring the permanence at the expense of the necessary change. Even ideologically fracturing themes, such as public investment, admit some ambiguity, depending on the lived moment. Thus, at the beginning of the crisis, in 2008, José Sócrates pointed out to the opposition, stating: “We have all felt, in practice, the deeply negative effects of the theory that the country would not supposedly have money for anything and would have to give up any investment in its future”. This “theory”, which he later states as “nefarious”, is not properly confirmed by Passos Coelho, who chooses to associate the risks inherent in the fiscal consolidation plan with a state-held restraint role: “the expenses of the public administration sector and of state’s business sector, are being reduced at a considerable pace”. In the speech of 2016, António Costa proposes to “turn the page of austerity”, reassigning importance to public

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18 In 2011 there was no such debate due to the dissolution of Parliament.
investment, through the announcement of new Programmes – National Fund for Urban Rehabilitation and Blue Fund, dedicated to the economy of the sea – and promising to raise limitations to municipal investment.

Beyond crisis, there is another important feature unifying speeches, the idea of reform. We have seen how this word has become central to the economists’ vocabulary, and we find here an evident approximation between these two universes. It is, however, a rhetorical centrality, since it is too imprecise and vague what the proclaimed reformism refers to. In Sócrates, reform is inseparable from modernization and it reports, especially in 2008, to technological development – renewable energies or the Technological Plan for Education. In the following years, he gave in with the accentuation of the crisis, speaking of a “reformist agenda” applied to Social Security (2009), without ever failing to say that he advocates a “value-oriented reform” (2010). Passos Coelho gives another meaning to reform: his purpose is to “build a new economy: more competitive, more open, more democratic” (2013). We are, in this case, closer to what can be called the liberal agenda, with reformism emerging as an instrument of structural transformation of the economy. If Sócrates placed the State at the centre of the reformist action, Coelho sees reform in the retreat of the state. As for Costa, he proposes (2016) a National Reform Programme with six fundamental pillars, highlighting education, innovation, and modernization of the State. We can see the recovery of qualification and technology that Sócrates insisted upon, but it seems more vital to us the replacement of a macroeconomic reformism by a more nuanced and convergent solution that bears the idea of “turning the page of austerity” (2016).

The ideas of modernization and progress are also recurrent, thus suggesting a structural function, exactly that of pointing out, once again, the counterpoint between what exists, and is seen as an unwanted inheritance of those who have abandoned power, and what they promise to achieve, in the condition that it is always to attain consensus, or at least a responsible opposition, which does not follow a “bottom-up culture” – a term used by Sócrates in 2008. Modernization is always seen as indispensable to good governance, signalling a necessary path to the desired approach to some of our European partners. Here, too, convergence is somewhat misleading, since at least two different directions are defined around the same word. On the one hand, modernization through qualification, which implies betting on education and on the maintenance of a strong Social State; on the other hand, modernization as a design of the economy, which refers to the demand for greater liberalization and reduction
of the weight of the State. Sócrates is in the first case and Coelho in the second, of course, although this distinction is not clearly shown, since both resort, perhaps in a rhetorical way, to solutions other than those they seem to prioritize: Sócrates promises “budget consolidation” (2010) and Coelho “the real qualification of every Portuguese person” (2012).

The use of strongly convergent narrative strategies makes it difficult to find in these discourses clear points of ideological fracture. Nevertheless, while in the discourses of Sócrates and Costa one perceives a political position within the social-democratic tradition, in Coelho’s discourses the emphasis is always placed on the false/true dichotomy, being ideology a part of the first term and reality a consequence of the second. The theme of his first speech (2012) seems to be a “clarifying moment”, which means that the crisis has led the country to a situation that results from giving in to ideologies and it is necessary to rediscover the path by living according to reality. This understanding supports the proclamation that there is no alternative, and there is therefore only one path which, because it is the only one, reveals itself to be stripped of ideology – “ideology” is a “booklet”, a “distraction”, as he states in the 2015 debate. In Passos Coelho’s speeches, the idea of truth opposes not only what is false, but also what is illusory and unreasonable. This is why Passos Coelho opposes policies that defend the hope in “more or less miraculous events” (2012), excluding “magical solutions” (2013). In this same discourse he makes this very structuring distinction of his thought very clear: “It is the duty of all political agents not to confuse the reality of the country with the strict world of politics and the media agenda. It is mainly with Costa that this inevitability (tina) is deconstructed through discourse. In his speech of 2017 he declares: “Yes, there was an alternative!” , and this alternative, if not ideologically assumed, is at least politically valued because it translates itself into a “climate of social peace and institutional normality.” Looking at the question from the point of view of economic theory, the clearest confrontation is between Sócrates and Coelho. The discussion about what triggered the crisis helps us to realize the differences between them. While recognizing external factors, Coelho emphasizes the guilt of those who ruled before him, yielding to an easy way out and disregarding rigour. Thus, he gets closer to a neoliberal vision, apparent in the defence of an open economy, in the orientation of education to respond to the market or in the proposals of reform for the State, centred in the reduction of public expense. Sócrates focuses his 2009 speech on the idea that the crisis has an external origin, exempting the country from direct responsibilities and
also the political/ideological course that had been followed: “it was not the intervention of the State, nor was it the social state that provoked the crisis!” (2010). The fault lies within the deregulation of financial markets and, in the same speech, he also argues that “poverty and inequality are not fought with any kind of ‘invisible hand’.”

Sócrates’ censorship of the belief in an invisible hand that governs the economy infallibly provides proper completion to this paper because we see in it the strength of the foundational narrative of Political Economy, root of words and beliefs that are rewritten and persist, thus guiding collective action and the decisions of those who govern. But the invisible hand is also a good metaphor for that which hinders a more active participation of citizens in the polis. We know that this is more implicit than explicit in our writing, but refusing to circumscribe the understanding of the crisis to the restricted circle of authorized specialists, who reduce it to a technicity that ultimately refers to the ungovernable mechanics of an invisible hand, is to diminish democracy and open the way to dangerous motivations.

CONCLUSION

We have evoked the complexity inherent in the persistence of a foundational narrative as well as the different analytical levels and articulations that need to be used to deepen the debates that we have only touched on in this text. This was very much to look for the signs and language resources that allow the political game and the permanence of certain ideas. We began by stressing how the segmentation of the crisis (crisis in financial systems, public debt crisis in the Eurozone, crisis in emerging countries, crisis of low growth in developed countries) is a form of dissociation that does not encourage an integrated look at the crisis, as a complex phenomenon resulting from the connection of these different segments. Fragmentation, simplification, and recurrence introduce an effect of banalization of the crisis, thus making it possible to be adjusted and manipulated by different political narratives. Second, we emphasized the importance of Political Economy and of the Rational action theory (rational choice, individualism, virtuous balance of the competitive market…) in constructing the arguments for explaining the crisis. It was possible to highlight that at the same time sophistication in the tools of calculation and analysis was produced from the Economy, with closing effects to the
non-experts, a newspeak and a simplification of language was introduced in order to allow the words that gave sense to social processes. The crisis could thus become a pretext for managing social inequalities. Finally, we sought to illustrate through political speeches how narratives of political affirmation were constructed, highlighting how the notions of crisis and reform but also of adjustment, ideology, and reality were mobilized to produce decisive effects in the sense that is attributed to practices and representations that govern the world. The discursive dynamics allowed us to observe the variable role of a more ideological thought, which is affirmed or faded according to the moment of the political cycle, that is, as it is in the opposition or in the government. We have followed some narrative threads of a complex plot and, although we left out many others, we realize the importance of what is said, what is feigned to be said and, mostly, what is not uttered. It is by linking these ties, paying attention to words and silence, that the community and citizen’s participation may be strengthened.

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VIRGÍNIA HENRIQUES CALADO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
vmcalado@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-5292-2440

LUÍS CUNHA
CRIA, Universidade do Minho
lmcunha@ics.uminho.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-9940-9265
§ REFERENCES


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PART II

Actors in crisis
5. Children, citizenship and crisis: towards a participatory agenda

Ana Nunes de Almeida
Ana Sofia Ribeiro
Jussara Rowland
INTRODUCTION

Children’s citizenship has become a major theme in contemporary social policy and science debates, and children’s rights have gradually emerged as benchmarks for many national, regional or local policy narratives, consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1989). Indeed, the UNCRC concept of citizenship encompasses, for the first time, participation, provision but also participation rights. The attention has focused not only on children’s “superior interest” but also on their agency capacities and their participatory rights, considering them active and competent actors in social relationships, who have a voice, irrespective of those of adults. Crises, caused by disasters, economic and social adversities are moments of disruption where the pre-existing unequal social ties between individuals or groups in society become more visible, evidencing different access to citizenship status. Children have very often been portrayed as passive and helpless victims or as vulnerable recipients of aid in crisis situations, with little attention given to their ability to perceive and interpret these phenomena, or what they can contribute to public policies that address these issues.

The chapter discusses the relation between children, citizenship and crisis, based on two research projects focusing on the perspectives and roles of children in crises, either of an economic nature (“Portuguese Children and the Crisis”) or climate change related disasters (“CUIDAR: Cultures of Disaster Resilience among Children and Young People”). It addresses the importance of including children’s perspectives in crisis narratives (the right to be heard) and advocates a participatory agenda recognising children’s agency and competence to be active participants in policy processes that concern not only their present, but also their future (the right to participate). It ultimately supports the importance of engaging children from an early age in citizenship practices that benefit society as a whole not only in the present, but also in the future.

CHILDREN AND CITIZENSHIP

In contemporary Western societies, “children have an unsettled relationship with the status of citizenship” (Larkins 2014, 7). Although they are given provision, protection and some participation rights (UNCRC 1989), their full legal or political citizenship is not recognised. Children (as once women or
blacks) do not accede to some exclusive adult privileges or obligations in the public sphere: they are denied the right to vote or to be elected; they cannot make contracts; they do not have financial or economic responsibilities. The word “minor”, designating individuals under 18 years old, illustrates their “lower”, “inferior” position in this domain. In the aftermath of World War II, T. Marshall (1950) proposed citizenship as a complex multidimensional concept, involving three dimensions depicting historical stages, but naturally designed for adults: civic, political and social rights. If children, as individuals, are implicitly embraced by civic and social forms of citizenship, they are certainly excluded from its political dimensions. This is not an accidental or natural eviction, instead it is based on cultural conceptions.

Liberal and formal perspectives on citizenship, on the one hand, and traditional representations of childhood, on the other, underlie this citizenship divide between generations.

First, citizenship conceived as an abstract, legal or social status conveyed by nation-states to rational autonomous individuals excludes children on the basis of their vulnerability and dependence: their “unreadiness”, as Cockburn (2012, 3) remarks. In contrast to adults, children would not have “come of age” or lack “the competences associated with citizenship, such as rationality and independence” (Larkins 2014, 8). They are “in need” of being prepared and trained as future citizens.

One might ask, however, if this is a clear-cut distinction. In “risk societies” (Beck 1992) or in “liquid modernity” scenarios (Bauman 2000), adulthood has become a never-ending, unpredictable changing process of searching for fulfilment in relational settings. Adults, like children, very often seem “in the making”, unready, unprepared or vulnerable to face varied social injunctions. This can be acknowledged for individuals facing the impact of an economic crisis, where evidence of vulnerable and dependent adult groups in need of protection (not to mention the provision of basic material goods and services) is strong. Adulthood is very often an open, incomplete and unfinished experience of relational or institutional dependences. In addition, the abstract notion of “citizen” hides the fact that adults (just like children), depending on their social position and power, have unequal competences to use rights and face duties. Even in this traditional framework, some groups of children are not more vulnerable than some groups of adults.

Second, the association of liberal citizenship with the public sphere reinforced children exclusion, as home was the right place for them to be.
However, when child labour became a major issue in industrial Europe, and schooling appeared later as the predominant form of socialisation, the indoor-outdoor border became more unclear. Adults work in the labour market, but don’t children work at schools as well? (Qvortrup 2001). Also, feminists brought citizenship issues into the private realm, rehabilitating the home as a place of production and gender domination; and claimed body, sexual, reproductive rights as crucial dimensions of citizenship. More recently, minority sexual groups coming out from a long standing social quarantine, claiming their right to visibility, have reinforced the extension of citizenship rights from the public to the private sphere. Borders between adults and children have thus been blurred in some times and spaces, and hybrid generational categories reveal the limitations of a traditional concept of liberal citizenship conveyed, in abstract, to (all) adults and denied to (all) children.

Furthermore, hegemonic social representations of children and childhood, very often supported on scientific or philosophical lines of thought, have contributed to reinforce adult-centric views on citizenship. As regards social sciences, during the 1980s a new paradigm emerged advocating childhood as a social construction and a contingent product of time and space, contrasting with biological or psychological views considering it a universal or abstract condition (Almeida 2009; Prout 2005; Jenks 1992). Consequently, childhood is a heterogeneous condition, where gender, social class, ethnicity and age groups introduce difference and diversity. Furthermore, conceptual autonomy of children in research (and society) is defended, and so children’s relationships are worthy of study on their own, irrespective of adults’ perspectives. Importantly, children are considered as “beings in the present” and not just “adults in the making” (Harden et al. 2000) or “human becomings” (Soares 1998). In the same vein, Sirota (1998) refused to reduce childhood to a “forerunner moment” or a transitional stage to adulthood, in a continuum from an unachieved, immature or uncompleted being to an immutable and completed adult. Also, children agency is put forward: instead of tabula rasa or passive recipients of social norms and practices, they are competent and active in the construction of their lives, the lives of those around them and the societies in which they live.

Hence, giving voice to children in science has become a major challenge for researchers, ultimately contributing to methodological innovations in the field. Participatory methodologies enhancing child agency in all research stages has gained increased importance. This turn cannot be dissociated from
contemporary political and children/adult rights movements demanding more inclusive and participatory forms of “active citizenship” (Trevisan 2014).

A major milestone was the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (UN 1989), where child citizenship was, for the first time, conceived as not just a matter of holding individual rights to protection, provision, but also to participation (Beazley et al. 2009). UNCRC announces the “superior interest of the child” as the primary consideration in making decisions that may affect them. It mentions that children’s opinions should be taken into consideration in decisions taken on their behalf. It assigns the child the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kind” and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. International binding citizenship standards are now established concerning children’s status and participation in contemporary societies. Not surprisingly, commentators highlight the gap between “the rhetoric and ideals of the UNCRC and the reality on the ground” (Cockburn 2012, 169). This is particularly evident during historical times of crisis, where extreme events or situations disrupt the daily order. The topic is discussed in the following section.

CITIZENSHIP AT STAKE IN TIMES OF CRISIS

Large scale and recent political, economic and environmental global turbulence has made living through critical events more frequently experienced or perceived, both at the local and global levels, in “developed” countries. They are less and less seen as unusual, isolated or unique situations typical of distant societies, but have all fuelled a growing sense of vulnerability and insecurity among citizens who tend to represent the world as an increasingly vulnerable and not-taken-for-granted place (Furedi 2007). Moreover, predatory media coverage (Kleist and Jansen 2016; Lewis 2010) amplifies their importance, omnipresence and familiarity. In this respect, children are typical instruments to announce and report social or natural crises with devastating impact; in contrast to normal periods where their visibility is rather hidden or discrete, children (or certain groups of children) acquire an unprecedented prominence in images of victimised or at-risk population in critical scenarios.
Seen as ruptures in the social fabric of everyday life (Nolas 2015), crises appear as revelatory moments (Solway 1994). Before-after ruptures can reveal, on a brutal scale, the pre-existing unequal social ties between individuals and groups (Vaughn 2012). Divides between privileged vs. deprived, dominant vs. dominated, protected vs. vulnerable groups emerge in their full strength. An illustration of these cleavages lies in the generational order that is often pulled inside out through the lens of a crisis. Indeed, statistical data uncovers the fact that children – compared to adults - are very often the most vulnerable part of a population affected by a natural or social crisis, and its impact can lead to dramatic violations of fundamental protection and provision rights (Peek 2008; Morrow 2009).

So crises are associated either with occasional or breakdown events or they can emerge throughout historical lengthy processes embracing time, their impact affecting the present, but also the future (Baez Ullberg 2017; Hay 1996). Interestingly, the relation to a coming time is the key factor founding children’s presence in rescue or emergency public policies: they are envisaged as “future citizens”, requiring protection here and now, so that later adulthoods are not compromised. They are perceived as the “inheritors”, in the long term, of the major problems created by adults today (Morrow 2009). Along top-down hierarchical programmes and initiatives designed by adults, children either appear as the object of measures taken to mitigate the negative impact of a crisis; or “they are targeted as an audience for education” (Johnson et al. 2014), to be trained in order to learn basic prevention and emergency rules. On the other hand, children can also be used as vessels to accede adults and encourage behavioural change (Schmidt e Guerra 2013). They are anyway excluded from decision-making processes where strategies are discussed and planned. Rather than partners in crime, children are systematically depicted as recipients of aid, helpless victims of external adverse conditions, which they would passively go through under the guidance of adults (Gibbs et al. 2013).

When it comes to children’s citizenship, crises open windows revealing the fact that they are in the front line regarding harm and negative impact, which can severely compromise provision and protection rights. Second, they very clearly unveil the prevalence of “children at risk” and “unreadiness” paradigms, which ignore or belittle their agency, competences and participatory rights.
TOWARDS CHILDREN’S CITIZENSHIP: GIVING A VOICE, INVOLVING THEM IN DECISION-MAKING

We present and discuss in this chapter results of two research projects recently carried out at the ICS, regarding two types of critical disruption: a social, economic crisis (Portugal, 2008-2012); and climate change related disasters. We bring both together into discussion as examples of distinct methodological experiences dealing with children’s citizenship. The first illustrates the importance of giving children a voice, capturing their narratives about concrete daily experiences and introducing their perspectives (irrespective of those of adults) on social discourses. “But voice is not enough” (Lundy 2007). Departing from a participatory framework, the second was expressly designed to work in the field with children, involving them as partners in collective discussions and actions, in order to produce recommendations to decision-makers on disaster risk reduction policies.

Commissioned by UNICEF Portugal, “The Impact of the Crisis on Portuguese Children” intended to listen to children\(^1\) and report practices and perceptions about how their everyday life experiences had been affected by the drop of family income and rising levels of unemployment. Face to face interviews were carried out at home with 77 children, 39 boys/38 girls of two age groups (8-12 and 14-17 years old) during March-May 2013 (Wall et al. 2015). The qualitative sample ensured diversity of childhood conditions: it involved boys and girls, living in urban, suburban and rural areas of North/Centre/South, living in different family forms (biparental, reconstituted and monoparental families) of higher, middle and working classes.

The latter, “cuidar – Cultures of Disaster Resilience among Children and Young People” (2015-2018) is a European project aiming to enhance the resilience of children in urban communities to disasters, and to enable disaster respondents to meet their needs more effectively (Delicado et al. 2017). Albufeira and Loures were the two cities involved in the consultation process. In each location, we worked with two different age groups: 4\(^{th}\) graders and 9\(^{th}\) graders. In Albufeira, a Y4 class of 24 children aged between 9 and 12 years old participated in the workshops. It was gender balanced (13 girls, 11 boys), and very diverse: 16 pupils were Portuguese, while the remaining had other nationalities (Ukraine, Moldavia, India and Equator). The volunteer

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\(^1\) Following the CRC, a child is here considered an individual under the age of 18.
group of 9\textsuperscript{th} graders was composed of 10 14 year old students (8 girls, 2 boys), from quite a homogenous background. In Loures, we worked with a 4\textsuperscript{th} grade class of 26 children (11 girls and 15 boys), with most children coming from a low to middle socioeconomic background. The 9\textsuperscript{th} grade group was composed of 3 boys and 8 girls aged between 14 and 15 years old. Five had a foreign background - either family origin or experience of living abroad (South Africa, Luxemburg, Cape Verde, Brazil and Bulgaria).

THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD

“The Impact of the Crisis on Portuguese Children: voices of children, public policy and social indicators”, carried out at the ICS in 2013, aimed to provide a thorough and updated picture of childhood in Portugal in times of crisis (Wall et al. 2015).\textsuperscript{2} Two types of analysis were undertaken. Based on available statistics and studies, the evolution of material conditions of children and their families in Portuguese society was depicted based on key indicators over the time period 2005-2012. Public policies impacting on their lives and launched to face the economic crisis and austerity measures were also contemplated. Complementary to this extensive approach, a qualitative one was developed, in order to capture the experiences and the perceptions ordinary children had with the crisis, giving them a voice. The aim was to understand – from their own perspective – what the crisis meant for them and how it had affected their everyday lives.

Indicators and studies shared evidence: Portuguese children had been dramatically affected by the crisis. Poverty and inequalities were on the rise all over Europe (Caritas Europe 2015), but their intensity and devastating effects were particularly serious in Southern countries like Portugal. In households suffering from severe material deprivation and poverty, unemployment, underemployment, unprecedented cuts in salaries and in social benefits, and tax increases, children were disproportionately affected, jeopardising or even compromising their fundamental provision and protection rights (Sarmento et al. 2014).

In 2013, 439 000 children in Portugal were at risk of poverty after social transferences, and since 2008 they were the age group most affected by poverty risk after social transferences (22.4\%) and by material deprivation (24.4\%).

\textsuperscript{2} We would like to thank all our Project colleagues for their contribution to our work.
compared to older age groups (+65 or 18-64) (Wall et al. 2015). Available data also indicated that risk of poverty rate in families with children (20.1%) was higher than in families without children (15.6%); among households with dependent children, large families (a couple with 3 or more children) or single-parent ones stood out from the other arrangements (Sarmento et al. 2014).

Reports in 2013 by the Children and Youth Protection National Committee registered growing numbers and changing patterns of “cases”: higher numbers of children exposed to “deviant behaviour of adult family members” (alcohol or other addictions, domestic violence), a higher proportion of children under 5 signalled by the system (victims of several forms of negligence), increase of school dropout (cpcj 2014). Material poverty emerged as an experience for many children: for example, following school directors’ accusations of hungry children, the Government launched a special programme to mitigate this problem: “Breakfast at school”. Many schools in deprived areas of the country started, in 2011, to open canteens during holidays to provide meals to children in need (Sarmento et al. 2014).

Against this background, how did ordinary children perceive the crisis affecting the country or their families? How did they speak about it? How did they describe the impact, if any, on their own lives and those of their friends?

All children interviewed were aware of the “crisis” affecting the country. It was a meaningful word and a known, very problematic reality for them, even though they revealed that the subject had not been directly raised or discussed with them by their own parents (“they want to protect us”) or teachers in schools. They were concerned about it, either because their family was going through a delicate situation, or because their friends were experiencing hard times. Who told them about the crisis? There were no specific informants. They heard and observed people around them; they picked up clues here and there; they saw the news on TV or the Internet. “By chance”, as Nuno (9y) remarked. Daniel (10y) said the same: “In the streets, on TV, on the computer news and my parents debating with my brother as well”. Or Carolina (11y): “I listen to conversations when the family is together”.

The impact of the crisis was “everywhere” but their parents’ work load, unemployment, underemployment, salary cuts and lower family incomes were the most influential factors in shaping new “austerity” routines. Parents seemed always “worried”, “stressed”, “tired”, “working more and more”, “unmotivated”; sometimes they had to migrate, leaving children behind. Concerns were shown that relational family environments, affective ties were or could be
undermined by parents’ troubles to earn a living. Crisis was perceived, mainly, as having impact on adults (more than children). As Inês (12y) mentioned: “We don’t have to pay, it’s our parents. So, they are ultimately the ones who suffer most”. Or Rodrigo (16y): “Because they have to pay all the bills and if anyone becomes unemployed, it’s them not us. They earn the money and they take care of the family. Young people do not have the same notions: they only think of themselves”. Curiously, children themselves reproduce the traditional divide between adults (perceived as beings in the present) and children (adults in the making, frameworked by the future). Sara (15y) summarised this quite expressively: “we study and are preparing our future…but it’s our parents who carry the burden, they are always thinking I have to work, I have to do this and that so that food is not missing at home”.

Children were terrified of “getting poor”. Vanessa (11y, working class) asserted: “If they take our house from us, I’ll be forced onto the streets”. Joana (9y, working class) expressed her fears: “if there is no money in my family, I’m very afraid…because they’re always saying that there is less money, and I’m afraid it will end and then I won’t eat. It’s terrible!”. Inês (12y, upper class) was concerned about “being forced to leave school, about not being able to attend”. So, children were able to explain, detail and exemplify the impact of the crisis: on food consumption, for example.

For the working class, there were clear signals of drastic cuts in certain types of food (“meat”, “fish”, “yoghurts” and “fruit”). The word “sacrifice” often appeared in testimonies. Carlos, aged 10, exemplified: “Mum can’t cook our favourite meals anymore…because she has no money to buy…steaks and that kind of stuff”. The same with Bernardo (12y): “no more biscuits at home…just water…we don’t go out to lunch anymore”. Or Fernando (14y): “when there is no food, my parents do this: they don’t eat and the food is for us”. For the higher classes, the strategy would be rationalisation, savings and avoiding waste. Inês (12y) explained: “before, we had those cereals we loved and now we have to buy those white label ones…we don’t like them so much”. Rita (16y) noticed: “before, almost every week we had fish, at least twice a week. Not now. Not even once”.

Another very important domain affected by the crisis is education. Middle and upper class children mentioned examples, such as being forced to move from one (private) school to another (state school); having to use recycled or low cost school materials, and having to cut back on extra-curricular activities. The following excerpts highlight such cases:
My cousin was at a private school...her parents couldn’t pay and she was sent to this school. (Jorge, 12y)

I wanted to buy those pens, but they said: ‘Oh...you have so many pens...’ but we always want to buy a new thing, don’t we? To show our friends. (Rita, 16y)

My mother wanted me to buy folders and not notebooks...because it would just be to fill in with sheets, and much cheaper! (Leonor, 15y)

My mum lost her job...she decided to pull me out of music, gymnastics and English lessons. (Maria, 8y)

Attending free state schools in the present, working class children however share middle and upper class fears for their future education. Would the crisis compromise their expectations? Two examples. Tiago, 14y, upper class: “I’m afraid of my mother and my father being unemployed...and of not being able to continue to study”. Joana, 17y, working class, both parents unemployed: “If things go wrong, if my parents do not receive their subsidy next year... because if all goes well, I’ll be at university. Otherwise, it will be more difficult for them to support us both, my sister and me”. Education is quite a pillar for children and they significantly claim it as a right.

Access to clothes and shoes appeared as a problematic domain as well. Upper class children referred to parental restrictions in order to “avoid buying so much”, “buying the minimum and cheaper” and taking advantage of “inheriting clothes”. The following excerpts illustrate this new behaviour:

I think that, before, my mum almost every week or every month ...well, whenever she came from shopping, she would bring me a jumper, a hair band, something. Now she does not bring things so often. Because she doesn't go shopping so often. (Carolina, 12y)

We try to buy much less...and I inherit from my eldest cousin...I have lots of cousins from whom I inherit cute clothes. (Inês, 12y)

For working classes, the situation is more serious. Cuts were drastic for some children, as Isabel, Carolina and Rui assert:
My mum stopped buying new clothes for us... We wear the ones we have. Shoes also became rare. Only when we need them. (Isabel, 14y)

My mum buys me clothes... but it is when others don't fit me anymore or they begin to get faded. (Carolina, 11y)

We cannot buy you the tennis shoes you want, because there is the crisis! (Rui, 12y)

Interestingly, some children introduced other dimensions of the crisis related to poverty. Not material ones, but the risk that poverty would bring ravages to their happiness and emotional well-being. Francisco (9y, upper class), related poverty with “no food” but also to being “alone”. Maria (10y, middle class) emphasised that “a poor child is a child who doesn’t have the essential things in life... No food and... perhaps not as much love and affection as I do (...) and she hasn’t got such a warm place to live as I have at home”. Inês (12y, upper class) mentioned poverty as a synonym of “lack of food, of a comfortable place to sleep and to be, lack of clothes and of heating... lack of happiness. And Gonçalo (15y, working class) explicitly depicted a “poor child” in the following terms: “They have no love, no affection... not enough cuddling”.

To sum up this brief overview, we can conclude that the critical economic macro scenario of the country found a significant place in common children narratives. They were able to recognise the gravity of the economic crisis in their everyday lives and were competent to elaborate coherent discourses on its more serious dimensions and impact. Family budget and family consumption were the most signalled affected domains, but the overall picture included references to threats to children’s relational well-being and future expectations. Even if they reported the lack of adult interlocutors (either parents or teachers) on the crisis, children gathered dispersed information on their own about its seriousness and multidimensional nature. And they clearly illustrated how basic protection and provision rights were put at stake by the austerity agenda. The following example is mostly focussed on participation.

THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE

Disasters are becoming more frequent and intense round the world, worsened by climate change effects and urbanisation trends. Children, because of their physical vulnerability and their position in society are one of the groups
that suffer most dramatic consequences in these events. In Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policies, they are however often only seen as victims or passive recipients of aid requiring protection (Tanner 2010), or as targets for disaster education (Jonhson et al. 2014). Their needs and experiences, before, during and after disasters are seldom considered, and their competences in terms of responding, recovering and promoting resilience tend to be ignored. This dominant narrative meets traditional views of children as “unready” to accede full participatory rights and, due to this bias, leaves them out of policy decision-making processes.

It is in this context that the United Nations has been working progressively on the inclusion of children’s necessities and perspectives in DRR. As children and young people’s participation in public debates has been increasingly enhanced, following the adoption of Art.12 of the UNCRC (stating the right to be heard in matters that concern them), the UN has been highlighting the importance of including them as active participants in these subjects. This has been reflected in the Sendai framework (UNISDR 2015), by the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), where they are explicitly included as stakeholders, and are seen not only as victims of disasters but as agents of change who must be given the opportunity participate in DRR programmes “in accordance with legislation, national practice and educational curricula” (UNISDR 2015, Ref. 2, 20)

In Portugal, although children are often considered targets of DDR programmes and risk education initiatives, “civil protection and risk education culture still tends to see them mainly as a passive and vulnerable group, to be safeguarded and educated, rather than listened to and engaged in the protection of their community” (Delicado et al. 2017, 225). Exposure to the UNISDR initiatives and international best practices is slowly changing this attitude, but a lack of participatory culture and of deprioritisation of this issue has so far hampered the process of children’s effective DRR participation in the country.

CUIDAR—Cultures of Disaster Resilience among Children and Young People is a European research and intervention project (2015-2018)\(^3\) that aims to strengthen the resilience of children in DDR processes, namely by fostering the inclusion of their voices and needs in the local emergency plans and

\(^{3}\) The CUIDAR project—CUIDAR Cultures of Disaster Resilience among Children and Young People—has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 653753. We would like to thank our Portuguese coordinator, Ana Delicado and our CUIDAR colleagues in the UK, Greece, Italy, and Spain for their contribution to our work.
strategies. Coordinated by the University of Lancaster, it has five institutional partners, including a team from the ICS-ULisboa. After a scoping analysis that enabled the mapping of children’s participation in these matters across Europe, each country undertook participatory workshops with children and youth in several locations in order to listen to their ideas and capacitate them to later interact with decision makers, in mutual learning events.

The Portuguese team chose to focus on climate change related disasters. The project goals were: to better understand the risk perception, disaster needs and capacities of children and young people in urban societies; to strengthen children’s understanding of emergencies and the actions they can take to prepare themselves, their families and their communities in urban contexts; and to improve communication, awareness and understanding amongst disaster responders and policy makers about children and young people’s needs in disasters.

During four workshop sessions, groups were introduced to the issues of climate change related disasters. The main risks in their community, schools and family homes were identified; one risk was selected for further exploration, producing messages addressing its prevention, response and recovery. While the workshops obeyed a common framework at the European level, the activities proposed in Portugal were designed by the national team, considering the need to make the “capacitation” process as participatory as possible. As Rashid, Ronan and Towers (2015) recall, DRR is an action oriented field, therefore active and student-centred learning strategies are key to making the capacitation process more effective. In the CUIDAR case, and relying on teacher support, the pedagogical tools employed to elicit children’s thoughts on the subject were inquiry and interactive learning strategies requiring research in the community and debates and interviews in class, along with art based methodologies that included drawing, poster designs and video making.

In both localities, children and young people deemed floods as their main concern, considering their research upon recent disasters in the area. While the risk was the same, the appropriation of the topic and the messages proposed varied, according not only to local contexts but also to their experiences or specific capacities. For instance, in Albufeira we worked with an extremely diverse recently formed 4th grade class, with some facing language barriers and other special educational needs. This required some adaptation of the planned activities, namely recurring mostly to drawing rather than written forms of communication, and the class illustrated basic prevention, response and
recovery measures. The 4\textsuperscript{th} grade class in Loures was more homogenous and with the teachers’ help created a video and a flyer about flood prevention using child friendly language. The 9\textsuperscript{th} grade youngsters were more autonomous in choosing their own messages. If one group chose also to focus on DDR measures and proposed the creation of civil protection youth clubs; in another case, the youngsters went far further in their appropriation of the topic, relating it to the bad quality of their own school infrastructure, which was not well equipped to face heavy rain or harsh weather conditions.

The capacitation phase was followed by a dialogical one, with the creation of “mutual learning events”. Similar to the “structured dialogues” framework promoted by the European Union\textsuperscript{4}, these events consisted of a peer learning exchange where several stakeholders of a given community (e.g. local mayors and council members, education and civil protection officers, school heads, teachers and parents) met children that participated in the workshops. The latter presented their ideas and proposals, got feedback, asked questions and debated recommendations or the feasibility of some proposals. These events are used to foster children’s negotiation and expression competences, and also require stakeholder sensitisation for hearing young people, through mutual questioning and exposure to different viewpoints and expectations. If some stakeholders were used to interact with children, others had to make an effort to embrace different communication codes. While mutual learning events ultimately aimed to find solutions, and bring change to communities, it was not possible for all proposals to be realised, due to limitations in resources and divergent political priorities. As in many other participatory processes, change is incremental and requires more time to be effectively implemented. Nevertheless, in both mutual learning events, children’s ideas were greeted with enthusiasm, and the civil protection clubs’ proposal was welcomed. Elsewhere, the 4\textsuperscript{th} grade flyer was adopted by all the schools of the municipality. Regarding the requested school infrastructure renewal, although those in power recognised this need, they also highlighted the dependence on national public funds.

The engagement process culminated with a national dissemination event where, once again, young people had the opportunity to interact with invited stakeholders, through roundtables on three topics: participatory risk education; children and youth as active participants in disaster risk management in the communities; children and youth as active participants in school safety. The

\textsuperscript{4} For further information: https://ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/implementation/dialogue_en.
groups debated barriers and protective factors in all 3 areas, and suggested solutions. Lack of time was identified by all groups as a major factor impeding not only the participation of young people in the volunteer DDR activities in their community, but also the implementation of more participatory pedagogies in risk education. In fact, the overwhelming school schedules pointed out by youngsters once again reflected the need to tame and surveille children, that are then deprived of the autonomy to freely determine how to use their own time. On the other hand, the need for greater information about DDR achieved through contact with others with experience on the subject was also suggested, with the youngsters recognising that the project provided them with a critical knowledge on the topic that they would not otherwise gain.

Hence, this engagement process raised awareness in children and young people on the topic of disasters, with conceptual maps showing an increase of vocabulary and with children themselves recognising that “We learned that floods aren’t fun” (Pedro, 4th grade) or that “I learned that we shouldn’t think about natural disasters only when they occur” (Vanda, 9th grade).

However, the main goal of this process was not educational but participatory, that is, to create an opportunity for the participation of children in a matter that concerned their present and future, and from which they tend to be excluded: climate change related disasters, an issue that sets itself up as a matter of intergenerational justice⁵. By thinking and debating the reality they lived in, and by conceiving actions or proposals that improve both their wellbeing of that of their communities, they have internalised a civic conscience and gathered skills that will allow them to motivate their peers to participate in similar projects, thus becoming empowered agents of their communities. In fact, along with the sharing of their ideas with others, children stressed the importance of group work as an opportunity to get relational skills:

In the beginning, I only wanted to skip classes, and disasters was a boring Geography topic for me, but then I got interested because I felt like I was helping people. (Maria, 9th grade)

I felt that the workshops were very good not only because we could express our opinions but also because they taught us how to relate to each other. (Magda, 9th grade)

This confirms that besides being heard, effective participation also requires co-production of knowledge, shared decision making and idea exchange (Day et al. 2015; Lundy 2007). It is then in their interaction with their peers that children are exposed to other points of view and experiences, thus gaining the critical thinking skills and commitment values necessary to make informed collective decisions and perform meaningful citizenship acts.

It is worth recalling here that the chief argument for not allowing children to participate in formal political processes and full citizenship is their lack of competence. In an interesting discussion on “the health of a democracy” (Wagner et al. 2012), the lowering of the voting age and the pros and cons of youngsters’ electoral participation, political science has challenged the taken for granted assumptions on their “unreadiness”. Research has brought relevant clues to the debate on whether or not young people (at 16 or 17 years old) have the maturity, the interest or the knowledge to vote, and if the quality of their choices is similar to older first time voters. Now, there is little empirical evidence that they are less able or less motivated to participate in elections; their turn out is even higher than the older ones’ (18-25 y). This is perhaps because they vote in a more sheltered environment – still living at home and attending school (Zeglovits 2013, 253). Moreover, their views are based on “reasoned arguments” (Wagner et al. 2012, 373). After all, an earlier experience leaves “a footprint on one’s voting biography” (Zeglovits 2013, 252), which can encourage future political pro-activity.

For its part, CUIDAR demonstrated that although children required assistance in developing their ideas, they are fully capable of reflecting upon their experiences, cooperating in solving problems and proposing solutions that can be adopted and debated by those in power. On the other hand, while it provided an opportunity for these children to rehearse their further participation, its development faced several challenges, namely the resistance of some adults in regarding these topics as not being just a children’s affair, or the amount of time and willingness these engagement processes require in order to be effective and engaging for children. There is some reluctance from both sides that can be overcome with more dialogical moments. Regarding the CUIDAR national event, one youngster stated: “During the meeting, I became aware that there are adults who still care about what teenagers say.” Stakeholders themselves recognised that the CUIDAR’s work made them realise “the urgency of ensuring the empowerment of children and young people in information and awareness-raising programmes”. Thus, more work needs
to be done in sensitising both stakeholders and children of their rights and duties, and to the active role they can play in these processes, in order to foster their growing inclusion in policy processes adjusted to their needs in Portugal.

**DISCUSSION AND CLOSURE**

To challenge dominant conceptions of citizenship, bringing children into the discussion reveals its reductive scope in contemporary societies. Pertained to an individual status held by adults in the public sphere, it keeps children at a distance. However, from this formal perspective, generational cleavages do not lead to sharp dichotomies: in risk or reflexive societies, adults seem to share attributes of “unreadiness”, “immaturity” and “vulnerability” with children. Both are simultaneously “beings in the present” and citizens “in the making”, and this double time affiliation runs throughout their life course. Now, it is consensually accepted that both are due provision and protection rights. But the same cannot be said about participatory rights: despite the mandatory *UNCRC* or similar international directives, children are still very rarely engaged in decision making processes, even for domains that particularly affect them.

On the other hand, crises are revelatory moments. Under their ravages, societies can be exhibited on their reverse side, namely as regards social inequalities or vulnerable ties. The example of children – portrayed as innocent or helpless victims in media “tragedy” coverages, objectively the more affected by the harm and negative impact of critical events or processes – is relevant. The predominance of a children at risk discourse in critical scenarios ignores or wastes their agency and competence to work together with adults in preparing, responding and recovering from their negative impact.

First, crises very often worsen their living conditions (for a longer or shorter period of time) and compromise their protection and provision rights. The research project on the Portuguese economic crisis uncovered alarming indicators concerning poverty and deprivation rates and the ways real anonymous children perceived it. The word “crisis” had a meaning for them and they were able to apply it to real situations of their daily lives (family budget, food, clothing or schooling). From their perspective, children’s rights were far beyond the access to material goods or social services: they very firmly extended them to a relational well-being (in the family) and to their future expectations (in education, for example). Interestingly, the crisis was not an explicit theme...
of conversation with their significant adults, either parents or teachers. Dispersed information was caught informally here and there, through media coverage, social networks or listening to adult conversations. The right to receive and impart information (art 13, UNCRC), parallel to the right to freedom of expression, was not guaranteed, leaving children on their own in a no man’s land where insecurity or fears cannot be expressed or softened.

On the other hand, the CUIDAR project illustrated methodological approaches to put participatory experiences with children into practice. Based on their daily experiences and from an interaction with local stakeholders, children were able to envisage an active role in their communities in disaster risk management. Also, they were able to step up to a macro level and tackle global climate change issues. CUIDAR drew attention to the often ignored environmental dimension of citizenship. The right to live safely in, and preserve, the blue planet (our common home) implies the knowledge of threats affecting it, a consciousness of human predatory behaviour and its consequences, and information on good practices to protect it. This was also an innovative contribution from CUIDAR.

As mentioned above, to be heard, as in the first project, is not enough: citizenship is ultimately built upon children’s engagement in daily decision making processes, participatory acts or real experiences. Based on perceived critical scenarios on climate change related disasters, CUIDAR involved children in gathering information, enabling them to identify and choose priority topics to be collectively dealt with. It also engaged them in knowledge co-production and dissemination among peers and adults, encouraging them to advocate recommendations to policymakers in face to face workshops. In contrast to consultative processes, where adults obtain information from children and use it to protect them during critical events, in top-down initiatives reinforcing representations of children as passive aid recipients and their dominated position in the generational order, here children were recognised as active citizens capable of being involved in the development of policies for self-advocacy prevention, preparedness and response projects.

In contrast to formal learning-teaching hierarchical procedures prevalent in Portuguese schools, these hands on child-centred activities (using visual methodologies), inspired by a participatory agenda, were not only feasible but also successful and very positively evaluated by participant children. They give powerful arguments to those who claim children should be considered citizens in their own right, which obviously implies a careful consideration
of their internal diversity, their real insertion in particular social contexts or interactional settings.

In other respects, a participatory agenda for children offers an opportunity to seize and enhance their provision and protection rights. To capture children’s voices on these topics, irrespective of adult ones, while creating the proper settings for them to be heard, can highlight dimensions or clues that are significant (from children’s perspective) and permit the choice of an understandable and appealing language to enunciate them.

Interestingly, opening up the participatory issue, via children’s exclusion from a full citizen status, is also a way to denounce quite similar situations concerning adults. It can legitimately be claimed that expressive social fringes of adults (particularly the economically deprived and those with little education) are not heard or included in decision making processes affecting them. But on a larger scale, contemporary representative democracies have been challenged by citizens’ social movements concerned about the distance between the people’s voices, their expression or influence and the elected political rulers.

ANA NUNES DE ALMEIDA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
ana.nunes.almeida@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-3174-3870

ANA SOFIA RIBEIRO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
sofia.ribeiro@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-6648-611X

JUSSARA ROWLAND
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
jussara.rowland@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-2639-3714
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Youth and generations in times of crisis: Portugal in the global situation

Vitor Sérgio Ferreira
The discourse on generations is, presently, prolific and widespread in the public and political spheres. There is a sequence of letters to identify age cohorts born in distinct decades (generation “x”, “y” or “z”), as well as multiple categories to describe today’s young people as a generation distinct from the previous ones. The label Millennials – a chronological qualification initiated by Howe and Strauss (2000) to name the young people born after 1980 – became the most popular generational category in the media, underlining supposed specificities of the age cohorts that live the transition to adulthood in the turn of the millennium or later.

Beyond the Millennials label, other generational categories were later used to distinguish the current young people, mainly based on their practices and experiences in the spheres of work, mobility, and digital life: “geração mileurista” (Freire 2006; Gentile 2014),¹ “precarious generation” (Bessant, Farthing and Watts 2017), or “lost generation” (Allen and Ainley 2010; Pritchard and Whiting 2014); “global generation” (Edmunds and Turner 2005; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009), “Europe generation” (Lopes 2014) or “Erasmus generation” (Wilson 2011; Ieracitano 2014); “digital generation” (Feixa 2014; Ponte 2011), “net generation” or “digital natives” (Tapscott 1998; Hargittai 2010; Jones and Shao 2011). Among many others, these are some of the labels recurrently assigned to contemporary youth in the sense of emphasizing differences, conflicts, or flows between their ways of life and their parents’ and grandparents’ – who also received their own generational epithets: “baby boomer generation” (Roberts 2012) or “Great War generation” (Pais 1998a).

The proliferation of generational categories has not been followed, however, by empirical research wide enough and with a deep analytical engagement in the social sciences scope. The claims concerning the existence of generations and generational changes are surrounded by too much speculation, are too simplistic, and have a universalistic exaggeration, sometimes even contradiction. These generalizations are usually based on market studies promoted by large companies guided toward marketing and to business

¹ The reference for this designation is the imagined average wage for the contemporary youth. In Portugal, it has acquired equivalent discursive formulations that, however, disclose the presumption of lower wages in relation to other European countries, around 500-600 euros.
(Williams and Page 2011; Parment 2014), with more market-centred than scientific interests in their analyses and conclusions.

In general, these studies intend to evaluate the overall economic capacity and the symbolic availability of specific youth segments for the acquisition of certain consumer goods (objects, experiences, services, etc.), assigning to them preferences, pointing out social practices, and defining life styles that are made available in the market, later generating pop labels for specific consumption profiles. These are studies that tend to homogenize the youth condition and the respective behaviours, blurring unequal social and cultural conditions in light of western youth experiences, located in Anglo-Saxon countries, among the white, urban, and more educated middle classes (Little and Winch 2017). Furthermore, those studies take for granted that distinct demographic cohorts – that is, young people born between date x and date y – have a generational correspondence. However, there are no definitions consensually accepted concerning the content of all generational labels created, nor their age cohorts.

In this perspective, I start this essay by introducing the current sociological approaches to the concept of generation. Considering the global context of systemic crisis and establishment of austerity policies in several countries of the world since 2008, from the USA to Europe and Brazil, I will discuss the hypothesis that this moment is, indeed, a generational marker: for young people who are making their transition to adulthood, austerity measures identify a turning point that creates distinctive structural conditions to their life courses, so that they are experienced, viewed, and planned in structurally diverse and unequal forms of life when compared to their parents’ lives. This happens, to a large extent, because of several reorganizations established by austerity policies that have extended beyond the crisis environment, jeopardizing social citizenship rights that are critical in the organization of present and future life courses of young people.

The flexibility established in the labour conditions and its potential extension throughout the life course put the focus of the inequalities in the discussion on generations, freeing it from the mere cultural values and ethics of life differences. In this sequence, I introduce the hypothesis that “precariousness”, although experienced in very distinct ways due to the unequal social supports of young people, can be part of the core of a new generational conscience as a structural condition considered throughout life, with deep and extended effects that go beyond the sphere of the labour life, reifying a context that is favourable to the ontological insecurity of the younger citizens.
Concerning to a great extent the case of Portugal, one of the countries most affected by the crisis and the austerity policies within the Euro zone, this discussion will be developed with recourse to several sources and studies.

GENERATIONS AND GENERATIONALISM

Despite the empirical approach to the concept of “generation” being often made through age groups, the fact is that, sociologically, generations do not emerge “naturally” from the secular cadence established by the biological or demographic rhythms translated in the ages of the individuals. Assuming a generational approach implies going beyond the analysis of the age effects indicated by the chronological structure of successive age cohorts. It demands a reading that is centred on the longterm of social structures, and not only on the variations that the attitudes and behaviours have throughout the “ages” or “cycles” of the life course. As pointed out by Mannheim – one of the predecessors of the generational approach in the beginning of the 20th century with the publication, in 1928, of The Problem of Generations (1990) – the age groups correspond to “potential generations” that, only when touched by a picture of deep social destabilization, with sufficient disruptive and transforming power to make emerging attitude and behavioural standards that are distinct from those shared in the past, will be able to configure “effective generations”.

The generational perspective inaugurated by Mannheim and sustained in sociology with differentiated inputs\(^2\), shares two central attributes to identify and understand a generation in its unity and specificity as social reality: on one hand, the existence of a picture of events that are quite wide and intense to separate the historical continuity of the collective life, events that in the present can correspond to “slow and non-catastrophic processes with economic, political and cultural nature” (Feixa and Leccardi 2010, 191). On the other hand, this exact same picture of historical discontinuities must be experienced in a comprehensive way by the members of a social formation in an early phase of their socialization, so that the new structural conditions produce long-term effects in their lives and subjective relations with the world.

Therefore, the generational perspective is going to locate the individuals within specific structural configurations of economic, social, cultural, and/or political nature. It considers the change processes that allow the induction of socialization conditions that are sufficiently wide and distinct from the past to provide new experiences and to shape new subjectivities between the younger layers of the population. In this sense, my hypothesis is that new emerging priorities and subjectivities in the context of new material conditions of existence of young people do not assume a mere “transitional” reality (that is, the result of an effect of their youth condition), but have the ability of being transported throughout life, resulting in a generational condition.

Do the labels already mentioned concerning the contemporary youth really translate the emergence of new social generations? Will these labels correspond to actual and objective social realities? Are contemporary young people forging new forms of transition to adulthood? Even though we live in times of acceleration of the historical temporality, it is certainly impossible to think about changes that are so fast that they justify such a quick succession of generations as the recent profusion of vague and hasty qualifiers and categories of generational identification. More than showing the actual existence of generations, the frantic creation of generational categories witnesses the recent trend for generationalism (White 2013), that is, the systematic invocation of the concept of generation as a principle of categorization, division, and explanation of the world, aiming to locate, narrate, and understand in time the global changes that happen in the social, economic, and political level and that – supposedly – reach the younger with higher intensity and continuity.

In the generationalist approach, the concept of generation is assumed not as an objective social reality, but as a discursive reality (Scherger 2012; Aboim and Vasconcelos 2013; Pritchard and Whiting 2014; Timonen and Conlon 2015). The generational labels are discursive realities in the sense that they are symbolic constructions underpinned by cultural narratives that integrate codes and terminologies that intend to express differences of preferences, values, representations, and ethics of life based on age principles. In this perspective, the generations are taken as symbolic categories used in the public space and in the social interaction, in diverse configurations and with differentiated contents and social interests. The individuals can mobilize those generational categories in their daily discursive practices as principles of organization and interpretation of the world and social change, in their processes of social identification and categorization.
Thus, the generationalist approach moves away from the generational approach in the sense that, in the former the discursive realities do not need to have any objective correspondence with generations as social realities anchored to events endowed with potential of historical change. This does not hinder, as claimed by White (2013), the emergence of generationalist expressions with the emergence of the social formations that consider identifying and describing, not only forewarning them, but also contributing to their social production.

GENERATIONS AND INEQUALITIES

The generationalist discourses and labels allude, to a great extent, to transformations concerning the distinct practices and experiences of current youth in different spheres of their daily life, in relation to their preceding generations. And they do it not only in a perspective of identifying intergenerational differences, in a horizontal plan of cultural differences, but also, and increasingly, in the perspective of making known intergenerational inequalities, in a vertical plan of asymmetries and power relations involved in a moral language that often tries to identify economic, social, and political injustices and inequalities within the relations between generations (Pereira da Silva and Ribeiro 2017). This happens to the extent that, as Roberts argues (2012), in many European countries, following the Second World War, the baby boomer generation was the one, after many, that lived better than its predecessors and that knows that it was living better in terms of income, consumption levels, and social rights.

Although with quite distinct rhythms, intensities, and configurations, this context has been under a wide reconfiguration on a global scale, with a mass of more educated and more “globalized” youth – that is, more connected among themselves and with the world – experiencing not only new forms of transition to adulthood, but also facing a deep transition in the adult condition itself – marked by added difficulties, even blockage, in terms of capacity of social autonomation and economic emancipation. To a large extent this is due to the structural transformations that happened in the labour sphere under the aegis of a “new form of capitalism” (Sennett 1998; Boltanski and Chiapello 1999), marked by the implementation of a set of measures guided to the “flexibilization” of labour conditions, with deep implications in the youth capacities of planning and decision-making in several spheres of their lives.
The labour blockages that they experience end up transforming into transitional blockages, underpinned by postponements in their aspirations and projects due to the lack of means of achievement. The youth condition has been extended in such a way throughout the life course of the citizens born after the 1980s that there is a risk that youth studies are no longer analysing the conditions of postponement of the traditional markers of entrance to adulthood (Ferreira and Nunes 2014). Instead, they are analysing the conditions that restructure the adult condition itself in this generation, as well as its future condition as elderly. In fact, we are facing a revolution in the very standards of life courses, currently less organized according to pre-set and linear “cycles” and more organized in contingent “spirals”; increasingly vertiginous and risky, with consequences in the intergenerational commitments established until now, recently questioned and frequently attacked. It is in this context that the term “generation”, especially after the crisis, is emphatically adopted as part of the language of the youth collectivism, and it is frequently operated as a political category mobilizing collective actions in face of the inequalities that are assigned to it. Just as the social class was, too, in the past.

This does not mean, in any way, that the inequalities based on social classes have disappeared in the 21st century, but that age – along with other variables like gender, sexual orientation, or ethnical-racial belonging – became a relevant criterion in the access to and the struggles for resources, wages, and social rights. The concept of “precariat”, this new, wide, and heterogeneous social category characterized by the social vulnerability resulting from structurally precarious jobs, and by the chronic uncertainty and insecurity in terms of income in the future (Standing 2014), either from the point of view of the wage or the retirement, allows handling this new reality of class in articulation with the age/generation.

It is a social category that is no longer only associated with a set of concretely and symbolically less qualified professions, but that is increasingly extended, among the newcomers to highly qualified and symbolically valued professions and activities, to whom nowadays much more flexible, unsafe, and disadvantageous contract and salary conditions are offered, contrasting with the past.3 Concerning this, Côté (2014) emphasizes the need to resume the topic of the youth-as-class, evidencing the systemic proletarianization of the young population in many countries, in which young people are left –

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3 See, for the Portuguese case, Matos, Domingos, and Kumar (2010), and Matos and Domingos (2012).
namely by the State – at the mercy of neoliberal economic interests and their mechanisms of exploitation.

It is in this setting that the generationalist discourses often express social struggles concerning policies of power and income redistribution, as well as of recognition of certain social citizenship rights that begin to be questioned, naming by those who are susceptible to having some commonality in these types of experiences. There is, in fact, an unequal distribution of the power positions in generational terms, in which the “generational authority” is the target of disputes and rankings. The large socioeconomic changes presently occurring are not being promoted, to a great extent, by the younger generations, but by the financial elites who benefit in detriment of those. Beyond that, the demographic advantage that older age cohorts have in the face of the younger in the traditional electoral and public consultation process has favoured, in several places of the world, the ascent to power of politicians with more conservative positions.

It is in this perspective that the term “generation” was a discursive practice that was challenged, for instance, during the referendum associated with Brexit, when it was argued in the streets and the media that the voters who voted yes in the referendum for the exit of Great Britain from the European Union, would have been, over all, the older voters, thus defining a future that they would not live themselves, and that was not the future mostly intended by the younger generation, perceived as more educated and cosmopolitan than its predecessor.

The generation is also a category currently mobilized discursively in relation to problems pertaining to the fair redistribution of wealth and rights between older and newer generations, namely concerning the labour world, where the intergenerational conflicts are being potentialized. The inequality that can be felt between different generations in the labour field are generating unease regarding relative injustice, when often in one same organization or company, presently, the younger workers take over the same tasks or even more important and demanding tasks (quite often related with new competences, digital and

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4 See, for instance, Gouglas (2013); Williamson (2014); Milkman (2017); Bessant, Farthing, and Watts (2017).

5 It suffices searching, in any search engine, for the terms “Brexit and generation” to find thousands of news and articles published in the media such as BBC, The Independent, The Guardian, The Times, etc., that between 2016 and 2017 tried to show and interpret the Generation Gap present in the Brexit.
others) than the older workers, but with much more unfavourable remuneration, contractual forms, and social protection. In a society where fertility has decreased, and the average life span has increased, the generational inequalities become evident in terms of the distribution of increasingly scarcer public resources, considering that “the new [generations] will see the older generations to take possession of the realized productivity gains, being increasingly harder to justify ethically the transferences between them” (Mendes 2005, 250).

In this context, I claim the possibility of the current generationalist discourses being analysed to be a symptom of a generational change underway and, to this extent, a vestige of a generation as social reality in construction. And it is not only forewarning it, but also contributing to its social and symbolic production. In fact, as Roberts claims (2012, 479), the conditions that made possible the reproduction of the experiences and the standards of living of the baby boomer generation have disappeared, foretelling the likely emergence, although still undefined, of what will form a new generation among young people born after the 1980s, who know and live in a world that is distinct from the one of the past and projected for the future. It is a hypothesis with a global nature to be seen and followed in a contextualized and intersected way, considering the variety (in space) and variability (in time) of national public policies, as well as variables of schooling, class and family social capital and social background, gender, ethnic-racial and citizenship stature, among other variables.

CRISIS AS GENERATIONAL MARKER

As some academic studies already show, in several countries the generation born after 1980 faces lower wage standards when compared to the preceding generations, and with precarious labour conditions that go beyond the moment of entrance in the labour market, increasingly marking the active life course of this generation. In Portugal, these conditions were particularly intensified when, in the aftermath of the subprime crisis in 2008, announced worldwide, Portugal asked for an international bailout in 2011 to face its public debt and, as a consequence, a set of political austerity measures were imposed by the so-called

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6 See Bessant, Farthing and Watts (2017) for the cases of the USA, England, Australia, France, and Spain. See Côté (2014) for the Canadian case, and other examples. For the case of Portugal, see Ferreira et al. (2017), Bago d’Uva and Fernandes (2017).

Troika, formed by three international institutions: the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

The period between 2011 and 2015 forms an historical backdrop that had specific effects on the life of Portuguese young people (and those less young, as well). Even though recently there are signs of economic improvement in Portugal, the systemic reconfigurations added by the austerity measures were so intense and deep that their effects can hardly be circumscribed to the period when they happened, and were later reverted in short or middle term. They were, indeed, effects that ended up going well beyond the economic sphere, opening the possibility of having established for a long-term “a social regimen of precarious existence”, with “deep and hardly reversible consequences, at least in middle term, in the economy, in the labor world, but also in the social and class structures” (Carmo and Barata 2017, 322-323). This social regimen, in the long term, can be translated in a diversity of precarious ways of life among young people that vary depending on the conditions of social inequality that are inherent to the plurality of youth conditions.

Considering the changes produced in the social and economic structure of the Portuguese society (and other societies of southern Europe, like Greece, Spain, Italy, and Malta), I leave open the hypothesis that the austerity measures implemented during this period work as a generational marker: not in the sense of forming an event accountable for abrupt ruptures, but for establishing a turning point marked by the intensification and acceleration of economic and social processes that were already happening and that are generator of a context structurally differentiated from the past. That is, effects that do not correspond to historical discontinuities directly induced by the economic recession, but that result from trends that were already signaling and forecasting the frailty of the hope for the April Generation – the generation that, in Portugal, corresponds to a pale and late reflex of the aspirations of the baby boom generation in Europe7 – in consolidating a strong Social State, with social justice and economic growth.

7 As Bauman proposes (2007), the borders that separate the generations are ambiguous and indefinite depending on their localization in time and space (territorial, social, and cultural). In this sense, in Portugal, we did not have a baby boom generation properly as it is described in the literature, much less in the historical time when it emerged in the Anglo-Saxon context. Portugal lived under a dictatorship during World War II and lived like this for another 30 years thereafter. It also dealt, during this time, with its own wars, in the sense of trying to keep the occupied territories in Africa. They were difficult conditions that are not consistent with the ideals of prosperity and well-being of the Anglo-Saxon baby boomer generation.
In fact, the set of conditions inaugurated on April 25, 1974 – the day that symbolically marks the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal and the establishment of a democratic system – encouraged the belief in the possibilities of actual security, peace, and upward social mobility among those who, since an early age, were brought up in this setting. The installation of the democratic system in the 1970s and the end of the war for the defence of the occupied territories in Africa by the Portuguese, was followed throughout the 1980s by the stabilization of a model of constitutional State and welfare State, a union of economic growth and progressive outsourcing of the economy, the adhesion of Portugal to the European Economic Community (in 1986), the expansion and democratization of the social media, the substantial increase of the schooling rates, especially in higher education, and the decrease of the unemployment rates (Figueiredo, Lorga da Silva and Ferreira 1999).

A feeling of hope in the future was nurtured among young people socialized under this set of structural conditions, those who shaped the April Generation, born in the 1960s and 1970s. It was not, however, a sufficiently solid and durable framework to guarantee the continuity of this feeling of hope for the coming age cohorts. From the 1990s, the levels of (youth) unemployment climbed again (Ferreira 2006), becoming a phenomenon that Natália Alves came to identify as “uncontrollable, massive and selective. Uncontrollable, because it did not stop increasing in the last the 20 years, except for the second half of the 1980s. Massive because it reached a high number of employees. Selective because it is not uniformly distributed through all the categories of workers, affecting mainly the more vulnerable social groups (youth, women and, in some countries, emigrants) or specific sectors of activity” (Alves 1993, 651). As explanatory factors for the difficulties added to young people in their transition to the labour market in the 1990s, there already were “the reduction of the volume of employment, particularly in sectors of activities traditionally responsive to the young labor force, and the precariousness of the wage relation” (Alves 1998, 110).

When contrasting some common indicators in the National Youth Surveys conducted in 1997 and 1987, it is observed that young people in the 1990s expressed higher aspirations related to the academic qualifications they wanted to achieve, when contrasted to the youth in the 1980s (Pais 1998b, 189). Therefore, the expansion of the school aspirations among young people and their investment in the prolongation of their school trajectories was still felt, believing in the value of the diploma as an antidote against the difficulties of
labour market insertion and in its virtuous power of joining the type and the level of instruction, the profession, the remuneration, and the social status (Alves 1998, 89). On the other hand, in the 1990s young people were already disclosing a greater conscience of the difficulties of the labour market and the threats of unemployment.

Socialized in conditions shaped by the expansion of education since the mandatory schooling until higher education, many more young people than in the past had possibilities of nurturing throughout their school years high aspirations and expectations concerning the value of employability of the diplomas they were earning – that is, the value assigned to diplomas in the access to a work position equivalent to the qualifications certified by it, the steadiest forms of employment and, ultimately, even in the access to work position tout court.

But the remarkable schooling progression of Portuguese young people in those years, and the resulting expansion of the aspirations and expectations among them for a better quality of life in the future, in terms of labour stability and security, was being followed by added difficulties in finding jobs, namely in positions corresponding to the qualification obtained in terms of remuneration, status, and social protection (Figueiredo, Lorga da Silva and Ferreira 1999; Ferreira 2006). In the face of this situation José Machado Pais had already posed the following question at the end of the 1990s: “is the education system instilling among young people excessive, or at least disproportional, expectations related to the prosaic reality of the labor world? And when these expectations are betrayed in young people with strong expectations of social mobility, won’t it be created conditions for the emergence, in the future, of specific forms of social disenchantment?” (Pais 1998b, 190).

About 20 years later the hypothesis put forward by José Machado Pais was confirmed. The social reactions triggered by the austerity measures imposed by the Troika in 2011 – evident in social movements that, organized in a global, rhizomatic, and virtual way, acquired expression in Portugal during the years of the crisis (Pais 2014), as the Movimento 12 de março [12 of March Movement],8 the Precários Inflexíveis [Inflexible Precarious], the Indignados [Appalled], or other equivalents9 – handle this feeling of disenchantment

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8 Resulting from the organization of the demonstration that happened on this date in 2011.
9 These movements, among others, indicate new ways of looking at and making politics among the youth of our days, as expressions of resistance to the new structural conditions that they experience,
and social dissatisfaction. Although generalized, it is a feeling shared, to a great extent, by young people and adults raised in a horizon of expectations marked by the growth of the Social State and by the belief in the value of employability of the school diplomas, but that is confronted with a picture of difficulties added in the access to the labour market and that, not being totally new, has intensified greatly throughout the deep economic crisis in Europe after 2008.

The higher education diploma no longer guarantees access to and progression in a certain career, not even a job corresponding to the qualification achieved (Cardoso et al., 2014). A disenchanted reality of which, in turn, young people and their families are increasingly more aware, as is shown in the chronicle by Andreia Fonseca, a young holder of a Masters in Psychology, published in the Público newspaper in June 2015:

I’m part of a curious generation. At 25 years of age, I grew up with the nonsense that a degree was a guarantee of success. But this generation was deceived. The sheepskin is not a guarantee of anything. At the most, it is a long-term investment that, perhaps, one day will generate profit. Deluded, this generation went to the university at 18 with all their luggage, in a heroic search for a promising future. But, in my case and in so many others (I dare to say thousands of people), it backfired.

The course was finished with effort, investment (at every level) and an average of 18 valores – with the right to tears of pride in the presentation of the master’s thesis. And after the happiness peak, the reality came… Back home, with the same luggage, loaded with heroic dreams when one left, but that came back with fear, doubts and anticipated difficulties.

The luggage was right! Days passed by, cvs were printed, delivered and, with much certainty, ignored at a vertiginous speed. “Change the cv”, “hide your master’s”, “you have to accept that this is difficult and will have to accept anything”, said the wise voices around me, and that at each word “burnt” my dreams, transforming them into mere ashes.

(...)

as well as trying to configure alternatives to the social system that is drawn (Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas 2011; Williamson 2014; Milkman 2017). They are highlighted, over all, for being movements of collective action to the global scale, formed in globalized conditions of connection, provided either by the integration of new technologies of information and communication in daily life, or by the relative widening of the opportunities of geographic international mobility.

Andreia Fonseca, “Sou desta geração que nem se permite sonhar” [I am from this generation that doesn't even allow itself to dream], Crónica P3, Público, June 12, 2015. See http://p3.publico.pt/actualidade/sociedade/17113/sou-desta-geracao-que-nem-se-permite-sonhar.
All this frenzy, that is my life of an unemployed graduate, ends at the dinner table. That moment when I sit, I see the air of fatigue in my parents’ faces (that air of those who need to count cents to survive) and I feel that I still depend on them to eat a mere loaf of bread.

And in the unfolding of this “simple” thought, I feel that I do not even dare to think about having my own house, my own car (or another vehicle with wheels) or buying my own food. And it is this generation, that now is also nicknamed “young adults”, that one day will be the core of our active population. A generation that does not allow itself to dream, because dreams cost a lot… They cost the price of the disillusionment, ours and of those who love us. And since the “dream commands the life”, I do not even dare to say that I live: I survive, to the cost of my parents’ sacrifices, those that some time ago cried out of pride when I acquired the damn sheepskin!

These are strong words from somebody who, just like other young people in Portugal, as in other countries of southern Europe, lives in a setting where the conditions that would favour the optimistic search of formal education and the itineraries that this offers saw themselves quite fragile. The reduction of the volume of employment and the consequent compression of the labour market resulted in very high indices of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, namely in segments until then less exposed to these conditions there, like the young graduates (Cardoso et al. 2014). The rate of youth unemployment reached peaks never seen in the past (around 40% in 2013). The most structural unemployment configurations were also intensified, in the form of long-term unemployment, strongly accentuating the probability of transitory forms of unemployment as a temporary situation to become, with time, circulating forms of unemployment as intermittent condition, with the risk of precariousness becoming rooted in their course and to structure their ways of life due to the regularity and temporality that it acquires when adults (Ferreira et al. 2017).

And it should be noted that the official unemployment numbers exclude several of these young people who would prefer to be working, but are counted as non-active population, sheltered in an educational system through which they hang on as students, or under the stigmatic condition of “unoccupied” young people – more known as neet (not in education, employment, or training), a designation that to a great extent, reupdates the traditional image of youth as “allergic” to work (Rowland et al. 2014; Ferreira, Pappámikail and Vieira 2017).
On the other hand, the forms of underemployment also increased, present in the resurgence of atypical forms of employment, of gig economies, and of informal economies (Ferreira et al. 2017). A certain instability has always been part of the youth processes of transition to adulthood. The notion of “experience” itself, namely of professional experience, is always part of the youth transitions to the labour market. The beginning of the active life always tended to be marked by short bonds, high turnover of occupations, with professional identities still little defined and consolidated. However, in certain structural conditions like those that have recently characterized the economy, the enterprises arrangement, and the legal framework of labour relations in the Portuguese society (OECD 2017), the increasing risk is that more unstable, temporary, and flexible forms of youth transition are extended along the life course and become a social condition in the adult life. In other words, that situations of intermittent work, oscillating between situations of legal or informal independent work, internships, scholarships, accumulation of partial and opportunistic jobs, and the whole plethora of forms of employment once called “atypical” are institutionalized as typical, shaping labour trajectories and life courses with very diffuse possibilities of projecting a future beyond the constraint and randomness of the present. And this is well beyond life’s professional dimension.

PRECARIOUSNESS AS CORE OF GENERATIONAL CONSCIENCE

The situation of extreme labour precariousness can be the structuring core of a generational conscience (Mannheim 1990; Feixa and Leccardi 2010), a reflexive focus around which the unit of subjective experiences among young people born after the 1980s is set, as well as the recognition of its particularity when compared with previous generations; a conscience that, additionally, finds conditions to be extended. In a context of systemic crisis that includes many countries of the world, with quite different intensities and configurations, the experiences and meanings of young people concerning precariousness, traditionally rooted and understood in a national order, find conditions to be fast and efficiently shared on a transnational scale, potentializing the creation of a global generational conscience (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009; Edmunds and Turner 2005).

In Portugal the intergenerational recognition regarding the current youth unemployment as a structural problem is remarkable. That is, youth
unemployment is understood as a consequence of the recent compression of labour market, in contrast to the social perceptions and moral judgements traditionally shared concerning youth unemployment. From the point of view of common sense, the situation of youth unemployment was traditionally perceived as a result of the voluntary refusal of young people to work, ensuing in moralizing judgement based on a work ethics as a duty. More recently, the moral judgment tends to be directed to the school and the vocational training system: based on a purely instrumental view of knowledge, it is argued that the institutional systems of knowledge transmission, supposedly, do not promote, before and after their action, the articulation between competences, qualifications, and places in the labour market (Alves 2007; Cardoso et al. 2014). Consequently, youth unemployment results from these institutions not guaranteeing the supposed “youth employability” – their capacity of becoming “employable” – pretending that young people would not be prepared for the work places supposedly available.

However, far from common sense arguments that reasoned for “allergy to work” on the part of the youth, or far from the theses constructed around the fallacy of the “employability” and the supposed lack of preparation by the school, there is a wide intergenerational consensus in the Portuguese society regarding the perception of youth unemployment as having a structural nature, caused overall by the reduction of the volume of jobs and the consequent compression of the work market. In a survey from 2015 (Ferreira et al. 2017) more than 60% of the Portuguese people recognized that the causes of the youth unemployment are linked to the fact of having “increasingly fewer jobs for those who are entering in the labor market”, reflecting the chronic lack of capacity of the Portuguese productive system to generate sufficient work positions, widely expanded during the economic and monetary crisis.

To a great extent, the structural subsistence of this feature in the Portuguese society happens because the regulation made by the State has kept its role as coach, keeping its traditional recommendations in terms of youth employment public policies: (a) on the one hand, policies of employment activation, underpinned in short-term measures based on ephemeral forms of training, internships, or insertion contracts, to guarantee the “employability” of the young – a watchword understood as the capacity of the worker in adapting to the demands of the work world; (b) on the other hand, policies of promotion of self-employment and creation of enterprises, known under the name of “entrepreneurship promotion policies”, under-financed and with a residual
adhesion among the unemployed young population, with little capacity for its later sustainability. The figure of the “young entrepreneur” and the image of the “employability”, nurtured on a large scale by the most recent public policies to tackle the youth unemployment, are typical figures of the economic liberalism, that places on the individual the burden of the responsibility (and the culpability) for the condition of unemployment and for his exit from this condition, disregarding the structural factors that are the basis of the addition of young people in this situation.

Finally, the most recent policies have been in the direction of the liberalization of the labour market (labour flexibilization, professional mobility, collaboration in projects, etc.), which have not had the support of any “invisible hand” in the Portuguese economy in the sense of rendering the expected outcomes (increasing employment), resulting in mobility “from precariousness to precariousness” (Matos 2014), passing through periods of increasingly longer unemployment. In fact, for those young people who have been employed, the austerity policies established by the Troika were followed by requirements in the sense of volatilization of steady employment, consolidation of a more flexible, contingent, precarious, and individualized labour relation, wage reduction in comparison with previous generations in equivalent positions and occupations, resulting in the questioning of many public social protection guarantees.

In this context, in which the precariousness of labour relations is installed with intensity and throughout the life course, the Portuguese young people share with others from southern Europe a paradoxical social condition: there has never existed in Portugal such a condition of qualified youth, while, simultaneously being so frustrated in the aspirations and labour expectations socially nourished by the school and the family, as well as under such a great difficulty of transition to the labour market, in trajectories increasingly more discontinuous and in which the labyrinth tends to almost always lead to the same goal: precariousness. It is a generation in “dysrhythmia between the idealized and the accomplished”, “when the imagined futures are denied by the reality” (Pais 2012, 267). A reality of labour difficulties that are propagated to several dimensions and phases of life, surpassing the labour dimension and resulting in wider problems of social inclusion.
FROM LABOUR PRECARIOUSNESS TO ONTOLOGICAL INSECURITY

The effect of the austerity measures have intense and lacerating effects far beyond the economic sphere, as the conditions of youth precariousness are not felt only in their transition to the labour market, but reach a much wider dimension in the transitions to adulthood, affecting other dimensions of youths’ lives in terms of social (un)protection and (in)dependence and, ultimately, of ontological (in)security. The ontological security, according to Giddens (1995, 75-82), refers to a feeling of continuity in the personal identity of the subject, of stability and order in the events and experiences passed through, and of steadiness of the social and material environments involving her/him. The precariousness felt in youth transitions to labour tends to be a consistent threat to this sense of existential and personal security, contaminating and narrowing future horizons.

There are several recent studies that have pointed out the remarkable impacts of the difficulties felt in terms of labour insertion in the management of the daily life of young people, as well as in the delineation and realization of future projects that go far beyond the professional life, but that depend on this to a great extent. I am referring to transition markers to adulthood that cross other spheres of youths’ lives, like leaving parents’ home and life autonomy, conjugality, and parenthood (Pais 2012; Alves et al. 2011).

In fact, the decision-making of today’s young adults in relation to projects like leaving parents’ home, buying a house, or forming a family is much more difficult and risky. Not by chance, these are projects that are postponed and whose accomplishment will happen according to the extent of the material conditions of each youth segment, always with the spectre of being reversed at any time. This is also a mark of the current generation, an indicator of its existential precariousness: the reversibility to which the social statutes that they take over in life are subjected. They leave their parents’ home running the risk of coming back, relationships are tried, and conjugality is experienced; they are not students anymore, being aware of the need to go back to school later; they are workers and in the following day they are unemployed; internships, training and similar events accumulate in a life course increasingly more labyrinthine, without guiding landmarks.

On the other hand, facing the “lack of future” of their life, the youth condition of this generation ends up being more “presentist” than young people of previous generations. That is, they end up appreciating much more
the experiences that are provided to them in the present and the respective
gratification than valuing future projects, much more difficult to delineate
and to materialize and with uncertain gratification. Facing a reality in which
stability is quite difficult to guarantee, and the future is made of open scenes
and short terms, the important thing is to live the present moment, day-by-
day, and to enjoy it not only in hedonist terms, but also with personal and
identitarian accomplishment – despite being, from now on, in a provisional
and recyclable, flexible and adaptive way. The notion of “experience” becomes a
discursive value in the most diverse spheres of life, whose practical concretion
is certainly quite dependent on the respective objective conditions.

At the same time, even by means of the massive presence of new technologies
of information and communication among the youngest generation, but also
the relative democratization of the access to “traveling” (low cost flights,
different forms of lodging at low cost, student exchange programmes, etc.),
it is a globally connected generation that tends to have “more world” in their
horizons, and to have access to more and diversified experiences, much more
segmented, unstandardized, and unrutualized than it was in the past. The
accelerated flexibilization of the labour market, in terms of contract, secular,
and even geographic bonds, the ubiquitous digitalization of life worlds, and
the lack of conditions to design projects of (and with) the future ultimately
makes the life course of today’s young people a sequence of voluntary or
conditioned experiences.

At a time when the notion of “professional insertion” cannot be
conceptualized anymore as a specific moment in life (denoted with ideas of
“entrance in the active life” or “transition from school to work”), converting
into an increasingly zigzagging, indeterminate, and inexact process (Alves
2008; Pais 2001), the articulations of this process with traditional markers
of passage are creating transition forms to adulthood made of complex,
uncertain, and insecure settings and itineraries (Vieira, Ferreira and Rowland
2015). It is in this context, when the structures of opportunity to the access
to employment are increasingly blocked, ultimately hindering more and
more youths’ access to the realization of other projects of life, that the idea of
professional insertion increasingly converges with the idea of social inclusion,
and the attainment of jobs is intrinsically associated with mechanisms of
protection from social exclusion (Alves 2008, 76).

However, for those who live their youth condition in a crisis and post-crisis
context, this will happen not necessarily already under the aegis of a feeling of
victimization and frustration in front of projected futures and identities, like the April Generation. Socialized in conditions of labour scarcity, the hypothesis of the precariousness not being discussed as such is visible, and the new rules of capitalist and neoliberal games tend to be lived along with a functional feeling of acceptance and naturalization. Those who have backing to explore in an adventurous and creative way the limbo of uncertainty and insecurity might even appreciate the practices and experiences that such rules might provide. Even though the objective conditions stimulate efforts that often are inglorious, the psychological adjustments compel the incorporation and reproduction of neoliberal beliefs: one needs to be optimistic and restart, always with energy and hard work (Franceschelli and Keating 2018), looking for escaping, managing, always moving, without complaints or fatalism, even when this movement is made in circles that unfailingly return to the home left (often the parents’ home).

CONCLUSION

Will these impasses leave a generational mark on the professional life of young people? Will they be, along with other life dimensions, identifiers of a structural change of such an order in the experience of the youth throughout their life course that may signal the emergence of a new generation? Will the austerity years and the changes that happened (or were intensified) during them be a turning point and generational rupture?

It is still early to evaluate with rigour the impacts of the changes that have happened in terms of their longevity in the life course of the age cohorts born after the 1980s, but it would be sociological naivety to think that the trends identified in the crisis years in Portugal, but not only there, will be circumscribed to transient circumstances. For the time being, there are certainly temporary effects that are transversally shared with a long youth condition and that are prolonged in the life course, that is, they are increasingly further from being conceptualized as mere effects of “age” or “life cycle”. Given their intensity and structural rooting, the detected effects will have, certainly, conditions to disseminate beyond temporary crisis, legitimizing the hypothesis of crystallizing in time and becoming generational effects, in the sense of extending in the biographical time of life course and in the historical time of future age cohorts.
This means that they are effects that question the symbolic borders not only of the “youth” condition, but also, including, the “adult” condition itself. Not embarking on controversies marked for mutually exclusive positions – as do those who present the generational paradigm as a substitute of the transitions paradigm or point to the generational paradigm as a “new emergent orthodoxy in the studies of youth”. It is worth considering that a new generational framework will have among its major effects the reconfiguration of forms of existence of the condition as “adult” and of life course themselves just as they have been lived and projected until then. The fact is that we have been witnessing structural changes that have significantly modified the experience of the traditional markers of entrance to adulthood in Europe, with specific effects among young people born after the 1980s, allowing them to know and live in a world that is distinct from the one in the past and projected for the future.

Facing the global change in the structural conditions following the 1980s, in terms of conditions of autonomy in personal life and communication in daily life, the Millennials, whether in the discursive formulations that fall on them, or in the objective conditions that involve their experiences and world experiences, could be the basis of the configuration of a new generation, still under construction, marked by structural changes that the economic-financial crisis accelerated and consolidated. It is not yet an effective generation, in the sociological sense of the term, but the expression of a process of generational transition lived globally, in which those born after the 1980s were the first ones dealing directly with the reality of the neoliberal capitalism, adjusting many of the expectations and aspirations of which they still assign to the hard structure of constraints and opportunities made available to them, intrinsically marked by the precariousness of their existences.

This does not mean that such changes will be experienced by youth in an equal way. The generational paradigm is often criticized for supposedly homogenizing the subjects born in certain space-time contexts, crystallizing and standardizing differences from senses of rupture, and to level diversities and inequalities existing at this moment. However, there is no guarantee that this will happen. The fact that the new generation is unequally exposed to the restructuration underway, which is strongly asymmetrical from the social and spatial point of view, makes it fallacious to think that this transformation

inevitably creates a totalizing intragenerational unit of symbolic constellations. The youth asymmetries persist and acquire new contours. For such, the impact of “time marks” among the youth and along the life course will always be filtered by their objective conditions of existence, namely in terms of their background concerning social class, schooling or social-professional situation, gender or sexual orientation, ethnicity or stature of citizenship, for instance.

Mannheim already confronted this problem, advancing the concept of “generational units”, that is, groups that although sharing a “generational awareness” marked by the proximity in the face of a new structural context (and by the distance in relation to the previous one), reflect and react in a distinct way regarding the same, considering the social status that they assume in it. Although immersed in a relatively particular structural context, marked by structural processes in common (as the expanded schooling, the difficulties and restrictions in the insertion in the work market, the access to new technologies, among others), the youth trajectories are crossed by different socializing experiences, supports, and social conditions that have distinct and unequal effects in the difficulties faced and the strategies used to deal with them.

In this sense, the intensities with which the ontological insecurity is felt and the ways that precariousness is experienced and managed along the life course are socially diversified and unequal, as their effects on the trajectories depend, to a great extent, on regimes of transition to adulthood underlying the national political contexts, as well as the social backgrounds and the capitals that the subjects, young or adult, have accumulated in their respective course. Certainly the public, family, and school backing of some young people when compared to others will make it possible for them to better resist the processes of professional disqualification that are not in consonance with their aspirations and/or qualifications. Others, however, in positions of greater risk of social exclusion, will experience the precariousness of their labour trajectory in conditions of stronger objective and subjective suffering.
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The crisis impact on the political discourse of Portuguese social partners

Raquel Rego
Miguel Won
Bruno Martins
Amália Mendes
Iria del Río
Pierre Lejeune
INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a sociological perspective on citizenship at a time of crisis enriched with data analysis techniques from computer engineering and linguistics. We base our research on the assumption that citizenship assumes a political and civic dimension illustrated in an exemplary way through the development achieved and role performed by trade unions and employers’ associations in our societies.

The recent crisis imposed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Portugal (2011-2014). This compromise challenged the already consolidated democratic institutions, inclusive social dialogue mechanisms, through which both trade unions and employers’ representatives acquire the status of “social partners” in corporatist regimes. In fact, through social concertation, but more through collective bargaining, these civil society organizations assume a unique hinge function. We contribute to the volume on “citizenship” with the understanding of the evolution of social partners discourse in the context of the crisis. We hope to add to the debate about the quality of democracy, providing empirical evidence on how Portuguese social partners were affected by the supra-national intervention of the troika (IMF, EU, ECB).

We assume that the asymmetric positions associated with the structural nature of social partners in our societies lead to very different perceptions concerning the neo-liberal policies implemented by the supra-national intervention; and that their distinct ideological orientations are reflected in their political programmes as far as they are the result of a consensus found through a collective understanding. Furthermore, these written discourses serve as guidelines for action in the coming years reflecting the appropriate solutions for a problem, and may, as a result, help to predict cooperation/resistance. This is how we came to analyse social partners’ final documents of general meetings during the most important period of the crisis: before, during, and after the troika presence in Portugal.

In this chapter we answer two main questions: to what extent is the crisis associated with the troika by the social partners? Did the supra-national intervention change social partners’ attitudes toward democratic mechanisms of social dialogue?

The first two sections of this chapter embed our research in the discussion about the destruction of corporatism by neoliberal policies, and the external but also internal reasons for the lack of Europeanization of union (in particular)
opposition. Then we present and justify our methodological choices and, finally, we present and discuss our findings, first by organization and then comparing the selected cases.

THE SUPRA-NATIONAL ACTORS’ IMPOSITION OF AUSTERITY

According to Culpepper and Regan (2014), trade unions were not invited to negotiate paths of economic adjustment in the countries hit especially hard by the crisis due to their declining legitimacy, based on membership.

However, based on the Portuguese case, we sustain that trade unions have attained a crucial position in European societies that cannot be judged (only) by the gatekeeper function of social peace. Although trade unions’ membership has been falling in what has been called the “unionism crisis” and the European social model has been eroded – witnessed through the freeze of the European social dialogue, for instance – trade unions are also labour market regulators. Through collective bargaining in particular, trade unions together with employers’ representatives define wages and working conditions, providing benefits to those beyond their members.

In fact, trade unions were not invited to negotiate the paths of economic adjustment in countries like Portugal – despite the celebration of a social pact in 2012 with the weakest union partner, which did not prevent it from joining general strikes some time later – because the supra-national intervention is dominated by a neoliberal ideology.

As James Raymond Vreeland (2003) explains, during crises, Governments use conditionality, that is specific policy prescriptions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in exchange for loans to developing countries, to impose unpopular policies. Also Balbona and Begega sustain that governments seem to use “…the imposition of austerity as a mechanism for the avoidance of blame” (2015, 289).

For Vreeland (2003), the IMF programmes have a negative effect on economic growth but these effects are distributed unequally and some are not even hurt. Moreover, the reforms may lead to different levels of political opposition, inclusively from the trade unions and other representative civil society organizations (Moury and Standring 2017).

In its lending and advisory role, the IMF, as Eichengreen and Woods (2015) state, intervenes in national affairs, raising the risk of weakening democratic
The weight of member countries such as the United States in IMF decision-making, in keeping with how voting rights depend on the quota size, is one reason for some passionate reactions it raises. Balbona and Begega sustain that in the recent crisis we went “from bargaining to imposition” (2015, 272). In fact, the institutions of social dialogue became at risk of demolition, as the Spanish authors say, but not only because of social concertation, which has a pure consultative role, but in particular through the offensive addressed toward collective bargaining (Stoleroff 2015).

In the same sense, decision-makers considered the centralization of European economic policy, and therefore destruction of corporatism, as the best process for guaranteeing Eurozone stability and this furthermore required austerity measures (Prosser 2016). However, one of the alternative solutions called for by some authors (Stockhammer 2013) was European solidarity and an “…institution-building that guaranteed a role for labour organisations (or more broadly labour and capital) in the administration and funding of the decisions of the institution. Effectively, these measures would amount to the creation of a European welfare state” (Stockhammer 2013, 16-17).

The IMF ideology, as that of other international institutions, usually is presented as the doctrine of economic neutrality. This doctrine, which assumes that politics stays to one side and that economic decisions are neutral, provides an ideological smokescreen for Western nations to intervene in favour of free trade capitalism. However, such international aid calls national sovereignty into question even while the opposite sides of the labour relations conflict may see this differently. As a neoliberal approach, this is expected to satisfy employer interests and be to the disfavour of those of workers. Having presented IMF mission aims as “…to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other” (http://www.imf.org/en/About), the IMF presence may clearly lead us to expect to generate opportunities for the entrepreneurs, and a threat to the power of trade unions and socially protected workers.

In sum, the centralization of European economy seems to be the path found to guarantee Eurozone stability and, according to the leading actors of that process, supra-national institutions, that path implies the exclusion of social partners.
The analysis of the reaction toward a supra-national intervention of a neoliberal actor, such as the IMF, seems limited to organizations at a European level (Müller and Platzer 2017). According to Erne (2008), trade unions are not expected to take political positions against European trends because they remain submerged in national specificities. The author considers that unions adopt technochratic and national strategies in response to the EU integration process, because national diverse identities, the integrated European market, and the supranational EU governance structures prevent European collective action.

Neoliberal actors seem to count on a crucial asymmetry in European policies to impose their view (Erne 2008). While economic policy takes on a European scale, social policy has a national base and that contributes to a deficit of European reflection in national debates. As Scharpf explains:

In the nation state, both types of policy had been in political competition at the same constitutional level. In the process of European integration, however, the relationship has become asymmetric as economic policies have been progressively Europeanized, while social-protection policies remained at the national level. As a consequence, national welfare states are constitutionally constrained by the “supremacy” of all European rules of economic integration, liberalization and competition law. At the same time, they must operate under the fiscal rules of monetary union while their revenue base is eroding as a consequence of tax competition and the need to reduce non-wage labour costs. (Scharpf 2002, 665-666)

If there are concerns over social inclusion in European treaties or a European Employment Strategy, there is also a corresponding need to respect the diversity of national contexts (Scharpf 2002; Erne 2008). Thus, despite the last financial crisis having created similar problems in different countries, social policies were left behind on the need for convergence. And this is how social policies contribute to a weak response from the workers’ side. There was opposition and mobilization in countries like Portugal, namely through general strikes, which doubled its number in a few years, but with no political consequences before the elections.

National specificities weaken trade unions’ action at a European level, making it more difficult to develop common strategies (Müller and Platzer 2017).
In these national specificities, we must contemplate the reality of entrenched national parochialisms as a major constraint upon the possibility of supranational institution-building (Abbott 2011). The European trade union movement has simply not had enough influence: “The crisis did not stop popular protest. However, European trade unions primarily fought pressing defensive struggles at the company or national level and therefore recurrently lacked the resources necessary to engage in longer-term transformative struggles” (Erne 2015, 358).

Based on their comparison of European trade union organizations, before and after 2008, Müller and Platzer (2017) identify how trade unions went from a period of organizational consolidation and improving institutional power resources toward a less European engaged movement having a new economic governance framework, which only reinforces the asymmetries.

These authors conclude that trade unions need to present plausible alternative policies. And they cannot only lobby for reform of the institutional set-up of the new economic governance framework. They also need to overcome the national sphere. In the authors’ words: “[trade unions] need to grant a higher priority to ‘Europe’ and all that this implies in terms of specific activities, in terms of both strategies and organisation, and reflect this in the allocation of scarce staff and material resources” (Müller and Platzer 2017, 310). In the same sense, Lima and Artiles also said: “Trade unions are still capable of mobilizing workers when needed, but national trade union action must be coordinated with regional and European action to develop alternative policy options” (Lima and Artiles 2011, 400).

One must have in mind that trade unions usually focus on the national level because this is where workplace problems can be identified and factors influencing national unions are more easily identified. Furthermore, as Erne (2008) stresses, the choice to act at a certain level is primarily determined by the means available.

Literature does not seem to relate much the scarce national unions’ opposition toward neoliberal policies with the mobilization capacity of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). Corinne Gobin noticed that this supra-national organization performs a unionism of the top (Gobin 1997, 137) and is not politically influential. The ETUC took position on austerity, having organized demonstrations or holding its congress in Athens in 2011, but demonstrations were relatively weak: May 2009, 250,000 participants; September 2010, 100,000 participants; November 2012, hundreds of
thousands of demonstrations (Degryse 2013). The ETUC considers austerity measures mainly as counter-productive. In fact, the ETUC is a mega-structure but assembles very distinct organizations, not only from different European regions but also from the same country.

In sum, although it would be important that the “…unionists perceive[e] the EU as an effective framework for collective action and not just a threat” (Erne 2008, 194), there are external and internal reasons for the lack of Europeanization of union strategies.

METHODOLOGY

We here intend to ascertain which ways social partners discourses evolved within the context of the crisis and in particular considering the supra-national intervention of the troika as a defining moment in Portuguese history. Hence, we analysed social partners “voices” before, during, and after the troika presence (May 2011-May 2014).

There are two main reasons to use the written discourse as a good source of data. First, it ensures the comparative exercise, which would be less reliable through interviews for instance when taking into consideration the distance from the events and the trend to rebuild discourses. Second, the written discourse is both a set of ideas and an interactive process (Schmidt 2002), which means it may be a way to gain agreement for reform from relevant policy actors. Therefore, we analysed the political programmes of social partners. These documents are based on a collective consensus and serve as guidelines for a mandate (usually 3-4 years), for both internal and external audiences, binding the respective organizations with future claims and actions.

We analysed the written discourses of the CGTP-IN-Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersyndical (General Confederation of Portuguese Workers) and CIP-Confederação Empresarial de Portugal (Confederation of Portuguese Business). These are the two most representative, influential, and oldest Portuguese social partners, although there are neither objective nor legal criteria to assess its representativeness, prevailing a “mutual recognition” system (Eurofound 2016).

We undertook a multidisciplinary analysis considering the use of techniques from other scientific fields. First, we applied word extraction with the help of computer engineering to identify key-phrases (words or sequences of words
that represent entities and/or topical phrases), together with their occurrence (frequency) and centrality, i.e., how relevant a key-phrase is when considering each document as a connected web of possible key-phrases (Won et al. forthcoming). We have additionally considered specific and topically-related words, namely “Europe”, “EU”, “troika”, “crisis”, “sovereignty”, “interference”, and two social partners at a European level (the ETUC and BusinessEurope), not automatically identified as key-phrases from the algorithm. Then, with the help of linguistic expertise, we analysed the ideological discourse of the segments in which those key-phrases were found, seeking to understand the sense associated with those words. Having found a very low frequency of words like “Europe”, we benchmarked it considering also the frequency of “Government”, assuming they are comparable in the political system.

Table 7.1 identifies the documents analysed.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1</th>
<th>Political documents analysed</th>
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<td><strong>BEFORE THE TROIKA ARRIVAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>DURING THE TROIKA PRESENCE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CGTP-IN</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008 Programa de congresso (11th general meeting programme)</td>
<td>2012 Programa de congresso (12th general meeting programme)</td>
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</table>


* We also considered in a first moment the CIP Programme for the triennium 2014-2016, because the 2011 document was published in March, thus before the troika arrived in May 2011. However, the 2014 document is shorter than usual (12 pages instead of about 50) and its content does not change our findings significantly.

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1 The analysis was obviously made in Portuguese, words being presented in English only in this chapter.
FINDINGS

THE BACKGROUND

Over the last four decades, not only has the Portuguese economy changed, following the European Economic Community integration and the subsequent stages in the European project, in particular the Eurozone, but the Portuguese labour relations system has also acquired a level of maturity. The stabilization of the national industrial relations system in the beginning of the 1990s illustrates this as all representative organizations were included in the social concertation council. Although the main union organization, CGTP-IN, started by refusing to participate in social concertation, it joined and signed the first social pacts in 1991.

In addition to the transposition of a normative framework and other legislative aspects, European integration has contributed to the emergence of a new pattern of social relations, marked by the institutionalization of social dialogue at the national level (Royo 2012). For many social actors, Europe represented not only economic encouragement for adopting free markets but also a political opportunity for pluralist regimes (González 2012).

The polarization of labour relations in Portugal also concerns the European project. While for CGTP the European integration was an “adventure” (Cartaxo 2011) and its initial rejection at the European Trade Union Confederation seems to reflect it (Castanheira 1985), for CIP, one can identify an important receptiveness, considering the strengthening of the free market and the support provided for democratic regimes. Despite the ideological division amongst employers between those oriented toward the Atlantic economy and those interested in the European economy, the European project seemed to push employers further into Europe in conjunction with the problems arising in the ex-colonies (González 2012).

Portugal has made recourse to a supra-national support on three occasions since the advent of democracy: in 1977-79, 1983-85, and in 2011-14. The first two were an IMF intervention and the last was a troika intervention, thus also including the European Central Bank and the European Commission. In fact, the first and second IMF interventions in Portugal were held in a period of preparation for joining the European Economic Community with the membership application process running from 1977 through to accession in 1986. For the last intervention, Portugal was not only integrated into the
European Union but was also a Eurozone member-state, which meant it was particularly exposed to the crisis due to the interdependences within the Eurozone.

By the time of the last IMF intervention in Portugal, the industrial relations system and social dialogue mechanisms were consolidated. CGTP expressed their protest against austerity and the other union confederation signed a social pact that did not prevent a political crisis (Lima and Artiles 2011). In fact, the situation grew worse until the troika arrived. According to Lima and Artiles, trade unions opposed not only governments but also supra-national actors: “General strikes and mass demonstrations were called against the austerity plans of governments, but were also an expression of a generalized opposition to external constraints and impositions” (Lima and Artiles 2011, 399).

We will see next the importance of the supra-national intervention during the crisis from the perspective of the two main social partners: unions and employers. We will address our attention to how this supra-national intervention changed the social partners’ attitudes on democratic institutions, namely social concertation and collective bargaining.

**CGTP-IN**

The CGTP-IN was founded in 1970 (before the Carnation Revolution of 1974), and until 1978 was the only main trade union organization. From the outset, its social composition spanned the industrial and services sectors, with the founding sectors including the metallurgic, wool, banking, and sales sectors (Cartaxo 2011). The CGTP follows an ideology of class struggle unionism and is one reason why Portuguese industrial relations are considered as still marked by the heritage of authoritarian corporatism (Royo 2012). Its repertoire of action often extends to street demonstrations and strikes, and, in addition to its late membership of the social concertation committee, the CGTP rarely signs social pacts. Through the years, experts and opinion makers consider its action as following a clearly partisan orientation, usually explained by a strong communist influence (Castanheira 1985; Rebelo and Brites 2012; Lisi 2013; Stoleroff 2015). Although this relation can be illustrated by the publicly-known affiliation of the general-secretaries of CGTP in the Communist Party, there is no empirical evidence in literature.
Analysing the CGTP political documents, a common idea emerges, that the CGTP serves as an important tool for defending workers’ rights against “capital”, “multinational companies”, and “financial capital”. The enemy is either a vague entity or arises out of the global economy. CGTP uses the word “fight” and other belligerent expressions, endowing a warlike dimension to its discourse that increases in the following meeting. In fact, after the troika departure, these warlike words have decreased but there remain an important number of deontic terms, such as “requires” and “unavoidable”, for instance.

It comes as no surprise that the top six key phrases in all the CGTP documents analysed include “workers”, “rights”, and “collective bargaining”. But if in 2008 the focus seems to be on employment, in 2012 we would highlight action, and in 2016 collective bargaining.

The Portuguese situation itself seems to gain only a low level of importance, at least in the introduction to these documents. Before the troika arrived, at its XI general meeting, in 2008, the CGTP set out general criticism addressed to neoliberal policies in Europe, and less so as specifically regards the Portuguese case. In this discourse we can already identify the questioning of the neoliberal argument as to the lack of alternatives to austerity:

A summary analysis of the current situation shows us that the world is being governed by the hegemonic interests of the financial capital and the power of the multinationals in the context of a process of capitalist and neoliberal globalization, as a unique solution for the future of humanity, leading to serious imbalances and contradictions in development between countries, a generalized climate of insecurities, a sharp increase in social injustices and inequalities, and increasing threats to peace in various regions of the world.

(in Preamble 2008 – authors’ translation)

In the next general meeting, in 2012, the specific problems are considered the obvious theme. In the table of contents, for instance, we identify a full chapter addressing the Welfare State with specific sections on social protection, the national health system, etc. After the troika departure, in 2016, CGTP considered that the troika is not the only signal of a supra-national intervention in the country. Sovereignty is in fact a word present in the discourse during the troika presence. In 2012, CGTP considered that Portugal is an occupied country.

The CGTP clearly assumes a political orientation in its written discourse. The CGTP is on the left-wing and supports the renegotiation of debt:
This is an exhausted but not defeated model, which requires the mobilization and enlightenment of all, to continue the struggle for an alternative, from Left wing and Sovereign, that the country needs and the people demand. (2016, 4 – authors’ translation)

The CGTP clearly expresses political opposition toward the neoliberal orientations for both economic and social reasons:

Fifteen years after the introduction of the Pact of Stability and Growth (PEC) and the rules of the Economic and Monetary Union, the Memorandum of the Troika and now the Budget Treaty, these instruments have been put in motion as backward movers, which impose economically erroneous decisions and limitations socially unbearable. (2016, 54 – authors’ translation)

In fact, in 2016, references to the new national political situation, that is, the political alliance among left-wing parties in Parliament, were very restrained and not completely positive. The most positive aspect seems to be that the CGTP is responsible for the political change even while remaining less clear its assessment of the current situation:

The CGTP-IN action and the workers’ struggle were decisive for the creation of a new political framework which, being more favourable to the realization of its just demands, requires the continuation and intensification of our intervention. The first months of this new phase of national life confirm positive advances regarding the replacement of rights but reveal contradictions that are not unrelated to the pressures of the great patronage, which adapts to the new reality and tries to maintain the privileges accumulated in recent years. (2016, 7 – authors’ translation)

The reversion of the collective bargaining situation would allow unions to regain power and, if that had already gained an important position in the 2008 document, it deserves no less space in the following documents. The CGTP seems to opt to underline the association of the status quo with the former right-wing government:

Fight for the repeal of legislative changes which weaken and hamper the right to bargain and collective bargaining enshrined in the Constitution, which requires repealing the rules on the expiry of conventions and reinstating the provisions prior to the 2003 Labour Code, in particular, the principle of automatic renewal of conventions and
more favourable treatment for workers, and the replacement of duties which have been eliminated or reduced as a result of changes resulting from revisions made after 2003.

(2016, 27 – authors’ translation)

At the same time, the attitude toward social concertation has clearly worsened. If CGTP is known for not signing most social pacts, the signature of a social pact in 2012 by UGT, which later was disappointed, may have been the last straw. If, before the troika, the CGTP had included a section in its document entitled: “Tornar mais efectivo o diálogo social, a concertação social e a participação institucional” [Making social dialogue, social consultation and institutional participation more effective], this then subsequently disappeared with social concertation beginning to be imprisoned by the enemy:

... it is a fact that during the 31 years of its existence, social concertation has been confirmed as an instrument at the service of the interests of the big capital and has often been used as a simple registry, intended to legitimize negotiations behind-the-scenes, as happened with more than two dozen agreements that, guaranteed by the UGT, as a divisive instrument used by employers and governments, were very burdensome for workers.

(2016, 30 – authors’ translation)

CIP

The founding of CIP dates to 1974, in the immediate wake of the Carnation Revolution. It represents some of the largest Portuguese companies, such as Sonae, Galp, and EDP, and employer associations from all sectors with the exception of the primary sector. In 2010, CIP underwent an important restructuring process in 2010 with the merger of the former CIP and two centenarian business organizations, a longstanding project that apparently only became possible with the new and current CIP leader. The CIP mission involves promoting the right to free enterprise and private activity. In its early years, the CIP was associated with the right wing. Although its political party orientation has not gained much reference since then, its headquarters were inclusively subject to an arson attack in 1975 (Sanchez Cervelló 1994).

Considering the key-phrases of all the documents analysed, there is little surprise that the top six key phrases of its political documents highlight “enterprises”, “market economy”, and “competitiveness”.
The political documents seem to play a role of self-reaffirmation:

... we will develop actions that reinforce the position of CIP as the most representative confederation of the business associative movement for its history, notoriety and credibility, and at the same time strengthen its role as a connecting entity of a vast network of associates. (2017, 2630 – authors’ translation)

We would note that the 2010 document also served for the assumption of the need for internal changes required by its members:

In any case, not wanting to dispense with responsibilities that must surely be shared by all without exception, we would like to underline that the people who make up the Board have long been demanding a different action from the CIP. In due course, suggestions were made in this context for the effective improvement of this Confederation. Naturally, these suggestions have now been invited to this Programme, adding to a number of others that we believe could contribute to the goal of making the CIP stronger, more efficient and more cohesive. (2010, 3 – authors’ translation)

In general terms, we may identify the pragmatic content of CIP political documents even while they are also clearly ideological. The CIP ideology is liberalism as it defends the market economy and strongly opposes the state taking an active role in the economy. Before the troika period, in 2010, the CIP was already calling for more flexibility and adopting the same arguments of international institutions. CIP, focused on the national case, considers that Portugal maintains a rather rigid legal framework, especially regarding individual dismissals, collective lay-offs, and the regulation of temporary work:

The Portuguese labour legislation has been, and rightly, pointed out, along with other constraints, as a demobilizing element when making investment decisions. The rigidity of labour legislation, where Portugal is the OECD country with the highest labour protection index, contributes to the increase in the weight of fixed-term contracts. In the three indicators of labour flexibility (protection of individual contracts of permanent employment, collective lay-offs, and regulation of temporary and fixed-term work), Portugal remains very poorly placed in terms of flexibility in individual employment contracts. (2010, 22 – authors’ translation)
Thus, before the troika’s arrival, CIP had already nominated the state as an enemy. According to the CIP, the state is bureaucratic, nosy, and unable. Furthermore, the state was, in general terms, responsible for the crisis and had an abusive intervention during the crisis:

The shock of the financial crisis subsequent to 16 September 2008 has had perverse effects on the world economy. Private initiative was stigmatized and there was a false legitimacy to a greater intervention of the State in the economy. This is truly paradoxical. After all, at the origin of the crisis, more than any other actors were the states themselves, which failed to fulfill their essential obligations: regulation and supervision. It is indeed fundamental that, as far as Portugal is concerned, a point of order should be made here. And the CIP must have a decisive say in this, publicly assuming its values. (2010, 14 – authors’ translation)

Targeting the state is a constant feature in CIP discourses. In fact, CIP sustains the idea of a lean state:

Conscious of a reconciliation between the sustainability of public finances and the stimulus to economic growth, it is necessary to reduce current public spending, and CIP is available, in particular, to collaborate in structural reforms to reduce the weight of the State in the economy, in order to obtain a sustained reduction of sovereign debt and a general decrease in the tax burden. (2017, 7 – authors’ translation)

However, in the period following the troika, there are very few derogatory expressions. The CIP discourse dropped its warlike tones and became more reconciliatory, inclusively considering the use of the first person plural, and non-explicit criticism of the state, and instead targeting the fiscal authorities, for instance.

… CIP is aware that economic development requires a broad social consensus, involving the State, Business Associations, and Trade Unions. A broad consensus that defines goals and means and ways to control, with the definition of public policies that transcend the normal duration of government cycles. (2017, 7– authors’ translation)

CIP’s demands switched from a focus on the lean state and reducing costs toward economic growth. The title of the president’s introduction states this clearly: “Make growth happen” (2017, 2).
CIP mentions social concertation in a brief but supportive way in the post-troika published document, while there was no reference in the document for the period prior to the troika’s arrival. Simultaneously, collective bargaining also deserves a very brief reference in both periods. The CIP position sustains that nothing is able to change the status quo, in particular in the period following the troika. This reflects how the CIP intends to lobby for the maintenance of the deregulation reached since the implementation of the Labour Code in 2003:

In particular, CIP will be intransigent in maintaining the legal framework in force for collective bargaining, in particular as regards negotiation space, validity, and oversight, as well as the legal regime on working time and organization, duration of vacations, and compensation for extra work. (2017, 19 – authors’ translation)

COMPARING CGTP AND CIP DISCOURSES ON THE IMPOSITION OF AUSTERITY BY SUPRA-NATIONAL ACTORS

Comparing the discourses of the two main social partners, CGTP and CIP, we realize they are not only ideologically distinct but opposite, polarizing the two sides of labour relations. Both discourses are ideological and assume a belligerent tone. They clearly identify the “enemy”: on the one hand, capital, on the other, the state. The warlike language is common to both organizations although the written CGTP discourse also includes interjections, while CIP is softening its discourse following the departure of the troika.

The pragmatic positions of the social partners emerge out of their most important key phrases, as Table 7.2 shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top three innovative relevant key-phrases before and after the Troika</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DURING THE TROIKA PRESENCE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CGTP-IN</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour market</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
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<td><strong>CIP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Market economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portuguese economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although both social partners always present the same first key phrase (“workers” in the CGTP case, and “companies” in the CIP case), the relevant new words emphasize their contextual concern, which clearly is the national situation. Thus, the CGTP seems mainly concerned about the high unemployment rate before the troika arrival, changing its focus to the need to recover the collective bargaining power after its departure. We would explain this shift in the core demands by the slight decrease in the unemployment rate after the troika left but especially by the perception of an opportunity to reverse the status quo within the newly prevailing political configuration.

On the other side of the divide, faced by the troika, CIP elected the judicial system as the focus of its campaigning. It considered that the judicial system posed an obstacle to the development of the Portuguese economy. This issue loses importance after the troika left. We can explain the judicial system’s loss of importance both through considering the troika’s changes to the legal framework, and also through the emergence of a new concern. In fact, after the troika left, the CIP focused on the compromise associated with the maintenance of the status quo, and seemingly adopting a reconciliatory discourse. Finally, the post-troika CIP document also displays concerns over its own members. This internal question probably stems from the loss of members or the need to recover their trust. We would note that in March 2014, the former CIP presidents accused the current incumbent of harming members’ interests when signing a petition calling for the renegotiation of the public debt (Negócios 2014).

In no social partner discourse does Europe or any corresponding word, like EU or Brussels, achieve importance, although CGTP makes more references to “Europe” than CIP. This does not mean that Europe was expected to present a high score, because the subject is in principle not the focus of the programme of a national organization meeting, but it could assume a more important position considering the troika composition and its austerity policies. The benchmarking with words like Government and troika showed that Europe is more important although still with few occurrences. In any case, we also observe a decrease of importance of Europe and related words in the discourse of CGTP while it increases in the CIP discourse after the troika departure. Note for instance that a section of the 2017 CIP document is entitled: “A Confederation committed to Europe United around Competitiveness”. Also the reference to the supra-national social partners in which CGTP and CIP are affiliated (ETUC and BusinessEurope respectively) is low, as we can see in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1  
*CGTP and CIP occurrences of selected key-phrases*

![Diagram showing CGTP and CIP occurrences of selected key-phrases]

The position of selected key phrases in both discourses seems to show that the “crisis” disappeared quite soon from the social partners’ discourses. And while “troika” for instance never entered in the CIP discourse, it decreases the importance achieved in CGTP discourse. In fact, while CGTP emphasizes the troika as its enemy, CIP tends to convey the impression that troika’s intervention was normal.

The great capital and the executors of right-wing politics are responsible for the problems with which the workers, the people, and the country are confronted. All problems were aggravated by the implementation of the Pact of Stability and Growth (PEC) and the “aggression programme”, but the “end of the troika” did not represent an end to interference in Portugal. (2016, 24)

When making a general comparison between CGTP and CIP, CIP emerges as more innovative. In fact, while CGTP documents contain almost 50% new key phrases, CIP deploys about 60% of new key phrases when compared with previous documents. We can illustrate this by its introduction of new subjects, such as climate change, which falls beyond the scope of CGTP’s discourse. Such innovation does not necessarily mean that CIP explored this subject in any progressive fashion. In fact, in 2017, the CIP maintained that it would not support any norms more advanced than those of the EU, especially in the environmental field. We should also take into account how, in 2010, CIP also intended to introduce the debate on nuclear energy as a potential alternative energy source (2010, 31).

In sum, the political programmes seem to play ideological roles addressing members while simultaneously clarifying the values of these antagonistic actors. While the CGTP elects “capital” as its enemy and stands in favour of more solidarity and equality, reaching further in its political position by affirming its leftish affiliation, CIP elects the “state” as the enemy and reaffirms the value of market solutions and individual responsibility. Their ideological orientations did not change over the period of the troika’s intervention. Their discourses softened as they moved on from the height of the crisis, although the CGTP’s references to the right-wing policies emerged more clearly, as well as social concertation criticism. Furthermore, in the most recent documents, both organizations stress their concrete priorities for the Portuguese economy in the coming years: increases in wages and recovering collective bargaining powers for the CGTP and the reduction of the weight of the state in the
economy to enable its growth as framed by CIP’s European commitments. Their pragmatic positions may also be summarized as a pro or con attitude toward the status quo left behind by the troika.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The centralization of European economy seems to be the path found to guarantee Eurozone stability, and that path implied the exclusion of social partners from the compromise between the Portuguese government and the troika, in May 2011. Social partners were not invited to negotiate paths of economic adjustment in Portugal because the supra-national intervention is dominated by a neoliberal ideology, IMF conditionality usually being used to implement unpopular policies.

Portuguese union confederations, and CGTP in particular, revealed an important opposition to the presence of the troika, as the entity mainly responsible for austerity measures and a supra-national intervention of neoliberal actors. General strikes were called and CGTP is known for its communist influence, thus, we could expect that its political written discourse showed a protest reaction more than CIP a supporting one. Nevertheless, our findings show that the crisis seems to disappear quite soon from both social partners’ discourses and that both CGTP and CIP discourses give a much lower importance to supra-national actors than during the troika presence, a few years before. In fact, the crisis and national problems seem older than the troika presence and framed by a more in-depth fight against an abstract enemy. This ideological attitude of Portuguese social partners may help to explain why the crisis disappeared so quickly from the political programmes. Our findings show that the belligerent tone of the discourse is, not only a union feature, but, having found it in employers’ discourse also, we consider it a characteristic of our labour relations system. Both organizations have clear enemies, abstract, and polarized: capital for CGTP and the state for CIP.

National problems consume most attention of both Portuguese social partners, which joins literature findings when it considers that national organizations and unions in particular stay submerged in national problems. While CGTP keeps focused on the recovery of its collective bargaining power, CIP intends to establish compromises in order to preserve the already achieved deregulation of the labour market. Both social partners seem to adopt a less
belligerent attitude after the troika’s departure, motivated by different reasons. While CGTP intends to recover collective bargaining power but is aware that the issue is not mentioned in the agreements between the socialist party and the other left-wing parties with a seat in the parliament, CIP intends to apply pressure using social concertation, in which it possibly will not meet CGTP, at least in the last stage of negotiations.

Apparently, the supra-national intervention only underlined the CGTP opposition toward social concertation, based on the inefficient social pact signed with the UGT in 2012. CGTP seems to depreciate social concertation as if the government used social pacts for its own democratic image, contributing to the decline in unions’ legitimacy, which is supported by some literature.

The two Portuguese social partners do mutually share a broad lack of attention to the broader European scenario, which also joins literature on the topic. This happens, concerning not only European institutions, but also European social partners with which they are affiliated. One cannot neglect the fact that the absence of an articulation between the European and the national organizations contributes to a less cohesive and influential movement. And this articulation problem seems therefore an important research topic for a near future providing new insights on why the European union movement is not capable of dealing with centralized neoliberal policies.

Although our results contribute to knowledge about the evolution of social partners in the face of the economic crisis and Europe, especially on how important was the supra-national imposition of austerity, our research also took place under constraints. An important limitation stems from the nature and partiality of the documents analysed. Only through considering other documents may we gain an effective overview of the written discourses of social partners. Other sources also hold relevance, including press releases, board member interviews, and diverse Internet platform content, even if the political programmes are supposed to be the result of a collective consensus and other sources are less systematic. Furthermore, one must be aware that although the political documents analysed are guidelines for action, actors’ strategy is also the result of a daily reflection built upon unexpected events and interactions.

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8. Party-citizen online challenges: Portuguese parties’ Facebook usage and audience engagement

Sofia Serra-Silva
Diana Dias Carvalho
Júlio Fazendeiro
INTRODUCTION

Despite the formal and theoretical importance of political parties and their roles in representative democracies, several opinion polls have been revealing signs of political apathy, disaffection and discontent among European citizens regarding political institutions; and parties are not immune to this trend (Norris 1999; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Dalton 2004; Pharr, Putnam and Dalton 2000; Torcal and Montero 2006; Inglehart 2016). This has led institutions to re-evaluate their current practices and seek new approaches to connect with citizens, by developing strategies to increase political participation, including ways to take advantage of new technologies and the internet to reach the “digital natives” (Furlong 2009). Accordingly, many political actors and institutions across the world have undergone considerable reforms over the last two decades, more recently by using internet channels and tools, to support a deepening of public engagement (IPU 2009; Hansard Society 2011; Leston-Bandeira 2009).

Currently, a myriad of informational and communicative possibilities are available for politicians and the public, such as resorting to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Skeptics and cyber optimists have been discussing the consequences of the Internet on democratic politics. Skeptics believe that the rise of the internet will not bring about any significant changes. This so-called normalization thesis contends that, contrary to predictions that it would revolutionize our everyday lives, expansion of the Web has done little more than provide a new medium through which established patterns, in all aspects of social life, persist (Margolis and Resnick 2000, 73). While “cyberoptimists” believe that in an era of almost unlimited Internet access, citizens can be better informed of public issues. Thus, the Internet has the potential to strengthen the connection between the public and intermediary organizations, including political parties and social movements. The public space would be reactivated through these new forms of vertical and horizontal communication without hierarchies (Norris 2011).

However, the full impact of the new ICT on parties and the political process is not yet clear (Gibson and Ward 2010), as well as whether digital technologies are widening the pool of the politically active or exacerbating existing democratic biases (Cantijoch et al. 2015). Nevertheless, although no consensus has been delivered, literature increasingly points to the conclusion of a positive but small impact of Internet use on engagement (Boulianne 2009).
Nonetheless, the widespread use of Internet and ICT among citizens is undeniable. And with the transition from a one-way top down channel (Web 1.0) to a more conversational and interactive tool (Web 2.0), social media are becoming more important. In particular among youth who satisfy their above-average political interests via the internet (Emmer et al. 2011). Millennials (individuals born after 1980 and until about 2000) are heavy users of social media, relying on platforms such as Facebook (FB) and Twitter to connect, and spend much more time on their mobile devices and on the web. However, political online communication is no longer a marginal phenomenon among young, urban, and high-income cohorts, but a widely known and regularly practiced one (Klinger 2013).

In a closed list and party-based system, such as the Portuguese (Leston-Bandeira 2009), the political party plays a major role in spelling out politics, since there are no incentives for candidates to build a personal image. Therefore, parties are in charge of the overall communication strategies in the election and non-election periods. Within this framework, along with the widespread access of Internet and social media in Portugal, this study resorts to a social media metrics set to assess how Portuguese political parties use social media and how people engage with parties online. We analyse parties’ FB usage across a time span of 7 years (2010-2017) and examine how users’ engage with parties online.

Portugal has often been somewhat marginalized in the study of parties’ online communication strategies. The increase in ICT usage in the country (internet diffusion increased by 32.3% between 2005 and 2016), along with the current presence of all parties in one or more social media platforms, makes it a worthy case study. While plenty of research has provided important insights on the use of the Internet by political parties during election campaigns, effectively providing us with periodically skewed data, recent research has been focusing on “permanent” (Jackson and Lilleker 2004) or “postmodern” (Vaccari 2008) campaigning – indicating the need to look at these activities beyond election season. As we consider a time span of 7 years (2010-2017), this study contributes to this recent and growing literature by approaching the ways in which Portuguese parties use FB as a communication tool and how the public responds to this new way of political communication. This chapter contributes to the volume’s purpose of addressing the contemporary challenges to citizenship by looking at the current relationship between parties and citizens in the digital context, a space where political action and active citizenship is increasingly undertaken. The chapter is structured in three main
sections. The first reviews the literature on how political parties use ICT and social media. The second outlines the methodological phases of the empirical study. Finally, the third presents the findings and discussion.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: POLITICAL PARTIES AND INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

Today parties are no longer the fulcrum of political life in democracies. Citizens can now influence the decision-making process without going through a party by forming interest groups (Dalton et al. 2003). Furthermore, there is a consensus around the idea that parties are experiencing hard times and their representative functions do not work as they used to (Mair 2013). There is a clear decline in party membership (Katz et al. 1992; Mair and van Biezen 2001; Delwit 2011; van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012), concomitant with a growth in popular disenchantment with parties and a citizen disengagement with politics (Gallagher et. al. 2005; Mair 2006, 2013; van Biezen and T. Poguntke 2014). Likewise, in Portugal political parties are also experiencing a decline in citizens’ support (Lopes and Freire 2002; Martins 2004; Magalhães 2006; Jalali 2007; Lisi 2011; Fazendeiro 2017). Additionally, political distance seems to have increased in recent times, suggesting that the crisis has reinforced the general feeling of political apathy (Lobo et al. 2015).

Regardless, parties continue to perform to some extent several important functions in democracies, namely “to integrate and, if necessary, to mobilize the citizenry; to articulate and aggregate interests, and then to translate these into public policy; to recruit and promote political leaders, and to organize the parliament, the government and the key institutions of the state” (Mair 2013, 203). Even if they are no longer the only vehicles of citizens’ representation, parties remain critical actors in democratic politics.

Today, at the same time citizens recoil from participation within formal organized institutions (Pickard, Nativel, and Portier 2012), there is a far vaster array of political action and activity undertaken, including online forms of action. The online participatory experience (Caron 2014) takes many shapes: “the use of Facebook and other social media to follow candidates and parties, discuss political issues, to organize various political actions, political expression on blogs, Twitter and YouTube” (Gallant 2018, 79). For instance, in the United States the percentage of citizens following candidates, politicians,
or political parties on social media increased from 6% of registered voters in 2010 to 16% in 2014.

The use of ICTs and the internet by political actors is not a new phenomenon. Especially since the mid-1990s, political actors have begun to use Internet-based tools such as e-mail and websites (Norris 2001). When compared with traditional media, the internet offers the potential to give politicians direct contact with voters; create ongoing dialogue; reach different voter groups more easily; inform and mobilize voters more effectively; increase visibility; and decentralize the party campaigning. In this cyber optimist perspective, Internet increases the opportunities of interaction and is considered a tool capable of revitalizing the citizen-based democracy and challenging the monopoly of the existing political hierarchies by empowering and amplifying the ordinary people (Rheingold 1993; Taylor and Burt 1999).

Political actors, including political parties, have not been indifferent to the opportunities offered by the innovative technologies and began to use them to achieve their goals. However, some studies have been showing how political parties and actors have been using the internet as another top-down channel to provide information and communication, and less as a two-way platform to encourage interaction, discussion and dialogue (Baxter et al. 2011; Klinger 2013; Magin et al 2017). Even though Internet facilitates direct communication between leaders and ordinary members (Heidar and Saglie 2003), many political actors show some reluctance to respond to questions or engage in interactive online communication or discussions with the electorate (Baxter et al. 2011). Observing election campaigns worldwide, it is notorious that politicians are considering the internet a “Swiss Army Knife of political communication” (Lachapelle and Maarek 2015, 175), in which they can communicate bypassing party organization or any other hurdles posed by journalists or media gatekeepers. Margetts’ “Cyber-Parties” (2006, 530) clearly displays how parties could benefit from the use of ICTs to “strengthen the relationship between voters and party rather than traditional notions of membership”. Probably structuring what Gibson (2015) calls “citizen campaigners”, which are citizens who do not belong to the party but perform several actions through the web that help parties and their campaigns. Maybe this is part of the solution parties have found to address their decline and loss of relevance in contemporary societies (Bardi et al. 2014, 8).

Even though there is broad agreement among researchers that institutional political actors have missed opportunities offered by the internet, maybe it
is too soon to draw this kind of conclusion (Vaccari 2013). It is known that parties are more willing to publish information than allow it to be discussed, meaning that parties (like others political actors) are very cautious when allowing citizens, or even members, to discuss and participate in political issues (Nixon, Ward, and Gibson, 2003). As in the earlier days when TV dominated the media communication, parties are slowly adapting to the ICT and Web 2.0, instead of radically changing the way they communicate with their sympathizers. In Cristian Vaccari words, “early conclusions about the adoption of digital media by political actors may simply have been premature because fully implementing innovations throughout complex organizations requires time” (Vaccari 2013, 50).

Due to the role of social media in the exposure of information, consumption of news, and network contagiousness, these platforms can be seen as ways to increase opportunities to participate in civic and political life or to promote citizens’ knowledge of political information; having therefore a positive impact on political participation (Boulianne, 2015). Social networking sites have been representing new dynamics of political participation: granting politicians new ways of communication and interacting with followers, and offering citizens more opportunities of information exposure and political discussion, as well as allowing an evaluation through a community perspective (Douglas et al. 2015). Via FB, parties address their messages directly to the electorate (Bimber and Davis 2003), a strategy particularly important for small and newer parties (Lilleker et al. 2015; Larsson 2016).

Unlike communication via mass media, FB provides a feedback channel, thereby enabling parties to engage in discussions with voters, which might provide valuable information for modifying their campaign strategies. FB provides tools for target-audience-specific mobilization (e.g., photos and videos that are well-suited to being shared). Furthermore, FB as an information resource, and can easily reach the politically uninterested segments of voters who otherwise tend to avoid political information in the current high-choice media environment (Lachapelle and Maarek 2015; Bene 2017).²

¹ The term web 2.0 refers to tools that use a bottom-up approach whereby people can share content and collaborate with people online, building social media (Cormode and Krishnamurthy 2008; O’Reilly 2005).

² The dominance of “accidental exposure” to political information on FB has been found in the USA, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany, which may also influence political behavior, mostly on voters with low political interest (Valeriani and Vaccari 2015).
Although it has been argued that using Social network sites (SNSs)\(^3\) facilitates the creation of new virtual spaces to mobilize people in the political arena, this has not yet been the subject of extensive empirical study (Gibson and Ward 2010), nor has it been applied to the Portuguese context, by looking at the political parties. Initially, Portuguese political parties developed Websites, and thereafter moved on to the Web 2.0. Currently, the majority are fully present at different SNSs, including Facebook (FB) and Twitter. While it might be useful to also know why a party is choosing to engage in social media as part of its communication strategy (Jackson and Lilleker 2009; Kalnes 2009a; Mascheroni and Minucci 2010), it is more important to know how they are doing it, and explore how their strategies are being received.

How parties adapt and use the new communication technologies is intrinsically associated with their own political characteristics. Sväsand linked the changes in the communication technologies to the age of the party: “older parties therefore will assume organizational characteristics of newer parties. In many of the new democracies, parties have developed in a technological environment that makes the traditional communication function redundant” (Sväsand 2013, 267). These findings highlight that party characteristics interplay with parties’ online communication strategies.

At the organizational level, Vaccari (2013) identifies two important party characteristics that interact with parties’ online communication usage: incentives and resources. For instance, parties that are internally organized through grass-roots activists, in bottom-up endeavours, find it easier to adapt and use online communications tools, such as social media (Löfgren and Smith 2003). Another relevant incentive may be the party’s challenger status. Parties in power do not have the same incentives to go online as parties in opposition, whose electoral failure may trigger ambition and the urge to change and innovate in the hope of returning to government (Gibson and Römmele 2001).\(^4\) Regarding the party resources, there are two opposing assumptions in the literature: the equalization thesis argues that small parties try to compensate

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3 Social network sites are web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system; articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection; and, view and traverse their list of connections, and those made by others, within the system (Boyd and Ellison 2008).

4 In the same direction the electoral system will produce different incentives, whereas the proportional system presents more incentives than the majoritarian ones (Vaccari 2013, 55).
their structural disadvantages by attracting the voters’ attention through direct and low-priced channels (Larsson 2016). By contrast, the normalization theory (Margolis and Resnick 2000) assumes that the disparities between parties in the offline context are mirrored in the online. Hence, large parties with greater financial and personal resources are better able to generate effective online communication than small parties (Klinger 2013; Gibson and McAllister 2011).

Finally, some findings have shown an ideological divide among parties: those of particular ideological families may find it easier than others to adapt to digital media (Vaccari 2013; Åström and Karlsson 2013; Vergeer et al. 2011). However, this is not true for every country. A few mechanisms may be responsible: key decision makers and organizational structures are more inclined toward the type of communication fostered by the internet, and/or the voters’ profile is more likely to be online or more willing to engage online (Vaccari 2013). Various studies have claimed that extremist parties, especially those on the radical right, may be more likely to take advantage of online tools because they have more difficult access to the mainstream media, and cultivate relatively small cadres of dedicated supporters who eagerly engage within the comfortably segregated echo chamber of the internet (Copsey 2003; Bratten 2005). Also, previous studies have noted that green party elites and their voters also tend to be particularly at ease with online communication (Vaccari 2013).

METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY

This study explores how Portuguese political parties make use of Facebook (FB) and how citizens engage with parties on this platform.

The empirical research was carried out through a quantitative research design. We collected and analyzed parties’ FB pages, in the following stages: (1) identifying the official FB accounts of political parties; (2) collecting data from the pages identified; (3) setting up a metrics tool to measure how parties use FB and their associated level of users’ engagement.

FB was chosen as the platform of our data collection because it is one of the most used social media platforms in the world, as well as in Portugal. In Portugal, in 2017, there were 4.7 million FB users, representing 70% of the residents on the mainland between the ages of 15 and 64. FB is the most active social media platform in Portugal (Marktest 2017). In fact, a recent study of
2014/2015 found that among the most used sources of information on policy/governance issues, social media such as FB and Twitter were the third most frequent source, used by 34.4% of the respondents (Cardoso 2015).

Accordingly, we first identified the official FB accounts of political parties that took part in the last general elections in Portugal (2015 General Election) and that won at least one parliamentary seat (Table 8.1). For this purpose, the official FB accounts of the following political parties were examined: The Ecologist Party (PEV), The Left-Bloc (BE), People-Animals-Nature Party (PAN), Socialist Party (PS), Social-Democratic Party (PSD), and CDS-People’s Party (CDS-PP).

During our data collection (which was carried out until October 30th of 2017) the Communist Party did not have an official FB page. However, while writing this chapter the party started a FB page. Although PCP was not included in the analysis, the recent creation of its FB page is already, in itself, revealing a change in the party’s online communication. While there was an FB account of the Democratic Unitarian Coalition (CDU, i.e. the electoral coalition of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Ecologist Party (PEV)), the two maintain fairly different party programmes. Moreover, the CDU FB page was inactive for all the non-campaign periods, so we decided to exclude it in our analysis. Table 8.1 presents detailed information on the parties under analysis and their social media presence.

As table 8.1 shows, among the parties that are present in social media, the common element is FB. Every Portuguese party is on FB. Besides FB, the majority of parties have invested in other sns such as Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, Instagram, and Pinterest. PSD is clearly betting for a multi-channel strategy. While PAN, the most recent party in the Portuguese political system, is only on FB, which may be a result of the fact that it has fewer resources. These data reflect a consolidation of the social media platforms: of the vast array of platforms available, only a small part has been selected and applied, which points to the question of whether there are sufficient resources to manage social medias’ demands or parties perceive them as established channels (Klinger 2013).

5 PCP was the first in Portugal to have a web page, which has been considered the most important source of information to their members and sympathizers, according to their manifestos. In their general congress resolution reports, they have not stressed sns at all (2008) or have acknowledged them as something negative, because they favour individual action over collective (2012). More recently (2016), they mention the need to embark in the new technological environment, where sns play an important role, in which the webpage is the centre of all information.
### Table 8.1: Political parties and Facebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY NAME</th>
<th>FB ACCOUNT</th>
<th>ACCOUNT CREATION DATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PAGE LIKES/ FOLLOWERS (OCTOBER, 2017)</th>
<th>LIKES GROWTH (MONTHLY AVERAGE)</th>
<th>OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA PRESENCE (OCTOBER 2017)</th>
<th>PARTY FOUNDATION YEAR</th>
<th>FIRST ELECTION YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ecologist Party (PEV)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2011 (Feb.)</td>
<td>9,424</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>YouTube; Twitter</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left-Block (BE)</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>2011 (Nov.)</td>
<td>58,733</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People-Animals-Nature (PAN)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2015 (May)</td>
<td>136,171</td>
<td>469.5%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (PS)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2011 (Jan.)</td>
<td>59,707</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>YouTube; Twitter</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democrat Party (PSD)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2010 (May)</td>
<td>147,096</td>
<td>165.2%</td>
<td>YouTube; Twitter; Instagram; Pinterest; Flickr</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS-PP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2015 (Jan.)</td>
<td>30,284</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>Twitter; Instagram</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The Left-Bloc FB page “esquerda.net” is on FB under the category of News and Communication and not as a political organization, such as the rest of the parties’ FB pages. However, since it is the only FB page owned by the party we chose to include it.
In the second phase of our empirical strand, data were collected through the *Rstudio Rfacebook package* by extracting all the posts made by each FB account, from the beginning of the page’s existence until October of 2017. Thus, this time lapse includes not only campaign and non-campaign periods (including the legislative, presidential, European, and local elections), but also different political and economic contexts. We collected 20,618 posts published by the parties. The number of likes, comments received, and shares made, for each post, were registered for all parties, as well as the FB tools parties used to communicate. It is important to stress that algorithmic automated processes play a part in the content presented to each individual user on FB, thereby deciding whether it deserves to be highlighted in news feeds. Also, the existence of fake FB accounts is one of the issues raised when considering the quality of FB data collection (Kosinski et al. 2015).

To measure the FB users’ engagement with parties we carried out an analysis of the *popularity, commitment, and virality* of parties’ FB posts following the metrics developed by Bonsón and Ratkai (2013). This metrics set was first used to measure the stakeholder engagement in the private sector. Later, Bonsón et al. (2015) used it for public engagement for municipalities. Since then, it has been applied to measure citizen engagement in social media of local governments in the US and Canada (Galvėz-Rodríguez et al. 2016), in Spain (Haro-de-Rosario et al. 2016), and the party-public engagement of political parties (Sobaci and Hatipoglu 2017).

Popularity is measured by the number of “likes.” Commitment refers to the number of “comments” made by users. Finally, virality shows the effectiveness of viral messages/posts, which is measured according to the number of “shares” of posts. As Table 8.2 shows, for each dimension of analysis there are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metrics set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULARITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1 Total likes/total posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2 (P1/number of fans) x 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMITMENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Total comments/total posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 (C1/number of fans) x 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIRALITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V1 Total shares/total posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2 (V1/number of fans) x 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENGAGEMENT INDEX</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2+C2+V2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Bonsón and Ratkai (2013).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

PARTIES’ FACEBOOK USAGE

How do Portuguese parties use FB? Which are the most active? When did they join social media? From the outset, it is important to recognize that Portuguese parties have come a long way regarding social media usage.6

The first Portuguese party to start a FB page was PSD, in 2010. In March of that year, the PSD leadership changed with the victory of Pedro Passos Coelho at the party’s internal elections, who subsequently won the 2011 Portuguese general election and became the prime-minister of Portugal until 2015. The page was created around May of 2010, two months after the change in party leadership and a year before the 2011 electoral campaign, reflecting also a shift in the party’s communication channels and strategies.

In the following year, all parties with parliamentary seats had created an FB page, with the exception of CDS-PP, which started in 2015. This seems to clearly represent the idea that “party organizers look to innovations made by other parties”, meaning that sometimes external factors pull parties toward convergence by imitation (Heidar and Saglie 2003, 233). The last party to join social media was PAN, the most recent party in the Portuguese party system. It was founded in 2011 but won its first parliamentary seat in the 2015 general election. In the same year, four months before the election, the party created its FB account.

In order to examine trends, post numbers are calculated per party, per month (Figure 8.1). First, apart from the first year on FB, parties published a relatively similar and constant volume of content per month over the years. Additionally, we observe an increasing investment throughout 2017 for all

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6 Nowadays, beyond the parties’ official FB pages, there are other pages related to parties’ activity, for instance to party districts’ pages or party leaders’ pages and even specific pages for electoral purposes such as “Costa 2015”, or electoral coalitions such as “Portugal on the Front”, both created for the general election of 2015.
**Figure 8.1**

*Volume of posts per month published by parties*

![Graph showing the volume of posts per month published by different parties.](image)

Source: Data collected by the authors through RStudio. The dotted lines represent the elections dates.
parties: the average volume of posts increased to 2.5 per day for most parties. This reflects that Portuguese parties have, to some extent, clear, uniform, and consistent, social media strategies regarding their presence and input on FB, thus fulfilling the expectation that political parties extend their campaign and political communication strategies to the online world and adapt to the new media logic (Klinger 2013).

Second, theory suggests that the number of posts would increase during the time leading up to election, given that publishing election information would happen only during these periods (Steinberg 2017). In our data we are able to observe an increase in the number of posts preceding election dates, that is, the June 5th 2011 and the October 4th 2015 (marked on the graph with dotted lines), especially for PS in 2011 and the BE and PAN for 2015.

FB is a platform that enables multimodal communication including status updates (text), notes (text), publishing an event, sharing hyperlinks, and publishing images or photos and video content (visual). Visual elements are generally associated with a higher degree of involvement compared to text, which is sometimes attributed to a more immediate perception of content (Eisenlauer and Hoffman 2008) and a stronger reliance on association and higher emotional response (Muller and Kappas 2011). This suggests that different types of content can further increase involvement or not, leading to a higher degree of actual user interaction (Hoffmann and Bublitz 2017). Table 8.3 sheds light on the tools used by parties.

BE uses mostly FB to share information hosted in their websites, redirecting their “likers”/friends to them7. This suggests a view of their page as an aggregator rather than a source of original content. Whereas PEV made extensive use of status updates8 as from 2016, the use of image and video increased, approximately half becoming the publication of images. The PS and the PSD showed similar patterns: both used a wider array of available tools, especially links, photos, status updates, and videos, aside from the years 2013 and 2014, when they relied mostly on photos (representing almost all of its content). Both parties have relied more on videos in the last three years. CDS-PP has also used a wider array of content: photos, videos, and links. PAN presents a more constant and balanced diversification strategy: links, photos, and videos, emerging as a very interesting case that has been investing in different formats.

7 BE has three different websites (http://www.bloco.org/; http://www.esquerda.net/; http://www.beparlamento.net/) which are regularly updated, thus, this pattern was not surprising.

8 A status update means text-only posts.
**Table 8.3**

*Facebook tools used by political party over the years*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACEBOOK TOOLS (%)</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Link</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Photo</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Video</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data collected by the authors through RStudio.
Recently, for most parties, we can observe a new strategy to publish content in a more interactive way. The use of newer and fancier tools, such as video and photos, may be suggestive of a better understanding of how to take advantage of social media to get the most value from a post (Steinberg 2017). This strategy also follows the growing demand for videos on the internet. In fact, in 2014, 64% of the world’s data traffic on the internet consisted of videos (excluding peer-to-peer movie swaps and video on demand previews). This value will be 80% by 2019. This is partly due to young people watching considerably more video content on YouTube and other Internet sources than TV. While this recent change to include more video content is evident, most parties do not produce original video content for SNSs. Instead, they often use the content created by the Parliament TV Channel, which is then edited and shared in the parties’ various networks, including YouTube and FB.

**Facebook users’ engagement: popularity, commitment, and virality**

To truly assess how citizens are interacting with parties on FB we need to look at the public’s feedback to their posts. Responses by those who view the posts serve as a measurement of engagement between the “likers”/friends and the party. An individual respondent can engage with parties’ posts on FB by clicking “like”, by commenting, or by sharing a post.

It is without any surprise that we found that, in general, for all parties, at least 99% of their wall posts were liked. Regarding the percentage of posts commented or shared, there are significant differences between parties and among dimensions of engagement, showing different dynamics of user’s engagement. In the case of CDS-PP, 88.3% of the posts were discussed and 95% were shared. The Esquerda.net page of the Left Bloc presents the following statistics: 58.6% of the posts were discussed and 94.9% were shared. In the case of The Greens, 36.8% of the their posts were discussed while 74.9% were shared. The posts published by the PSD were likewise discussed on FB (81.7%) as shared (88.8%) by their FB users. Contrary to the previous parties, the PAN had more content discussed (89.3%) than shared (75.7%). Similarly, the Socialist party had more posts discussed (92.7%) on its page than shared (86.0%). The fact that the highest levels of engagement were achieved in the dimension of popularity,

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above commitment and virality, is probably because it requires less effort to press a “like” button than to write a comment, and it is less compromising and more impersonal than a share, which is shown on the user’s timeline. Indeed, as Steinberg (2017) emphasizes, when individuals respond by making a “comment,” they are making more of an effort to communicate, which implies a greater degree of engagement than “liking” or just reading the post.

In relation to the dimension of popularity, we can examine the likes of the parties’ posts across the months and years, by looking at the average number of likes per post (every post was equally considered, regardless of their format).

Looking at Figure 8.2, overall, all parties saw their posts’ popularity increase over the years, but fall since 2015. We can also see a slight increase in PSD’s post popularity in the 2011 election, but a greater effect was noticed regarding the recent election of 2015.

The party with the highest average post popularity is the PAN for 2016 and 2017. CDS-PP, which started its FB page in the same year as PAN, in 2015, shows less users’ engagement, falling considerably. In turn, the PEV is the party with lowest popularity. Even though the party publishes almost the same number of posts as the others (Figure 8.2), it is clear that their posts are not engaging its audience. As Steinberg (2017) stresses, the value of the “like” metric is that it provides guidance to the party organization regarding which messages appeal to its members.

Looking at Figure 8.3, we can observe similar patterns in the commitment dimension. On average the PAN has the highest number of comments made by post and PEV is the party with the lowest user engagement. Again we can see a slight increase in commitment during election times, in 2011 for PSD and in 2015 especially for PAN, PS, and PSD.

The only two posts with more than 1,000 comments are both visual and belong to PAN and PSD. The most discussed (1,364 comments) is a photo referring to a high-profile case on social media about a young boy mistreating his dog. While the second most discussed post (1,328 comments) is a recent video published by PSD with Pedro Passos Coelho announcing that he will not compete in the next internal party elections, leaving its leadership.

The last engagement dimension is virality, measured according to the number of “shares” of posts. Sharing is the soul of FB communication and anything can be shared: a moment, an experience, an opinion, public information, content from others, links etc. Users create communication networks, including mostly their offline acquaintances, kept alive by the activity of sharing content (Bene 2017).
Figure 8.2  Popularity per month among parties and over years

Source: Data collected by the authors through RStudio. The dotted lines represent the elections dates.
Figure 8.3  
Commitment per month among parties and over years

Source: Data collected by the authors through RStudio. The dotted lines represent the elections dates.
The distribution logic of network media is virality (Klinger and Svensson 2015). The term is taken from marketing and defined as “network-enhanced word-of-mouth” (Nahon et al. 2011). This definition captures the dual meaning of sharing, namely an act of communication as well as an act of distribution. Broadly speaking, it means being shared in many different communication networks. The more people share a content, i.e. use it within their ongoing communication with members of their networks, the more extended is the reach and influence it can achieve.

Regarding this dimension (Figure 8.4), the difference between pan and the rest of the parties is even more notable. The pan is the party with the most viral content on fb. Additionally, unlike the other user engagement dimensions, no association can be observed between election times and virality of parties’ posts.

The most shared, discussed, and liked posts belongs to the pan. The post that gathered the most shares (30,310) and likes (16,362) is a photo celebrating the approval of a new law that put an end to the slaughter of dogs and cats in municipal kennels. As well the most discussed post (1,364 comments) is also a photo, as mentioned before.

pev continues to be the least successful party in engaging its fb users. Interestingly, be presents better users’ engagement on content virality than the rest of the parties (with the exception of pan).

Concluding, in order to be effective, political communication on social media also has to engage with fb users, obtaining popularity, discussion, and virality. In fact, in the online world, sharing is a common, low-limit, but potentially very effective, mass-centric form of parties’ mobilization (Wallsten 2010). It is now clear that the posts that obtained more likes, comments, and shares are visual posts such as photos or videos. A strategy mostly used by pan, which can help explain why it emerges as the most successful party regarding fb users’ engagement.

The above data provided a closer look into how fb users engage with parties in absolute terms, not considering the active population of the audience reached by the Parties’ fb pages. We calculated the same metrics but taking into account the active population of the audience regarding popularity, commitment, and virality, by dividing the average number of likes, comments, and shares per post for all the years by the number of page likers at the time of data collection. An Index was composed with the sum of these values,

10 Since it is not possible to assess the number of fb “likers”/friends for each year considered in the analysis, the analysis is based on the number of “likers”/friends at the time of data collection (October 2017).
Figure 8.4  Virality per month among parties and over years

Source: Data collected by the authors through RStudio. The dotted lines represent the elections dates.
resulting in an aggregate measure of Parties’ engagement level with its public on FB. Multiplication by 1,000 was performed in order to offer the possibility of a better comparison, as the original results were close to zero (Bonsón and Ratkai 2013). This index has limitations and is far away from being perfect, but in this context it provides a relatively proxy measure to understand the overall engagement at the same time (popularity, commitment, and virality) taking into account the number of the audience of parties’ FB pages. The index raw values per se does not give us much information but it can inform us about the relative differences among parties.

Looking at Figure 8.5 we can observe a scenario different from the previous ones. Taking into account the number of “likers”/friends provides a relative measure of engagement that acknowledges the active audience reached by each party. By active audience we mean the FB users who have liked the party’s page and potentially receive its updates in their timeline. However, it should be stressed that FB users who do not follow the party’s FB page are able to interact and engage with the party in the same way. Moreover, a “non-liker”/friend could also receive the party updates in her/his timeline through other means, for example, if a friend has shared, commented, or liked a post.

In relative terms, CDS-PP presents the highest engagement level and PSD presents the lowest. Comparing PSD and PAN, which have a similar number of “likers”/friends on FB, the difference of engagement with the public is clear.

**Figure 8.5**  Engagement Level across parties

![Bar chart showing engagement levels across parties](chart.png)

Source: Data collected by the authors through RStudio.
Moreover, the higher users’ engagement level with PAN may be a result of the fact that the party invests more in social media since it receives less coverage in the traditional media comparing with the other parties.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study reports on the recent widespread use of social media by Portuguese political parties, namely via FB, acknowledging its importance for party communication. Since PSD’s adoption in 2010, almost all parties, apart from PCP, joined FB the following year. This reveals the contagious effect among parties in relation to their communication presence and strategies.

Findings regarding how parties use FB show a fairly consistent social media communication strategy, shared among parties: the volume of published content was relatively stable across the years and 2017 saw an increased investment in FB content. For us it is still not clear about the extent to which this strategy is a response to the recent and growing signs of political apathy.

Looking in depth at the type of posts, we similarly observe congruent patterns between parties, as well as diversity. Parties use various Facebook tools to get their messages across, but they still rely on links to their own websites or other text-based websites to provide information, rather than make full use of multimedia technology such as photos and videos. However, in recent years most parties have been moving toward a strategy to increasingly include more multimedia content.

Regarding user’s interaction with the parties’ pages, several levels of engagement were observed. Discrepancies between different dimensions, and across parties, emerged. The popularity dimension is clearly the most frequent, in a much greater proportion than the remaining forms of engagement (commitment and virality), due to it being less demanding and compromising. Additionally, the choice of tool can lead to differing levels of engagement: posts that stood out for having more likes, comments, and shares had a visual component in the form of photo or video. This probably helps justify the recent trend found for an investment in video tools by Portuguese political parties on their FB pages.

An increase in posting, as well as popularity and commitment (of posts), before both elections was observed. Moreover, when comparing
the two election periods, 2011 and 2015, there was a greater impact of FB on parties’ campaign in 2015, which needs to be confirmed by further robust analysis.

There is no question that PAN stood out as an interesting case. Despite being a small and recent party, when taking into consideration the relative number of “likers”/friends, it showed the second highest level of users’ engagement. In addition, it is the party with the most likes growth, i.e. monthly average, in its short FB presence (see table 8.1) This result highlights how the use of new technologies can favour new parties and help them overcome their limitations. PAN’s successful FB communication might be explained because it emerged in a more recent technological context when compared to parties, such as PCP, PS, and PSD, which developed at a time when the printed mass media were the dominant communication channels between leaders and citizens. For these parties it will take more time to adjust to the new technological environment (Klinger 2013). Additionally, literature has shown that newer parties rate the importance of social media higher than established ones (Lilleker et al. 2015), which helps to explain the investment PAN has made in Facebook. This is likely to be strengthened in a context like the Portuguese one, with a party system that has remained quite stable since the first legislative election in 1976 and it is characterized by a two-party dynamic (Van Biezen 2003), leaving little space for new players.

It is indisputable that Portuguese parties are investing in social media communication and trying to take advantage of its possibilities and potential. However, there are some challenges ahead. Studies have shown that FB algorithms bury much of the content from a political page in users’ news feeds, compromising the very purpose of parties being on FB (Kalsnes 2016). Thus, in order to become visible, parties have to encourage fans to be very active, in addition to buying visibility, and to do so, they need to engage in an interactive and dynamic communication strategy instead of using it as a top-down channel.

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SOFIA SERRA SILVA  
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa  
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal  
solfaraquelseven@gmail.com  
orcid.org/0000-0002-7731-7183

DIANA DIAS CARVALHO  
Centro de Administração e Políticas Públicas,  
Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, Universidade de Lisboa  
dianadiascarvalho@gmail.com  
orcid.org/0000-0002-6826-0664

JÚLIO FAZENDEIRO  
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa  
julio.fazendeiro@gmail.com  
orcid.org/0000-0002-2242-7238

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PART III

Consequences of the crisis
Racisms and normative pressures: a new outbreak of biological racism?

Jorge Vala
Cícero Roberto Pereira
INTRODUCTION

Racism is a core topic in research on citizenship in contemporary societies, mainly regarding discrimination and the denial of civil rights. This paper presents the main lines of a research programme on racism in contemporary Europe, and its impact on social relations in diverse societies. Previous and new empirical research is presented. This research is framed by the concepts of social representation and social norms, with the metaphor of racism as an evolving virus being used to explain its mutations in contemporary societies.

Accordingly, our analytical perspective clarifies the concept of racism by approaching it as a polemical social representation that evolves and adapts according to changes in social contexts. This conceptual clarification is important because it helps distinguish the differences (and complementarities) between racism as a social representation, and the concept of racial prejudice as a negative attitude towards a social group. This distinction is fundamental to understand what is at stake when we address racism in contemporary European societies.

After this conceptual clarification, the paper proposes a dynamic analysis of racist beliefs. It specifically argues that the anti-racist norm developed since World War II transformed racist beliefs and that any reduction of the anti-racist norm pressure can induce a new outbreak of biological racism.

The final part of the paper analyses the impact of racist beliefs on discrimination against immigrants perceived as belonging to different racial or ethnic groups. The forms of discrimination addressed refer mainly to the field of basic civil rights and are contextualised by legitimation processes (Costa-Lopes et al. 2013; Pereira, Vala and Costa-Lopes 2010). In order to clarify our argument, some key empirical research is summarised in each of the paper’s three parts.¹ The chapter concludes by proposing an integration

¹ This chapter integrates previous work developed by the authors at the ics-ul. It comes mainly from the chapter published in the book edited by Bethencourt and Pearce (2012) about racism in the Portuguese-speaking world, and a paper by the first author about racism as a social representation published in Papers on Social Representations (Vala 2013). This latter paper entirely structures the first part of the chapter. The last part of the chapter includes new data and theoretical issues prepared by the authors and Alice Ramos for publication in the Journal of Ethnic and Migrations Studies (Ramos, Pereira and Vala, in press). The problems addressed in this chapter follow another research programme on the construction of social differences in diverse societies (Costa-Lopes, et al. 2008), summarised in a book also focused on review research carried out at the ics-ulisboa (Itinerários: A Investigação nos 25 Anos do ics).
of the arguments and data presented, and explores the possible impact of economic crisis and rising new right-wing extremism on the weakening of the anti-racism norm and the legitimation of discrimination

RACISMS, SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SOCIAL NORMS

Moscovici (1961, 1984) reformulated the concept of collective representations proposed by Durkheim (1898) and developed the concept of social representations accentuating the social nature of the dynamic construction of representations of complex social objects that question the life of groups (e.g. power, health, social needs, justice, social differences, the functioning of mind etc.). In Moscovici’s theory (1984), societies are “thinking societies” that produce social representations or practical social or lay theories about objects that are relevant to individuals, social groups and the relations between groups. As theories, social representations are organisations of beliefs, attitudes and explanations for every significant event occurring in their social environment. As practical theories, they organise social behaviour; as social theories, they emerge, evolve and disappear in the context of everyday communication, salient social identities and power relations, and normative contexts.

We propose that the analysis of racism as a social representation provides the theoretical elements necessary for grasping racism as a lay social theory. It stimulates the diagnosis of different forms of anchoring and institutionalising racism, and makes it possible to examine the objectification of the concepts that sustain racial beliefs (Vala 2013). Finally, the theory of social representations offers an analytical framework conducive to a psychosocial analysis of racism within the context of collective memory (Cabecinhas and Feijó 2010; Licata and Klein 2010; Licata and Volpato 2010; Valentim 2008) and can promote inter-disciplinary dialogue, mainly with history (for the Portuguese context and beyond, e.g. Alexandre 1999; 2017; Bethencourt and Pearce 2012; Bethencourt 2013; Castelo 1998; Fredrickson 2002; Jahoda 1998; Matos 2006; Sobral 2004; Xavier 2012; Pollares-Burke 2012) and the articulation between racism and other concepts and phenomena like nationalism and cosmopolitanism (Balibar 1991; Billig 1995; Silva and Sobral, 2013).

Moreover, the study of racism within the framework of social representations approach allows us to establish a theoretically coherent distinction between racial prejudice and racism (Vala and Pereira 2012; Vala, Pereira and
This distinction is important for the understanding of racism in contemporary societies and is part of a theoretical debate that must be renewed. This debate was initiated by Jones in the USA (1972) and, more recently, was promoted by several authors, specifically in terms of social representations theory (Augoustinos 2009; Sanchez-Mazas 2004; Howarth and Hook 2005) and social identity theory (Augoustinos and Reynols 2001; Vala and Pereira 2012), allowing for a deeper understanding of racism in diverse contemporary societies.

Within social psychology literature, as well as in other social sciences, the terms racism and (racial) prejudice are used almost interchangeably. With few exceptions, the majority of studies have analysed racism as a set of negative attitudes towards specific devaluated social groups, such as black people, Jewish people and Gypsies. Research has established a significant homology between racism and racial prejudice or, more generally, between racism and explicit or implicit negative intergroup attitudes, as exemplified by the classic definition of prejudice proposed by Allport (1954) and the research it inspired (for a revision, see Fiske 1998; Yzerbit and Demoulin 2010).

In contrast to this view, we propose a distinction between racism and racial prejudice, specifying that racism is not a mere negative evaluation of a specific social group, though it may include negative attitudes towards racialized groups, that is, groups defined in terms of racial categories. It is conceivable that, based on feelings of pity, individuals may express racism without negative attitudes towards racialized and inferiorised groups, and that not all negative feelings towards racialized outgroups are based on the belief of their infrahumanity.

Racism is also distinct from racial prejudice since, by definition, it is a social theory inscribed in social institutions and in social thought and not a personal trait, or merely a phenomenon that reflects individual or intergroup attitudes. Racism is a phenomenon which organises asymmetrical relations between social groups. It is more than an individual negative evaluation of these groups. Prejudice, meanwhile, in social psychology literature, is the expression of an individual position with respect to a group, even though that individual position may be relatively widespread, as proposed by the concept of the cultural stereotype of “races” or “ethnicities” developed by Devine (1989) and Devine and Monteith (1993).

In sum, racial prejudice is closely related to ethnocentrism (Doise 2005), while racism expresses radical alterity, to use a term coined by Jodelet (2005).
Indeed, minimal or even irrelevant biological or cultural differences are perceived as deep-seated and the cause of natural hierarchies that are hard to overcome, or can only be overcome in the historical long term.

It was within this framework that we recently proposed (Vala and Pereira 2012) the conceptualisation of racism as a social representation of the nature of humanity based on the following fundamental psychological and social processes: categorisation (belief that humanity is organised according to racial or ethnic groups); differentiation (there are profound differences between human groups); hierarchy (certain groups have a permanent superiority to others); essentialisation (differences are immutable due to biological as well as cultural “essences”); radical alterity (not all groups have all the essences which common sense considers to be specific to humans and, consequently, radical alterity is a form of dehumanisation of racialized groups). The way these psychological and social processes interweave assumes particularities according to the human groups involved, the nature of social relations between those groups (e.g. cooperation vs. domination) and the historical social contexts.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RACISM AND PREJUDICE

Is it possible to find empirical evidence in favour of analytical distinctions between racism as a social representation and racial prejudice? Research by Vala, Pereira and Costa-Lopes (2009) has contributed to this debate by examining the relationship between basic biological and cultural racial beliefs (e.g. “The human species is divided into racial groups that are very different from each other”; “The human species is divided into very similar cultural ethnic groups” (reversed); “The mixture of different human groups may weaken the biological evolution of the human species”; “Some human groups are culturally more civilised than others”) and four different expressions of racial prejudice. Results of a structural equation model showed that hetero-ethnisation (the perception of deep cultural differences between black people and, in this case, the Portuguese; Vala, Brito and Lopes 1999/2015); ontologisation (the greater attribution of natural features to black people than to Portuguese and the greater allocation of cultural traits to Portuguese than to black people; Moscovici and Perez 1997); infra-humanisation (the greater attribution to Portuguese than to black people of the capacity to express secondary emotions; Leyens et al. 2000); and the devaluation of black people...
are dimensions of a latent factor that the authors called racial prejudice (i.e. negative attitudes towards a target-group). These results also showed that this latent factor (racial prejudice) is predicted by core racist beliefs integrated in the social representations about the nature of the differences between human groups (see above). These racist beliefs concern not only the biological hierarchisation of human groups (biological racism), but also the hierarchisation of cultures (cultural racism). An alternative explanatory model considered a single latent variable integrating racial beliefs and dimensions of prejudice. The results showed that the theoretical proposed model had a better fit than the one that did not distinguish between racial beliefs and racial prejudice. Thus, racism is different from prejudice, although racism may be an antecedent of racial prejudice.²

In sum, our theorising proposes that racial prejudice is a negative attitude about some social groups, whereas racism is a lay theory (i.e. a social representation) about the natural hierarchy of human groups and its insurmountability, supported by psychological essentialisation of historical processes. Indeed, as in any social representation, that representation of differences between human groups is socially anchored in social relations. Specifically, racism is anchored in ideas of domination. Firstly based on religious thinking and legitimised by religious beliefs promoting a proto-racism, and later based on and legitimised by supposed scientific evidence offered by the first wave of racial theories produced in the 19th century (for a review see Bethencourt 2013 and Fredrickson 2002), racism was incorporated by the politico-institutional sphere. It was when racial theories made inroads into political institutions that it became possible to legislate and bureaucratise racism, making racial categories familiar and perceived as being as natural as any other bureaucratic category. Both in everyday life and the institutional fabric, social groups perceived as “inferior races” were then dominated, exterminated or excluded on the basis of legitimization processes. This approach eliminates *per se* the possibility of a dominated group racially inferiorising a dominant group. However, this positioning does not eliminate the possibility that the dominated group will express prejudice or general negative attitudes towards the dominant one.

² A complete description of the study, including samples, methods, etc. is available in Vala et al. (2009).
THE DYNAMICS OF RACISMS: IS RACISM LIKE AN EVOLVING VIRUS?

According to our theorising, racist social representations of differences between human groups, racial prejudice and its forms of expression can evolve in and adapt to social contexts. This paper offers a contribution to this approach in contemporary European societies. It is based on socio-normative principles (Beauvois and Dubois 1988; Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno 1991; Pereira and Costa-Lopes 2012), on theories about inter-group relations (Doise 1986; Tajfel 1982) and on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Gaertner and Dovidio 2005).

This normative approach to racist beliefs is pivotal in understanding the social expressions of racism in the dynamics of contemporary political and social relations. It is these dynamics that drive the transformation of racist expressions from overt to hidden, from conscious or deliberate to unconscious or implicit, from biologically to culturally based.

The events of the Second World War, the progressive expansion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and other social movements are all important moments in the process of delegitimising the idea of race and of social inequalities founded on race. Such social processes show the gradual dissemination of the anti-racist norm and erected obstacles to the triumph of the idea of race. After such events, racism is no longer a hegemonic social representation but a controversial social representation, the subject of dispute and conflict regulated by anti-racist legislation and the dissemination of the anti-racist social norm.

FROM EXPLICIT TO HIDDEN AND IMPLICIT RACIAL PREJUDICE

These transformations have been more successfully studied within research on racial prejudice than within research on racism itself. It is through the study of prejudice that a significant decline in the attribution of negative stereotypical traits to black people in the United States between the 1930s and the 1990s has been identified (Dovidio et al. 1996). At the beginning of the 1990s, various European studies also showed a reduction in the attribution of negative traits to people from racialized groups. For example, Pérez (1996) showed that in Spain respondents attributed more negative traits to the Spanish than to Gypsies. A similar effect was observed in Brazil by Camino et al. (2001), where white participants concealed their racist motivations by exaggerating their
attributed of more positive traits to black than white people. In both studies, respondents were clearly keen to show that they were not racist towards groups protected by the anti-racist norm.

On the other hand, in the study on racial prejudice against immigrants conducted by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) in four European countries, the authors showed that racial prejudice manifested itself through the absence of positive feelings about immigrants (rather than the expression of negative feelings). A study carried out in Portugal in the same decade (Vala, Brito and Lopes 1999/2015) obtained similar results, and also showed that anti-black prejudice was expressed by the attribution of more positive traits to the Portuguese than to black people and not through the attribution of more negative traits to the latter. These, like other studies, showed that it is not normative to express openly negative opinions about members of groups who are the target of explicit racialization (for example, in the studies cited, Gypsies in Spain, black people in Portugal, Afro-Caribbeans and Asians in the United Kingdom, Surinamese and Turks in Holland, North Africans and people from Southeast Asia in France, and Turks in Germany).

Perhaps one of the best examples of hidden racial prejudice is the research line inaugurated by Leyens et al. (2000, 2003) about what they called “infrahumanisation”. Firstly, the authors verified that people implicitly distinguish between primary emotions (e.g. pleasure and anger) and secondary emotions (e.g. love and hope). Secondly, they empirically demonstrated that people consider primary emotions common to humans and animals but not secondary emotions, which are considered uniquely human. Thirdly, through dozens of studies, they demonstrated that people differentiate between the ingroup and devaluated outgroups (e.g. black people) regarding the capacity to express secondary emotions (that represent human uniqueness). This means that members of devaluated outgroups are represented as less human than ingroup members.

In parallel to research on hidden racial prejudice and racism, the study of implicit prejudice introduced by Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983), which measured automatic association between words (positive vs negative) and targets of evaluation (e.g. Whites vs Blacks), showed that racial prejudice remained very active, albeit in an implicit way. This research became prominent through the dissemination of Greenwald and collaborators’ studies (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998; Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald 2002), using the well-known Implicit Association Test
This test and other similar measures, which use response latencies when positive and negative traits are associated with white and black people (i.e. genuine unobstructive measures of attitudes, Fazio and Olson 2003), made it possible to question whether racial prejudice really has been decreasing. The nature of these measures makes it impossible to consciously control responses and thus align these responses with the anti-racist norm. In other words, what the measures of implicit prejudice show is that racial prejudice is “hidden”, or is expressed in less explicit ways.

Numerous critics of this type of measure argue that such analyses of prejudice reveal feelings that are very deep-seated, but which do not have an impact on behaviour. However, this does not appear to be the case. For example, in a particularly sensitive area, such as the prescription of thrombolysis in a hospital environment, implicit prejudice, measured through the IAT, predicts that thrombolysis will be recommended more frequently for white than for black people presenting exactly the same symptoms (Green et al. 2007).

The studies mentioned allow us to confirm that the anti-racist norm has an impact on the overt expression of racial prejudice, but not on its implicit expression. On the other hand, it is important to point out that the anti-racist norm does not have the same effect with respect to all racialized groups, or in all cultural contexts. For instance, in Portuguese society, the anti-racist norm protects black people, but not gypsies (Aguiar et al. 2008; Correia, Vala and Aguiar 2007 and Correia et al. 2005). This doesn’t occur in Spain, however, a country in which the anti-racist norm protects gypsies (Pérez 1996; Correia et al., 2005), but not black people. In any case, we should underline that, in the empirical studies referred to above, the role of the anti-racist norm has been suggested but not directly measured. In fact, this norm has been little studied in terms of observing its effects on the expression of racial prejudice, with the exception of the initial studies by Katz and Hass (1988) and more recent work by Crandrall, Eshleman and O’Brien (2002), Lima et al. (2006), and Costa-Lopes, Wigboldus and Vala (2017), as well as in the research by Monteiro, França and Rodrigues (2009) or by Falomir, Garrot and Mugny (2009). The first two cases demonstrated the impact that the egalitarian

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3 For a map of implicit racism across Europe, see the results of the project about IAT at the University of Sheffield: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/philosophy/research/implicit-bias-jennifer-saul-tackling-gender-bias-academia; http://theconversation.com/this-map-shows-what-white-europeans-associate-with-race-and-it-makes-for-uncomfortable-reading-76661.
anti-racism norm has on the reduction of implicit prejudice. The remaining studies mentioned showed that the same norm impacts on overt prejudice.

**ADAPTIVE MUTATIONS OF RACISM:**
**FROM BIOLOGICALLY TO CULTURALLY BASED RACISM**

In the previous paragraphs, we argued in favour of the idea that normative pressures and the strength of social movements lead to a retraction of explicit racial prejudice. Despite being alive, racial prejudice manifests itself more in a hidden than in an explicit way. The new question that emerges concerns what happens with social representations that hierarchise social groups. We propose that when the idea of racial hierarchies is not legitimised by the anti-racist norm, transformations occur in the representation of differences between human groups: the “essences” that differentiate social groups move from the domain of biology to that of culture. This adaptive transformation has allowed racism to survive unthreatened by the anti-racist norm and is one the best expressions of the adaptive evolution of racism as a social theory or a social representation. This hypothesis started mainly with the studies by Sears and McConahay (1973) in the United States about “modern racism” and research by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) about anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe in the 90s.

According to our rational, the anti-racist norm also makes it difficult these days to express overt cultural racism, i.e. the hierarchisation of cultures and the cultural inferiorisation of people perceived as belonging to other races, cultures and religions. Due to normative pressure, cultural inferiorisation is mainly practised in an indirect or hidden way, through the simple accentuation of cultural differences (Vala et al. 1999). In accordance with Taguieff’s (1987) studies, we have called this process hetero-ethnicisation, termed in the past hetero-racialisation. We have also shown that “ethnicised” groups, that is those groups attributed a cultural difference with respect to the majority group, react negatively to the attribution of this difference. In addition, the more that they believe they are seen as culturally different, the greater their feeling they are being discriminated against (Vala, Lopes and Lima 2008).

We therefore propose that racism has undergone adaptive transformations making it possible to maintain the fundamental aspects of traditional racial beliefs, without jeopardising democratic institutions and a non-racist, non-prejudiced self-representation. It is the mutation that racism has undergone,
the subtle shift from the biological to the cultural sphere that allows its overt widespread and socially effective persistence.

Research by Vala and Pereira (2012) supports our argument about the adaptive transformations of the expression of racism. In a study carried out in seven European countries, the authors compared the degree of overt expression of anti-black racism (the target of strong pressure from the anti-racist norm), biological racism without referring to a target (also censored by the anti-racist norm) and the expression of cultural racism (the target of this same norm, though to a lesser degree). The same pattern of response was verified in the seven countries: it was easier to show agreement with the beliefs that sustain cultural racism than with those that express biological racism, and it was more difficult to express anti-black racism than cultural or biological racism. Importantly, other results showed that not only biological racism, but also cultural racism were predictors of anti-black racism.4

This movement from biological racism to cultural based racism was anticipated by Lévi-Strauss (1952), theorised by Balibar (1991), among others, and has received empirical support in our own research. The fact that cultural racism correlates with biological racism and that both are predictors of cultural, economic or security threats associated with immigrants perceived as members of different racial, ethnic or religious groups (Vala, Pereira and Ramos, 2006; Ramos, Pereira and Vala, in press) is significant for the conceptualisation of cultural racism. Importantly, the association between cultural racism and the perception of a cultural threat from immigrants perceived as different indicates that social claims aimed at defending national identity are, in many cases, expressions of cultural racism. This transition from cultural racism to the threat to culture and identity is, in fact, implicit in the warning against immigration in the United States launched by Huntington (2004) in his work on “The challenges to America’s national identity”. According to him: “a multicultural America will, in time, become a multicreedal America, with groups with different cultures espousing distinctive political values and principles rooted in their particular cultures” (Huntington 2004, 340).

4 This data is part of a European study about Group-Focused Enmity directed by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Andreas Zick from Bielefeld University (http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/projekte/GFE.html). A sample of 1 000 individuals per country was used and the data was collected in the winter of 2008/2009. The study used indicators of anti-black racism: e.g. “There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people”; cultural racism. e.g. “Some cultures are clearly superior to others”; and biological racism: e.g. “Some races are more gifted than others”.

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This warning from Huntington follows more general warnings against “horizontal equalisation of cultures”. In sum, the evolution of racism from biological assumptions to the cultural domain protects racism from the norm of anti-racism but doesn’t reduce its socially negative impact in the domain of discrimination against racialized groups. This is why it is possible to talk about racism and racial prejudice as an evolving virus (Dovidio and Gaertner 1998) and analyse their historical transformations and mutations under the pressures of social norms.

**BIOLOGICAL RACISM: A NEW OUTBREAK?**

Based on a normative approach and framed by the concept of social representations, our hypothesis about racism as an adaptive evolving virus suggests that, in democratic western societies, anti-racist legislation and social norms have produced an evolution in the expression of racism: from overt to hidden, from explicit to implicit, and from biologically to culturally based. This same approach raises a new question: to what extent are social norms and anti-racism legislation sufficient to eliminate lay understandings of genetics, as the base for constructing differences between social groups and their hierarchy? In other words, to what extent has the anti-racism norm only been the object of circumstantial compliance in societies where inequalities continue to structure social relations that need to be legitimised?

This question is pertinent within a social and political context where a diffuse “conservative populist political culture” is apparently increasing and where “conservative thinking” (for a contextualisation of this concept, see Jost et al. 2003) is expanding and the anti-discrimination norms, pro-equality norms and anti-racism norms are actively weakened by leaders of that “conservative populist political culture” and amplified by traditional and social media. To what extent may this social, political and ideological context generate a new outbreak of biological racism?

Using data from the ess8 (2015/16)\(^5\), it was possible to measure individuals’ agreement with two items expressing two core beliefs of biological racism: the superiority of some social groups over others and the essentialist nature of that

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\(^5\) The European Social Survey began in 2002. It is a biennial study of social attitudes academically oriented and based on probabilistic samples and highly rigorous methodologies. The ess8 was carried out in 20 countries involving 40 000 respondents. Data is open access and available on http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
superiority. Specifically, participants were asked if they agreed (0 = not; 1 = yes) with these questions: “Do you think some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent than others?”; “Do you think some races or ethnic groups are born harder working than others?” The combination of these two indicators allows us to calculate and index biological racism (see table 9.1). Results show that in 11 European countries out of 20, 30% or more of inquired people (n = 39,860, representative and probabilistic samples) expressed biological racism. Portugal, as well as France, the UK and the majority of the ex-communist countries are among them (Ramos, Pereira and Vala, in press).

Table 9.2 presents a more exigent analysis of the same results. In this table, we only consider the people that answered “yes” or “no” to both sentences. Results show that the qualified majority of inquired people (i.e. more than 2/3 of individuals) disagreed with the two items of racism only in four countries (The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden). If we take as a criterion whether more than 50% of participants disagreed with both racism items, we find that racism is anti-normative in 14 European countries.

Finally, Table 9.2 also presents the polarisation of positions regarding racism in the countries studied. This index represents the extent to which there is a concentration of individuals supporting the two extremes of the normative dimension of racism, which could serve as a proxy for the estimated tension within the country around two antagonistic positions concerning biological racism: a full support of
Percentages of individuals who agreed and disagreed with both racism items and polarisation index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% FULL DISAGREEMENT (FD)</th>
<th>% FULL AGREEMENT (FA)</th>
<th>POLARISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Czech Republic</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from ESS 7 (2014/2015). Polarisation = (100 – d)\*p, where: d = absolute difference between FD and FA; p = proportion of participants in the extreme categories, i.e. p = (FD+FA)/100.
racism vs. a full rejection of it. The assumption underlying this index is that
the more polarised a country is, the greater the likelihood that the debates on
racial issues will be more tense and intense among the groups that support
the opposite poles of racial issues. Results presented show that polarisation varies
a lot across countries, which can be classified in three levels: high polarisation,
including countries with an index higher than 50% (the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Slovenia, Hungary and Portugal); moderated polarisation, countries with an
index between 30% and 50%, and low polarisation, formed by countries with
a score lower than 30% (The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). These results
are important because they show that countries with higher levels of biological
racism are also the most polarised, meaning that the racist representation of the
differences between human groups divides those societies and that, despite its
vigour, racism is no longer a hegemonic social representation but a polemical
social representation, and subject to social dispute.

With the resurfacing of explicit biological racism having been identified,
the question we can raise now concerns its predictors. What, at the individual
level, are the factors explaining the persistence of biological racism in European
societies? We tested several models (logistical regressions, Table 9.3), including
biological racism as a dependent variable, but only with participants who
answered “yes” to both racism indicators, and those who answered “no” to
the same two indicators. This strategy allows for a better contrast between the
respondents’ positions. Two hypotheses were tested. The first one (the second
step of each model) predicts that ideological identifications (left-wing vs right-
wing and exclusive national identification)\(^6\) will explain biological racism over
and above the control variables, as estimated in the first model (objective and
subjective social positioning: gender, age, education, subjective income and
relative deprivation).\(^7\)

\(^6\) Individuals’ positioning on the *left-right political continuum* varies from 0 (left) to 10 (right) and
was measured with this item: “In politics, people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right. Using this card,
where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” *Exclusive
national identity* is a different score (national identification minus European Identification). For the
rational of this later variable, see Ross, Huici and Gomez (2000) and Vala and Costa-Lopes (2012).
National identification and identification with Europe were measured by a scale ranging from 1 (not at
all emotionally attached) to 4 (very emotionally attached).

\(^7\) *Subjective income* was measured by this item: “Which of the descriptions on this card comes
closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” We coded answers to vary from 1
(“Finding it very difficult on present income”) to 4 (“Living comfortably on present income”); *Education*
was measured by years of schooling; *Gender*: 0 = Male, 1 = Female; *Age* was measured in years;
The second hypothesis predicts that power values opposed to universalistic values (see Schwartz’s human values scale, 1996) predict biological racism over and above positional and identity variables (the third step of each model). This hypothesis is inspired by the Social Dominance Theory (SDT) proposed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999). According to this theory, societies are organised by group-based hierarchies and people that easily accept these hierarchies and agree that hierarchical systems work positively in how societies function, i.e. these individuals have a high social dominance orientation. In contrast, non-supporters of those social hierarchies have a low social dominance orientation. These different positions are supported by legitimising myths or ideologies that enhance social hierarchies (e.g. conservatism, power glorification and faith in strong leaders) or by hierarchy-attenuating legitimising myths seeking to support group equality (e.g. egalitarianism and universalism). It is in this context that we hypothesise that more support for power values than for universalistic values facilitates racism, specifically biological racism.

Our hypotheses were tested in four different groups of countries, plus in Portugal alone (Table 9.3). Results showed a very consistent pattern of effects across regressions and are in accordance with what has been demonstrated regarding racial prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), specifically regarding the positional variables: biological racism mainly increases when subjective income, relative deprivation and education decrease. The consistency of ideological identifications as predictors of biological racism is expressive: the support for biological racism is stronger among right-wingers and those expressing stronger exclusive national identity and, as predicted, these variables explain variance over and above the positional variables.

Relative deprivation (natives vs. immigrants) was measured by this item: “Compared to you, does the government treat new immigrants better or worse?” We coded the answers to vary from 1 (less deprivation) to 5 (more deprivation).

8 Power vs. Universalism values is a difference score (Power values minus universalism values) as measured by the Schwartz scale used by ESS (scores vary from 1 – lesser adhesion to 6 – higher adhesion to each value.

9 In Sidanius and Pratto’s original theory (1999), it is not clear if racism, like prejudice, is a consequence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) or a legitimising myth of prejudice and inequality generated by SDO.

10 All countries: see Table 9.1; Northern countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; Central European countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom; Eastern Countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia.
Table 9.3  
*Predictors of biological racism (logistic regression coefficients)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL COUNTRIES (N = 23715)</th>
<th>NORTH EUROPE (N = 4411)</th>
<th>CENTRAL EUROPE (N = 7353)</th>
<th>EASTERN COUNTRIES (N = 7500)</th>
<th>PORTUGAL (N = 785)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Odds</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Odds</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.27***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-2.76***</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-3.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Positional Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Income</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-.56***</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.10***</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>-.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01***</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.01***</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relat. Deprivation</td>
<td>-.31***</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>-.27***</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.09***</td>
<td>.10***</td>
<td>.08***</td>
<td>.02***</td>
<td>.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>.09***</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>-.18***</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive National Ident.</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>.75***</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.11***</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td>.10***</td>
<td>.03***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poder vs. Universal</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.24***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from ESS7 (2014/2015). The samples only consider participants that answered “yes” or “no” to both indicators of biological racism. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
further supporting the relevance of symbolic and psycho-social variables in predicting racism.

In the same vein, the salience of power values over universalistic ones, as hypothesised, is also relevant to the prediction of biological racism, demonstrating that support for social inequalities and the enhancement of social hierarchies are key factors in the persistence of biological racism. Note, however, that the explained variance in the five models is not high and, in fact, is particularly lower in eastern countries. This suggests that new theoretical models are needed to understand the persistence of biological racism in contemporary European societies and that these models should rely more on symbolic and ideological dimensions than on socio-positional variables.

RACISM AND IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT DISCRIMINATION: IMPACTS ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Previous arguments have proposed that racism, as a social representation, underwent a process of evolving adaptation due to the pressure of the anti-racism norm after World War II and that, recently, a weakness of that norm induced by the conservative populistic political climate seems to have revitalised blatant biological racism. However, are these dynamics in social thinking actually important to understand discrimination against racialized minorities? Do they specifically help understand resistance to immigrants’ civil rights and, consequently, the social climate of today’s diverse societies? The third part of this chapter analyses the impact of racial beliefs on attitudes and discrimination against immigrants perceived as belonging to different racial or ethnic groups.

This topic involves a conceptual controversy: is discrimination already a part of racism? For instance, Brown (1995) defines prejudice as “the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership of that group” (Brown 1995, 8). In the same vein, Bethencourt (2013) defines racism as a combination of prejudice and discrimination. The inclusion of discrimination in the concept of racial prejudice or that of racism goes against the Allportian tradition (Allport 1954), followed by Pettigrew (1991), and many others. This tradition does not include discriminatory behaviour as part of the concept of prejudice, instead race based discrimination is seen as a consequence of racism. Accordingly, we propose that,
from an analytical point of view, it is important to analyse when and how racist beliefs generate discriminatory behaviour. We will focus mainly on facets of discrimination related to core aspects of civil dimensions of social and political life, like access to naturalisation, the use of ethnicist criteria in the selection of immigrants or behavioural orientation against anti-discrimination laws.

RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION THROUGH THE INTERGROUP TIME BIAS

The first research discussed in demonstrating the effective impact of racist beliefs on discrimination will address a particular implicit or non-deliberative form of discrimination: depersonalisation, i.e. not consider the other as an entity per se but only as a group member, a first step to dehumanisation (Vala et al. 2012) and exclusion of basic rights. This research evaluates the time invested by white people in forming an impression of white and black people. The hypothesis was that participants would show an implicit intergroup time bias (itb), meaning that they would put more time into forming an impression of white than black people, an implicit form of discrimination with potential impact on several areas of social life, such as the evaluation of students in schools, employees at work, patients for medical diagnosis, when making political and administrative decisions about minorities. Time, here, signifies the degree of interest, consideration and attention that a person object of evaluation deserves. To test our hypothesis, we carried out a series of studies which showed, as predicted, that white participants invested more time in forming an impression of other white people than of black people. We also showed that the itb correlated with other unobstructive or implicit measures of prejudice and with the homogenisation of black people (the perception they are not individual entities but mere members of a group). More importantly, our studies also showed that explicit racism is the main predictor of itb. In a broader sense, itb is a form of discrimination predicted by racism that depersonalises or negates an individual identity or a personhood status, the first step to being considered a citizen, to other.

RACISM, OPPOSITION TO NATURALISATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND TO ANTI-RACIST LEGISLATION

The negation of personhood status to a member of a racialized group is an important step in the process of their dehumanisation and, consequently,
negation of citizenship. As with our studies about ITB, other research has analysed the relationship between racism and discrimination at interpersonal or group levels. For instance, several authors have shown the impact of racism on avoiding contact with people perceived as members of a racial outgroup (Verkuyten and Thigs 2002; Williams and Eberhardt 2008). Other studies have shown that racism facilitates the rationalisation of social inequalities (Yzerbyt, Rocher and Schadron 1997); or even that people who hold racist beliefs are more likely to racially stereotype others (Bastian and Haslam 2006). However, few studies demonstrate the impact of racial beliefs on discrimination concerning public policy domains.

Contrary to this panorama, Pereira, Vala and Costa-Lopes (2009, study 2), using data from the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme, 2003) carried out in Portugal and Switzerland, analysed the correlation between an explicit measure of racism and a measure of opposition to the naturalisation of immigrants. Results clearly showed that the higher the endorsement of racist beliefs, the higher the opposition to the naturalisation of immigrants the key to their access to civil, political and labour rights (for a contextualisation of citizenship and immigration in Portugal, see Peixoto 2013).

Another central aspect of basic rights in modern democracies includes the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnicity. To learn the position of Europeans on this, Ramos, Vala and Pereira (2008) inquired about opposition towards anti-racist laws in thirteen European countries, and about the factors underlying opposition to anti-racist legislation. According to the anti-racism norm, only 18% of Europeans showed an overt opposition to such policies in 2002 (ESS1). More importantly, however, is the fact that the same study demonstrated that individual factors, more than contextual or structural ones (unemployment, percentage of foreign people, percentage of non-European people, and vote for right-wing parties), explain the opposition towards anti-racist legislation. Indeed, conservation

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11 The item used to measure racism in this study was: “Imagine that one of your children has children with someone of a different colour. In other words, imagine that your grandchild was a different colour from you. Would you have any difficulty in accepting this?” As we know, the prohibition of “interracial” marriage was supposedly a way to guarantee white purity and supremacy, a core aspect of racism.

12 These results were obtained through a Multilevel Analysis (for a complete description of the results, see Ramos, Vala and Pereira 2008).
of social order values, racism and the feeling that immigrants constitute a threat contribute to opposition to anti-racist legislation. Moreover, adhesion to universalistic values was positively related to support for anti-racist legislation.

To consolidate the role of racist beliefs on discrimination in the domain of public policies, Ramos, Pereira and Vala (in press) hypothesised and found the impact of both biological and cultural racism on support for ethnicist criteria in the selection of immigrants that can be received by a European country: to be white, Christian and able to speak the host country’s language. In other words, exclusion was based on ancestrally and supposedly “natural” criteria and not on aspects that individuals can control.

Despite the clear prejudice in racialized people being denied civil rights, naturalisation and anti-racist legislation, the anti-racist norm has operated efficiently by obliging discrimination to justify itself through legitimising mechanisms. This is the final step of our argument in favour of an approach to racism based on the articulation between social representations and social norms.

RACISM AND THE LEGITIMATION OF DISCRIMINATION

Legitimation refers to the social and psychological processes by which attitudes and behaviours are justified and perceived as appropriate, conforming to social norms, fairness and justice. Legitimation and legitimacy are fundamental factors in interpersonal, intergroup, social and institutional functioning (for a review, see Tyler 2006; Costa-Lopes et al. 2013; Jost and Major 2001; White and Crandall 2017). The need for legitimation is particularly relevant when a non-normative belief or behaviour is a stake.

13 The items we used to measure racism in the ESS1 wave (to accept or not accept a hierarchical superior from another race or ethnic group; to accept or not accept a relative’s marriage with a person of another race or ethnic group) are sometimes considered measures of prejudice, sometimes measures of social distance. From our point of view, these items can be considered measures of racism because they address key points of lay thinking about race: the superiority of one group relative to another; and the superior group’s fear of degeneration through sexual contact with an inferior group.

14 Two dimensions were considered on the perception of threat: a symbolic and a realistic one (Stephan and Stephan 2000). The symbolic dimension regards the threat to identity and cultural factors; the realistic one regards threats to personal security and economic well-being. Recent research suggests the importance of demographic threat in relation to immigration (Outhen et al. 2018), an aspect that could be included in the threat to in-group security.
As summarised by Ramos, Pereira and Vala (in press), the social psychological mechanism involved in legitimising processes of racial prejudice have been specifically analysed by the Theory of Aversive Racism (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986) and the Justification – Suppression Model (Crandall and Eshleman 2003). Both theories propose that normative justifications allow individuals to express prejudice without feeling or perceiving auto or hetero disapproval and, consequently, protect their self-esteem. The Justified Discrimination Model (jdm) (Pereira, Vala and Leyens 2009; Pereira, Vala and Costa-Lopes 2010) has also examined the hypothesis that discrimination should be legitimised specifically in contexts where the egalitarian norm is salient (Pereira, Vala and Leyens 2009).

It was in this theoretical context that our research aimed to demonstrate that perceptions of threat play an important legitimising role in discrimination and racialized social relations. It was found that the relationship between racism and discrimination was legitimised by the perception that those who are racialized represent a threat to society and, consequently, when they are a target of negative interpersonal or institutional behaviours, these behaviours are not the result of racism or prejudice but the consequence of the need to protect society.

Using data from ESS7 (2014/15), Ramos, Pereira and Vala (in press) showed that biological and cultural racism not only predict the preference for ethnicist criteria in the selection of immigrants, but also that both biological and cultural racism predict the perception that migrants from poorer countries outside Europe and migrants perceived to belong to a different race or ethnic groups represent an economic threat and a threat to the cultural identity of host European countries. Importantly, these threat perceptions legitimise the association between racism and the preference for ethnicist criteria for selecting immigrants. The preference for those criteria are psychologically dissociated from racism and associated with threat perceptions and, therefore, the self-image of individuals is protected from the censure of the anti-racism norm and self-esteem is maintained (Pereira, Álvaro and Vala 2018).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Contemporary European societies are “racially” and “ethnically” diverse. This diversity will continue to increase due to European demographic and economic
needs. Peaceful social relations in diverse societies thus imply recognising the rights of all types of minorities, particularly those that are the target of racialisation and ethnicisation. This is why the study of racism is a core topic in research about contemporary European societies, mainly regarding the discrimination processes against minorities and their exclusion from civil rights. It is here that this chapter offers new contributions to better understand the social representations that create and hierarchise social categories as if they were natural entities, and the mutations those social representations have gone through regarding the supposed inferiority of some human groups and the role of the anti-racist norm in those mutations: from overt to covert, from explicit to implicit, from biologically to culturally based.

Finally, the paper addresses the complex relationship between racism, discrimination and legitimation. This dynamic approach to racist beliefs does not mean that when a “new” form of expressing racism emerges or is identified, the others disappear. For example, cultural racism coexists with biological racism, albeit with the latter being more anti-normative.

THEORETICAL ISSUES

In order to analyse these social and psychological processes, we propose three changes in the study of racism. The first is the conceptual differentiation between racism and racial prejudice; the second is the analysis of racism within the framework of social representations; the third change refers to the need to introduce social norms into the analysis of racial prejudice and racism. In this last domain, we have shown how normative pressures have provoked a shift in overt biological racism and forced social representations of differences between human groups to be reconfigured, associating them not only with biological essences but also cultural ones.

AN OUTBREAK OF BIOLOGICAL RACISM?

The central question we put regarding the racism dynamic concerns a possible outbreak of biological racism. Based on an ESS7 carried out in 20 European countries (2014/2015), high levels of biological racism were identified in eleven countries, despite the anti-racism norm continuing to be majoritarian. It is in this context that the social representations of the organisation of social groups sustaining racism are no longer hegemonic, but polemical, i.e. subject
to social controversy and dispute, and the source of conflictual relations between groups.

However, the anti-racist norm can be weakened by emergence of a far-right political culture. Indeed, immigrants and refugees are a target of populist political leaders, and their anti-immigration and pro-white supremacism messages are amplified by conventional media and electronic social networks (and receive support from the revival of “race science”). Thus, the weakening of the anti-racist norm can open the door to an outbreak of biological racism. Moreover, the combination of these factors can increase the representation of immigrants perceived as belonging to another race or ethnic group as inferior and a threat to host countries’ security, economic well-being and sense of attachment to European identity and culture.

Until now, however, and contrary to the messages spread by both the traditional and new social media, the majority of Europeans are resisting anti-immigration and pro-white supremacist positions disseminated by far-right leaders. According to the ESS results, openness to receiving immigrants increased, albeit slightly, from 2002/3 to 2016/2017 across Europe, except in 7 out of 20 countries (Ramos 2018): Slovenia, the Check Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Austria and Italy. In those countries, negative attitudes towards immigrants are statistically higher than both the European mean and the middle point of the evaluation scale used.

Moreover, threat perceptions associated with immigration in the economic field decreased across Europe from 2002/2003 to 2016/2017, except in Austria and Hungary. The picture, however, is not as positive regarding threat to cultural identity. The perception that immigration represents a cultural threat increased across Europe (despite being below the medium point of the scale used, except in Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania and the Check Republic) (Ramos 2018). Note, however, that the effect of active and structured minorities can easily spread anti-immigration feelings across Europe.

This panorama is, therefore, characterised by a diffused increase in the perception of immigrants as a threat to cultural identity and by expressive percentages endorsing racial beliefs in a significant number of European countries. Despite the salience of the anti-racism norm, that panorama indicates that the legitimation of discrimination against immigrants has space to increase, specifically regarding discrimination in the domain of basic civil rights. The diagnosed scenario is thus a mixture of anti-racist norm resistance and the emergence of conditions that could facilitate the outbreak of biological racism.
FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES

Our data and theoretical reasoning raise several questions that deserve future attention. One question that arises is the role that financial crises and austerity policies could have had in the panorama we have described. It was not possible for this chapter to address these topics systematically, because we don't have data that directly enables a comparison between pre and post financial crisis concerning racist beliefs. However, a rough comparison of data from ESS7 (2014/15) regarding biological racism and the data collected in 2008/2009 from the GFE project (Vala and Pereira 2012) suggests that the situation is now apparently worse. Contrary to this, as described above, the representation of immigrants as a threat decreased in 2014/15 compared to 2002/3, except regarding the perception of threat to European cultural identity. If one considers the apparent inconsistency between that data and the fact that individual racial beliefs and attitudes towards immigration are more dependent on moral values than individual economic concerns (Ramos et al. 2008), the direct impact of financial crisis on the social phenomena studied is not obvious. However, financial crisis and restrictive measures in social public policies may have an indirect effect on racial beliefs and attitudes towards immigration via the scapegoat role that right-wing parties and the far-right attribute to immigration. The best illustrative case of this hypothesis is the UK’s Brexit debate.

In any case, and despite the impact of financial crisis on everyday life, the pro-immigration and anti-racism norm continue to be majoritarian, in spite of suffering some weakening as shown by the increased far-right vote in recent elections, mainly across central European countries. Nevertheless, this hypothesis should be empirically evaluated because immigration issues may be only one of the drivers of this increase (other drivers may include: nationalism, protectionism, conservatism, perceived insecurity, or the revival by the far-right of a social agenda, a topic abandoned by most conventional left-wing parties, etc.).

Readers may also be surprised by the high expression of biological racism in Portugal, and data demonstrating that it was only in the ESS 8 (Ramos 2018) that Portugal manifested a position towards receiving immigrants perceived as racially or ethically different that was below the middle point of the scale. We propose the hypothesis that this is less an effect of economic insecurity than of a widespread luso-tropicalistic ideology (Valentim 2008), according to which the Portuguese are naturally a people overt to diversity, dialogue with other cultures and the creators of a cordial colonisation. Our hypothesis is that
these beliefs can implicitly protect people from the idea that they share racist beliefs. We hypothesise that, ironically, the belief that racism doesn’t exist in Portugal could facilitate the spontaneous expression of racism.

The results about high levels of racist expression in Portugal can also stimulate questions about the space for the far-right in the country. Our hypothesis here is that one or two more generations would be required for the far-right to have an organised political expression in Portugal. Currently, the fascist dictatorship and its social consequences is very alive in collective memory and the match between authoritarian beliefs and adhesion to a political organisation that promotes such beliefs is difficult to construct due to the negative cognitions and emotions collective memory evokes.

IS RACISM INEVITABLE?

Our final comment about the issues discussed in this chapter is on the question of the inevitability of racism. In the theoretical context of social psychology, the process of social categorisation and the differentiation between groups it creates drives a high probability of intergroup negative attitudes and forms of discrimination that can vary from innocuous ingroup favouritism to radical alterity and the representation of members of the other group as inferior or non-human. These socio-psychological processes may feed racist beliefs but racism as a social representation of how human groups are organised is dependent on the structure of social relations. It evolves according to social changes and activates discrimination and legitimising processes if and when discrimination needs to be legitimised; in other words, in democratic contexts. Racism is not inevitable, but it survives in democratic contexts via legitimising processes.

Indeed, the research results that are reviewed in this chapter illustrate how the expressions of racism are not crystallised across countries. They also show how different levels and forms of expression of racism depend on the social relations’ dynamic framing the motivations underlying social identities, and the content of social representations about the nature of human groups. Moreover, results presented validate the hypothesis that the salience of egalitarian norms, like the anti-racism norm, may weaken racist beliefs and inhibit the expression of racism. Despite that we may recognise the possibility that the anti-racism norm has led racism into “adaptive mutations” only in contexts in which the “vaccine of universalism and egalitarianism” has been more widely disseminated.
Jorge Vala
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
jorge.vala@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-1265-4936

Cícero Roberto Pereira
Department of Social Psychology, Federal University of Paraíba
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
crp@labesp.org
orcid.org/0000-0003-3406-3985

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CITIZENSHIP IN CRISIS


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Why no populism in Portugal?

Filipe Carreira da Silva
Susana Salgado
INTRODUCTION

Why study populism? Because populism, left and right, has been on the rise. Talk of populism is all around us: countless talk shows, columns, and op-eds have been devoted to it and everyone seems to have a strong opinion about its dangers. Yet, both outside and inside academia, what populism means remains elusive and how it works is poorly understood. Half a century of populist research has failed to reach a consensus about a minimal definition of populism. It has today several different meanings, an implicit normative duplicity, and its operationalization remains at the very least challenging.

We propose a fresh approach to populism and discuss how to test this approach against the Portuguese case (having Spain as a reference point for comparison). For the purposes of our argument, we consider the period between 2011 and 2015, the political agents are political parties, and the empirical corpus includes the parties’ public discourses. Theoretically, our approach supersedes both ontic and ontological approaches, and focuses instead on the work of articulation of contents within the logic of resentment by certain key political agents. Methodologically, in regard to populism, Portugal is conceived as a negative case. We hypothesize that the performative articulation of the populist logic of resentment by Portuguese political parties, turning a part of the Portuguese against another part in the name of the “people,” failed to translate into electoral success. Our aim is to shed light on the distinctive features of the Portuguese case and on the reasons behind the relative failure of populist strategies by political parties in Portugal. To shed further light on these dimensions, we also consider a comparison with Spain, where the Podemos party nearly tripled its share of the national vote between mid-2014 and late 2015, and can thus be considered a case in which populism flourished in the intervening period.

In addition to the Introduction and the Conclusion, this chapter includes three sections. A first where we describe the rationale behind our idea and approach to populism; a second where we further explain the underlying theory and our proposed methodological approach to study the use of populist rhetoric; and a third in which we discuss the empirical implementation of our approach based on four cases of welfare retrenchment: health care, retirement pensions, unemployment benefit, and salary cuts.
THE RATIONALE BEHIND OUR IDEA

This essay sets out to answer one central research question: why has populism been unsuccessful in Portugal? This is particularly intriguing since populism, left and right, is on the rise virtually everywhere. Since 2011 a streak of electoral results has stunned the world: Syriza, Podemos, Fidesz, Law and Justice (PiS), Brexit, Trump. Talk of populism is all around us. Yet, so far Portugal is one of the few Western countries that seem to have escaped this global pattern. Salgado (2018) articulates some of the reasons behind this exception, which we propose to further analyse now with this new approach to study populism and populist discourse.

The significance of our discussion is that it combines theoretical innovation with a proposal for in-depth empirical research to account for the seeming absence of populism in Portugal. For this end we propose and develop a new research agenda for populism. In doing so, we take as our starting point and guiding idea the importance of social theory for understanding current ideas of populism. More specifically, the main intellectual aim of the paper is to shift the terms and focus of scholarly and political debate to an alternative vision of populism that is able to account for its relative lack of success in Portugal by pursuing five related objectives.

Theoretically, it (i) offers an alternative to the main approaches to populism today, as it focuses neither on contents nor on a given ontology per se, but on the work of articulation by political agents of certain specific contents within the ontology of resentment. Methodologically, it (ii) studies this work of articulation as a matter of performance by political agents (namely, political parties), by (iii) reference to different topics (areas of welfare retrenchment), against the (iv) normative background of shared political values (legal consciousness) and emotions (resentment), and (v) in a comparative perspective (with Spain, a “positive” case of populism).

For this purpose, we draw upon intellectual sources from both social theory and political philosophy. This is an unusual move since populism is seen as a natural remit of political scientists. However, we believe there are good reasons to combine political theory with social theory. First, as any other political phenomenon, populism is deeply embedded in social experience outside the political domain. Social theory, understood as a general and systematic reflection on modern societies, is thus in an ideal position to complement political theory in analysing issues such as how cultural meanings are performed.
in politics and policy-making, the dynamics of leadership and charisma in political movements, the role of political representation in reflecting and constituting social and political cleavages, the long-term processes of state formation and democratization, and the relationship between state, media, and society more generally. Second, literature on populism since the 1950s has been markedly interdisciplinary, benefiting from contributions produced in disciplines such as philosophy of language (e.g. speech-act theory), as well as from broader intellectual traditions, such as structuralism (e.g. semiotics) and post-structuralism (discourse theory). As social theory functions less as a disciplinary specialism than as a platform for specialists from different backgrounds to think about questions of social order and change, it is well positioned to draw upon these various insights and complement political theories on populism, more narrowly focused on the political.

Eminent social theorists such as Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Richard Sennett, and Manuel Castells have analysed the origins and effects of the unchecked rise of global corporate and financial capitalism in increasing economic and social inequalities since the late 1970s, the mediatization of a heightened sense of insecurity in the face of global risks from environmental hazards to terrorism, the growing dualization of labour markets with the ensuing state of precarity that disproportionally affects younger generations in both the United States and Europe, and the gentrification of cities with their ever-growing gated communities and inward-looking political cultures around the world. Political theorist Wendy Brown (2010) has been calling our attention to a “proliferation of walling” around and within Western countries to cope with their waning sovereignty.

Although Brown does not refer to populism directly, it is impossible not to notice the relevance of her diagnosis for the recent rise of populist politics. Building walls has indeed become a trademark symbol of populist discourse in our time. There is hardly a more powerful symbol than a wall to signal the protection of “our people” from “the other people”. The moral message is clear: the simple, hard-working “people” are to be kept safely apart from the “other”, embodied in this case by immigrants, Muslims, and foreigners in general. In other forms of populism, the “other” is portrayed as the “corrupt elite(s)” (e.g. anti-elitism and in some cases anti-system as well).

But is populism necessarily associated with nationalism, racism, sexism, and demagoguery? Sheldon Wolin, another political theorist, disagrees. He finds democracy today to be not a characteristic of today’s neoliberal modes
of power, but, rather, an “ephemeral phenomenon” enacted by those “who have no means to redress other than to risk collectivizing their small bits of power” (Wolin 2004, 601-602). Wolin locates democracy’s “fugitive” energies primarily in voluntary organizations, the “great free schools of democracy” that Tocqueville praised for breathing civic life into formally democratic institutions, but also in broader social movements, such as nineteenth-century American Populism (Wolin 2004, 603-604). If Wolin is right, and we think he is, then the task of rethinking populism is not merely an intellectual exercise – it is, first and foremost, an ethical task.

THEORY AND METHODS

Populism is notoriously difficult to define. Few political actors call themselves “populist”. The “canon” of populist case studies is formed of an eclectic assortment of movements, parties, and political leaders, ranging from the Russian narodnichestvo and the American Populists of the nineteenth-century to the Latin American charismatic populisms of Juan Péron and Getúlio Vargas of the 1950s, on to the neo-populist wave of the 1990s in Europe, exemplified by Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party of Austria, and more recently to the left-wing opposition to the European Union’s decisions on how to tackle the Euro Crisis (mainly Syriza and Podemos). As varied as these case studies are, so too are the approaches that have been employed to study them. These approaches vary in several regards, such as their degree of abstraction or generality, their primary aim or function, and their preferred methodology. These differences can be traced back to the epistemological foundations of these approaches.

On the one hand, there are ontic approaches. By this we mean approaches that conceive of physical, factual, and material reality as existing independently of our knowledge about it. Ontic approaches comprise empirical-deductive approaches, which are oriented toward explaining populism through the discovery of causal relationships between structural determinants and its populist consequences, and also hermeneutical approaches, whose aim is to provide a thick description of populism through historically detailed case studies. Despite their differences, both empirical-deductive and hermeneutical approaches are first focused on the contents (not on the logic) of populism. However, there is no consensus on what these contents are. Populism is variously defined as a thin ideology (Canovan 2002, 2004; Mudde 2004), a strategy or
form of organization (Weyland 2001, 14; Betz 2002, 198); a practice of political mobilization (Jansen 2011); a direct style of political communication (Jagers and Walgrave 2007); a discourse or form of persuasion (Kazin 1995). But it is impossible to be all of these things and remain something distinctive. As a result, ontic approaches are unable to account for the coexistence of “populist” movements with fundamentally different social bases, forms of organization, discourses, and ideologies.

On the other hand, there are approaches aimed not at describing the contents that characterize populism, but at identifying the logic according to which those contents are organized. Illustrations include some of Canovan’s later work (1999) and Ernesto Laclau’s *On Populist Reason* (2005). In the case of Canovan, we can see her moving away from hermeneutics toward structuralism. Her position now is that: “we shift our attention from the ideology and policy content of populist movements and concentrate instead on structural considerations” (Canovan 1999, 3). By this Canovan refers to the three fundamental characteristics that all populist politics share: anti-elitism; a reference to “the people”; and a simple and direct style. Laclau, under the gaze of semiotics, goes even further and dispenses with contents altogether. With Laclau, populism ceases to be an ontic category to become pure logic: “Its meaning is not to be found in any political or ideological content entering into the description of the practices of any particular group”, Laclau observes, “but in a particular mode of articulation of whatever social, political or ideological contents” (Laclau 2005, 34). As a result, populism is understood to be immanent in politics, a logic that inheres in social and political experience. Yet this is not just any logic. Unlike classic theories of political representation, Laclau argues that the will of the people, rather than being constituted before representation, is instead constituted through it – it is, he stresses, the paradigmatic case of political representation (Laclau 2005, 163). This means that “the people” becomes the logic that structures the political, i.e. that all politics is populism (Laclau 2005, 47), and that “the people” becomes an empty, floating signifier: when the plebs sees itself as the populus, the part as the whole, it constructs a “people” – quite independently of any particular contents. Of course, identifying all politics with populist politics, as Laclau suggests, risks rendering the concept of populism not just empty, but redundant. This is because, we believe, his Schmittian-Gramscian ontology of hegemony replaces a one-sided emphasis on contents with an equally one-sided emphasis on logic. His ontology fails to fully account for
the ontic, and thereby risks replicating in new terms the problems it sought to supersede in the first place.

Given the difficulties faced by mainly ontic or logic-oriented approaches, several authors have tried to tread a middle ground and integrate both dimensions in their work (Arditi 2007). In particular, it has led the so-called “new populist studies” to shift the focus “from the social content of populism and the ends toward which it is directed to the means by which it is done” (Jansen 2011, 82); to study why economic crises need to be “performed” by social agents as to become effective causes of populist politics (Moffitt 2016); to examine how the contents of populism seem to be organized by “discursive frames” (Aslanidis 2015), and to analyse how populist claims-making by American Presidential candidates between 1952 and 1996 follows certain scripts and involve specific rhetorical tropes (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016).

This chapter joins this collective effort by developing a new understanding of what populism is and how it should be studied. Populism is here understood as neither a thing, nor as purely discursive logic. Drawing upon pragmatic sociology, democratic theory, and the analysis of political discourse, we argue that what makes one a populist is the pragmatic articulation of certain contents (ideas, things) within the logic of resentment. This means that resentment is here understood not as an ontic category (Shils 1956; Barbalet 1992; Mudde 2004, 547; Müller 2016, 88) – a feeling, affect, or emotion – but as the logic according to which that particular sentiment is socially and politically organized (Demertzis 2006; Ure 2014; Engels 2015).

Why resentment? First, because populism is ostensibly about the conflict opposing the many to the few, the have-nots to the haves, the people to the elite, the out-groups to the in-group. It is not about one people against another people; instead, it is about one part of the people against another part of the same people. Second, the logic of resentment seems to be particularly adequate to capture this phenomenon because either mobilizing feelings of righteous indignation or downright envy, resentment supposes a relation of identification between the two parties, which does not exist in the case of the alien Other of the Schmittian logic of enmity. If this is obviously true in the case of indignation (I have a morally tinged disapproval of the fact that you have enjoyed some undeserved good fortune), it is also the case, Aristotle says, in the case of envy, which completely lacks the quasi-moral dimension of indignation: “envy is a certain distress caused by the fact that some other people like oneself seem to have done well with respect to the aforementioned goods. The subject
envies these others not because he wants the goods in question for himself, but because they have them” (Aristotle 174-5, cited in Geuss 2016, 176). Aristotle is clear in stressing that we envy only those we perceive to be “like” us. In other words, envy makes sense only among equal competitors in the same game. One can hate almost anyone, but one envies only those who are sufficiently like us to be some kind of rivals or competitors. We hate enemies, but a competitor is not per se our enemy (Geuss 2016, 176). This is why, for Schmitt and Laclau, the logic of populism is not enmity, but resentment.

Previous studies have related a politics of resentment with social class and other divisions within a country (Cramer 2016), with both symbolic and explicit violence (Engels 2015), and the construction of identity, nationalism, and specific forms of sub-state nationalism and of right-wing populism (Mann and Fenton 2017). But so far resentment has not been deemed an inherent characteristic of populism in its different manifestations, as we are now proposing.

Consider for instance the example of US President Donald J. Trump’s “wall with Mexico” a central element of his campaign in 2016 and an enduring element of his political rhetoric. Trump’s wall with Mexico can be designated as a populist symbol as opposed to, say, a nationalist symbol. The reason why the wall with Mexico came to represent Trump’s populism is because it was about jobs: the jobs the “many” in America were losing because of the decision by America’s “few” to open factories in Mexico and elsewhere, as well as about the jobs Mexican emigrants were taking away from the American “many”. Hence Trump’s pressure on the CEOs of companies such as Ford to bring jobs back from Mexico. It was not framed in nationalist terms, as one people against another people. In contrast, the wall separating Israel from the West Bank is framed in such terms: this wall has been rhetorically justified, legitimized, and culturally construed by the Israeli right as a form of protection of Jewish people from the attacks of the Palestinian people. This shows that competing agents can construe the exact same object in mutually contradictory ways for different purposes. For Obama, having the wall associated with nationalism would have been politically toxic: hence the Obama administration’s attempt to keep its funding and construction undertaken if not in secrecy, as to attract as little media attention as possible. Trump spectacularly reversed this. He picked the exact same infrastructure and constructed it as a symbol of his politics. Trump’s politics, insofar as it uses that object in order to mobilize the resentment of one part of the American people against another part, construes it as a populist symbol.
Our second methodological aim is to suggest how to study the ways in which this logic has been employed by political agents, with varying degrees of success, to pit one part of the people against another part in the name of “the people” to criticize (or legitimize), proposing as example the politics of welfare retrenchment in Portugal between 2011 and 2015. Welfare retrenchment, which has fuelled the “dualization” of European societies between labour market insiders and outsiders, is particularly relevant for this purpose. We therefore question why it is that welfare retrenchment failed to provide a fertile ground for populist politics in Portugal but not in neighbouring Spain? We address this question by analysing four central policies of welfare retrenchment: (i) health care; (ii) retirement pensions; (iii) unemployment benefit; and (iv) public servants’ salary cuts.

Methodologically, our approach adopts the extreme case method of case selection because of its extreme value on the dependent (Y) variable of interest: populism. An extreme value is understood here as an observation that lies far away from the mean of a given distribution; that is to say, it is unusual. For case study analysis, it is precisely the rareness of the value that makes a case valuable, not its positive or negative value (Emigh 1997; Mahoney and Goertz 2004). This does not pose problems of sample bias because it refers back to a larger sample of cases lying in the background of the analysis. The aim is to maximize variance on the dimension of interest, not to minimize it. The case of Portugal between 2011 and 2015 looks unusual in that it does not seem to fit the international pattern of rise in populist politics since the 1990s, and more prominently in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, when the conditions were met for the emergence of populism. Portugal is a “negative case” because it seems contrary to this general pattern. Hence the research question: why has populism been unsuccessful in Portugal?

Following what has been said above, populism is here understood to refer to the pragmatic articulation of the logic of resentment by political and social agents for material/symbolic gain. By pragmatic articulation we refer to the political performativity of certain agents through, and by reference to, both linguistic claims and material things. Logics organize contents of different sorts, including rational claims to transparency and intelligibility, as well as emotions. We believe this to be the case of the logic of resentment. The logic of resentment organizes the specific set of emotions under the umbrella of resentment, which includes envy and indignation. To claim that one logic pertains exclusively to one particular phenomenon would be to engage in a
topological exercise of little interest. Logics operate or exist at a different level than phenomena: it is perfectly possible, then, that the same logic animates different phenomena, and that any one phenomenon may be animated by more than one logic. It is better to think of the relationship between resentment and populism as one of elective affinity. We thus do not claim that populists are the only ones mobilizing resentment. What we do claim is that without resentment, there would be no populism. That is, there is an elective affinity between populism and the logic of resentment, although the latter can animate a plethora of social situations and phenomena (e.g. a situation in which one individual envies another’s object or personal accomplishment), it animates populist politics when it acquires the specific configuration of pitting one part of the people against another part of the people, in the name of “the people”. Ontic contents matter, but need to be understood in their relationship with the ways in which they are mobilized (not per se, as the naturalist perspective wants it, nor arbitrarily, as the post-structuralist perspective wants it). Populist politics, as politics in general is not an endless language game; it involves the material world that we inhabit as much as ourselves as agents.

As do Stanyer, Salgado, and Strömbäck (2017), we acknowledge that non-populist political actors can also engage in populist rhetoric and populist strategies to achieve their goals. Populism is thus not a trait of populist actors only. In the case of the argument and approach here developed, these actors primarily include political parties engaged in policy discussion, but also other institutional agents that performed relevant roles in the politics of welfare retrenchment in Portugal in the period under examination: the Constitutional Court and trade unions are two cases in point. The question of accounting for the “negative case” of populism in Portugal is a matter of a “failed performance” (Austin 1962; Alexander 1987). Given that a performative may or may not work, that it may or may not succeed in realizing its stated intention, its appropriate evaluative standard is not truth and accuracy, but “felicitous” and “unfelicitous.” Our proposal involves the investigation of the (in)felicity’s conditions of populism in Portugal between 2011 and 2015, which include not only the speech act’s interactional context (Goffman 1956), but also the political culture out of which particular signs are drawn by political agents, populism included (Worsley 1969).

This methodological strategy draws upon critical discourse analysis and political discourse analysis (see for example Fairclough and Fairclough 2012) and complements these with an original emphasis on the logic of resentment.
It advocates the study of political speeches from party leaders and parliamentary debates in Portugal and Spain as sources of power imbalances, potential conflicts of interest, and differences in values by political opponents in what is a democratic context of disagreement marked by a tendency toward the mainstreaming of a populism mode of representation and articulation. It relies on the notion of language performativity to further explore the meaning of relational structures and the construction of discursive meaning within such political speeches and debates. Documentary evidence could potentially include: (i) a representative sample of speeches and debates from the various political parties and social movements, looking specifically on whether, when, and how the articulation of the logic of resentment works, and the degree to which it shapes the agents’ political arguments and proposals into populist narratives and populist approaches to democratic politics; (ii) the Constitutional Court’s rulings; and (iii) the news coverage in the leading Portuguese daily press of the most important political actors and debates on these issues.

Analysing information from these different types of sources allows taking into account both mediated and unmediated dimensions of political discourse. We include the analysis of how mainstream news media cover these issues and the political actors involved in these debates, which refers to the mediated dimension. We also consider unmediated political discourse by political parties, social movements, and the Constitutional Court’s statements and documents. Both dimensions are crucial in our analysis of populism, as political actors need the media (both mainstream and social media) to convey their messages to the wider population, while populist strategies often entail direct, unmediated communication, and links with the people. Our approach also involves, at a later stage, the comparison between mediated and unmediated content to analyse the mainstream media conditions and check for any potential impact of journalists or the medium itself on political discourses.

DISCUSSION

Our discussion and research question suppose the failure of populism (populist rhetoric and populist strategies) in Portugal. This is, of course, a claim rather than a self-evident fact. The performative failure of populism in Portugal in this period derives from the observation that, whilst it partly shaped the political debate regarding welfare retrenchment (the Troika was
often framed within the “us” vs. “them” argument and invoked as the visible face of the forces of economic globalization and capitalist accumulation and its measures presented as an undeserved punitive measure over the hard-working Portuguese people), populism seemingly paid less electoral dividends in Portugal than in other comparable countries. Whereas in Spain the Podemos party nearly tripled its share of the national vote between mid-2014 and late 2015, not to mention the electoral victories of the Syriza in Greece in September 2015, Brexit in the UK in June 2016, and Trump in the United States in November 2016, in Portugal the share of votes for the political parties one would expect to be more associated with a populist type of political discourse, including those using arguments that are similar to Podemos’ kind of populism, rose only moderately between the general elections of 2011 and of 2015, and the overall appeal of the Portuguese populist far right continues to be marginal (National Renewal Party-PNR). Notwithstanding the record-high levels of unemployment and deep popular discontent with the Troika-imposed austerity measures, the Communist vote remained virtually unchanged – from 441,000 in 2011 to 445,000 in 2015 – and overall left-wing protest parties secured only 12 more seats in Parliament. Significantly, the incumbent centre-right coalition remained the political force with the most votes. In addition, the popular demonstrations against the Troika, which in Spain were at the origin of a populist political party (Podemos), in Portugal did not produce a similar result. In fact, the attempts to create a new political party from these social movements were unsuccessful in Portugal and even the newly created PDR (Democratic Republican Party) by António Marinho e Pinto was, in the 2015 national election, very far behind (1.14%) the success of its leader’s election in the European Parliamentary Election, when Marinho e Pinto ran as an MPT (The Earth Party Movement) candidate (7.14%) (for a more detailed discussion about populist political actors in Portugal, see Salgado and Zúquete 2017).

As a “negative case”, Portugal can serve as a comparative case enabling further explanations about what populism is and what it is not, thereby helping to identify its conceptual boundaries. It can also enable researchers to extend or modify the original concept in the future, possibly adding to its explanatory power, which would have a considerable impact on the understanding not only of populist phenomena, but also of contemporary democratic politics. The “negative case” of Portugal can also lend an extra degree of validity to the study by demonstrating our willingness to consider alternatives and that we
have indeed searched for other possible explanations (Miles and Huberman 1994).

In addition, we selected the case of Portugal according to the Possibility Principle, which advises researchers to select only negative cases in which the outcome of interest is possible. As Mahoney and Goertz point out (2004, 656), Seymour Martin Lipset’s famous query – *Why no Socialism in the United States?* – made sense because social democracy was possible during earlier periods of US history. Likewise, the rise of populism in Portugal in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis was eminently possible, and indeed was seen as inevitable in certain political circles. Yet it did not occur.

In what follows we offer a preliminary (and arguably speculative) explanation of why populism has failed to take hold in Portugal while it flourished in neighbouring Spain during the financial and economic crisis of 2011–2015 that affected both Iberian countries. We do this by reference to four issues: health care; retirement pensions; unemployment benefit; and public servants’ salary cuts. Rather than presenting the findings of past research, what we offer here is the opposite: how would future research on populist politics look if it were to follow the model proposed here.

**HEALTH CARE**

Briefly, the issue at stake here can be described as follows. In early 2014 the Portuguese political parties’ public discourse focussed on the topic of health care reform. The topic of discussion was the Portuguese civil servants’ health care insurance scheme, *ADSE* (originally, “Assistência na Doença aos Servidores Civis do Estado”, nowadays “Direção-Geral de Proteção Social aos Trabalhadores em Funções Públicas”). At stake was the increase of the beneficiaries’ contributions from 1.5% to 3.5% in order to make the system financially sustainable and totally self-supporting. The contending parties were, on the one hand, the Troika and the government, and, on the other hand, the left-wing opposition parties and *CGTP-IN*, a trade union confederation traditionally associated with the Communist Party. A working hypothesis could be that it was the former, not the latter, to resort to a resentful logic in that it stressed the unfairness of treatment between the scheme’s beneficiaries (civil servants) and taxpayers, thus pitting one part of the people against another part in the name of “the people”. This particular debate could be analysed within the broader discussion of the universality of the National Health Care system,
and the universalist character of the legal consciousness of the Portuguese in this respect. If proven, this hypothesis would help us demonstrate that, contra ontic approaches, populism is not an exclusive feature of pre-defined “populist” leaders, movements, or parties; in fact, mainstream political parties and official authorities too (including international organizations) can in principle engage in populist strategies.

More generally, a line of empirical enquiry of this sort points to the possibility of exploring the complex relationship between populism and technocracy. It is commonly thought that populism feeds on a resentment of loss of control over one’s destiny, and the corresponding desire to assert domestic democratic sovereignty; that it represents a reaction to the technocratic logics of democratic politics, especially when conducted from a far distance, at a supranational level. The recent rise of populism coincides, in many cases, with the increase of external intervention from institutions like the IMF and the EU. What is the relationship between the two phenomena and what relation does it bear with different developments in terms of populist politics in Portugal and Spain? More generally, are there any hidden affinities concealed behind the open antagonisms between populists and technocrats? If so, what dangers do they represent for the logic and workings of our democracies?

RETIREMENT PENSIONS

Our proposed second topic of investigation is the debate around welfare retrenchment regarding retirement pensions. These were, alongside with civil servants’ salaries, one of the Troika’s main targets in terms of fiscal consolidation in the 2010-2014 period. This topic, like the next one (unemployment benefit), can be studied in comparison with Spain given the central position of retirement pensions to the so-called “dualization thesis”: given their long contributory careers, labour market insiders are hypothesized to be particularly keen in defending retirement pensions from cuts. In the Portuguese case, the debate involved not only political parties (the government vs. the opposition parties), but also the Constitutional Court, whose rulings acted as the last line of defence of higher levels of insider protection. The working hypothesis is that the Court’s intervention (whose rulings were expressed in a language of individual rights and universal guarantees) made the debate in Portugal to be framed less as a form of “structural violence” inflicted by neo-liberalism (Engels 2015) than in Spain, where political parties, such as Podemos, were
freer to depict cuts to retirement pensions as an undeserved result of economic globalization and neoliberal forces, thus unleashing sentiments of resentment and anger against the establishment. If confirmed, this hypothesis would help illuminate the reasons for the performative success of populism in Spain and its failure in Portugal.

**UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT**

A third topic of research is welfare retrenchment regarding the unemployment benefit. As the previous one, this topic would also allow for a meaningful, direct comparison with Spain. Briefly, what was at stake here can be described as follows. Active labour market policies, conciliating changes to unemployment benefits (such as making it more mean-tested dependent), training schemes (such as making these compulsory for beneficiaries), and public employment services (such as more efficient job centres), were a central feature of the Troika’s Memorandum of Understanding and were duly applied by the government. According to the dualization thesis, labour market outsiders are hypothesized to favour needs-based policies such as unemployment benefit at the expense of policies dependent on contributions. A plausible working hypothesis could be that in Spain the cleavage between outsiders (unemployed) and insiders was framed in more clearly populist terms than in Portugal, where an “unnatural” alliance between organizations representative of the interests of pensioners and outsiders was visible at the height of the crisis. If confirmed, this hypothesis would help illuminate the reasons for the performative success of populism in Spain and its failure in Portugal.

**SALARY CUTS**

A fourth topic of research is related to the fiscal consolidation imposed by the Troika. One of the most politically contested decisions of the Troika years was the salary cuts of civil servants. Originally introduced in Portugal before the bailout in 2011 by the Socialist government to salaries over 1,500 Euros, later the centre-right coalition government would expand the cuts to salaries below that threshold. In August 2014, the Constitutional Court imposed a return to their original formulation and ruled the prorogation of any cuts beyond 2015 unconstitutional. One working hypothesis would be that while opposition parties did mobilize a resentful rhetoric by blaming the forces of
economic globalization and their institutional representatives – the Troika and the government – for cuts deemed unnecessary and unjust, the technical-juridical language and the universalist logic of the Court’s ruling contributed to taming the resentment and anger felt by the Portuguese affected by the cuts. If proven, this hypothesis would further help account for absence of populism in Portugal.

CONCLUSION

The four topics briefly discussed above offer a realistic framework to assess our theoretical and methodological claims regarding how populism should be studied today. As a whole, they form what one could call a prospective research programme of populist politics. Our primary motivation in designing such a programme is two-fold. First, and more immediately, our aim has been to answer the question of why populism was not successful and did not emerge in Portugal in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2010, compared to what happened in other countries also affected by the crisis. It is our belief that an answer to this important question requires an interpretive methodological approach. As we try to show by reference to four key welfare retrenchment issues, the reasons for the relative absence of populism in Portugal have less to do with objective socio-economic causes (which were similar in Spain and in many aspects even worse in Portugal), than with the performance of these causes, their nature, and consequences, by different political agents. Such performance is to some extent a matter of language, i.e., the investigation of how populist rhetoric is used by political and social actors to achieve political ends. But it is also a matter of the political culture, the policies, the technologies, and all sorts of material things to which that language necessarily refers.

Our second aim has been to make clearer to the reader the nature and scope of our claims about the nature and functioning of populism. We do not reduce populism to empirical contents: resentment is here understood not as an emotion or feeling, but as an underlying logic, i.e. the way in which such sentiments are socially and politically organized. This signifies that populism seen as resentment is not to be studied through survey items connoting specific emotions such as envy, indignation, rage, or hatred. Yet we do not reduce it to a purely discursive logic either. Our pragmatic understanding of
the populist logic of resentment means, to put it in slightly different terms, that it should be studied relationally and as a matter of performativity. The meaning of populism is therefore not something that inheres somewhere in the innermost essence of populists’ discourses, style, modes of organization, or ideology. Instead, the meaning of populism depends on the relations between the different elements animated by the logic of resentment.

Exploring further the examples of Portugal and Spain (a negative case versus a positive case experiencing a similar crisis) adds to our understanding of populism, in this case as construction that is sensitive to political context, political culture, interplays of political actors and narratives, and to power relations. The interpretive nature of our approach stresses the relational nature of politics, with the potential to produce dissimilar outcomes, even in apparently similar situations.

Trump’s populism, and likeminded phenomena, point to the unconstructive nature of populism. One thing is to criticize democracy for failing to live up to its promises of equality – quite another is to do this by mobilizing resentment. While the latter can function as the beginning of a positive political project for progressive social change, the former can only do so with great difficulty. The logic of resentment, we argue, can be deeply unconstructive: I envy you just because you have what I don’t. But the logic of resentment can also mobilize sentiments of righteous indignation. It is here that populism’s ethical promise to which Sheldon Wolin alludes seems to reside. Interestingly, in Portugal, the “right to indignation” was used as a slogan in the popular demonstrations against the austerity measures that were implemented as a consequence of the 2011 bailout.

In fact, with the exception of the liberal anti-populist tradition (Hofstadter 1955), the understanding of populism as democracy’s worst enemy is fairly recent. Until as late as the early 1990s most were of the view that populism was good for democracy. For populist scholars such as Peter Worsley (1969), Margaret Canovan (1981), and many others, populism’s value resided in its aspirational qualities. It originated mobilizing political projects with the capacity for incorporating previously disenfranchised classes into the political community. This authentic, bottom-up popular impulse was seen as the much needed key to reenergize democracy: both old democracies stifled by their elitist tendencies and pragmatic or instrumental practices and less developed democracies seeking to expand the demos that counts and to which institutions and leaders must be responsive. Separating such disparate evaluations of
populism is, of course, the underlying normative ideal of democracy – liberal pluralist democracy, in one case, participatory democracy, in the other. This suggests yet another difficulty in finding something intrinsic to populism, which sets its apart: populism tends rather to be defined in and by its relationship to democracy, a relationship which is variously defined as extrinsic or intrinsic.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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FILIPÉ CARREIRA DA SILVA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
fcs23@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-2459-0802

SUSANA SALGADO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
susana.salgado@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-7967-3763

REFERENCES


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In welfare we trust?
Political trust in Portugal and Spain, 2008-2014

Edalina Rodrigues Sanches
José Santana Pereira
Isabella Razzuoli
INTRODUCTION

In representative democracies political trust is often featured as a key requirement of regime stability and legitimacy, as well as quality of democracy, translating the popular support that the democratic system enjoys (Easton 1975; Newton and Norris 1999; Norris 1999). Moreover, political trust has an impact in terms of electoral turnout and vote choice (mainstream vs. third-party vote), other modalities of political participation (distrust erodes institutionalized and fosters de-institutionalized forms of participation), or support for public policies targeting social outgroups (Kaase 1999; Hetherington 1999; Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Bélanger and Nadeau 2005; Hooghe and Marien 2013). Trust in political institutions is, therefore, a building block of political citizenship in contemporary democracies.

For that reason, the fact that several public opinion surveys pointed to a downward trend in trust in political institutions in Western democracies since the 1980s (Kaase 1999; Newton and Norris 1999; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; van der Meer 2010; Belchior 2015) has raised concerns. Representative institutions, in particular governments, parliaments, and political parties, are those earning less trust amongst citizens, while implementing institutions (e.g. police, courts) seem to fare better (Kaase 1999; Newton and Norris 1999; Marien 2011). This decline is more pronounced in the United States than in Europe (Marien 2011). Within Europe, Southern countries have recently known sharp downturns in terms of political trust (Torcal 2014; Belchior 2015; Muro and Vidal 2017; Fernandes et al. forthcoming). Portugal and Spain are no exception in the wider Southern European context, although the trust debacle seems to have been steeper in the latter than in the former (Fernandes et al. forthcoming).

Unsurprisingly, in the Iberian Peninsula these falling trends gained visibility as the economic and financial crisis became more severe. While previous studies pointed out the relevance of the general economic or government performance as key factors of political (dis)trust in these countries (Teixeira and Freire 2010; Torcal 2014; Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior 2014), less attention has been paid to the role of perceptions regarding the impact of the economic crisis beyond unemployment rates or poverty risks: namely the way the welfare state, an important staple in these recent democracies, actually works. A notable exception to this is the work by Fernandes et al. (forthcoming), who revealed that at the macro-level there was, surprisingly, a negative relationship between social protection spending and trust in representative institutions in
Southern Europe between 2000 and 2015. A positive relationship between the citizens’ welfare state experiences and political trust (that is, at the micro-level) has been observed elsewhere, however (Kumlin 2002; Kumlin and Haugsgjerd 2017).

This chapter analyses the relationship between welfare state performance (namely in the lesser-studied subfields of health and education) and trust in political institutions in Portugal and Spain at three key moments: before the financial crisis (2008), during its peak (2012), and after the end of the foreign aid programmes (2014): a full-fledged bailout in the case of Portugal (2011-2014) and the injection of funds in Spanish banks (2012). Both countries are new democracies, with slightly different institutional profiles (Bruneau et al. 2001) and party systems with similar degrees of stability, registering an increase in volatility only in the post-2008 period (Sanches 2017). Nevertheless, these countries have been affected unequally by the recent Eurozone crisis (Bellucci, Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012; Magalhães 2014): while Portugal experienced the most acute crisis and had to be rescued by the Troika, Spain also saw a worsening of several macroeconomic indicators such as government debt and the unemployment rate, but the external intervention was of a considerably milder nature: cash flows to Spanish banks in peril. The context of the post-2008 financial and economic crisis in these countries is an interesting one to test hypotheses about the factors that influence political trust, since the turmoil was of greater volume than any other pattern of negative economic performance experienced by most European democracies in the last decades. From this broad depiction, what interests us the most is how perceptions of welfare performance may have had different impacts on levels of political trust in Portugal and Spain, before, during, and after the peak of the sovereign debt crisis, and for citizens with different levels of cognitive mobilization.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we review the literature on the factors underlying political trust in democratic societies, with a special focus on studies carried out in Portugal and Spain and on those that attempted to find a causal link between welfare and trust in representative institutions (Guillén, Álvarez, and Silva 2003). Then, recent welfare state developments and citizens’ perceptions of welfare performance in both countries are discussed. The following section presents the goals, hypotheses, and data used in this chapter. The fourth section is devoted to the discussion of the results of several regression models computed with the aim of testing our hypotheses. The chapter ends with the summary and discussion of the main empirical patterns observed.
TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: AN OVERVIEW

Trust in political institutions is a recurring theme in the political science research agenda. This includes studies looking at political trust as an explanatory factor of political attitudes and behaviours such as satisfaction with democracy and political participation (Almond and Verba, 1963; Kaase 1999; Inglehart 1999; Zmerli and Newton 2008), but also those contributions seeking to identify the cultural, economic, and policy factors of political trust, at either the micro or macro-level (Newton and Norris 1999; Mishler and Rose 2001; Hooghe, Marien and Oser 2017; Zmerli and van Der Meer 2017). This second research stream, to which the present chapter contributes, can be divided into two main schools of thought: cultural and institutional.

Cultural theories suggest that political trust is exogenous, that it is generated outside the political sphere. Within this account political trust is perceived as “an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and, much later, projected onto political institutions” (Mishler and Rose 2001, 31). In other words, it is determined by the level of social trust that individuals develop throughout life, resulting from their socialization in specific cultural norms. Almond and Verba (1963) were the first to theorize this relationship by postulating that social trust was an important component of the democratic civic culture. Later, Putnam et al. (1983) and Putnam, Leonardi and Nonetti (1993) argued that citizens’ integration in social networks produced forms of social capital and of mutual trust that helped to increase the effectiveness and vitality of democratic political institutions. A few recent empirical studies have, indeed, observed such a relationship: there are significant correlations between social and institutional trust at the macro-level and, when important controls are included in the analysis, the relationship between social and political trust is also observed at the individual level (Zmerli and Newton 2008; Newton and Zmerli 2011).

Alternatively, institutional theories argue that trust is endogenous, a result of the evaluations people make of the performance of political institutions (Mishler and Rose 2001; van der Meer and Zmerli 2017). Institutional theories contend that the quality and the performance of institutions is what best predicts trust, thus suggesting that trust is quite instrumental: “Institutions that perform well generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate skepticism and distrust” (Mishler and Rose 2001, 31). This explanatory account anticipates short-term changes in trust levels as a result of shifts in economic growth or
perceptions of corruption. Many empirical studies have tested the effect of institutional performance, either alone or in conjunction with cultural variables. Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) found that at the macro-level, unemployment and governmental instability are negatively correlated with trust in government and in parliament. Newton and Norris (1999) have shown that neither social trust nor associativism are key factors of individual trust in political institutions; in fact, the performance of governments and political institutions are the strongest explanations for the decline of political trust observed in western democracies between the 1980s and the 1990s. Focusing on the Central and Eastern European post-communist countries, Mishler and Rose (2001) also concluded that the origins of political trust lie mainly in institutional explanations, being largely determined by the countries’ political and economic performance. Lühiste (2006) developed a similar study for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, noting that the performance of political institutions (perceptions about the economy, corruption, and evolution of civil rights) explains the confidence in political institutions better than cultural variables.

The recent wave of studies aiming at explaining the erosion of trust in political institutions in Southern Europe, namely in Portugal and Spain, have pointed out the relevance of the institutional factors, but also of cultural factors and political attitudes. Teixeira and Freire (2010), for instance, analysing the determinants of trust in parliaments in Portugal, Spain, and Italy, found that the greater the interest in politics and the trust in other institutions, the greater the confidence in parliaments. Interestingly enough, Portugal was the only country in which economy and government performance variables were statistically significant, and Spain the only one in which social trust has a significant effect. This does not mean that these are opposite cases, but instead that there are within-country specificities that need to be taken into consideration. Torcal (2014) also studied the determinants of trust in political institutions in Spain and Portugal during the crisis, using as main independent variables assessments of the economy and responsiveness (that is, the extent to which political elites care about what people think). One of the most significant results is that policy responsiveness is the most important and robust predictor of trust, suggesting that the fact that citizens think political elites do not care about their opinion is what most negatively affects trust in political institutions. His study also finds a significant effect of economic assessments, especially sociotropic assessments, in the levels of trust in representative institutions. Analysing the cases of Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain, Muro and Vidal (2017) tested the
effects of the quality of institutional outputs, observing that levels of public
debt, unemployment, and perceptions of corruption were the main predictors
of political trust, while inflation, GDP, and government effectiveness had no
significant consistent effects, unlike the GINI index, which also emerges as a
significant predictor. Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior (2014) observed that
short-term factors (evaluations of the government performance, the economy,
and the main parties during the crisis) were those with larger and more regular
effects on trust in parliaments in Portugal and Greece between 2008 and 2012.
More recently, in a macro-level study of trust in national political institutions,
Fernandes et al. (forthcoming) noted that higher levels of trust in representative
political institutions were correlated with lower rates of unemployment and
poverty risk in Southern Europe.

Within the institutional framework, studies focusing on the relationship
between welfare state performance and trust in political institutions are, as
we noted above, less common (Kumlin 2002; Kumlin and Haugsgjerd 2017;
Fernandes et al. forthcoming). Our knowledge on the effects of welfare
performance on political trust lags behind what we know about the effects of
interpersonal trust, and short-term economic and government performance.
However, citizens’ personal experiences with different kinds of welfare
institutions can play an important role in generating trust (Kumlin 2002),
because citizens will make inferences about the functioning of the political
system and the conduct of public officials on the basis of their experiences
with these institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

WELFARE STATE IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN:
RECENT EVOLUTION AND CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS

The creation of welfare systems in Portugal and Spain dates back to the second
half of the 1970s with the dismantling of the authoritarian regimes and the
transition to democracy. The new democratic constitutions sanctioned the
citizens’ right to social protection, such as access to public education and
health systems (Ferrera 2000; Silva 2013). European integration has activated
a set of reforms aimed at modernizing and improving the social protection
systems (Ferrera 2005; Petmesidou and Guillén 2014). Although several
indicators point to an improvement of the social protection system, some
dysfunctionalities persist in the two countries (Alves 2015; Silva 2013).
The outbreak of the crisis in 2008 and the following recession and its social and economic effects have put the welfare systems of Southern European countries under stress. Structural reforms of the welfare systems and cuts in social protection were carried out during the crisis, and key sectors such as pensions, workers’ protection, healthcare, and education were targeted by austerity measures (Gutiérrez 2014; Pereirinha and Murteira 2016; Villota and Vásquez-Cupeiro 2016), causing investment in these areas to obtain smaller proportions of governmental spending vis-à-vis previous periods. Indeed, if we consider public health expenditure as a percentage of the government expenditure, the data show a decrease of 2.8 percentage points in Portugal and 1.2 percentage points in Spain between 2008 and 2014 (Table 11.1). At the system level the measures undertaken meant a shift of the costs of healthcare increasing for patients, with potential negative effects in terms of access and inclusion (Petmesidou, Pavolini and Guillén 2014). Public investment in the educational system has fallen as well, but not at the same time in the Iberian countries. In 2009 Portugal came close to the European average in terms of government expenditure in education, but it quickly regressed to lower levels in 2010; in Spain, a visible governmental disinvestment is apparent only from 2012 on (Table 11.1).

To what extent has this set of developments had an impact on the way the Portuguese and Spanish assess the performance of their welfare states, namely in terms of the quality of healthcare and public education? In both countries citizens show throughout this period low, moderate, to negative, levels of

### Table 11.1 Public expenditure on health and education: trends in Portugal and Spain (2008-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public health expenditure</strong> (% of the government expenditure)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: EU = European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
satisfaction with the performance of their welfare systems (see Table 11.2). The European Social Survey data for 2008-2014 shows that the panorama in Portugal is of relative stability, while in Spain there is a continuous decrease in the perceptions of welfare performance. This trend may be surprising if one considers that, *grosso modo*, cuts were not significantly harsher in Spain than in Portugal, and could be explained by the fact that the decrease in public investment in these sectors may have been directed to more visible aspects of the health and education systems in Spain than in Portugal, or may have received more negative media coverage. Also, the fact that Portugal had to implement harsher austerity measures under the troika programme targeting several other areas of the welfare system might have polarized the media and the public debate around other topics (wage freeze, cut in pensions, massive emigration), leading to the same feeble impact on citizen perceptions of how the healthcare and education systems were performing.

GOALS, HYPOTHESES, AND DATA

This chapter has two main goals at its core: to test the effects of welfare performance perceptions on political trust and to examine whether there are differences in the effects of welfare performance on political trust in Portugal and Spain at different moments of the sovereign debt crisis, as well as for citizens with different levels of cognitive mobilization.

Four main hypotheses will be tested. First, in line with the institutional theories and inspired by the work of Kumlin (2002) and Kumlin and Haugsgjerd (2017), we expect that trust in political institutions will be greater amongst the citizens who assess the performance of the welfare state in a more positive manner (*hypothesis 1*). Assessments of the welfare state performance and levels of trust in political institutions that ultimately decide how much and how to manage the welfare system are different and fairly independent features. While trust can be seen as an affective orientation toward the political system, welfare assessments express an evaluative orientation concerning specific political/institutional objects (Almond and Verba 1963). Even though trust may have, in specific circumstances and for a number of citizens, a biasing impact on satisfaction with welfare performance, we expect the former to be a consequence of the latter. In other words, citizens will trust as a result of an instrumental evaluation of how well institutions perform, based on the quality
of the outputs. Thus, how citizens assess the performance of key sectors of the welfare state (specifically health and education) is likely to generate trust or otherwise distrust in the political institutions that are responsible for implementing welfare policies.

In addition, we expect that welfare performance perceptions will have a stronger role after the advent of the sovereign debt crisis (hypothesis 2). This expectation is based on the assumption that the context of crisis may have polarized these perceptions and given them a stronger political meaning.

We also test the assumption that during the crisis years, the impact of welfare assessments is less in Portugal (in which welfare cuts could be seen as exogenous) than in Spain (in which they did not stem from a bailout programme). In the first case, the welfare cuts were associated with the bailout, while in the latter a formal bailout never occurred; therefore, it makes sense that the national political institutions in Spain would suffer more in terms of their trustworthiness due to negative assessments of the welfare state performance. On the contrary, in Portugal the crisis was initially seen as “imported” and the incumbent party was not strongly punished for it at the polls in 2009 (Freire and Santana Pereira 2012), and the need for austerity measures was strongly linked with the three-year foreign aid programme. Corroborating this depiction, it has been shown that Portugal has the lowest share (even if still majoritarian) of citizens holding the government accountable for the crisis when compared to the other Southern European countries (Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012). Therefore, national political institutions may have been comparatively less blamed for the quality of welfare services in Portugal than in Spain. In short, during the peak of the crisis, the impact of welfare performance perceptions on the levels of trust in political institutions will be stronger in Spain than in Portugal (hypothesis 3).

Lastly, we examine the extent to which the effects of welfare performance on trust are significantly shaped by the way citizens process political information. The theory of cognitive mobilization suggests that those who are better educated and those who have more access to information will have more supportive attitudes toward the political system (Inglehart 1970, 1977), but also rely less on short-term cues to assess the degree of trustworthiness political institutions are entitled to. If that is the case, we should expect satisfaction with welfare performance to be less important for those with higher levels of cognitive mobilization. In other words, citizens with higher levels of cognitive
mobilization will display weaker links between their perceptions of the welfare performance and trust in political institutions (hypothesis 4).

Our analysis draws on data from three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted at the onset (2008), the peak (2012), and the aftermath (2014) of the crisis in Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is an index of political trust that varies between 0 (no trust at all) and 10 (complete trust). It reports citizens’ levels of trust toward three representative institutions/actors: political parties, national parliament, and politicians. The decision to collapse citizens’ ratings into an index follows conventional conceptualizations that treat representative political institutions as a cluster (Marien 2011) and is furthermore supported by both factor and reliability analysis that reveal a unidimensional structure of trust in our data. As Figure 11.1 demonstrates, levels of confidence in political institutions are particularly low not only in Portugal and Spain, but across the sample of cases included in the ESS. Still, there are some differences that merit highlighting. First, citizens of the two Southern European countries (Portugal in particular) display much lower levels of political trust when compared to most European countries. From a longitudinal perspective, however, levels of trust exhibit a more dramatic fall among the Spanish than the Portuguese. Second, levels of trust follow a downward trend during the crisis and recover a little in 2014.

To explain these differences, our main independent variable is welfare performance, which is measured as an index that aggregates citizens’ appraisals of the state of education and of health services using a scale on which 0 means “extremely bad” and 10 “extremely good”. This variable enters the models alone and interacted with an index of cognitive mobilization that considers citizens’ levels of media exposure and interest in politics. The index ranges between 0 (when there is no interest in politics and no time at all devoted to watching/listening/reading news about politics and current affairs programmes) and 4 (when the highest level of interest in politics and exposure to information on politics is reached).

1 Both analyses were performed for each country and year considered. All factor analyses produced a one-component solution that explained at least 70% of the total variance. The Cronbach Alfas are good, running from 0.861 (Spain 2008) to 0.890 (Portugal 2012).

2 Cronbach Alfas are acceptable, running from 0.570 (Portugal 2008) to 0.765 (Spain 2014).

3 Unfortunately the survey does not include questions on the performance of social security or pension systems, which is why we focus on education and health systems.
Additionally, we have considered a set of controls that come across as relevant predictors within the main theories of trust. Following the cultural approach discussed above (Mishler and Rose 2001), interpersonal trust was included in the analysis, with the expectation that it will bear positively on political trust. Interpersonal trust is measured by the question “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”, with answers being confined to a scale on which 0 means “you can’t be too careful” and 10 means that “most people can be trusted”. Also, based on the institutional approach (Mishler and Rose 2001), we use satisfaction with the economy and satisfaction with the government as a way to control for the effect of institutional performance on matters unrelated to welfare on trust. Both variables are measured similarly, through a scale running from 0 “extremely dissatisfied” to 10 “extremely satisfied”. We also added a variable measuring the level of agreement with the sentence “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” (original scale was recoded so that 1 means “disagree strongly” and 5 “agree strongly”). Finally, socio-demographic variables were also included:

Question: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy/government in [country]?
age (in years), gender (0 = female; 1 = male), education (in years), household income (runs from the lowest – 1st decile – to the highest income level – 10th decile), working status (1 = if respondent had a paid job in the last seven days; 0 = if otherwise), and radicalism, which is measured as the distance between citizens’ placement in the left-right scale (where 0 means “left” and 10 means “right”) and the centre point of the scale.

A total of six regression models were estimated for each country. That is, for each of the years considered (2008, 2012, and 2014) we estimated one model that comprises all independent and control variables and a second model that adds the interaction term between welfare performance and cognitive mobilization.

Descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables, presented in Table 11.2, allow us to make an initial characterization of Portugal and Spain across the three time points considered. Regarding satisfaction with

### Table 11.2  Summary statistics on independent and control variables

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVERAGE VALUES</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare performance</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive mobilization</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the economy</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the government</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing differences in income levels</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENTAGES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (paid work)</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
welfare performance, differences across time are small at the aggregate level, but the standard deviations (\(sd\)) suggest some variation around the average. Still there are differences between countries, for while in Portugal the trend of satisfaction is relatively flat, in Spain it is downward, thus suggesting greater convergence between perceived and actual welfare performance among the Spanish (see Table 11.2). In terms of cognitive mobilization, citizens have become more interested in politics and exposed to it over the years in both countries, and levels of interpersonal trust stayed more or less the same – even though much greater in Spain than in Portugal. Furthermore, it is in Portugal that more people agree that “the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”, particularly during the crisis. As for the other control variables, the Spanish have more years of education and higher income levels than the Portuguese, while levels of radicalism are very low in both countries (in Portugal polarization increased slightly after the crisis and in Spain at the peak of the crisis).

RESULTS

Starting with the first set of regressions, presented in Tables 11.3 and 11.4, the results give support to hypothesis 1. Across the models estimated, citizens’ satisfaction with welfare performance is positively and significantly correlated with political trust (the exception is Portugal 2012). The moderating variable – cognitive mobilization – also reaches significant effects, with higher levels of cognitive mobilization engendering higher levels of political trust. Regarding the main control variables, interpersonal trust is a significant predictor of political trust, thus supporting the culturalist perspective that trust is embedded in norms and values that citizens acquire outside the political sphere and throughout the socialization process. Additionally, the conventional explanation that trust is a matter of how well institutions perform is also corroborated: the greater the satisfaction with the economy and the government’s record, the higher the level of popular trust in political institutions. The other variables considered in the model show little or no effect at all on political trust.

For a clear idea of the effects of welfare performance on political trust, adjusted predictions are presented in Figures 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4. This gives us the predicted value of trust as welfare performance goes from being evaluated
Table 11.3 Determinants of political trust in Portugal: the effect of welfare performance assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare performance</td>
<td>0.20(0.03)***</td>
<td>0.04(0.03)</td>
<td>0.18(0.03)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive mobilization</td>
<td>0.34(0.08)***</td>
<td>0.16(0.06)**</td>
<td>0.44(0.07)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>0.07(0.02)**</td>
<td>0.11(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.07(0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the economy</td>
<td>0.34(0.03)***</td>
<td>0.44(0.03)***</td>
<td>0.32(0.03)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the government</td>
<td>0.02(0.01)**</td>
<td>0.00(0.01)</td>
<td>0.01(0.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing differences in income levels</td>
<td>-0.06(0.07)</td>
<td>-0.07(0.07)</td>
<td>-0.11(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>-0.07(0.10)</td>
<td>-0.23(0.10)*</td>
<td>-0.27(0.12)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>0.01(0.02)</td>
<td>0.00(0.01)</td>
<td>0.05(0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.14(0.03)***</td>
<td>0.09(0.03)**</td>
<td>-0.02(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (Paid work)</td>
<td>-0.14(0.13)</td>
<td>-0.13(0.12)</td>
<td>-0.25(0.13)+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>0.07(0.05)</td>
<td>-0.02(0.04)</td>
<td>0.05(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.57(0.46)</td>
<td>-0.05(0.44)</td>
<td>-0.38(0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
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<td>972</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R-squared</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: significant at +p<0.1 *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

as “extremely bad” (0) to “extremely good” (10), while all other variables are centred at their mean. Taking one year at a time, in 2008 (at the start of the economic crisis) the average value of trust when welfare performance is considered bad (0) is of 1.9 in Portugal and 2.3 in Spain (Figure 11.2). However, when the highest level of satisfaction with welfare performance is reached (10) the average value of political trust is 5 in Spain and 3.9 in Portugal. The effect of welfare performance on political trust then falls substantially in 2012, in both countries, and especially in Portugal, where the effect is not significant (as the flat line, and larger cIs, of Figure 11.3 show). In Spain the average political trust is of 1.5 at the lowest levels of satisfaction with welfare performance and reaches 3 at the highest levels of satisfaction. In Portugal levels of trust move from 1.9 to 2.2 from the lowest to the highest point of the
Table 11.4  Determinants of political trust in Spain: the effect of welfare performance assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare performance</td>
<td>0.27(0.03)***</td>
<td>0.17(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.23(0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive mobilization</td>
<td>0.43(0.07)***</td>
<td>0.26(0.05)***</td>
<td>0.22(0.06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>0.19(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.12(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.14(0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the economy</td>
<td>0.33(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.39(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.31(0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the government</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.02(0.01)**</td>
<td>0.02(0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing differences in income levels</td>
<td>-0.01(0.05)</td>
<td>-0.12(0.05)*</td>
<td>-0.09(0.05)+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>-0.24(0.09)**</td>
<td>-0.19(0.09)*</td>
<td>0.04(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>0.00(0.01)</td>
<td>0.01(0.01)</td>
<td>0.02(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.03(0.02)+</td>
<td>0.01(0.02)</td>
<td>-0.03(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (Paid work)</td>
<td>0.05(0.11)</td>
<td>-0.18(0.10)+</td>
<td>-0.40(0.11)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>0.11(0.03)**</td>
<td>0.06(0.03)*</td>
<td>0.01(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-1.06(0.37)**</td>
<td>-0.16(0.34)</td>
<td>0.06(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>1382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R-squared</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: significant at +p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

welfare performance satisfaction scale (thus confirming no effect of the latter at all). In 2014, levels of trust are more similar between the two countries. In fact, at the worst evaluation of welfare performance the predicted value of trust is 1.7 in both countries. Trust then increases across the scale, reaching 3.9 in Spain and 3.5 in Portugal at the highest point of satisfaction with welfare performance (Figure 11.4).

Overall the results show that the levels of political trust in Spain are much more affected by evaluations on welfare performance than in Portugal, thereby confirming Hypothesis 2. Contrary to our expectations under Hypothesis 3, the impact of welfare performance perceptions at the peak of the crisis is lower than its effect before and at a later stage of the crisis. In the Portuguese case the effect is not even significant in 2012.
Figure 11.2  
*Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance (2008)*

![Graph showing adjusted predictions of political trust in Portugal and Spain as a function of welfare performance.](image_url)

Note: Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean.

Figure 11.3  
*Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance (2012)*

![Graph showing adjusted predictions of political trust in Portugal and Spain as a function of welfare performance.](image_url)

Note: Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean.
Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance (2014)

Now, to what extent is the effect of satisfaction with welfare performance on political trust influenced by citizens’ levels of cognitive mobilization? To answer this question we performed a second set of regression analyses in which an interaction term between welfare performance and cognitive mobilization was added to the models. Results are presented in the Appendixes A and B. Overall our previous results obtain confirmation as to the significant role of cultural and institutional variables on trust. Regarding the interaction term, the effects are more significant for Spain (especially in 2014) than they are for Portugal. This suggests that for Portuguese citizens the impact of their evaluations of welfare performance on political trust is comparatively less affected by how much interest they have in politics and the amount of information they consume. To better clarify these effects we calculated the adjusted predictions for the interaction term. In 2008 the interaction is not significant in either country; looking at Spain, the effect of satisfaction with welfare performance on political trust is very similar for those with higher and lower levels of cognitive mobilization. In Portugal the interaction coefficient is also nonsignificant, but an interesting pattern, which would disconfirm Hypothesis 4, is observable: the effect of welfare performance on trust is hardly visible for those with no cognitive mobilization; otherwise, this effect would be positive among those more informed and interested in politics.
A similar trend – i.e. nonsignificant effects – is observed in 2012, but the pattern observed for Portugal in 2008 is no longer present (Figures 11.5 and 11.6).

Finally, in 2014 the interaction term for Spain is significant. There are striking differences between those with no interest in politics or exposure to political news and those that, on the contrary, are very interested and exposed to the political world: while the latter progressively gain confidence in political institutions as they are more satisfied with welfare performance (with predicted values of trust rising from 1.7 to 3.5), the former follow a downward trend (Figure 11.7). Hypothesis 4 is therefore disconfirmed. Instead, in Portugal the two groups follow a similar trend, although more cognitively mobilized individuals tend to accord more trust to political institutions. Differences between the two groups stop being significant when the highest levels of satisfaction with welfare performance (that is, >7) are reached.

**Figure 11.5**

*Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance and cognitive mobilization (2008)*

Note: Adjusted Predictions with 90% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean. No mobilization = no exposure to news on politics and public affairs in the media and no interest at all in politics, High mobilization = higher exposure to news on politics and public affairs and higher interest in politics.
Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance and cognitive mobilization (2012)

Note: Adjusted Predictions with 90% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean. No mobilization = no exposure to news on politics and public affairs in the media and no interest at all in politics, High mobilization = higher exposure to news on politics and public affairs and higher interest in politics.

Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance and cognitive mobilization (2014)

Note: Adjusted Predictions with 90% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean. No mobilization = no exposure to news on politics and public affairs in the media and no interest at all in politics, High mobilization = higher exposure to news on politics and public affairs and higher interest in politics.
CONCLUSION

Citizens’ trust in political institutions is often seen as a barometer of democratic health. The last decade has witnessed a widespread skepticism and distrust in political institutions, particularly affecting representative political institutions and politicians in European democracies. This chapter sought to identify the sources of political (dis)trust in two countries that were profoundly affected by the Euro Zone crisis. Our main arguments were twofold. Firstly, that levels of trust were strongly influenced by citizens’ interactions and experiences with welfare institutions such as the education and healthcare systems. This matters because it is on the basis of these experiences (perceived as good, bad, fair, and unfair etc.) that citizens base their assessments of political institutions. Moreover, since in both countries there had been important reforms in welfare systems, especially during the crisis, it was likely that this could bear negatively on citizens’ levels of political (dis)trust. The second argument was that this effect would be weaker for those more cognitively mobilized. To test these arguments, we performed regression analyses before (in 2008), during (in 2012), and after the peak of the economic crisis (2014) using ESS data for Portugal and Spain.

The results gave support to most of our expectations and confirmed the main explanatory accounts in the literature (cultural and institutional explanations). A first set of results confirmed that there is a causal link between satisfaction with welfare performance and political trust: the higher the level of satisfaction with how health and education systems performed, the higher the level of trust. This was more evident in the case of Spain and also at the start (2008) and after the crisis peak (in 2014). In fact, in 2012, which we used as benchmark for the peak of the crisis, satisfaction with welfare performance had lighter (Spain) or no significant effect on political trust (Portugal). A possible explanation for the differences between Portugal and Spain might have to do with the extent to which the Portuguese citizens – more than the Spanish – were more prone to hold the European Union – rather the national executive – responsible for the crisis. This might have shielded representative political institutions from harsher appraisals of their performance during the crisis. The fact that welfare performance assessments mattered less at the peak of the crisis suggests that other competing/control variables, such as satisfaction with the economy and with the government, played a larger role in shaping citizens’ perceptions.
A second set of results disconfirmed our expectation that welfare performance would matter less for the more cognitively mobilized individuals in terms of shaping their levels of trust. The only instance in which there is a significant moderating effect of cognitive mobilization was in Spain in 2014, and the trend is opposite to our hypothesis: indeed, the impact of welfare performance assessment was stronger for those more cognitively mobilized. Therefore, it seems that if and when interest in politics and exposure to political information had an impact on the explanatory power of welfare assessments on political trust, this impact is positive, reinforcing and strengthening the ties between outcomes and trust. Additional research, namely focused on what it meant to be strongly exposed to political information during these years in Portugal and Spain (in terms of salience and framing of welfare issues), might shed additional light on this finding.

EDALINA RODRIGUES SANCHES
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
eranches@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-6007-3680

JOSÉ SANTANA PEREIRA
ISCTE-IUL and CIES-IUL
jose.santana.pereira@iscte-iul.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-1713-3710

ISABELLA RAZZUOLI
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
isabella.razzuoli@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-2693-267X
## Determinants of political trust in Portugal: the effects of welfare performance and cognitive mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare performance</td>
<td>-0.05(0.18)</td>
<td>-0.01(0.12)</td>
<td>0.25(0.11)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.64(0.84)</td>
<td>0.10(0.58)</td>
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<td>1.42(0.56)*</td>
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<td>0.03(0.94)</td>
<td>0.51(0.62)</td>
<td>1.80(0.56)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare performance * Cognitive mobilization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.25(0.18)</td>
<td>0.10(0.12)</td>
<td>-0.11(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.28(0.18)</td>
<td>-0.01(0.12)</td>
<td>-0.04(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.24(0.20)</td>
<td>0.05(0.13)</td>
<td>-0.08(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>0.07(0.02)**</td>
<td>0.11(0.02)**</td>
<td>0.06(0.03)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the economy</td>
<td>0.34(0.03)**</td>
<td>0.44(0.03)**</td>
<td>0.33(0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the government</td>
<td>0.02(0.01)**</td>
<td>0.00(0.01)</td>
<td>0.01(0.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing differences in income levels</td>
<td>-0.07(0.07)</td>
<td>-0.06(0.07)</td>
<td>-0.11(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>-0.07(0.11)</td>
<td>-0.22(0.10)*</td>
<td>-0.29(0.12)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.01(0.02)</td>
<td>0.00(0.01)</td>
<td>0.05(0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.15(0.03)**</td>
<td>0.09(0.03)**</td>
<td>-0.02(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (Paid work)</td>
<td>-0.15(0.13)</td>
<td>-0.15(0.12)</td>
<td>-0.28(0.13)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>0.07(0.05)</td>
<td>-0.03(0.04)</td>
<td>0.04(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
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<td>-0.45(0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
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<td>972</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R-squared</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: significant at +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Determinants of political trust in Spain: the effects of welfare performance and cognitive mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare performance</td>
<td>0.35(0.12)**</td>
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<td>-0.09(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.10(0.13)</td>
<td>0.03(0.09)</td>
<td>0.30(0.12)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.06(0.13)</td>
<td>0.08(0.09)</td>
<td>0.33(0.12)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.04(0.15)</td>
<td>0.13(0.10)</td>
<td>0.38(0.12)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare performance * Cognitive mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0.03(0.09)</td>
<td>0.30(0.12)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0.08(0.09)</td>
<td>0.33(0.12)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.04(0.15)</td>
<td>0.13(0.10)</td>
<td>0.38(0.12)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>0.19(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.12(0.02)***</td>
<td>0.14(0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Reducing differences in income levels</td>
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<td>-0.12(0.05)*</td>
<td>-0.10(0.05)+</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.18(0.09)*</td>
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<td>Occupation (Paid work)</td>
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<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
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<td>Adj R-squared</td>
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<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: significant at +p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Critical trends of citizen participation in policymaking. Insights from Portugal

Roberto Falanga
INTRODUCTION

Worldwide, citizenry mistrust in governments, governors, and international financial markets is posing great challenges to democracy. Disaffection grows against the spread of ethnic, political, and religious intolerance, paired by the rise of populist instances that threaten human and civil rights worldwide. Within this turbulent scenario attempts to recover the relationship between citizenry and political institutions have been urged by a wide range of agents having different financial and political influences over the state.

Mechanisms of citizen participation in policymaking have emerged as one of the instruments aimed at strengthening democracies. In the last three decades participatory processes have spread around the world, mainly in the form of participatory budgets. In this span of time, discourses and practices of citizen participation have changed while models of governance have been demanded to effectively adapt to the global scenario. Surprisingly, changes in citizens’ participation and their relations with the global political and financial framework have been weakly addressed by scholars. The intricate relationship between global agencies influencing national and local governments in the enactment of citizen participation is the object of analysis in this chapter.

To explore this issue, light will be shed on the convergence of international and transnational agencies on the promotion of a global citizen participation agenda that matches and reproduces some of the neoliberal values. The dissemination of participatory processes is approached from a critical perspective by pointing out three main trends emerging from this global convergence: the detachment of local participatory practices from global issues; the shift toward technocratic approaches in detriment to political-oriented practices; and the scarcity of evaluation in contrast to the mushrooming of pilots. In the second part of the chapter the expansion of citizen participation in Portugal will be analysed in light of this framework. Considering the high number of participatory processes currently implemented in the country and celebrated internationally, the discussion will contrast national evidence with the three global critical trends in citizen participation.
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: A CRITICAL APPROACH

Spaces for citizen participation in policymaking aim to create institutional channels for civil society to enhance the effectiveness of democratic governance (Cornwall 2004). While evidence shows that institutional designs (Smith 2009) and policy areas covered by participatory processes can vary considerably (Barnes et al. 2007; Gaventa and Barret 2010), the improvement of public policies and services is often pursued as a normative goal of democratic values’ enhancement. As such, participation is promoted as both instrument to solve problems in need of wider consensus, and empowering practice for civil society (Fiorino 1990). This ambition characterizes current discourses on participation, and recalls early practices in the United States between the 1960s and 1970s (Pateman 1970; Arnstein 1971; Rosenbaum 1976), as well as goals of policy effectiveness and social empowerment promoted in the 1980s, within international projects for poverty reduction, mostly funded by the World Bank (wb) in developing countries (White 1996; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Brown 2004).

The initiation of participatory budgeting in Latin America at the end of the 1980s should be considered as a third historical phase for citizen participation and a milestone of ongoing dissemination. In emphasizing goals of economic redistribution and administrative reforms, participatory budget in Porto Alegre shined a light on the need for social justice and state reform in Brazilian cities (Avritzer 2006). The success of the Porto Alegre model relied on a complex institutional design of representative (via citizen delegates) and direct citizen participation at multiple levels, and was actively pushed forward by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) in local authorities as well as, from 2002 to 2016, in the federal government.¹

Meanwhile, after the “Washington Consensus” was agreed by the wb and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1980s, the UN and OECD were also converging, together with the wb, on the importance of participatory programmes as a device to improve new models of governance worldwide. Phenomena of growing electoral abstention and mistrust toward political institutions became evident throughout the 1990s, and the fall of traditional

¹ In Porto Alegre, the decentralization of decision-making power was accompanied by, inter alia, the creation of “community facilitators” in every local administrative department, and the institution of a new municipal council of the budget (Smith 2009; Baiocchi and Ganiuza 2016).
participation in associative groups and unions challenged the legitimacy of political institutions in the EU (EU, 2001). Against this backdrop, between the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, not only did participatory budgeting raise the enthusiasm of post-communist parties and alter-globalist activists in the World Social Forums, but also international and transnational agencies sensed the appeal that citizen participation had for the promotion of the new governance model (EU 2001; UNDESA 2008; OECD 2001; 2009).

The promotion of new governance models in the late 1990s was consistent with an emerging conception of civil society as the new “stakeholder” of the public good (DeLeon 1992; Dryzek 2010). This conception relied on the need to shift from a vision of citizens as customers, rather than mere beneficiaries of the State, supported by new public managerial oriented reforms between the 1980s and the 1990s (Bryson et al. 2014). New governance compelled the adoption of new values and mechanisms seeking to decrease hierarchical and bureaucratic blueprints and enhance the inclusion of private and social actors in decision-making. The transference of public competencies in decision-making to civil society meant including market-driven and not-for-profit agencies on the supply-side of policies on behalf of the state or in partnership with it. The repositioning of civil society between the “global market” and the “minimal state” (Bailey and Pill 2011; Eder 2014) challenged democratic governance, as private and public actors were now called upon to rethink forms of corporatist bargaining with the state (Balbona and Bebega 2015).

The recognition of citizens as owners of civic knowledge and rights made a case in point on the opportunity to include them in decision-making (Roberts 2002). The promotion of consultative mechanisms with civil society, as a way to ensure broader consensus on policy solutions, lowered criticisms against consumeristic drifts of new public management reforms and prepared the ground for a new participation-centred discourse (Barnes et al. 2007; Bryson et al. 2014). The change in discourses and practices of citizen participation within the current political and financial framework suggests that the intricate relation between global agencies and states should be understood in light of the convergence of opposite narratives – that of the radical left in the World Social Forums and that of WB, European Union (EU), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and United Nations (UN) – started at the end of the 1990s and 2000s (Dagnino 2004; Leal 2010; Lee 2015).
Some scholars viewed the incorporation of citizen participation in the new governance model as the strategy to decrease the countervailing discourse on social injustice and state inefficacy, in favour of political institutions’ (re)legitimization (Sintomer 2005). This shift led to the conceptualization of participation as a device for good governance, which opened the doors to the reinforcement of values of effectiveness and efficiency. However, according to some thinkers, it essentially meant branding the neutralization of political spaces in the name of neoliberalism (Cornwall 2004; Linke 2009; Hoppe 2011; Moini 2011). According to Jessop (2002), the evidence that citizen participation was used to compensate for the inadequacies of the global market is that it escaped from questioning the rules of neoliberalism in the global market. This convergence was also seen as a strategy for further market deregulation (Mohan and Stokke 2000), and further depoliticization of communities’ struggles (Miraftab 2009). Inclusion of social actors in policymaking was seen as the way to legitimize elites’ interests, while concealing (hence making less accountable) decision-makers’ agendas (Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Hajer 2003).

The incorporation of participation into the neoliberal script recalls the convergence of multiple agents of transformation. National and local administrators have shown different degrees of ownership and autonomy in designing participation, as also transnational and international agencies should not be considered as monolithic in their attitude (Boughton 2003; Nielson et al. 2006; Goldfrank 2012). Acknowledging the complex and multi-scale frame of participatory practices enacted worldwide, as well as the good results that many of them have achieved in terms of policy enhancement and/or democratic empowerment, the next sections focus on critical trends from the convergence of neoliberalism and citizen participation.

CRITICAL TRENDS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:
AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

The influence of international and transnational agencies on the implementation of a neoliberalism-friendly version of citizen participation has led to the emergence of critical trends. Scientific literature highlights a broad range of issues, and the following sections explore three main trends: the way the local scale favours the detachment of citizenship from global issues; the growth of technocratic approaches in contrast to ambitions of political change; and the scarcity of evaluation against the burgeoning of accountable pilots.
LOCAL PARTICIPATION

Recent data show that global population is increasingly concentrated in urban contexts and that cities currently contain more than half of the world population (un 2014). Global cities are repositioned on a highly competitive landscape as they are the outpost of financial, political, and social strategies driven by international finance (Bailey and Pill 2011), while demanded to strengthen democratic values and mechanisms. Local authorities are called upon to effectively act on issues that, in several cases, reflect and reproduce global forces. Whenever demanded to engage, local communities are also requested to be flexible, self-empowering, and proactive in solving issues, although these often exceed their actual capacity to tackle them (Jessop 2002; Swyngedouw et al. 2002; De Vries 2016).

The promotion of new urban agendas oriented toward the engagement of local communities within a framework in which international finance has a key role in influencing democracy posits great challenges. Criticism in this field of study says that local participation is often detached from wider discussion and understanding of the global order, or even minimizes the effects of neoliberalism on local democracy. Participatory practices tend to narrow deliberation around technical, and more often than not, short-term issues (Moini 2011). The “insulation” from the global framework is functional to reduce and neutralize the potential of conflict in decision-making (Mohan and Stokke 2000). This neutralization is often supported by discursive devices aimed at individualizing responsibilities (i.e. local agents are put at the centre of the arena with little provision of information on entrenching interests from other spheres of decision) and “romanticize” community life (i.e. social, demographic, and economic diversity of local communities is disguised as homogenous).

TECHNOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

The opening of wider margins to interest and organized groups has provided citizen participation with powerful symbols of public legitimacy. After the Porto Alegre participatory budget was lauded as best practice by un Habitat in 1996, the international debate shifted the focus from goals of state reform and social justice to procedures and technical arrangements for citizen participation (Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012). This shift was broadly supported by local actors (Linke 2009) and, likewise, the globalization of participation technology and packaging amplified this trend.
Transnational and international agencies have led the dissemination of techniques and tools, while supporting knowledge transfer among practices. From a critical perspective, the spreading of recommendations and toolkits for good participation has been one of the most impactful neoliberal strategies in this domain (Chavez 2008). Their role has helped to dilute the political orientation of citizen participation toward goals of social justice and state reform, toward a neoliberalism-friendly version. This shift is critically addressed by Leal (2010) in these terms: “[o]nce purged of all the threatening elements, participation could be re-engineered as an instrument that could play a role within the status quo, rather than one that defied it” (Leal 2010, 95).

Participation technology and packaging has often overemphasized the adoption of the right tools and techniques in detriment to critical reflection on societal change. The rhetoric of “easy” consensus building between local backers with the poor and marginal sectors of society has often shadowed social conflict. On this, Cornwall (2008) says that “although the term itself evokes a warm ring of inclusion, ‘participatory’ processes can serve to deepen the exclusion of particular groups unless explicit efforts are made to include them” (Cornwall 2008, 277). This point is corroborated by Brown (2004), who warns about the trivialization of participatory methods into the sequence of neutral brainstorming, in which major stakeholders are invited to “easily” agree on their interests (Brown 2004).

**Non-evaluated Participation**

Evidence on the effectiveness of participatory processes continues to be scattered and the debate on criteria and measures remains almost nonexistent. Scarcity of scientific debate and practice of evaluation in this domain is often linked to the hurdle for rigorous and comparable evaluation before the complexity of the concept and the multiplication of forms through which participation can be implemented in different contexts. As Carpentier (2016) summarizes “[t]he abundance of concepts involved (and invoked) in participatory processes produce a level of analytical complexity that is hard to cope with, also from a researcher’s perspective” (Carpentier 2016, 77). Another reason behind the scarcity of evaluation calls upon trends to hide political agendas behind the rhetoric of democratic innovations (Rosener 1978). More pointedly, citizen participation has often become the instrument for political, economic, and social elites to reinforce predefined agendas with renewed legitimacy.
If evaluation is scarce, the dissemination of participatory processes continues to grow, together with the “market” of professionals and experts, often supported (or hired) by international institutions (Lee 2015). The multiplication of one-off local practices that barely provide comparable evidence of effectiveness deserve suspicion (Mosse 2001; Lee 2015; Bouchard 2016). The “pivotal” age of participation has been accompanied by a general lack of evaluation and, more in general, institutional frameworks in favour of temporary agreements and covenants. The lack of institutionalized relations between deliberative procedures, representative bodies, and their standard processes of decision-making and evaluation should not be underestimated (Hoppe 2011). Dependence on political willingness and, hence, on turnover and timings imposed by electoral cycles is likely to be exacerbated without institutional embeddedness.

PORTUGAL: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Public decision-making and the economic system in Portugal are essentially organized through national and local authorities. This binary system oversees regional intermediation, confirming historical state centralization and control over national economics (Teles 2016). Whereas mechanisms of direct democracy are issued by law, participatory democracy principles are presented in the national Constitution in support of representative and direct democracy (art. 2,9/c, 263-265, 266, 270). At the local level, representative democracy mechanisms are coupled by opportunities for citizens to directly voice into decision-making via referendums, forms of direct consultation with the municipal assemblies, local association, and civic lists (De Sousa and Maia 2017).

The engagement of civil society in the design and implementation of public policies recasts some paramount initiatives experienced in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution, such as the “Serviço de Apoio Ambulatório Local – saal” led by architects and citizens between 1974 and 1976 for the collective design of social housing. Whereas the last 30 years witnessed the slow decrease of grassroots self-organization, the recent success of participatory budgets and the like has been counter trending. Implemented from the mid-2000s on (Dias 2013), and despite degrees of discontinuity in space and time (Alves and Allegretti 2012), the expansion of participatory processes in Portugal is today
distinguished at the international level. The country currently hosts more than 180 initiatives distributed between municipalities and parishes, which is the highest rate in the world when considering the ratio between processes with the 308 municipalities and 3092 parishes. Along with this, the implementation of the national participatory budget in 2017, allocating 3 million euros for the participation of citizens, and its second edition in 2018 with an increased amount of 5 million euros, further marks a world record for Portugal.²

Since the mid-2000s the growth of citizen participation in policymaking has become a case in point in Portugal, Spain, and Italy (Font et al. 2014). These countries were especially affected by the recent financial crisis and, against risks of contagion, the Portuguese government agreed on the provision of a bailout package of 78 million euros under the supervision of IMF, EC, and European Central Bank (ECB). The intervention of the “Troika” was argued to reflect the high vulnerability of the country to the effects of the global crisis. The three mainstream parties – Socialist Party (PS), Social Democratic Party (PSD), and Popular Party (CDS-PP) – agreed to consolidate domestic finances and improve international competitiveness.³ The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Portugal was preceded in 2010 by the attempt of the socialist government led by José Sócrates to pass austerity measures, which led to a u-turn from expansionary and countercyclical fiscal measures (Accornero and Pinto 2018; De Giorgi et al. 2015). Between 2011 and 2014 the implementation of the economic adjustment programme under the MOU imposed significant pro-cyclical fiscal consolidation measures, in line with the bailouts provided to other countries in the same period (Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Spain).

Compared to countries like Spain and Greece, social mobilization against the austerity in Portugal was weaker and, according to Caldas (2012), characterized by increasing alienation from the political class, perceived as corrupt and dishonest.

² In 2017 an additional national measure was launched for the young sector of society: the National Youth Participatory Budget, implemented between October and December with a share of 300,000 euros, and similar guiding rules to the NPB (www.opjovem.gov.pt).
³ The package, with an EU-share of 52 billion euros, represented the third IMF intervention in Portugal (the first in 1979 and the second in 1983), and was aimed at recovering low economic growth, high levels of public debt, and international competitiveness. The assistance was made conditional on the implementation of policy reforms, internally monitored by the special governmental unit ESAME. The programme included overruns on goods and services, with tax hikes and salary cuts for public servants, including a two-year suspension of 13th and 14th monthly wages and pensions eventually revoked by the Constitutional Court.
Moury and Standring (2017) explain that alienation of grassroots movements and self-organized groups, especially of professional bodies, occurred because austerity was presented as a *fait accompli*, with narrow margins for revision. This alienation exacerbated the negative outlook on longstanding trends of disaffection toward political representatives and institutions in the country (De Sousa et al. 2014). Notwithstanding that, social protests and strikes increased during the peak of the crisis between 2011 and 2012, with both direct and indirect support of labour unions and political parties at the far end of the left spectrum.\(^4\) Mobilizations managed to attract public interest over large payroll tax increases, some of which were eventually suspended.\(^5\)

Trust toward national policymakers was progressively eroded during the implementation of the adjustment programme (IMF, 2015; EC, 2016). Data from the Eurobarometer show that between 2012 and 2013 trust in EU and positive influence for national economy decreased tremendously (ec.europa.eu/comfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_first_en.pdf). Negatively affected by the rise of the value added tax, discontent also spread among business sectors, and within party ranks of both government coalition and opposition. The major mainstream party of the opposition, the PS, decided to stop supporting the government in 2012 by voting against amendments to the 2012 budget and the 2013 budget, at a time when pools on voting intentions gave it an edge over the coalition (De Giorgi et al. 2015). Additionally, the Constitutional Court played a key role in legitimizing distrust and discontent, as several measures were forced to be suspended, such as the Labour Code amendments in 2013 (Decision 602/2013), followed by the Law 27/2014, though that came into force despite the opposition of the labour unions (Cardoso and Branco 2017).

Against this backdrop, IMF and EC stress that the programme should have been better understood and communicated by the national government (IMF 2016). While the communication strategy was failing to gain broader social support, researchers made it clear that the government was keen to

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\(^4\) For instance, in 2012 the University of Coimbra created the *Observatório sobre crises e alternativas* (www.ces.uc.pt/observatorios/crisalt), and in the same year civil society launched the *Congresso Democrático das Alternativas* composed of, *inter alia*, trade unions’ members, left-wing militants, and supporters of social movements (www.congressoalternativas.org/).

\(^5\) Different approaches to the programme led to the approval of Law 23/2012 reforming the Labour Code under the tripartite agreement with UGT, historically linked to mainstream parties, and the opposition of the main labour union CGTP, historically linked to the communist party, calling for general strike.
persuade society on the need for austerity. The TINA (There Is No Alternative) rhetoric, abundantly adopted by government leaders, was supported by a rich repertoire of arguments shifting blame to both previous administrations and external factors (Fonseca and Ferreira 2015; Moury and Standring 2017). The goal seemed to be that of strengthening its position in the domestic arena and enlarging power of discretion to pass policies hard to be approved otherwise (Cardoso and Branco 2017).

Government strategy, however, resulted in a confidence drop-off vis-à-vis dramatic socioeconomic conditions, rising unemployment (especially among high-profile skilled people), and young generations’ flows of migration (De Sousa et al. 2014). Alienation from the political sphere reached the highest abstention rates since 1979 in the 2013 local elections (47.4 %), preceded by 41.9% in 2011 and followed by 44.1% of abstention in 2015 in legislative elections. De Sousa and Maia (2017) show that abstention was positively associated with lower socioeconomic resources and educational skills. In this sense, the crisis exacerbated the exclusion of the most vulnerable groups from having influence in public decision (OECD, 2015).

Although mobilizations were perceived as a legitimized way to dissent, scepticism persisted and protests were often perceived as controlled by labour unions and political parties (Observatory for the Quality of Democracy report 2012: www.oqd.ulisboa.pt). As a matter of fact, labour unions were key in the organization of protests and the four general strikes called between 2010 and 2013, as their influence is argued to have limited the affirmation of international claims and connections (Baumgarten 2013). Borders between institutional and non-institutional spheres often blur as activism and politics share, on occasion, the same actors (Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2018). This condition made Portuguese society’s reaction to the crisis different from

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6 The negative outlook in the evaluation of democratic governance and political representatives’ performance grew from 2007 and plunged to critical rates in 2012 (De Sousa et al. 2014; Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2018). The Observatory for the Quality of Democracy Report 2012 shows that the role of European Union and international corporative agencies was extensively criticized as it was seen to interfere with popular sovereignty. Recognition of national corporative groups and labour unions as legitimate partners in political dialogue equally decreased with the general public opinion on their role in the face of the crisis (Balbona and Begega 2015).

7 The Gini coefficient remained stable around 34% between 2009 and 2014, as social and economic inequality showed severe growth (the extremes of the normal distribution identifying the poorer and the richer were further distanced), and existing asymmetries gained new strength (Rodrigues et al. 2016).
the disruption of movements and anti-system parties in Spain and Greece. Political parties in Portugal rather tended to incorporate some of the instances claimed by the movements, advancing slow institutional changes and political strategies with few shocks for the system (Afonso et al. 2015).

At the end of the 3-year adjustment programme, Portugal was considered a case of success by IMF, EC, despite the lack of enthusiasm in civil society. Indeed, the national elections in 2015 expressed the will to reverse the austerity agenda, as its efficacy continues to be questioned at its heart by economists and experts. While IMF recognizes much “fatigue” in the implementation of the programme, data show that the rise of unemployment and poverty exceeded what had been anticipated in the MOU (OECD, 2015). According to some scholars, recessionary effects were influential in securing the neoliberal political agenda imposed by banks and financial institutions, which eventually affected welfare regimes in all Southern European member states in a way that could not be obtained by democratic means (Caldas 2012). These conditions not only broke with corporatist traditions in these countries (Balbona and Begega 2015) but also interrupted secular trends of greater equality and inclusion (Perez and Matsaganis 2017).

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PORTUGAL: RECORD-BREAKING LEVELS

Social mobilization at the peak of the crisis framed within disaffection toward decision-makers had a unique political momentum in Portugal, little connected by the growth of citizen participation in policymaking, though. The adoption of institutional designs deliberately seeking to engage individuals rather than organized and grassroots groups characterized the diffusion of participatory budgets in the country. While austerity was being implemented, however, neither permeability of the arenas nor forms of erruption occurred within these processes. In Spain, on the contrary, participatory processes

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8 The Post-Programme of Surveillance was initiated when Portugal exited the adjustment programme in May 2014 in order to monitor economic, fiscal, and financial policies until at least 75% of the financial assistance received was repaid. Reports of this programme stress weaknesses in labour market, public administration, and judicial system inter alia. The programme also critically observes the reverse of some previous reforms, such as the return to the 35 hour working week in civil service; the increase of public employment via new hiring policies; the reduction of VAT for food at restaurants; backtracking in reforming state-owned enterprises, and concessions negatively affecting the capacity to attract foreign direct investment.
opened space to self-organized groups and mass mobilizations, eventually contributing to the formation of new antagonist political subjects (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2016). Likewise, institutional designs in the country tended to encourage individual skills to network and campaign in favour of their ideas in the participatory budgets. These mechanisms may have impaired great participation from the most vulnerable sectors of society, often lacking the necessary resources to have an effective voice in decision-making.

The adoption of institutional designs promoting the engagement of individuals and their capacity to compete with other ideas characterized the diffusion of participatory budgeting in the country. While Latin American practices inspired a first generation of participatory processes in the early 2000s, the initiation of the participatory budget in Lisbon between 2007 and 2008 opened to a massive dissemination in Portugal. The first generation was characterized by consultative mechanisms in small cities, as in the case of the participatory budget of Palmela in 2002 (Sintomer 2005; Sintomer and Allegretti 2009). The empowering discourse promoted by the Brazilian Workers’ Party on social justice and state reform was generally replaced by a more paternalistic attitude at this stage (Sintomer and Allegretti 2009). The participatory budget of Lisbon opened an historical phase in which citizen participation was endorsed by both left and right political parties’ local agendas (yet with noticeable prevalence for PS-led governments), and individuals were put at the centre of decision-making, with power of proposing and voting.

The Lisbon process allocated 5 million euros for citizen participation until 2012, dropping to 2.5 million euros due to budgetary cuts. Dias (2008) defined this deliberative model as “competition of ideas”. Citizens were put at the centre of the process and invited to propose (and vote for) ideas on a one-to-one basis: one citizen, one proposal, and one or more votes. The model clearly relied on the capacity that each citizen had to network and campaign to increase the chances of single projects to be voted on, funded, and implemented. This model has been replicated by most of the municipalities in Portugal, and only a few exceptions have adopted different models of deliberation. In Cascais, for example, citizens are requested to deliberate in public assemblies by shortlisting the proposals to be voted on and imposing

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9 The participatory budget in Lisbon was acknowledged by UN-Habitat in 2009 (Cabannes 2009) and OECD in 2010 (OECD 2011, 216) as an effective democratic innovation, and in the same year the Eurocities organization shortlisted this PB as a notable participatory practice (website: http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/eurocities-awards/awards2009).
the rule of negotiation in round-tables (and reducing the list of proposals to be voted on).\textsuperscript{10} In Lisbon, other municipal practices have challenged the model of ideas’ competition and promoted local partnerships’ participation, as in the case of the BipZip.\textsuperscript{11} All in all, the few existing variations to the one-to-one model prove that it continues to be the main reference in the country, as it also was recently adopted in the scaling up of the national participatory budget.

The National Participatory Budget (NPB) was launched as a pillar of the socialist party programme leading the government in coalition with the communist party (PCP) and the left bloc (BE) (Art. 3, Law 42/2016) from 2015. NPB was designed to promote: (i) the quality of democracy; (ii) active and informed participation; (iii) economic and social cohesion (\textit{Diário da República} n.º 21/2017, Série I de 2017-01-30). In the first edition (2017) citizen proposals were made in the 50 local meetings organized by the leading team throughout the country between January and April. Proposals were required to identify the scale of implementation, either national (i.e. involving more than one region) or regional (i.e. involving more than one municipality)\textsuperscript{12}, while policy areas included: culture, science, education and adult learning, agriculture, justice, public administration (the last two only in the two autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores). After the analysis of the proposals according to predefined criteria, 38 winning projects that had been voted on (via both online platform and SMS), were publicly presented in September 2017.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} The participatory budget in Cascais was recently recognized as a best practice by the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (www.fiscaltransparency.net/blog_open_public.php?IdToOpen=5408) and an extensive outlook on its outputs was published in the same year (www.cm-cascais.pt/sites/default/files/anexos/ge_raiz/new/2017_op_livro_ingles_final.pdf).

\textsuperscript{11} The BipZip programme provides a share of around 2 million euros per year on an open competition basis for NGOs and citizens’ groups to design and implement urban regenerative projects in critical areas of the city (www.bipzip.cm-lisboa.pt). It was recognized as best participatory practice in 2013 by the International Observatory for Participatory Democracy (www.oidp.net).

\textsuperscript{12} Regions were distinguished in mainland – North, Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley (AML), Alentejo, Algarve – and autonomous – Madeira and Azores. The amount of 3 million euros was distributed into 375,000 euros for national projects; 375,000 euros for regional projects; and 375,000 euros for the two autonomous regions (Azores and Madeira).

\textsuperscript{13} Proposals could not address infrastructure building; support private service delivery; contravene the national government coalition programme nor the implementation of specific public policies; be technically unattainable; be impossible to translate into a concrete project; exceed a 200,000 euros budget per project.
For gaining an overview of participatory processes in Portugal today, updated information provided by public authorities is scarce and fragmentary (e.g. it is difficult, and often impossible, to obtain information about the sociodemographic definition of publics and the policies implemented for each process). Despite the impressive number of processes implemented in the country, and the recent implementation of the NPB, few data are available on their performance and outputs, and scientific literature is surprisingly limited on these topics.

The national observatory of participation created by the project Portugal Participa: Caminhos para a Inovação Societal (www.portugalparticipa.pt/Monitoring) can be considered as the main source in this field, as it permits visualizing local processes according to: (i) typology (participatory budget; participatory platform; open presidency; referendum; municipal transparency); (ii) phase (ongoing; suspended; and concluded); and (iii) local authorities. A web search conducted in August 2017 on participatory budgets and participatory platforms resulted in 186 ongoing and 38 suspended participatory budgets, finding only 8 participatory platforms implemented (i.e. practices concerning the involvement of citizens in specific policy areas). These processes occur mainly at the municipal level (around 80%), including a high percentage of municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, while a relatively small share is implemented by parish governments.

CRITICAL TRENDS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PORTUGAL

A critical discussion of citizen participation in Portugal should be made in light of the intricate relations between global agencies, national government, and local authorities in the last few years. Critical reflection should be able to explore the influence that transnational and international agencies have had on the spread of participatory processes and their growth during the implementation of the austerity agenda.

The relation between local and global actors of citizen participation can be looked at through the micro-sociological articulation of discourse and practices. The attention paid by some agencies like the UN and the OECD on Portuguese participatory budgets has been extensive since the outset of the participatory budget in Lisbon. This relation implied neither fiscal nor explicit political intervention in the processes, although the role of these agencies in shaping a common discourse on citizen participation cannot be underestimated.
On the one hand, practices have been awarded for complying with global standards that define what is currently considered as a good practice in citizen participation. On the other, the celebration of their success has most likely reinforced the legitimacy of global discourse (and agents), helping generate expectations and new scenarios, both inside and outside Portugal.

The action of local practitioners, researchers, and social actors is also key to characterize the relation between global and local agents. The opportunities looked for by local agents and opened by international institutions in terms of funding has led to the dissemination of research and/or social innovation-oriented projects on citizen participation since the mid-2000s. Acknowledging the autonomy of research agendas and work-plans of these projects, it is worth highlighting their role in feeding public interest and, on occasion, training public servants and decision-makers in citizen participation. It is emblematic that the national network of municipalities adopting citizen participation (Rede de Autarquias Participativas) was created under one of these projects (Portugal Participa: Caminhos para a Inovação Societal), confirming that neither international funding nor political representatives, third sector, or academia can be taken as an isolated factor in this analysis.

The international endorsement of citizen participation in Portugal started before the peak of the crisis, passed through it, and continues until today. Apart from cuts in some participatory budgets, citizen participation survived almost undisturbed by the turbulent crisis scenario. One of the reasons why the number of processes grew could be related to cuts and reorganization of local authorities under the mou (Green Paper on Local Administration Reform and the Law 22/2012). The requirement to review public spending in efficient ways probably drove some local authorities to see participation as an available device to convene on public priorities and minimize risks of

14 The “Participatory Budgeting Portugal” project (“Orçamento Participativo Portugal”), funded by the equal Community Initiative in 2008, was one of the first projects in this field under the leadership of national academia and third sector (www.op-portugal.org). These partnerships have become key in other projects, as in the recent European Union-funded “Empatia” (www.empatia-project.eu) and the eea grants-funded project “Portugal Participates: roads to societal innovation” (“Portugal Participa: caminhos para a inovação societal”) (www.portugalparticipa.pt).

15 The key measures for local authorities under the mou entailed reduction of administrative units; reduction of state grants (about 60% of local revenue); reduction of municipality staff by 2% in 2012 and 2013; decrease of the local debt; reduction of municipal-owned enterprises; new mechanisms for risk management control, reporting, and monitoring (Teles 2016).
decreasing public legitimacy. Nevertheless, far from representing a “merely” anti-austerity phenomenon, participation continued to grow after the end of the adjustment programme, as proved by recent data and the implementation of the NPB.

This said, why should the relation between international and transnational agencies with national and local decision-makers be considered as intricate? Focussing on the years of austerity, citizen participation, and the agenda imposed by the Troika seemed to work in parallel with little visible interaction or friction. Previous and concurring legitimization provided by project-funding, practice awards, and other forms of international recognition may have prevented these processes from being dramatically suspended by austerity-led retrenchment measures. However, neither did the Troika seem to consider the expansion of participation in the country as a threat or an opportunity, nor did participatory processes directly address the austerity to, for instance, reformulate their principles and mechanisms. Although Balbona and Begega (2015) argue that attempts were made to reinforce political dialogue with social partners on the austerity guidelines, Teles (2016) mentions that significant consultation with the associations of local authorities would have prevented opposing austerity measures as merely top-down imposed reforms. This evidence mirrors what White (1996) argued: “[i]f participation means that the voiceless gain a voice, we should expect this to bring some conflict. […] The absence of conflict in many supposedly ‘participatory’ programmes is something that should raise our suspicions” (White 1996, 15).

The virtual exclusion of austerity from participatory processes, and the absence of reference to opportunities and risks of citizen participation in the MOU should be understood in light of the convergence of global agendas discussed above. More pointedly, comparing critical trends of citizen participation with practices in Portugal, the next sections aim to explore the topic from a critical perspective. Focus on participatory budgets is motivated by their great dissemination and openness in terms of policy areas and publics, which contrasts with either public or issue-based typologies of participation (e.g. the abovementioned participatory platforms, or the BipZip programme).

**LOCAL PARTICIPATION**

Regarding the first trend, the implementation of the NPB challenges is argued to be the reduction of participation on the local scale. While so, it is also worth
highlighting that neither formal nor informal connections exist between NPB and local processes, which means that citizen participation is both promoted and implemented separately on the two scales. In these terms, NPB recalls what Avritzer and Ramos (2016) define as a “weak” form of scaling up citizen participation, one that provides little articulation with local practices, and, hence, contributes little to the creation of a (new) national public sphere. The authors compare this typology to the multi-scale system of delegated and direct participation in Brazil. Acknowledging the challenges that such institutional design posits in terms of state reform, the implementation of the NPB raises some concern about its impact before the proliferation of local processes and, more broadly, on the possibility to reframe citizen participation through a multi-scale approach to policymaking. Without this effort, small interventions risk barely approaching – or even interfering with – current socio-political challenges.

TECHNOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Regarding the technocratic trends, hurdles created by the use of technical jargon in public communication, the growth of ICT as a privileged channel of information and participation, and/or the existence of architectural barriers in public meetings increasingly represent a concern for the design of these processes in Portugal. Efforts to identify accessible places for public meetings, as well as the diversification of communication strategies should be noted at both local and national levels. However, the systematic identification of goals of social inclusion and clear definition of their operationalization generally are lacking in participation covenants. Although participatory budgets often conceal enabling measures for the participation of the most vulnerable sectors of the society, risks of discretionary inclusiveness and/or self-organized lobbies are great. When participation is non-binding, the risk is to further exclude citizens with no access to public contention. This trend confirms what Baiocchi and Gauza (2016) argue about the increasing ambiguity regarding social justice in participatory budgeting worldwide. Given the critical outlooks on country-specific socioeconomic and educational indicators (OECD, 2015; EC, 2016; IMF, 2016), attention to the effective operationalization for higher inclusion of the groups at the margins of society should not be dismissed from a critical analysis of participation in Portugal.
NON-EVALUATED PARTICIPATION

A critical observation of the expansion of citizen participation in Portugal also raises concerns related to the paucity of accessible data about procedures and outputs. Beyond the responsibility of governments in providing little account on this, the trends discussed above further impair the establishment of a clear demand for accountability to sponsors. The “stepping back” of self-organized society from participatory arenas may have helped downgrade the formation of the demand of public accountability. Font et al. (2014) advocate that “the development of a participatory agenda in local government as the result of movements strongly directed from above without much connection to social pressures is probably correct for Southern Europe” (Font et al. 2014, 62). However, other agents may have played a role in this field. Apart from political representatives and civil servants, academics and practitioners (who had great influence in spreading values and mechanisms of citizen participation in the country) have helped little to enlarge the debate on the evaluation.

CONCLUSIONS

While in Portugal citizen participation in policymaking has offered a great chance to improve discussion on and practice of democracy at both local and national levels, critical reflection is needed in the light of the international socio-political framework. Blessed by international organizations, the growth of participatory processes continued despite the recent implementation of austerity measures imposed via the international agreement with the Troika. This suggests the existence of an intricate relationship between international and transnational agencies promoting the citizen participation agenda at the global level, and decision-makers in Portugal.

Even though the processes are being implemented on both local and national scales in Portugal, little data and little scientific debate exists on the phenomenon. The discussion provided in this chapter has sought to contrast evidence retrieved from the institutional designs of participatory processes, with focus on participatory budgets, with three critical trends: the detachment of local participatory practices from global issues; the shift toward technocratic approaches in detriment to political-oriented practices; and the scarcity of evaluation in contrast to the mushrooming of pilots.
In Portugal, regarding the first trend, although the implementation of the national participatory budget challenges international preference for local scale, the weak institutional articulation with the massive presence of local processes may impair goals of effective socio-political changes. About the second trend, models of deliberation focused on the capacity of the individuals to network and campaign without either intermediation or inclusion of organized groups may have favoured the emergence of self-organized lobbies. This dynamic may have had impacts on the participation of the most disadvantaged sectors of civil society, as principles and mechanisms did not directly address austerity as a major issue, and austerity did not seem to interfere with them either. Finally, the absence of evaluation from both local and national institutional designs further limits this reflection, given the lack of data about who is actually participating in these processes. It is expectable that critical assets for research on and accountability of these processes will be posited soon if trends of non-evaluation are not more consistently contested and reversed.

ROBERTO FALANGA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
roberto.falanga@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-1059-5509

§ REFERENCES


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Political consequences of socio-territorial conflicts.
Conceptualizing changing paths of citizenship and democratic governance in the Andean Region of Latin America

Gonzalo Delamaza
INTRODUCTION

Social conflict impinges on political systems and their dynamics in different ways. It has been studied by the theory of social movements, but only recently has it received more attention from researchers, previously more focused on its origins and dynamics. This chapter analyses socio-territorial conflicts — a type of conflict that is on the rise in countries in the Andean Region of Latin America. We suggest that socio-territorial conflicts have generated a different type of political outcome that has enabled citizen sectors formerly excluded from political expression to become increasingly visible. Until now, political outcomes have been considered to derive mainly from urban conflicts and have not normally been associated with socio-territorial conflicts. In turn, political expression had been the exclusive province of political parties and national organizations. However, things have changed in the new scenario of democratic governance, loss of State power and capacity, and neoliberal internationalization of the Latin American economies. The frontiers of “extractivism” in the Andean Region have expanded; socio territorial conflicts have spread all over the region; and the nature of the relation between social actors, politics, and the State is changing. In ways that are different from the past, local affairs now have political consequences, expanding the frontiers of citizenship and incorporating new social actors.

The relation between the crisis of the political and economic models and citizenship has acquired specific features in Latin America. In Europe, the adjustment policies applied to counter the economic crisis of 2009 resulted in the further dismantling of the Welfare State. In turn, this called into question European integration and the “globalizing consensus”, which had been hegemonic concepts in European politics in recent decades. In Latin America we must start from a different assumption, given the frequency of (economic) crises in this part of the world. The exhaustion of the developmentalist State economic model prompted deep neoliberal reforms that increased foreign dependence and transformed the political and social panorama. Although the Andean countries were able to outgrow military rule, the emerging democracies did not have the full capacity to install an effective regime of citizen participation, and thus lost legitimacy and support (Pinto and Flisfisch 2011). This was the triggering context for the emergence of different non-traditional actors that have modified their relationship with politics as they seek to conquer citizenship spaces and rights. How can we
interpret the political impact of these new forms of collective action? Do they have the actual ability to promote reforms and facilitate the inclusion of hitherto excluded sectors in new political deals?

This chapter analyses some of the political consequences of the socio-territorial conflicts, in relation to institutional changes and the implementation of public policies. It also focuses on the emergence of new political actors in the very same conflict territories. Its aim is to conceptualize this kind of phenomenon to improve our understanding of the current relationship between crisis and citizenship. It presents empirical evidence from four countries in the region (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Peru) and a general overview, to be dealt with in greater depth in future articles. The hypothesis of the chapter is that there have been important changes in the historical patterns of politicization prevailing in the region. They involve new political actors as well as new forms of political influence and new conflict venues (non-urban, peripheral); they keep their distance from political parties and formal organizations and have adopted diverse and heterogeneous processes of organization and mobilization (networks of articulation that do not constitute social movements and have different orientations in their midst). New ways of citizenship have emerged (as is the case of indigenous people, for example). Often invisible as these changes are, it is urgent to investigate them to improve our understanding of politics in a globalized world.

The chapter reflects on the way in which citizenship has evolved in the context of the crisis, with the specific characteristics of this in a part of Latin America. The crisis in its various dimensions creates large challenges to the way in which citizenship can be exercised. It involves new forms of relationship between political or social dimensions. Our approach is a comparative one, and intends to include a regional dimension -four countries- in the debate of the evolution of crises and changes in citizenship.

The chapter starts with a reflection on the historical and conceptual debate on social movements and politics in Latin America, seeking to show the particular nature and novelty of socio-territorial conflicts. The second section explores these conflicts in connection with the debate on “extractivism” and its intensification in the region, and identifies different approaches. This is followed by the conceptualization of the political consequences of these conflicts, a discussion on the methodological problems involved in their research, and finally some conclusions.
THE DEBATE ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

In the region, socio-economic changes and action by the State have prompted profound changes in the dynamics of collective action and its link to political changes. The dynamics of collective action and its connection with political changes have undergone numerous profound transformations in keeping with socio-economic changes and action by the State in the region. After the intense mobilizations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, several countries of the region experienced authoritarian regression and periods of violent repression. In Chile, in its early days, the military dictatorship imposed a new economic model characterized by an open economy, market deregulation, and the expansion of direct foreign investment in natural resources (French-Davis 2014). But in most of the other countries in the region economic transformation, to a greater or lesser extent, was to arrive via economic adjustment, the privatization of public companies, and the imposition of economic rules by international organizations. These changes were to have a significant effect on the exercise of citizenship and collective action (Pinto and Flisfisch 2011).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During the national-developmentalism stage, which started in the late 1920s in Latin America, the state expanded because of the imports-substitution economic model and the development of the national industry. Populist leaders encouraged the political mobilization of large hitherto excluded social sectors, especially, trade union movements. An actual welfare state was never established and productive development and social equity varied from country to country. It was during this period that the processes that called for the inclusion of formerly excluded social groups took place. Collier and Collier (2002, 17), analysed eight countries and classified these mobilizations into four types: by the State, by the electoral mobilization of traditional parties, labour populism, and radical populism.

During the 1960s and early 1970s there were different processes of political radicalization, which were interrupted by military coups (in Brazil and the Southern Cone), civil wars and violent armed conflicts (Central America, Colombia). Social movements became weaker, as did the national-populist movements that provided access to politics.
In the 1980s the neoliberal model implemented in Chile, profusely recommended by international organizations and systematized by the so-called Washington Consensus, began to spread through the region. The 1980s were also a decade of impoverishment of the population and scant economic growth (the “lost decade”) due to this structural adjustment. The democratic transition and the decline of authoritarian rule coincided with the implementation of this new model of state action and prevalence of direct foreign investment in natural resources.\footnote{The cases are different: old dictatorial and authoritarian political systems were modified (Paraguay, Mexico), but in general there is no returning to the usual military coups of the past, although authoritarianism increased in Peru, during the Fujimori administration, and in Paraguay and Guatemala. Many countries experienced the dismantling of the traditional political system, leading to periods of great instability (Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina). Colombia kept its traditional political system, but the state lost control over a large part of the territory due to confrontations with several guerrilla groups, which continued well into the 21st century.} It is worth noting that the new wave of political democracy was not accompanied by more inclusion and that the traditional pattern of inequality in the region remained unchanged.

By the end of the 20th century and the early 21st, the socio-economic and political evolution of the region gave rise to various national processes. A first group of countries (Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Chile) continued opening their economies based on neoliberal underpinnings, and implemented some compensatory social programmes. By contrast, a second group of countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) began a process of anti-neoliberal political re-foundation. Yet a third group underwent a somewhat milder and varied “left turn” process (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador) that has already come to an end.\footnote{Chile can also be classified within this third group because since 1990, it has been governed mostly by a centre-left coalition that tries to strengthen social reforms, alternating with right-wing governments that try to undo them (Barómetro de Política y Equidad 2017).} This period overlapped with a commodities boom, during which the price of raw materials increased, and the Latin American economies turned to exporting natural resources, exploited by foreign companies, mainly in the mining, oil, and power sectors.

The global crisis of 2009 did not hit Latin America quite as hard as other regions. In general, “in the South, the 2009 economic decline was not too steep, and recovery was more rapid. Growth projections by 2017 more than double those for the North” (ECLAC 2012, 6). The subsequent slowdown of the Chinese economy toned down the optimistic forecasts for 2012 because of its impact
on the prices of commodities, particularly, oil and copper, while food prices continued to increase. But even so, this had a milder effect on employment compared to other regions such as southern Europe. Also, growth recovered much faster than in the United States and some European countries.

Thus, Latin America’s longstanding dependence, which has weakened its development prospects, underwent a transformation in the last ten or fifteen years, which provided its countries with more resources to finance social policies and reduce poverty. However, these countries gradually lost control and sovereignty over non-renewable natural resources as the extractive frontier expanded. Common goods such as water, and biodiversity and the environment in general were affected. All of this triggered new social conflicts, arising not from institutional struggles between political projects or from the great national-popular movements, but from the new sectors that were affected by these changes. These shifts in the struggle to expand citizenship require a conceptual effort of understanding, since they are part of global change trends.

THE STUDY OF CONFLICTS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES

The weakening of the great social movements of the past, particularly trade union and peasant movements, has given rise to other forms of collective action and the “territorialization” or “localization” of social conflicts (Pleyers 2011b, 26). Therefore, it is important how these new dynamics are conceptualized. The unilateral emphasis on the disarticulation of national movements and the diversity of local spaces led some authors to see in this dynamic mainly the effect of neoliberal policies, the atomization of society, and the ineffectiveness of collective action (Gómez 2010). Others rather simply consider these events as nimby conflicts (Báez 2013, 101). The lack of fit of empirical dynamics with previous theoretical models originating in structuralist Marxism or in the

3 In 2016, ECLAC itself was forced to admit that since 2011 there had been a marked drop in international prices of raw materials (agricultural produce, metals, and oil), which had particularly affected South America, an exporter of this type of commodity. On the contrary, Central America had not been affected given that it is a net importer. There has been a slow expansion of global commerce and increased international financial uncertainty since the United Kingdom voted in favour of the Brexit option to withdraw from the European Union.

4 Bolivia is a particular case, as the State has regained control over mining and hydrocarbon exploitation. This has produced a significant increase in social spending, which, however, also operates to the detriment of common goods affected by this type of production.
formalism of analytic sociology prevents the easy definition of the new trends in collective action.

We suggest that these dynamics can also be analysed from the viewpoint of collective action and social movements theories (Tarrow 2011). This approach distinguishes between structure and actor, awarding relative autonomy to action, without considering it a mere effect of structural dynamics. As Chantal Mouffe put it, these are “decentered and detotalized” actors, originating in multiple individual standpoints not necessarily related, but which nevertheless, open the “possibility that this multiplicity may turn out to be the breeding place for antagonisms and thus become politicized” (Mouffe 1994, 86). According to such an approach, it is possible and necessary to determine the characteristics of these “localized” movements.

Thus, in the first place, the local dynamics of mobilizations responds to transformations in the economy and in the countries of the region. The reorientation of social policies from labour to local issues, the decentralization processes and the pluralization of actors, which involve non-governmental organizations, the outsourcing of services, the targeting of social programmes to specific groups, and other issues, play important roles (Pleysers 2011b; Delamaza 2014).

In the second place, it has to do with not only the pluralization of motives that originate social movement. This pluralization gave place to human rights, ecologist, feminist, and “new social movements” (Jelin 2003). This extension of the classic canons of sociology, such as Alain Touraine’s and Alberto Melucci’s, refers to the retraction of the state, and the greater political value that citizens assign to aspects of daily life, shared cultural experience, and other conflictive cleavages—all of which are further away from the previous mobilizing tradition or are simply invisible in the prevailing accounts and interpretations. However, the emergence and spread of what we call socio-territorial conflicts also confirm the politicization potential of collective action, given the particularity and fragmentation of the territories.

Thus, we do not look at socio-environmental territorial conflicts from a postmaterialist perspective that considers new sensitivities and concerns—new subjectivities—unrelated to the classic referents of the world of work and survival (Castells 2006). In the Latin American context, conflicts do not primarily originate in response to these subjectivities, but to actual pressures on the territory resources, which limit or destroy the economies and life quality of the local communities—the so-called “environmentalism of the poor” (Martínez Allier 2010; Folchi 2001). They are also classified as “cultural conflicts, arising
from problems derived from the use of natural resources and the deterioration in quality of the environment produced by specific actions by public, private, or both kinds of institutions” (Calderón 2012, 23). This conceptualization, however, places socio-environmental territorial conflicts in the same category as citizen security conflicts, and politico-ideological and human rights disputes (Calderón 2012). Such diversity forces cultural conflicts into a residual category and prevents them from being considered among the “big ones”, that is, social reproduction and institutional efficacy and efficiency conflicts.

Social movements theorists address an ample set of motivations, framings, repertoires, and steps into the political sphere. For the last ten years or so, attention has focused on “alterglobalizing” movements (Pleyers 2011a; Della Porta 2015), which go beyond national borders, disseminate via non-traditional means, and engage in confrontation with the global power centres. In addition, there are conflicts and mobilizations that have a local origin. These correspond to a different type of organization and mobilization and have different consequences in the political field.

The above setup has generated enthusiastic reactions, which see in the emerging social movements and the new sorts of territorial governance a way to overcome the many existing limitations. For this reason these movements have been regarded as open, flexible, pluralistic, and diversified networks (Abramovay 2006). However, in this assessment there is less empirical evidence than normative approaches to democratic territorial governance (Gomà and Blanco 2002; Cruz 2008). Above all, the underlying fact is that these movements confirm the loss of legitimacy and representational capability of the traditional institutions of the democratic system (Subirats 2006; Della Porta and Diani 2004). Empirical evidence in Latin America appears to indicate that these mobilizations not only respond to pressures on the territory and represent new forms of collective action, but also to the inability of the institutional systems to meet current demands for participation in decision-making about issues that affect them and the general orientation of society (Varas 2006).

APPROACHES TO SOCIO-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE EXTRACTIVIST BOOM

Most of the studies of socio-territorial conflicts are in one way or another related to the boom period of ore extraction as the pillar of economic growth
in the region. This phenomenon has been termed “extractivism” because it includes several productive sectors. Maristella Svampa speaks of the “commodities consensus” to refer to its scale and scope. She says that this development style is “sustained by the international prices of raw materials and the continually increasing demand for consumer goods in central and emerging economies” (Svampa 2013, 31). This development style “generates comparative advantages —visible in economic growth—at the same time that it produces new asymmetries and social, economico-environmental and politico-cultural conflicts” (Svampa 2013, 31). In turn, José de Echave, says that, at least in the case of mining, the expansion of the exploitation frontier precedes the boom in prices and will probably outlive it. This is explained by the technological changes in the industry, which cut production costs but do not always reduce the environmental externalities (De Echave 2009). The political institutions and administrative regulations underwent adaptation to favour of this expansion (Bebbington and Bury 2013).

In turn, the notion of “neoextractivism” (Gudynas 2009; Humphreys and Bebbington 2012), shows that the intensification of the pressure on the territories is not exclusive to the neoliberal economy and its spinoffs. Rather, it is a development style that has become generalized in the countries of the region and has received a boost from left-wing governments. This includes governments such as Bolivia’s, which promotes an ideology of respect for nature rooted in the indigenous tradition and might thus have adopted a different approach. In practice, the difference is that these governments have adopted policies for the public control of natural resources and have increased the State’s share of the benefits of their exploitation. These resources continue to be the main source of income for the country and thus, their exploitation keeps expanding. In Ecuador, it led to direct confrontation between the Rafael Correa Administration and the indigenous movement that had supported him in his accession to power. In Bolivia, it led to straightforward criticism of neoextractivism by the Vice-President of the country, the sociologist Alvaro García Liñera (García Liñera 2013, 97 and ff.). From the viewpoint of our analysis, this begs the question of politization forms, as they are not structured according to the classic options of Latin American politics.

5 “Thus, the central debate for the revolutionary transformation of society is not whether we are extractivists or not, but to what extent are we outgrowing capitalism —either in its extractive or non-extractive variant— as a mode of production” (García Liñera 2013, 103).
However, exploring socio-territorial conflicts in the light of the intensification of extractivism—relevant as it may be—does not fully account for the diversity of conflicts for various reasons. In the first place, not all the situations in which there is an extractive intensification lead to conflict. Neither do conflicts develop in the same way nor do they have the same consequences. In the case of conflicts related to disputes over natural resources, some of them represent upfront opposition to the introduction of mining or extractive activities. On the contrary, others relate to the negotiation of the conditions established by the extractive industries, and yet others to disputes over the income that these industries generate (particularly, when there is a fee or royalty favouring specific territories) (Monge et al. 2008, 127).6 We might say that the intensification of extractivism provides a backdrop for action, but that it is by looking into the social and political dynamics, as well as the technological, geographic, and economico-productive conditions, that we may come to understand the dynamics and consequences of conflicts.

Humphreys and Bebbington (2012, 33) draw attention to the diversity of motivations and objectives that underlie movements and conflicts. This does not solve the problem either, because movements may not initially have a clearly defined position. It is generally throughout the development of the mobilization itself, its specific dynamics, and the actors involved that different degrees of confrontation will be adopted in each conflict. For this reason, we prefer to speak of “conflict” rather than “movement”, since the result of the action depends on the conflict dynamics.

Another conflict dimension that has been gaining relevance in the territory has to do with public policy management (response to demands for provision and quality of services) and criticism of the institutional organization of the State (demands for autonomy and participation). Here the role of the State is crucial, since “the State is a central player in the power and conflict games but has a limited capacity to manage and sort them out” (Calderón 2012, 15). Despite the local nature of conflicts, the local problems that originated them, and their distance from the central authority, conflicts are managed by the State and, in this sense, many of them become politicized. Some of

6 There are also large differences depending on the type of technology used, degree of concatenation with other industries in the territory, size of the works, and productive sector involved. Even within one specific sector, there are differences: gold mining, for example, generates the greatest negative externalities of all mining exploitations.
them are conflicts demanding greater decision-taking autonomy through political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. Even in Chile, where the State’s institutional capacity is greater, the excessive privatization of services and insufficient decentralization weaken its capacity for action. This gives rise to demands for a modification of the rules of the distribution of power and decision-taking game. At times, conflicts originating in the provision of services converge with socio-environmental ones; at others, on the contrary, the dynamics co-exist without necessarily overlapping. Our hypothesis in this respect is that these conflicts become politicized because the existing institutional structures do not permit the local actors involved to discuss and negotiate terms on an equal footing with non-local actors, or simply, because there are no conflict management regulations.

Another way of classifying conflicts is by their conceptualization approach. There are conflicts that originate in disputes over the revenue produced by the activities carried out in the territory, especially when that revenue originates in the extractive industry. These conflicts involve a problem of distribution and do not necessarily question the type of exploitation or its modalities, but the unequal share of the spoils of the local groups. This line of analysis, in addition to the idea of “the curse of natural resources” accounts for many of the conflicts but does not explain all of them (Paredes and Delgado, forthcoming). A second approach emphasizes the concept of “environmental justice” (Boelens, Cremers, and Zwartveen 2011), in cases in which pressure from the extractive industry —especially mining and hydrocarbons— damages access to ecosystemic resources and services (air, water, crops) that are relevant for the territory and its inhabitants. This produces serious injustice in the distribution of costs and benefits. A third approach addresses conflicts as part of the defence of threatened alternative development styles and ways of life, or of the right to self-determination of use of the territory (Paredes and Delgado forthcoming). This type of conflict motivation and framing is usual in indigenous communities but is not exclusive to them.

In our opinion, these approaches are helpful, but none of them account for the whole of socio-territorial conflictivity, given its great diversity and the fact that there is no unique pattern. There is still not enough empirical evidence to characterize all these conflicts in a suitable way. Besides, it is perfectly possible that one same conflict may involve the co-existence of dimensions of disputes over revenue, over inequality in the distribution of environmental costs, as well as disputes over longer-projection “development projects” for the
territories. In addition, claims for autonomy and participation appear to cut across socio-territorial conflicts.

This diversity, which must be studied further, also indicates that these phenomena are different from NIMBYs, which are also local conflicts. The defense of the immediate environment of the groups affected and the preservation from contamination of local resources are relevant aspects for significant population groups. Claims for the right to participate in the taking of decisions are not the exclusivity of NIMBY conflicts, because there is an evident democratic element in them. The same goes for conflicts that transcend more ample disputes over the orientations of public policy or development style, which show a clear politization component (Pleyers 2011b, 33-34). We shall suggest an operational scheme to deal with this issue.

Summing up, socio-territorial conflicts have not normally been associated with political consequences or with ways to expand citizenship. However, things have changed in the new scenario of democratic governance, with the loss of power by the State and the neoliberal internationalization of Latin American economies. The frontiers of extractivism have expanded, socio-territorial conflicts have increased, and the nature of the relationship between social actors, politics, and the State has changed. Some of the local conflicts have installed issues in the public debate, which governments had normally ignored because they might encumber their commitment to extraction-based economic growth. Other conflicts have applied pressure to modify relevant public policies. Ultimately, the citizens themselves have constructed new forms of political articulation and expression from these conflicts, which until now, had just been local and specific. In a context of lack of coherent political response and scope, these movements are pressing to extend citizenship to groups hitherto excluded.

STUDY OF POLITICAL OUTCOMES

What have been the political outcomes of these conflicts that, apparently, had little chance of transcending into the public arena? We suggest that these conflicts have had significant impacts on the different dimensions of the political world and institutions. Thus, their outcomes appear to be a good starting point to approach the exploration of the relationship between social and political issues. We have characterized impacts as cumulative
and combined. That is, a specific conflict is not always intended to generate a relevant political change, although this may happen at times. In general, the impact of conflicts depends on how they add up and dovetail with one another and on how they act in a combined way. On the one hand, effects may depend on contextual political factors, which justifies the comparative approach between different contexts. On the other, “grassroots” consequences directly produced by the actors of the conflicts of the territories may combine with extra-territorial factors and generate multiple relationships between the different transformation spheres and levels.

OUTCOME SPHERES

The literature on the outcomes of collective action is not very extensive, despite some recent additions. Most of it originates in studies on social movements and refers to political consequences (external outcomes), consequences on the movements themselves (internal outcomes), and consequences related to the activists of the movements and their track records (biographical outcomes) (Amenta 2014; Giugni, Bosi and Uba 2013). Among the strictly political outcomes, the literature refers to those that have had a direct influence on certain public policies and others that point more specifically to the interests of the mobilized groups (Amenta 2014).

It is possible to apply these categories to socio-territorial conflicts, provided that we bear in mind that they are not quite as structured as the social movements. In fact, in general, they have a very low level of institutionalization. Also, these conflicts do not exclusively involve the civil society and the citizens: it is usual to find local authorities and other “institutional activists” in these territorial coalitions (Von Bülow et al., 2017). Thus, the differences between “external” or “internal” outcomes are somewhat blurred. Lastly, the study of political outcomes has so far focused on the regulatory and legal changes at national level. In the case of socio-territorial conflicts, the political consequences in the selfsame territory where they take place— not usual in other types of social movements— are of equal interest.

SOCIO- TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS: BETWEEN PROTEST AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Conceptually, a socio-territorial conflict, as the object of analysis, is a combination of protest event and social movement. Although it is theoretically
possible that socio-territorial conflicts may become social movements, apparently their territorial fragmentation and the local character of their struggles would suggest partially different constitution modes. Socio-territorial conflicts have different organization patterns, with different modalities of “coalitions of agents” (Diani 2015, 11). At least in Chile and Peru there is no evidence that local conflicts evolve into national forms of coordination or organization. In the case of Peru, Paredes (2015) points out that these conflicts may become “glocalized”, that is, they raise combined global/local interest but do not constitute conflicts at national level. Another recent analysis suggests that this is strongly influenced by the changing political context in Peru (Panfichi and Coronel 2011). In Chile, there has been no structuring of significant national organizations or coherent strategies for conflictive action. Paredes and Delgado (forthcoming) point out that the particular characteristic of a socio-territorial conflict is the defence of a territory, not as a jurisdictional enclave, but for the protection of a space that contains specific “ways of life”. The conceptualization of socio-territorial conflicts has been of use to describe contentious processes characterized by a heightened awareness of the place and claims related to regional or territorial diversity. In addition, it has been used to describe conflicts from a constructivist or “framing” approach, in which geographical discourses, narrations, and maps are reconstructed as strategico-political representations. In many cases they represent forms of grassroots citizenship because of their claims for the right to territorial self-determination (Dietz 2017).

In our study of this emerging phenomenon, we have conceptualized conflicts in their dual condition of “local” and “political”. In other words, we are interested in processes triggered by a local event, which may transcend the original motivation but do not abandon it, as they simultaneously link up with other dynamics and other actors. In our view, three copulative conditions must obtain to consider a conflict as local, whereas the political dimension may depend on alternative factors, as has been conceptualized in the case of Chile (Delamaza, Maillet and Martínez 2017). According to this formulation, a conflict is local when it arises from problems that affect the inhabitants of the territory directly; it includes contentious actions that take place in the territory itself or that are carried out by actors from the territory. In addition, their claims involve specific territories or issues that impinge directly on the territory. This can involve specific issues such as the environmental monitoring of a mine or perks such as the distribution of corporate profits.
Politization is produced by the involvement of other actors, who are not among those that originally promoted and generated the conflict, or when claims are not only addressed to those directly responsible for the original problem but also to the State (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Also, politicization is expressed in the framing of a conflict by its own actors, that is, when public policy orientations become the subject of debate, as has happened with decentralization, the environment, foreign investment regulations, rights over territory resources, etc. Obviously, some conflicts do not develop beyond the private sphere, but many others take an interesting turn into the political arena. Politicization is prompted by the duration and evolution of the conflicts and the diversity of actors involved in, or arising from them, whose scope exceeds that of those directly involved at the beginning. These new actors resort to their own repertoires of organized action to elicit public attention and political responses.

A conflict is much more than mere protest. Protest is a specific contentious component of conflict, which usually also involves negotiations, discussions, legal actions, political alliances, etc. It is an element of the repertoire: not all conflict is protest and protest on its own does not constitute conflict. This is important from an empirical point of view because the available information on protests is more itemized and has been used as the basis for the analysis of conflicts in Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia (Arce 2015; Quiroga 2014; Somma and Bargsted 2015). Information on conflicts, understood as a complex set of different actions, is frequently found in case studies, which are not always representative of all conflicts. Case studies tend to have a bias toward cases of greater public connotation or issues that are politically relevant for governments or international cooperation agencies.

Heterogeneous and asymmetrical groups of actors participate in territorial conflicts due either to their motivation or to their social conformation. The mobilization of actors and the conformation of coalitions is the result of arduous processes of negotiation, competition, and the search for hegemony.

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7 The term *framing* refers to the network of interpretative frameworks and political justifications that are essential as effective forms of communication with the agents inside and outside the mobilization process.

8 In the case of Chile, we can mention the conflict over polymetal waste in Arica, which resulted in changes in the national standard for lead (Arriagada 2012). In Perú, after the Tambogrande conflict, community referenda to decide the fate of large investment projects throughout Latin America (Arce 2015; De Echave et al., 2009) became far more common. In these and other cases, the conflict dynamics is very different from that of NIMBY conflicts.
(Melucci 1999). Indigenous and non-indigenous actors take part in a significant percentage of conflicts, in some cases in exclusive organizations and, in others in wider multi-ethnic coalitions (Rice 2012). However, as observed in Chile, coalitions in which there is indigenous participation acquire configurations that are different from those without, which points to new profiles in the civil society (Bidegain 2016).

The hypothesis of this chapter is that there have been important changes in the historical patterns of politicization prevailing in the region. They involve new political actors as well as new forms of political influence in new places (non-urban, peripheral) mostly some distance away from political parties or formal organizations, which operate through diverse and heterogeneous processes of organization and mobilization (networks of articulation that do not constitute social movements and may have different orientations). As is the case of indigenous people, new forms of citizenship have emerged.

HOW ARE POLITICAL OUTCOMES PRODUCED?
THE SPHERE OF OUTCOMES, ACCUMULATION, AND COMBINATION

Conflict analysis should go beyond such notions as “success versus failure” or “strengths and weaknesses”. This has inspired some relatively recent academic literature under the umbrella term of “political outcomes of social movements”, although there are fewer studies than those exploring the reasons for the emergence, dynamics, actors, framing, and action repertoires of social movements (Amenta 2014; Amenta et al. 2010; Bosi, Giugni and Uba 2016; Kolb 2005; Silva 2015). Some of the categories defined in these works are also applicable to socio-territorial conflicts.

In the first place, conflicts can have direct, indirect, or mixed outcomes and impacts (Giugni 2004). This implies the study of mediation agencies and operations as a crucial aspect of the process leading to the materialization of political outcomes. In addition, not all outcomes are positive or negative. In fact, they can be progressive, in extending politics into new sectors by incorporating them or in increasing the weight of the participation of the actors mobilized in the territory. However, there can also be a regressive effect if the impact runs contrary to the claims, as happens with repression. Conflicts can also have no effect if there are no noticeable changes.

The spheres of outcomes may vary since they may take place in the territory itself —new actors, changes in regulations or in the local institutional
framework, new political dynamics, etc.—or they may take place on a larger scale at country level—national or sectoral policies, changes in the law and regulations, etc. It is also relevant to consider the time scale of outcomes, which may be immediate, short-term, or long-term. Lastly, outcomes have been conceptualized according to how they are influenced by the actors’ strategies and competencies as well as according to political opportunities (political process theory). It seems reasonable to include both dimensions in a combined effects model, in which the outcomes of collective action combine with elements of the context.

Although rare, political change arising from territorial conflicts can reach the sphere of national politics. In these cases, there is a complex connection. In Bolivia, for instance, different territorial mobilizations—such as the “water war” in Cochabamba—combined with the “gas war” (Perreault 2006). Although both involved natural or subsoil resources, their dynamics were very different, as was their impact at national level. Both took place during the rise and electoral victory of Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Subsequently, during the Morales administrations, the links and political control of the MAS over the social movements influenced their dynamics, obstructing their emergence and consolidation. In Colombia it is also possible to see links between the government’s decision to expand the mining sector, the emergence of local protests, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court to preserve some rights of the local communities to decide over their territories (González 2017).

Outcomes have a greater impact on the sectoral sphere of public policies, on both distributive and procedural participation aspects, as happened with the ratification and implementation of ILO Convention 169 and the right of indigenous people to prior consultation in their territories. Chile has also undergone significant changes in energy policy in both aspects. The former focus on mega-projects has been replaced by projects that favour renewable energies and smaller-scale projects. In addition, there is now a stronger and more inclusive participation policy (Maillet 2017).

It is difficult to attribute political outcomes to one conflict in particular: they should be understood as the “cumulative effect” of many (Silva 2016). This can be seen in the dynamics existing in one same territory, for instance, when hydrographic basins become saturated or diverse conflicts overlap in the same geographic area. There is also a cumulative effect when a given motivation gets repeated in several conflicts, as happens with water resources.
In this case, the motive that cuts across conflicts becomes a political issue because of the accumulation of territorial conflictivity.

Another process that has been observed is the combination of mobilized resources and political opportunities (Tatagiba and Teixeira 2016). The literature provides several useful distinctions to understand cumulative and combined effects, among them, the phases of public policy, the role of networks with participation of institutional agents and/or political actors, and the intervention of the international variable in the decisions. A simple model of combined effects somewhat schematically suggests two hypotheses that influence the impact on public policies, the first one, related to the presence of powerful allies and the other, to the nature of the claims (Giugni 1998, cited by Tatagiba and Teixeira 2016). The larger the number and variety of powerful allies in public opinion or the political system, the greater the chance to exert influence. Also, the smaller the scope or extent of the proposed reforms, the greater the chance to exert influence. Without denying the relevance of these two hypotheses, the current empirical evidence allows expanding and diversifying the field of combined effects.

Conflicts may produce changes in the territories themselves. These changes may affect the structure of social and political agents and their capacity for action, or the local regulations. Last, but not least, other important changes are those due to the framing of a situation in the territories. By this we mean the evolution of the way a movement is understood and the ensuing modification of public opinion in the territories under conflict. This has happened in several conflicts over water (Yacob, Duarte and Boelens 2015), as well as in territories considered not suitable for intervention by productive dynamics, because of their religious, landscape, and eco-diversity value or other aspects considered relevant by the local communities. It has been observed in Chile in some of the cases studied, which have involved the coalition of environmentalists and indigenous groups (Delamaza, Maillet and Martínez 2017). In this regard, our hypothesis is that territorial consequences depend to a large extent on the institutional conditions of the country (degree of decentralization) and on the relative presence of political actors in the territory, that is, the greater the lack of political articulation and the more decentralized the country, the more favourable the environment for changes in the different territories.

Actors are not always able to anticipate outcomes because they do not emerge from ideological platforms or structured political projects, but from very diverse and reciprocally disconnected territories. For this reason, it is
crucial to observe the diversity of consequences and try to link them with the characteristics of the conflicts. Post-conflict dynamics can be quite different from what the actors initially expected, either within the territory or in other territories that become “contaminated” and “learn” from previous experiences. The feedback between the conflict dynamics generates different scenarios, which depend on the institutional response, the dynamics of coalitions, etc. This underscores the importance of studying the evolution of conflicts to identify possible patterns in them.

WHERE CAN WE OBSERVE CUMULATIVE AND COMBINED POLITICAL OUTCOMES?

From what we have said so far, it is possible to derive a research strategy suitable for conceptualization from two main entry points. One is the study of local conflicts, to observe their outcomes in different spheres and at different levels. The other is to start from observable outcomes in representative politics, the organized civil society, sectoral public policy, and entrepreneurship strategies and explore their possible relationship with socio-territorial conflicts in the light of cumulative and combined effects. Table 13.1 establishes the different analysis levels and spheres of the study.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS ENVISAGED

The methodological design of the strategy described above encounters three difficulties inherent to this type of research: attributability of outcomes; comparability between national and subnational cases; and the multidimensional nature of the object of research, which also results in great internal variability. Only by safeguarding methodological rigour will it be possible to draw conclusions about an increase in participatory citizenship from the local social dynamics of these types of conflicts and their outcomes.

In connection with attributability of political changes, how far is it possible to assert that a given reform, or a political change, has been the result of one or more conflicts? It is difficult to determine causality and for this reason the research strategy should focus on finding out significant connections, and

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9 We have not included the international level because it is not the main object of analysis. This level should be considered in case studies in which the dynamics operate at “glocal” level (Paredes 2015).
attempt to isolate recurring elements in different situations. Complexity increases at the national level, given the difference in scale between socio-territorial conflicts and the policies and institutions concerned. Therefore, rather than attributing single causality to a conflict, our option is to determine the specific role that one or more conflicts may have on certain political decisions (their “cumulative effect”), as well as their connection with elements of political opportunity (their “combined effect”). The methodological design must also consider resorting to mixed methods that reinforce the explanations, that is, it should use aggregate quantitative data to establish correlations and compare national cases, as well as case studies, including perception surveys, to identify the main cumulative and combined effects.

A comparative design should include two levels. At the level of country, it should consider the history and economic importance of the extractive industry in the respective country, its recent evolution, and the variation in number of socio-territorial conflicts. However, cases may also differ significantly in the strength of their political institutions and the structure of their party-political system (Cameron and Luna 2010). At subnational level, it is necessary to select territories whose main characteristics are similar, to allow for “systematic

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Table 13.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes: spheres and levels of analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcomes:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Spheres/levels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Representation Sphere</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples: Election of new representatives arising from conflicts; New movements; Comparison of local election results between territories “with” and “without” conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organized Civil Society Sphere</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples: Defence/coordination Fronts; Civil society and indigenous presence; Other coalitions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Politico-Sectoral Sphere</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples: Sub-national environmental programmes and institutions; Participatory institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcomes:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spheres/levels</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Within the territory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples: National parties and movements emerging from territorial conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outside the territory</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples: National civil society organizations and platforms; Advocacy NGO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples: Creation of new ministries and services; Participatory institutionality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples: Corporate policy and regulation of dialogue with communities.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by author.

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Maillet (2017) analyses the change in the energy production policy in Chile from this angle.
and contextualized comparisons” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 10). In other words, the design must consider the interaction of the subnational territories with the politico-institutional variables in the countries, as this may account for the differences in the respective spheres of analysis. It is advisable to opt for a multilevel research design (Luna 2014, 14-15) and apply the “subnational comparative method” (Snyder 2001), that is, the qualitative comparison of cases in subnational territories in different countries.

Mixed methods allow for comparison in different spheres and levels: trends and configuration of conflicts (in an aggregate way, but also in specific territories including, for example, perception surveys) and changes in participatory representation policy; creation of institutions; elaboration of local platforms; coalitions of actors; corporate political strategy, etc. Territorial case studies should permit integrating qualitative information with perception surveys and the data on the evolution of electoral results in the territory. The suitable selection of territories will also permit the comparison between subnational territories and between countries.

The multidimensional nature and internal variability of socio-territorial conflicts make it advisable to analyse them by economic sector, or to select the sector with the highest concentration of cases. In addition, the selection of four spheres of outcomes, each of which is analysed at the national and local level, makes it possible to deal with the main dimensions of the conflict in a suitable way, without assuming that they behave in a homogeneous way.

CONCLUSIONS

The expansion of the neoliberal economy and free markets has produced social and political changes in a large part of the world in recent decades. In the case of several Latin American countries this has resulted in important degrees of disarticulation of the social actors combined with very serious political crises, especially in the early years of the 21st century. These processes have been accompanied by the emergence of new social actors and the redefinition of their relations with political institutions. The limited access of many sectors to political participation typical of the developmentalist economic model prevailing in the 20th century is being challenged by the neoliberal transformation.
In this study we have undertaken the conceptual exploration of a particular type of social conflictivity, which has become more frequent in different contexts, namely, socio-territorial conflicts. These conflicts have a local origin but may have national consequences in countries in which the “extractivist” or “neoextractivist” economic model prevails. Do these new social conflicts contribute to a growth in participatory citizenship in the sectors in which they take place? Do they modify the structure of opportunities of the subordinated sectors in dependent societies? Do they generate forms of political participation that differ from those of the past? How do they compare to the social movements and outcomes already dealt with in the literature?

The main conclusion of this chapter is that socio-territorial conflicts are not the same as NIMBY conflicts, which are circumscribed local conflicts that have no impact on the public sphere. Contrary to the belief that such impacts favour only certain corporate interests, socio-territorial conflicts affect the public sphere to varying degrees, including the increase of participatory citizenship. Over and above the examples from the Andean Region that we have mentioned, the conceptualization that we suggest shows the different sectors in which these conflicts have produced political outcomes, which range in size from single territories to larger areas. There is evidence that there are several areas in which the conflict dynamics opens up spaces to new actors, new territories, and new forms of social and political action.

In addition, the examination of possible outcomes draws attention to their diversity and suggests ways in which they can be compared to establish common patterns. In countries of the Andean Region the extractivist foundations of the economy and the crises that this entails provide the contextual backdrop to which these conflicts respond. In this sense the local dynamics are linked to the dynamics of globalization (evolution of the demand for commodities, changes in prices, global institutional deals influencing terms for the Andean countries, etc.). This is particularly valid to explain the origin of conflicts. However, their dynamics and, above all, their outcomes, also depend on the political and institutional variables that are specific to each country, as well as on the accumulation of conflicts and their combination with environmental factors.

Finally, we have suggested some recommendations for the comparative analysis of the immense diversity of conflicts. This conceptual and methodological reflection is crucial to assess conflicts in relation to the political changes being produced. In other words, it is a suggestion for the
specific treatment of this new type of conflict, which a) considers them as longer-term phenomena than protest episodes; b) incorporates the mediation strategies that any political change process entails; c) permits distinguishing between the different types of outcomes, including those that expand participatory citizenship and processes that restrict it or consolidate the status of exclusion; and d) accounts for the feedback existing between a contentious social dynamics and the evolution of institutional framework, in an attempt to respond to it.

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GONZALO DELAMAZA
CEDER – Universidad de Los Lagos
Cátedra Raúl Prebisch, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Avenida República 517, Santiago, Chile
gonzalo.delamaza@ulagos.cl
orcid.org/0000-002-5418-3135

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In 2016, the Institute of Social Sciences (University of Lisbon) decided to prepare a three volume publication in English based on its 2015/2020 Strategic Programme: *Changing Societies: Legacies and Challenges*. Each volume focuses on one of the programme’s main research areas: *Inclusion*, *Citizenship* and *Sustainability*. The publication foregrounds the Institute’s work and, through the 48 texts included, disseminates its researchers’ innovative contributions to the social sciences.

This publication is a clear sign of the ICS community’s remarkable collaborative vitality. This high quality research, now accessible to a vast international readership, highlights the virtues of interdisciplinarity in science practice, one of the pillars of ICS-ULisboa.

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